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

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'THINGS OF INDIA'

MADE PLAIN;

OR,

A JOURNALIST'S RETROSPECT.

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By W. MARTIN WOOD

(*Formerly Editor of the* TIMES OF INDIA *and of the* BOMBAY REVIEW).

TO CONSIST OF FOUR PARTS.

PART II.—SECTION 3.

"THE MOTHER OF FORESIGHT LOOKS BACKWARD."—EGYPTIAN PROVERB.

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LONDON: ELLIOT STOCK, 62, PATERNOSTER ROW.
CALCUTTA: THOMAS S. SMITH.
BOMBAY: THACKER & CO., LIMITED.
MADRAS: HIGGINBOTHAM & CO.

1885.

PART II.

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PREFATORY NOTE.

SEVERAL copies of this Section 3, forming the larger portion of Part II. of *Things of India Made Plain*, are issued in advance, mainly to suit the convenience of Bombay residents, past as well as present; and because the Section, dealing chiefly with affairs of that city and presidency, may be presumed to have certain special local interest. During the period of Banking, Municipal, and Commercial history covered by these selections, Bombay underwent a series of struggles, misfortunes, and experiments not only memorable to all locally concerned in them, but replete with warning and instruction for administrators and others interested in observing the results of European methods applied to the large urban communities of our Indian Empire. Thanks to the constant extension of the sea-borne trade of the port—it having reached the value of £80,000,000 in 1883, being an increase of £20,000,000 over that in 1862—the crash of 1865-6 and the accumulated monetary difficulties which cumbered the city during several succeeding years are gradually being forgotten; but it can scarcely be said that the lessons then offered by stern experience have all been duly learned. Hence these extracts, written whilst those lessons were fresh, may yet prove serviceable for local use, and also enable observers from this side to understand various anomalies and deficiencies that still exist in "the second city of the British Empire." This remark applies more especially to municipal affairs, to local business questions such as cotton-mill management, and to the lack of variety in industrial enterprise. In regard to railway and harbour appliances for the port of Bombay, very substantial progress has been made since these extracts were penned; but it will be seen from them how formidable and perplexing were the obstacles that had to be overcome. And it may be doubted whether, in the financial arrangements for the docks and other works serving the foreign commerce of the port, the local interests of Bombay citizens have always been fairly considered. Speaking of docks, it may be noted that, after years of pegging away at the subject—from the almost despairing appeal (page 217) to the opening of the Prince's Dock (page 236)—nearly seven years had to elapse; and it was stated in one of the Bombay papers quite recently that sailing vessels have still to load and discharge by cargo-boats in the open harbour.

Quite apart from civic and local topics, there may be found in these extracts many subjects touched upon that concern general questions of Indian administration—the relations of the Local to the Supreme Government on one side, and to the "Secretary of State in Council" on the other—questions that demand the careful attention of British statesmen and of all who are responsible for the future of India. To take one illustration relating to ordinary administration, that of the attack of Mussulman rioters on the Parsees in Bombay in the early part of 1874. Nothing could be plainer than the lessons of prevision, timely firmness, and impartiality taught by that occurrence; yet, in the course of 1883, in connection with what were known as the Salem Riots in the Madras Presidency, those plain duties were flagrantly neglected by the local authorities concerned, with fatal and distressing results, followed by well-grounded political agitation of very serious complexion. Yet the Madras Government of the period succumbed to the social and Service influence of the local officials responsible for permitting the outbreak and for the sub-

sequent gross miscarriage of justice. Indian law and regulations for the conduct of administration are, to speak in general terms, of remarkable completeness and excellence; but unless supported by well-informed British public opinion, and vigilantly watched by Parliament, mishaps will arise and disaster may occur. It is hoped that the study of current observations and criticisms, such as are comprised in many of these extracts, may promote that direct and continuous interest in Indian affairs by which alone our duty to the people of the country can be faithfully fulfilled.

Bombay, as a city on the sea and a centre of far-reaching inland influence, abounds with attractions for men of all pursuits; and if these reprints should serve to induce political observers of light and leisure to follow up and test the suggestions and problems which may be traced in these retrospective pages, the somewhat unusual nature of the publication may be forgiven. To not a few Anglo-Indians, whose working years have been spent in the Western Presidency, this Section may even prove welcome.

W. M. W.

EXTRACTS FROM NOTICES.

THE following selections are made from various notices of Part I. that have appeared:—

". . . We have special pleasure in welcoming the reissue of many admirable comments on various Indian topics in the work of which the first part is now before us."—*Allen's Indian Mail.*

"No reader is expected to agree with all the writer's conclusions, but it is of considerable importance on Indian affairs to have the opinion of one who was on the spot, whether we share it or not."—*Globe.*

"The present part . . . extends from 1865 to 1873, and contains many articles marked by some power of vigorous description and not a little humour. Mr. Wood has strong convictions, and he expresses them strongly; but in the majority of the articles here republished there is not much that the most susceptible and earnest of politicians will not forgive."—*Home News.*

"Intelligence, impartiality, courage, high public spirit, and an earnest desire to benefit India and its children, are stamped upon every extract."—*British Mail.*

"This book, taking for its motto the Egyptian proverb that "the Mother of Foresight looks backwards," is a selection from articles written and published by Mr. Martin Wood, from 1865 to 1880. They were written on the events of the times, considered on their merits and without adhesion to any particular theory or to any political party. . . . Dealing with the commonplace realities of Indian life and of the Indian Civil Service, things about which few in England trouble themselves, they provide for those few a great deal of valuable instruction. Arranged in the order of date, they have somewhat of the effect of a chronicle without pretending to be a history."—*Vanity Fair.*

"The selection will consist of four parts, treating separately the many political and social subjects that come up for discussion in the Indian Press. It rescues from oblivion many admirable biographical and other sketches, and puts much useful and interesting matter in a handy and permanent shape. . . . The sketches traverse a period of nearly fifteen years, contemporaneous with the Viceroyalties of Lords Mayo, Northbrook, and Lytton, with Sir Bartle Frere, Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, and Sir Philip Wodehouse as Governors of Bombay. They give a lively picture of the times, and call to mind many little incidents that are now almost forgotten, but which made considerable stir at the time when they occurred. Altogether the book is a very useful compilation both for general reading and for purposes of reference. It is very well calculated to familiarise the British public with Indian politics."—*Indu-Prakash* (Bombay).

"The student of contemporary history would do well to read and study these extracts written during a period of fifteen years by one who was no mean observer of men and things. . . . The history of this period, which commenced when the fires of the Mutiny were scarcely cooled, is sure to present much food for thought and speculation; and placed before its readers in this form, conveys in the tersest form much of profit and interest."—*African Times.*

"The reviewer brings in notes on the career and characteristics of four Viceroys, and includes certain striking passages connected with the sad fate of the Earl of Mayo. This personal section is also of special interest, in that it exhibits the great variety of public service that has to be undertaken by our countrymen and some of their native coadjutors in the difficult but elevating task of administering the British Empire of India. . . . The second section provides somewhat stiffer reading, as it deals with the extensive, and at first sight complicated, subject of Indian Public Works, the controversies on Railway Extension, on Irrigation, and on Harbours. . . ."—*Civilian.*

PART II.

3.—BOMBAY—POLITICAL, COMMERCIAL, MUNICIPAL, SOCIAL.

SITE OF A NEW CAPITAL FOR INDIA.

INDIA desires a site for a new capital, and Mr. George Campbell sets his foot down at Nassick,* saying, in effect, "This, and this only, is the place for it." Whatever may be thought as to the conclusion thus suddenly offered for our acceptance, all will admit that Mr. Campbell has done invaluable service in stating with almost scientific fidelity most of the facts which must be considered in arriving at the ultimate decision. His pamphlet, taken together with the quantity of material which must be under his hands, is well worthy of being expanded into a thin octavo for the benefit of untravelled Europeans who can well appreciate useful information set forth clearly and distinctly. Such a book, coming from one who has seen almost every part of India and has resided here so long, would, for English readers, be worth whole piles of blue-books, or shelves' full of frothy and gossiping tales of travellers. With regard to the special purpose of Mr. Campbell's book, one's suspicions of his possible partiality are dissipated on finding that he, a Bengal Civilian, sums up the claims of Calcutta to little more than those of a place like Belgaum, which, save for its elevated and salubrious situation, is utterly out of the question. The conviction forced upon the public at home by the perusal of Mr. Campbell's pamphlet—bearing in mind his official partialities and qualifications—will be, that Calcutta as a capital is irrevocably condemned. We may be reminded that Bombay stands but some three per cent. higher in the scale than does the city whose glory is departing. True; but if the eastern capital has entered on a descending groove in political and civic status, and if the western city is steadily moving up a rising incline, the case then stands very differently. The eastern city not only has possession, but, strong in prestige and association can, just for the present, afford to smile at the untried claims of her rivals, seeing that, out of the whole eight, there is only Bombay that has at hand any of the material appliances requisite for a capital.

Not that we are desirous, just now, of putting in an appearance in behalf of Bombay as *the* place for the future capital of Hindostan. There will be time enough for that discussion when Nassick, with all its bright and juvenile charms, shall have been subjected

* Or, according to the Hunterian spelling, "Nasik," about 100 miles north-east from Bombay, is situate just beyond the crest of the Ghauts, about 1,800 feet above sea-level, and near the sources of the Godaveri. Near Nasik is Deolali, the military depôt, through which nearly all British troops pass as they enter and leave India.

to the jealous scrutiny of her rivals. . . . It cannot be wondered, however, that Bombay, as the elder sister, should feel a little piqued at the "odorous" comparisons which Mr. Campbell draws to her disadvantage. Thus at Nassick are vineyards, and, what is more, grapes, which Mr. Campbell has been told "are excellent." Now if grapes be the proper food for legislators and Viceroys, as of yore was ambrosia for the gods, that statement may be to the point in choosing Nassick as the metropolis of India. Yet the good citizens of Bombay have often seen most "excellent" grapes on the breakfast table in the hospitable mansion at Parell, and such products are to be met with even in bungalows on Malabar Hill. Of course Mr. Campbell's point is, that "excellent" grapes prove the healthiness of the climate. Well; as to those classes in society of whom are the higher officials, there would be no difficulty in their obtaining residences near Bombay in situations where grapes would grow and legislators might thrive. It is a special advantage of Bombay, since the completion of the Great Indian Peninsular Railway's two lines over the Ghauts, that from hence a few hours' ride suffices to remove our citizens into a complete change of climate. On this account Mr. Campbell's pamphlet will be welcome here, as it describes in tempting terms a new sanatarium to which our citizens can readily resort. We know what Poona can do for us, and now we are shown that we have Nassick in addition, with even superior advantages. . . . Few persons who know India well can doubt that if the standard of Indian healthiness is to be set down at thirty, then Bombay can fairly claim twenty-five as her due. Both in connection with climate and "amenities," Mr. Campbell seems to have forgotten that perpetual invigorator—the sea-breeze of Bombay. It is hard to be told that we have no "amenities" at Bombay, no "green and pleasant places," no "good gardens;" but let us plead for at least a few marks on behalf of our sea-breeze—a blessing which Calcutta would give half her palaces to obtain. . .

As to "safety from attack," Mr. Campbell puts down a cipher for Bombay; a position which might make one uncomfortable, supposing there were any probability of our city being attacked by a strong nautical power—an event, by the way, which is to be deemed in the last degree unlikely. When the question of our coast defence requires to be seriously discussed, there are, besides our correspondent "C.E.," at least a dozen men who will undertake to make Bombay proof against the bombs and shells of all our enemies. Even non-professionals can see that if the harbour lights were put out—or, what would be better, removed so as to mislead—and all our pilots packed off to Poona, there would be small chance of an enemy's fleet taking up a position in our harbour. When Mr. Campbell puts down the full ten marks for Calcutta as being absolutely safe from attack, he is, of course, thinking only of the approach by the Hooghly. No doubt he is correct enough so far; no nautical enemy would imitate the "how-not-to-do-it" policy in which it appears the jog-trot merchants of Calcutta delight. The Hooghly, with its shoals, shallows, and bores, would be studiously avoided by any Admiral having respect to the nautical safety of his fleet; but what of the Mutlah? That deep estuary would afford ready approach and safe anchorage to any fleet that might be laden with all siege appliances, and with wheel carriages suitable for transport from Port Canning along the embankments of the South-eastern, ready for use in case the rails had been torn up. Once a modern siege train were within four miles of Calcutta—that low-lying city of the plain,—what could become of her stately palaces then? We merely refer to these contingencies as points of fair comparison between the present and the probable future metropolis of British India. There is little chance of either being exposed to attack, except as an incidental result of some series of incredible blunders in political policy at home. . . .

Whilst, as we intimated at starting, thanks are due to Mr. Campbell for collecting the valuable facts he has brought together in his pamphlet, it is scarcely likely that the practical solution of the Indian metropolis question will be attained through any process of synthetical reasoning. Great capitals grow, and cannot be made according to any theory however perfect. The various proportions in which so many different considerations combine to settle the locality of a city which must be at once a seat of government, an emporium of trade, and a social centre, cannot be indicated by any tabulated diagram. It would also be difficult to imagine any Anglo-Indian capital which should not be, at least, near the main sea. It is still less likely to conceive of the enormous material appliances required for any city where shall "sit Legislation's sovereign powers," being provided "to order," utterly regardless of expense, as would have to be done at Nassick. —*March* 20, 1865.

THE SPECULATIVE MANIA OF 1864-5, AND ITS RESULTS:

DELUSIONS, CRISIS, DISASTER.

IT is not a bad description of the duties of a banker to describe them as "delicate" and sometimes "disagreeable;" but our charge against the bankers—and in this case against the Bank of Bombay—is, that for fear of what was "disagreeable" in the way of their duty, they have shirked the "delicate" part of it. It was but a very rough-and-ready process for the Bank Directors to post up a high rate of interest, and then, without the slightest attempt at discriminating between the purposes to which their money was to be applied, to say to speculators and merchants alike, "Those are our terms; help yourselves." The former class have done so to their hearts' content; and so the bankers, not having troubled themselves with the "delicate" part of their duty, now find thrust on them, in a mass, all the *desagremens* of their profession.

It is only by courtesy that the Bank of Bombay can claim any exemption from the blame which attaches to the older exchange banks, for having beforetime fed speculation, and now starving legitimate trade. The Bank, it is true, did not directly advance upon shares until the passing of a certain memorable resolution. But what it did not do itself, it did by others. We imagine it could be no secret to the Directors that many of the financial associations and new banks who became debtors to the Bank at high rates of interest, were engaged in scarcely anything else but share transactions. Partly on this account we agree with the *Gazette*, that men prominent for speculative transactions ought not to have had a seat on the Board of Directors. This was, indeed is, a matter for the shareholders of the Bank to consider: but they might well ask, Where shall we find eight financial purists? where are the incorruptibles who, in these days of luxurious premiums, have contented themselves with the "cold mutton" of common-place trade?

One writer, on behalf of the Banks, helplessly asks, "What are they to do?" We answer, They are to fulfil their implied contract with the commercial public, and cease from needlessly aggravating the pressure they have had so large a share in bringing about. No one believes anything so foolish as that bankers "can create money when there is none in the place;" but every one knows that there are large funds in Bombay which, if not *arbitrarily withheld* from the channels of legitimate trade, would speedily relieve the pressing wants of the community. At such a crisis as this it frequently is the case that "public confidence" and consequent "prosperity" do depend upon the combined "efforts of the will" of the community. We have endeavoured to point out various considerations which should have a tonic effect on "the will" of the commercial public. Our contemporary has thought best to take the opposite course—that of deepening the depression and backing up a certain class of bankers, whose conduct, if we mistake not, will meet with lasting condemnation in Bombay. In demanding "a little wholesome rigour," the *Gazette* only incites bewildered creditors to bring about an indiscriminate smash, which would most certainly postpone indefinitely the revival of credit. . . . . .—*April* 22, 1865.

II.—We have no wish to underrate the gravity of the crisis that has seemed to be impending over Bombay during the last two or three weeks. So threatening and gloomy has been the prospect that those who could best estimate the danger have feared to speak too freely of it, lest they should accelerate the peril that could not be averted. A striking illustration of the sweeping losses that the recent fall in the Liverpool cotton market has inflicted on the merchants of Bombay is afforded by a popular calculation respecting one of the more prominent cotton shippers. It is said that, so large have been the shipments by this one merchant, that the decline of each penny per pound in cotton has represented to him a loss of more than 30 lakhs (£300,000). This estimate we give for what it is worth; but, as the returns show the total number of bales exported in the first three months of this year to have been 433,098—by far the larger part of which will not have reached its destination—it is easy to see that the aggregate loss to Bombay exporters must be very serious. There are, indeed, the splendid profits of former years to set against this loss; and the feeling has been—"If we could only know the worst, some arrangement might be made that would bring Bombay out of the trial unscathed." . . . . . .

But we have no intention here to go into the estimate of cotton prices for the future; our object was simply to join in the congratulations which every one in Bombay must be desirous of exchanging with his neighbours on seeing that the city has escaped a terrible financial calamity. We say, "has escaped," for, though there will be no doubt many grievous individual losses, there is not now any reasonable probability of that widespread ruin and confusion which the dread words "Fair Dollerah tenpence" would have spread throughout our island. The feeling has seemed to be—"We are rich, and can stand this much, but another straw will break the camel's back." Much of the present depression in Indian cotton is owing to the disproportionate favour in which even old American cotton is held—a fact which ought to influence our cotton growers if it could only reach their ears—but, as we have already remarked, the present excessive supply of American cotton cannot be kept up. We would not, however, countenance the notion that there is any likelihood of Indian cotton recovering its recently high price. Breathing time is again allowed to Bombay,—let us trust that it will be put to good account, so that such follies as time-bargains in shares, or attempts to buy up all the produce of a province, will never be heard of again.—*April* 27, 1866.

III.—There is need just now for the greatest calmness and discretion on the part of the bankers and financiers of Bombay. By this we do not mean cautious and jealous timidity—of which there is already too much in some quarters—but it is a wise and prudent courage that is required. There is much temporary uneasiness in Bombay; but, we believe, if the facts of our financial position be looked at in a reasonable spirit, there is no real cause for panic or alarm. Shares are depreciated, some perhaps unsaleable; but—although that is so much the worse for those who thought only of premiums and who bought only to sell—the real wealth of Bombay is not materially diminished. Of the several millions sterling which during the last three years have poured into Bombay, very little comparatively has yet been sunk as fixed capital. The price of cotton in England has been maintained, in face of the great event which was to bring it to its lowest point. The price at which it now stands here is more than twice the sum that would leave a profit for the cultivator. Even if cotton were not to be sown by the ryots, there are several other products which would be drawn through Bombay towards the markets of Europe. . . . . .—*May* 2, 1865.

IV.—Let us express a hope that this Monday morning, the beginning of the English business week, opens with a prospect of some methods being found to avert the calamities which, during last week, have loured over Bombay. Not yet have the definite disasters befallen us that have been dreaded, and busy brains have been at work to devise what it is in the power of financial skill to effect. It is future and uncertain evils rather than present necessities which press upon us; and a little prompt decision, combined with *immediate practical* help, will yet carry safely through the monetary credit of Bombay. . . . All, however, that has been gained by the exercise of patience and determination is, that a respite is now given in which for work to be done. . . . It is useless to lament over irreparable losses, but it is wise to gather up the fragments. Towards this object, we believe, it has been suggested that there might be formed an association to promote a general liquidation of all the newest aud weakest schemes, which may enable their promoters to get out of the shallows whereon, in company with even prouder craft, they find themselves stranded. . . . As intimated, such an association should only be regarded as a special expedient; it should promise no profit except simple interest, and it should be dissolved as soon as its work was done. Were such a voluntary court of equity to be established, the gain to the community would be very great. It would, at a very much smaller aggregate expense, conduct those liquidating transactions which, if done piece-meal, and in each separate case attended with heavy legal charges, would consume the lion's share of the assets. . . . . .—*May* 8, 1865.

V.—However severe may be the pressure of financial difficulty to-day, no one need speak of it with surprise, and there is scarcely scope for any one to add to the panic feeling by predicting worse evils to come. A man whose liabilities quadruple his assets knows that he is ruined, and the formality of handing his "char anna" (6d.) into the

keeping of trustees is an operation which should relieve his mind rather than depress him. An honest man, though ever so imprudent, can still hold up his head so long as he maintains the firm resolve to give up his present possessions and, if need be, his future earnings to satisfy obligations for which he has voluntarily made himself responsible. Nothing short of this will satisfy a man of integrity; and, besides signal instances that might be named, we feel sure that such a course will be the rule in Bombay. For most business men of our city there may reasonably be anticipated many years of future life, in which they may retrieve their own losses and indemnify those who have lost through their miscalculations or imprudence. The trade of Bombay and the prosperity of Western India are established on such a sound basis that, as far as the fortunes of the community are concerned, any revival is possible. There are, therefore, not only the considerations of duty which always impel men to act honourably, but added thereto are the reasonable inducements of future hope. There will no doubt be some exceptions to that course of strict rectitude which, however temptations abound, must be upheld as the standard of honour in a community on which the eyes of the world are set. In speaking of temptations, the "repudiation of time-bargains" is a phrase that will at once suggest itself, though, we trust, one still to be received with unequivocal condemnation. . . . .

This brings us again to the point that it is credit rather than cash that Bombay needs just now. Had our contemporary, instead of following the Indian weakness of praying to Government, addressed itself to the exchange banks, it would have taken, if not a more hopeful, at least a more direct course to a remedy. The managers of those banks have it in their power to change the face of things in Bombay in a few days. We say "have it in their power" merely for sake of stating the question; the managers here are evidently reduced to the position of automatons, moving or rather bound by wires from their London boards. It is evident that no confidence is placed in their discretion, and they are content to occupy the position of routine clerks. With ample funds at their command, they still refuse to afford that assistance to legitimate commerce which, if granted, would at once relieve the pressure and give opportunity for credit to revive. Of course these banks are private institutions, and can do as they like; but their London directors need not wonder if their "dog in the manger policy" be remembered by the merchants of Bombay for many years to come.

Our contemporary refers to a plan, advocated in our columns some weeks ago, whereby land, and shares in land companies, could be represented by a special stock, which might be duplicated, so that the title-deeds and original shares being deposited with a company of trustees, their owners might ultimately acquire an enhanced value in them when credit is restored. If some of our citizens who stand uninjured by the storm around them would gather together and make a resolute attempt to secure the valuable salvage that is floating around them, they would entitle themselves to the lasting thanks of the community. It is not too late; indeed, some such movement is more needed than ever in order to stave off the utter prostration of commercial affairs. It is no time to stand upon ceremony, nor is it wise to allow little personal jealousies to stand in the way of such an effort.—*June* 16, 1865.

VI.—It may often seem futile to remonstrate with a crowd, but many an officer has saved his troop by checking them in their flight when impelled by an exaggerated sense of danger. With any one who calmly reviews the present circumstances and recent history of Bombay, there can be no question that the panic around us is excessively exaggerated. There is excuse enough for this with those who find themselves insolvent, or see all their largest debtors becoming so. But there must be hundreds of men in Bombay who, having no personal occasion to allow their judgment to be unsettled, ought to be able to make head against the unreasoning terror around them. If some of this class take a quiet hour and look into the history of panics which have swept over other commercial cities, they will find that it is no strange or unheard-of thing that has happened in Bombay. The crisis, most similar in its causes to this under which Bombay now groans, is that which in England followed on the 'railway mania' of 1847. Though materials for comparison are not now before us, we imagine that Bombay has improved upon that example in the excessive rate which premiums have reached. But in one very substantial respect Bombay has the advantage over England in 1847. There has not been nearly so

large a proportion of her wealth actually sunk as fixed capital in her reclamation schemes as in England was swallowed by the first outlay for railway works. The net losses in Bombay have been from one person or company to another; many have lost very grievously, and very few indeed have won. The chief reason for this is, that the mere superficial loss in excessive premiums has, by the panic and *destruction of credit*, been converted into a real loss and permanent ruin for those individuals who, in the midst of the storm, are forced to liquidate their estates. In many cases there is no warding off what has been the result of individual miscalculation and imprudence. . . . . .

In expressing what we believe is a very general feeling of satisfaction at seeing the Government offer its support to the Bank, we did not do so through any philanthropic interest in the shareholders, much less from any sympathy with the directors. We expressed gratification because the public safety was bound up in the matter; but even on that account it was not to be desired that "the Bank should be permitted to appropriate a large sum of public money for the payment of its debt." . . . Whatever assistance is given to the Bank by the Government the Bank will have to account for and pay for. The Government only increases its ordinary deposits, and anticipates in some degree its issues of currency; but it does this through the Bank at a time when, owing to special causes, there is a lack of the confidence usually felt in that institution. The Government makes a tangible demonstration of its own confidence in the solvency of the Bank, and that, too, at a time when some other banks, which might fairly have been expected to assist in upholding public credit, have taken a course calculated to destroy all confidence. The Government deserve commendation for having acted on the principle that "banks exist for the community, and not the community for banks." It was to save the community from the ruinous consequences which would follow the total destruction of credit that the Government interposed. We think some disappointment must have been felt when it was observed that the measure was met in some quarters in such a captious spirit that, if general, would have deprived it of half its value. The Bank will, of course, have to pay in interest and consequent diminution of dividends for any advances it may receive; and nothing can be done to replace capital which the indiscretion of the directors may have sacrificed. With all that, however, the public have but a secondary interest; it is sufficient for them now that they know the Bank of the Sircar (Government) will meet all demands brought against it. . . . .—*June* 21, 1865.

A DARK DAY IN JULY.*

BOMBAY will to-day be too busy to trouble itself with thinking. Possibly, after sundown, some of our citizens will feel convinced that they ought to have taken more time to think a few months ago; and, it is very certain, many will find during the next week more occasion for reflection than ever they did before. This remark applies more forcibly, for the moment, to the private history of individuals; but it is not our business to deal with considerations of that class. All we can do is to point to the more obvious reflections which, suggested by the probable transactions of to-day, affect the general interests of the community as a whole. . . . Amidst the extraordinary pressure of to-day's business no one can realize the lasting importance of the issues which, though prepared for by long previous effort, are to be settled and recorded on this 1st of July, but it is certain that the day must become memorable in the history of Bombay.

Few people have not had occasion to feel how unwelcome are the wounds inflicted by your candid friends. This is especially the case in the numerous instances when advisers of that order are in undue haste to claim acknowledgment of their title to that gift of foresight which they assume their groaning victim has despised. Our familiar

* During this month in Bombay, the monsoon being at its height, the sky is usually overcast with thick clouds. As it chanced in 1865, July opened under a firmament unusually clear; but the thick cloud of financial disaster culminated on that day. It was the date fixed for settlement of the "time-bargains" in "Back Bay," and other shares sold at enormous premiums for delivery on July 1st. By the irony of legislative procrastination, it was decreed, under the "Wagering Act" (No. III. of 1865), that *after* that fatal day time-bargains should be illegal and irrecoverable: hence no other such cataclysm of mutual indebtedness and local ruin has since occurred in Western India.

acquaintance, the *Overland Mail*, in a recent number, addresses benighted Bombay in that patronising manner which reminds one of the "always-told-you-so" style of consolation. Thus our kind mentor takes up his impertinent parable: "We always predicted that those who were urging on the capitalists of India to over-production and excessive speculation would be proved, after a while, to have urged them on to their ruin." As is generally the fate of those who prophesy after the event, our seer must bear to be told that there is no remembrance with us of his wise sayings. Moreover, it is not at all likely that a writer unemancipated from the ancient fallacy of "over-production," would have been able to give any advice worth heeding for a moment by a community whose proper and imperative business it was to produce as much and as speedily as possible. Were there now in Bombay cotton enough to pile up to the roof of every shelter in the island, and to fill every ship in the harbour, we should be better ready to face the demands of to-day. Perhaps if there had been the "over-production" which the old-fashioned writer dreads, there might not have been the "excessive speculation" which has filled us with confusion, and made of Bombay a mark for the reproach and derision of any one who cares to have his passing fling at us. . . . . .

It is easy to-day to see that we have gone sadly wrong in having chosen the path of speculation rather than that of production; though it is not quite so clear where it was that the two paths divided, or what it was that pushed Bombay from the true path of steady material development. Perhaps the traditional aversion of the *sircar* and the older part of the Service to developers and Western industry might have a deterring effect, in the first instance; then, when certain local circumstances set the fashion of a sort of congested investment within the island itself, the heedless crowd followed. Still we do not see that strangers of the West have any right to lecture us hereon. Yet on this day, when Bombay does penance for the errors committed, it is a fitting time to acknowledge our mistakes, and so to take the first step in the path of repentance. Though the *Overland Mail* is quite wrong in speaking as if there could be any general "over-production" of useful commodities, we must ruefully admit that there has been a decided over-production under the head of "financials," and in all the machinery that is merely intermediate in the work of international commerce. How this has come to pass, is a question which may stand over for answer at another opportunity; but from this day should date some better-devised and more comprehensive efforts, on the part of our leading capitalists, towards developing the inexhaustible resources of Western India. It is true that a desire for a high rate of profit must be laid aside, and Eastern notions of rapid gain will have to blend with the Western maxim of "slow but sure." No time, however, could be so opportune for the growth of sober views of commercial progress as will be this gloomy month of July in the monsoon of 1865. . . . When this 1st of July is passed we shall breathe freely once more; but let Bombay never forget the lessons which the results of this day should teach.—*July* 1, 1865.

INFLUX OF WEALTH TO WESTERN INDIA IN 1860-5.

WE are told that "India talks of nothing but Bombay," so it is quite proper that Bombay should talk about itself. The talk alluded to refers to the very important question of how much money has Bombay had given to it, and what has been done with the large sum which, whatever be the exact amount, all the world knows we have received? A Calcutta contemporary has been endeavouring to reckon up our debit and credit account with the civilized world, mainly, of course, with England, and the calculation is principally based upon cotton exports and bullion imports. On the face of things it might seem one of the most simple problems ever presented in this age of statistics. Having, however, made several essays towards taking stock on behalf of Bombay, we can appreciate the proper modesty of our contemporary when he confesses that "it is with no little hesitation he attempts to answer the question." Let the ascertainable facts be gathered as faithfully as may be, there will still be a wide margin of uncertainty; and, as the Calcutta writer says, "we must necessarily deal in round numbers and somewhat vague statements." It may be said, What, then, is the use of presenting an estimate which must necessarily be incomplete? We answer, that though not full, it need not therefore be incorrect; and such a general review is always of service

as affording clay and straw from which each reader may make bricks for himself. Some facts are sure to be brought forward in respect of which general agreement is certain, besides others to which the majority of readers assent; and in this way a current opinion is gradually formed which serves to mould practical efforts when the occasion arises. Every one is just now ready to admit that great commercial mistakes have been made in Bombay; and in such a mood, especially during the comparative leisure of the monsoon, we are all more likely to take a sober estimate of the means at the disposal of the community. The *Friend of India*, in its not unkindly comments on our affairs, affords us excuse for going over ground which we have several times travelled before. . . . . .

Now we submit that it is a delusion to speak of Bombay having "sent back" any of that wealth in any shape whatever. Much of the bullion arriving in the earlier part of this year was probably in payment for very high-priced cotton; but that did not concern Bombay. The very mention of the word "bullion" ought to have reminded the writer that it represented payment for goods actually received in Europe, and was the balance in final settlement of completed transactions. Whatever is uncertain in these matters, there can be no mistake that Western India still keeps a very firm grip on all the bullion received. The re-drafts on cotton that come to a falling market do represent positive losses on part of the firms sending the goods; but the amount of those re-drafts can only be regarded as a loss on the part of the community when taken as a set-off against a statement of our aggregate profits based upon the value of our exports. Had the *Friend* estimated our surplus profits by a reference to the increase in our exports, the sum of sixty millions which it gives us to start with in the career of speculation, would have been inadequate, as we may shortly endeavour to show. It is a very convenient method to fix upon our bullion imports as a measure of the new wealth gained by Western India, and for a rough guess it suffices to give a tolerably correct impression. As, however, bullion is only one of our imports, and as its value to us depends upon the cost of what we send in return, it is manifest that many other things are to be considered besides. We might illustrate the unreliability of mere partial statistics by a reference to the other side of the account. Thus, for the five years ending April, 1860, and 1865 respectively, our exports of cotton to Great Britain amounted, approximately, in the former case to £15,280,000, in the latter to £83,450,000. But during the former five years there was probably 20 per cent. more cotton sent in addition to China, which in the last five years has all come into the account for exportation to England. . . . . .

It is an interesting subject for surmise—how far has the influx of wealth into Western India affected the ancient habit of hoarding? The *Friend of India*, referring, and very properly so, to Mr. John Fleming as an excellent authority, asserts that neither the ryots nor the small traders "send back their new savings or old hoards" to Bombay. Our contemporary must have misunderstood Mr. Fleming. That gentleman might probably state exactly what the *Friend* says; but he would also, as we have heard him do, add thereto another statement which requires a different conclusion. Though ryots and retail dealers did not send money to Bombay, the shroffs and money-lenders did do so, for their occupation was gone in the mofussil as their clients became rich. It is probable they have now found to their cost that it is difficult to get it back if they desired to hoard it ever so. This money of the shroffs, then, is one of the proximate sources of the present wealth of Bombay, and must be reckoned with the rest. After all the deductions for profitless investment and squandering are allowed for, we feel satisfied that Bombay still retains a large fund which, employed on practical and honest enterprises, would speedily be productive. . . . . .—*July* 10, 1865.

II.—Seldom has a city been more favoured by fortune than has Bombay. During the past four years at least fifty millions sterling have been poured into Western India, a very large proportion of which has stopped short in this city, almost the only exporting mart of the Presidency. These circumstances being known to all the world, it is easy to understand how, from all parts and especially from home, keen scrutiny should be directed to the mode in which this huge influx of clear profit has been administered and distributed. We do not here speak of its application to industrial improvements; that is a very diversified, and, it is deeply to be regretted, a somewhat humiliating subject. We need not now point out, as in so many detailed shapes has often been done before, how the

great stream of this wealth has failed to reach the purposes of most permanent utility, alike in the harbour, the city, and the mofussil—how the fructifying influence of this flood is, as it were, receding from the broad surface of general society in Western India, and is settling down in a few pools of private profit in this city—the great channel by which it entered. Much of this result was to be expected in the case of a population so deficient in general education and wholly unhabituated to the working and organisation of our modern joint-stock enterprises. The original resident proprietors and capitalists, a few native brokers and agents of preternatural astuteness, skilled in the methods of English commerce as well as Asiatic, and those amongst the leading European merchants whose position enables them to obtain, and whose prudence taught them to seize their fortune at the flood, these are the classes amongst whom has been shared the lion's portion of our national wealth. Outside of, and partly mingled amongst each of these classes has been a miscellaneous crowd who have displayed no lack of eagerness and determination to share in this wealth, which ought to have been diffused far more equally over the whole community. . . . It is needless here to repeat the more familiar names of men of the general class of adventurers, though, sooth to say, the list was a varied one. There was also this common characteristic—they were, with few exceptions, untried men, and though, as we have intimated, worthy of reasonable confidence for all ordinary purposes of business, they might be said to have all to gain and nothing to lose. . . . . .

It is not, however, surprising that amongst this class (*i.e.*, the owners of capital which has been frittered away in the speculations of other people) there should be much dissatisfaction. Few persons can look on with equanimity when they see that their savings have been placed in the hands of other men for purposes for which they would not have themselves dared to employ the money. . . . The owners of banking capital, the shareholders, naturally turn to their agents, the directors and managers of these institutions, and look for an explanation of the great losses that have been incurred, and for reasons why their funds should have been diverted from purposes of legitimate trade. They are told in general terms that "the times have been exceptional," that "what managers have done has been done for the best," that "although it is true all the profits are lost (*i.e.*, the dividends), that the reserve fund has disappeared, and even a couple of lakhs of capital also, yet the future prospects are good." But the tenour of these pleas only confirms the uneasy feeling that what has happened once may happen again; and the feeling has grown into a conviction, that without a very different understanding as to the responsibility of managers and directors, similar irregularities and losses as heavy may occur again. . . . Though the circumstances of the time have been exceptional, so have been the irregularities complained of, and the amounts lent and lost. It is therefore quite pertinent to ask, for instance, why A. B. should have been freely permitted to squander 40 lakhs, and then be unconditionally released from a deficiency of 20 lakhs? So we might go on through half the alphabet; but we only desire to specify so much as may suffice to put the whole system of granting personal loans on a different footing for the future, that thereby the credit of Bombay may be raised and the nett aggregate profits of the community may be economised for useful purposes and legitimate trade. . . . . .

There is another side in which to view the dispersion of so much saved capital: what would it have done if applied to some work of public improvement? The Bench of Justices (*i.e.*, the Corporation) higgle over and contest proposals for the expenditure of four or five lakhs, and very properly so too, though the outlay is pleaded for on behalf of some urgent municipal need. In the Commissioner's October budget he remarked: "Our very existence as a city depends now in a great measure on the Vehar water-supply. It is our life, and we must in self-preservation maintain and economise it." Then he states that 15 lakhs would secure for Bombay a new Vehar main and important extensions. Thus it appears that a great work of vital importance to the city, one which our Corporation is at its wits' end to provide the means for, might be accomplished with three-fourths of the amount which one "customer" of the Bombay banks has been allowed to dissipate in splendid but ruinous speculations. Not only would the 20 lakhs have secured our crowded city from the dire peril of a water famine, but the residue would have sufficed to build up the European Hospital, the forlorn foundations for which lie as a mute reproach to our wealthy city; or, again, the five spare lakhs would provide a handsome donum wherewith to buy out the grasping Great Indian Peninsular from its design of encumbering

our streets. We merely mention these purposes as illustrations of the value of money—a subject on which very hazy notions have been current in Bombay. . . . . .

To return to our starting point. Bombay is fortunate not only in having already had an unprecedented influx of wealth, but in its present prospect of another lease of prosperity. That the silver mines of Western India may be worked for the benefit of the whole community, and the produce be fairly distributed amongst the various classes of society, it is in the first instance essential that the management of all our financial institutions should be regular, prudent, and above suspicion.—*Jan.* 4, 1866.

CALCUTTA AND BOMBAY:

COMPARISONS ODIOUS AND OTHERWISE.

MOST of us have at one time or other flinched under those refined inflictions which can only be administered by a "candid friend." Whenever he meets us under misfortune, in what dreadful array he sets before us the long list of our follies, whilst he sternly points to our luckless circumstances as affording unanswerable proof at once of the justice of his unwelcome lecture and the superiority of his own conduct and character! Few of us are stoical enough to endure this social lynch-law with proper equanimity. We think, but have seldom the courage to say so, that the volunteered admonitions come very untimely; for, be it noted, your "candid friend" is never more demonstrative of his zeal for your good, never more confident in recalling his predictions of your coming fall—which, somehow, no one remembers but himself—than when you are in the depths of your distress and perplexity. . . . Bombay, in the midst of misfortune, struggling for very life in a slough of commercial despondency, has found her "candid friend" in the *Friend of India;* and we observe that our daily contemporary has afforded its readers an opportunity of seeing themselves as some others see them who look through the heated atmosphere on the banks of the Hooghly. Our *Friend*, true to his character as the "candid man," cannot afford to let a week go by whilst we take breath, lest he should lose his coveted opportunity for drawing a sensation sketch, and miss his chance of reading us a homily in respect of sins which Calcutta "has no mind to," and which that declining city can never more have any chance of committing. The article from the *Friend of India* on the "Modern Babylon," will remind many readers of a certain "letter from Bombay" which appeared very prominently in the London *Times* early in 1865. The writer, who appeared to have passed through Bombay at the moment when our sudden but then legitimate prosperity was at its culminating point, had just caught up a few of the more prominent facts and characteristics visible on the surface of society, or that were thrown up amidst the persiflage and *gup* of that agitated time. Mainly out of those flimsy materials, deftly blended with obvious and well-known facts respecting the cotton trade and Western India, the writer of the letter in the *Times* managed to produce a grotesque though glowing picture of Bombay, in which incongruous colours and strong artificial light combined to produce a representation as exaggerated and untrue in effect as it was striking and suitable for its transient purpose. So with the picture of Bombay as it is to-day: the prices quoted and the very few facts embodied in the article "Modern Babylon" are known to every one: but numerous statements in the *Friend's* articles, though written as if duly authenticated, as well as most of the inferences and assertions contained in it, are purely of Calcutta manufacture, and are so arranged that the whole tableau is eminently adapted to mislead the press and public at home. Take, for instance, the inference in which the *Friend* summarises his confused Babylonian dream: "If the facts stated in the Bombay papers, and vouched for by our own correspondents, are true, Bombay must fall with the speculators it has worshipped, and great will be the fall of it." . . . What are the "facts" which are so certain to prove the final overthrow of Bombay that our candid *Friend* is "unconsciously" (!) moved to such prophetic fervour, that, in order to relieve his o'erladen breast, he must quote Hebrew anathemas against Tyre and Sidon? These "facts" may be summarised in the writer's statement that some merchants here "bought millions of pounds of cotton at a shilling each, anticipating a sale at sixteen-pence." We are not told how many of our merchants have made this serious mistake, nor how many bales were purchased at "a shilling for each pound"—"facts" of this kind duly authenticated would have been of great service in

aiding our merchants and bankers to see a little before them—and we are left to form our own estimate of the aggregate loss which is to be the overthrow of Bombay. . . . .

Perhaps we have dwelt too long on the *Friend's* fantastic prediction of the financial ruin of all Bombay, and the last quotation reminds us that the article contains other and more reckless dashes of the painter's brush. What is to be said of any Indian journalist who, either through ignorance or civic jealousy, would write of Bombay as "still a collection of hovels amid widespread filth on the finest site in the world next to Constantinople"? We are quite aware that, compared with its new wants, Bombay is inadequately supplied with good bungalows; that Frere Town, though planned, is not yet built; and that the "elevations" of our new Court House and Secretariat are to be seen only in the architects' offices; but, after every admission of that kind, we are free to donounce the *Friend of India's* "collection of hovels amid widespread filth" as an unwarrantable exaggeration more gross than any traveller's tale. The native town of Bombay sadly requires improvement; it needs two or three wide streets to be driven through it; but we generally supposed that the houses are built of masonry. There are "hovels" enough in the suburbs, and wherever the crowds of poor reclamation coolies can put them up near the place of their work; but Bombay is at the best an Indian city, and we suppose that the "City of Palaces" itself could furnish a far larger "collection of hovels" than are to be found in Bombay. Then as to this reproach about "widespread filth," there must be some mistake, for our municipal authorities assure us that day by day our noxious matter is being cleared away completely. But is it so in Calcutta, and can Dr. Tonnerre make any such boast? Certainly not, to judge by the complaints we hear of the deplorable state in which large districts of that city are left in neglect, and the noxious condition of the Hooghly, from whence cholera is never absent. We have just heard, too, of the Calcutta Municipality abandoning a sum set apart for building a new market, though it is said that the present places where food is sold are filthy beyond description. We regret exceedingly that Calcutta should be in such plight as to sanitary matters, and that such a large number of her labouring classes, many of whom are just now at the point of starvation, should have to dwell in "hovels." It is, moreover, a pity that the ostentatious *Friend of India* should have to be reminded of these things; but when that journal publishes, we suppose for the public at home, a description of Bombay which is as incorrect as it is offensive, it is open to us to remind the same public that in all sanitary respects Bombay is in much better case than the ancient and splendid but malarious city of Calcutta. There is another reproach (one already alluded to) brought against Bombay by the Calcutta writer, which, though ingeniously worded so as to miss the facts of the case, seems singularly unfair and misleading. We refer to the remark: "With all the wealth of these five years, they had not managed to build a hotel, or a church, or a Christian school, or a public office, or anything beyond the Elphinstone Circle and Elphinstone reclamation works, which did not owe their existence to cotton at all." As it happens, nearly every charitable and educational work in Bombay, besides the two so cunningly picked out by the writer, has been prosecuted with a vigour unknown within "the ditch;" and as to hotels, a very complete one has been built and opened, and another good one has been opened besides. Possibly a new church was not much needed in Bombay, but considerable sums have been expended on the additions to the cathedral, and a splendid organ has just been erected in it. Though a Christian school has not been built, all the existing ones have, we believe, been materially strengthened in their funds, excepting, of course, the unpopular semi-governmental Byculla school. But the arrangements already made, and the subscriptions long since put down for two or three sets of schools for European children, are sufficient answer to the invidious contrast drawn by the *Friend* between "the wealth of these five years" and the lack of church and school building in Bombay. Hotels, churches, and Christian schools are necessarily the concern of Europeans in Bombay; but the *Friend* is under a mistake if he thinks that any appreciable proportion of "the wealth of these five years" has fallen to their lot, except in the case of a mere handful who got clear off with their spoil. For purposes of general benevolence, the list of subscriptions that have been given in Bombay during the last five years would present such a total as would dwarf into insignificance the public benefactions of Calcutta during any similar period. University buildings and scholarships; three or four hospitals at Bombay and Poona; the Parsee sanitarium at Colaba, a large dispensary at Callian, besides others in Gujerat; numerous school funds and *Madressas* in

the same province; the fine decorative buildings in connection with the Victoria Gardens besides several other ornamental additions to existing public buildings; and *dhurrumsallas* both in the city and at various railway stations, besides untold private gifts,—all these varied demonstrations of liberality and contrivances for ensuring to Western India so many perennial streams of beneficence have at least been left to us from "the wealth of these five years." Our unjust critic may, at any rate, take grudging thanks for having, in this gloomy hour, reminded us by his unfair omissions that there have been some incidents during the race for wealth in Western India which will result in the benefit of a grateful posterity.

True to the last to its character of a "Job's comforter," the *Friend of India* "cannot close its remarks without a reference to the banking associations of the island, and especially the Bank of Bombay." Any judicious friend of this city would speak with bated breath of these topics in such a crisis; but we may quote the following remarks, seeing that the chief circumstances referred to have passed away:—

> Now we believe that if the Bank of Bombay had not first fanned the flame of speculation by lavish advances on too small a margin, by having as its directors at least one great speculator and one most speculative Government Civilian, and if it had not, under a pernicious rule smuggled into its new charter, increased the difficulty it had thus created, the past and the impending crisis would have proved of manageable proportions.

These matters have long since been canvassed here, and it is not just now a time to discuss what might have been prevented. As a climax to its unjust, incorrect, and ill-timed article on Bombay, our "candid" *Friend* "imperatively demands a public inquiry into the management of the Bank." There may be found reasons for this course some day; but when the ship's crew are working at the pumps for their lives, the passenger who should urge an inquiry into a mutiny of a month before would almost deserve to be pitched overboard.—*May* 21, 1866.

JOINT-STOCK ENTERPRISE:

ITS TRIALS, USES, AND ABUSES.

IT is certainly not because of a desire to keep down any sound improvement in monetary affairs that we speak in terms of caution. We have often endeavoured to show that there is scope for genuine business progress, and therefore for the prices of some kinds of stock to go up. But let us be sure the progress is genuine. If people had begun carefully to examine the accounts and make a sober estimate of the property possessed by different companies, it would be reasonable to look for the recent advances in shares being permanent. There is little of that sober process going forward, that we can hear of. It is not in the nature of things that, before a single one of the rotten schemes that have collapsed has been wound up, *bonâ fide* investors should have come forward. Those whose purchases have caused the present spurt in the share market can scarcely be any other than men who wish to buy only to sell. This is speculation, and can only tend to the profit of a few and the loss of many. Some of the concerns which have shared this improvement are so far sound that no doubt they will eventually attain a permanent value above that at which they stand to-day; yet there are others which have also participated in the advance, although belonging to a set of companies which ought to be removed from off the face of the island as speedily as accountants can undertake the settlement of their affairs. So it is the caprice of speculation that is at work, and not that discreet discrimination which is characteristic of the steady movements of investors. The old leaven is at work; and we regret to see that there is yet a large portion of our community that allows itself to be moulded as the passive clay of the potter. There has, indeed, been enough to sober the people of Bombay, and make them turn to honest hard work. If they still allow themselves to be moved by the covetous desire of becoming wealthy without labour and patience, there is small hope for our city. We have inclined to the opinion that there is much realised wealth in Bombay notwithstanding all our disasters; but that capital needs to be applied by men who will insist on knowing for what it is spent, and by shareholders who will look after their own affairs. When the proper time for investment has come, more ingenuity and more trouble will have to be taken in "planting" the capital than has been the fashion in the fools'

paradise from which the Bombayites have been driven. Companies we shall have, but the objects they aim to accomplish must be such that the shareholders can understand. This condition points in the direction of commonplace enterprises of planting, carrying, and building—and these to be carried on beyond the narrow limits of this cramped up little island.—*July* 16, 1865.

II.—Back Bay has often, in the minds and expressions of many, been made to stand as scapegoat for many a foolish scheme, so that much interest attaches to what the "Bombay Reclamation Company" can say for itself. The Directors, in their report read on Friday, say with regard to the progress of the work, that they have little to add to the information given on the 6th June. Yet there is something satisfactory in the appearance of the small business-like pamphlet handed round at the meeting which contained the "First Annual Report" of the Directors of this celebrated Company. When the twentieth report comes to be issued, this pamphlet will probably have considerable historical interest; for, whether the great enterprise prove successful or not, it is bound to be famous in the annals of the island. The slight history given in the pamphlet is only in outline, but is quite sufficient for those who can remember, as of yesterday, the time when the Engineer of the Bengal, Bombay, and Central Indian Railway Company conceived the innocent design of "obtaining outside assistance to hasten the making of the line from Grant Road to Colaba." The Engineer told his desire to the Hon. Michael Scott, and we know the rest.

In characterising the report of the Reclamation Company as satisfactory, we do not so speak of it because the pamphlet reveals either the time when the returns will come in, or the amount of profit that will be gained from Back Bay. But the sober pamphlet is satisfactory because in perusing it we escape from the din of the share market, and are not bewildered with premiums. Here the nett value of the concern can be looked at; we see what money the Directors have actually received, how much they retain, and how the rest has been spent. There is also stated what the Company have set themselves to do, and the exact dimensions are specified of the small proportion of the work that has been accomplished. . . . . .

The mention of interest just above reminds us that, owing to an informality which invalidated the decision of the meeting on the 6th of June, the whole question is again re-opened whether the Directors would be justified in paying an interim dividend out of the interest account. It is an interesting question—one on which a good deal may be said on both sides. The interest appears to have arisen out of a fortuitous addition to the original capital of the Company. As the nature of the concern is better understood, the prospect of a return appears more distant than the most sober investors ever expected; and, in the present state of Bombay, even a small dividend would be thankfully received. On the other side it is to be remarked that there is no obligation on any public company to mitigate the sufferings which individuals have brought on themselves, and no public company is free to divert any portion of its funds from their prescribed purpose until its success is completely demonstrated—which is certainly not yet the case with regard to Back Bay. But the strongest argument against distributing the chance increment held by the Directors is to be drawn from the special character of the Company, and to which we have just referred above. The object of the Company is a distant, if not an uncertain one; and so long as that object is deemed feasible, its resources require to be carefully husbanded for the special purpose. Probably by the time this wonderful "electro-magnetic" light begins to illuminate the waters of Back Bay, there will be, besides, many other indications that a more rapid and effective stage of operations has been entered upon. And in proportion as the future prospects of the Company improve, the desire for a trifling interim dividend will diminish.—*July* 17, 1865.

III.—The power which shareholders of monetary institutions must leave in the hands of their agents and managers, is, as we have already pointed out, necessarily very full, and it is only at considerable intervals that it can be checked. The chief purpose of newspapers is to maintain the continuous force of public opinion; hence there is the best of reasons for the Press becoming the exponent of the just dissatisfaction of share-

holders. At the present time this becomes an imperative duty, and one as far removed from personal consideration as anything well can be; for the joint-stock principle is fairly liable to the objection that it will tend to the relaxation of a due feeling of responsibility. This society must not permit; and just men are bound to use every proper means to prevent the establishment of an indefinite and merely conventional standard of morality. The Law does not, and we trust never will, relax its maxims which define rectitude and faithfulness to trust. . . . . .

Our contemporary who ventured on a hesitating apology for quiet and speedy releases, found most difficulty in comprehending how it was that so great a number of well-known and respectable men could unite in doing what, if done by one singly, would be open to the gravest suspicions. The fact referred to is, by the way, a good illustration of the startling results which, at some stage or other, are sure to arise when the public sentiment has become flaccid or has lost its tone. Then it is that men will do in groups, and when countenanced by each other, what singly they would firmly refuse to do. If it were our business to find excuses for the doings which a soaring "Lark" has spied out, there is only one, or at most two pleas of any validity that can be named. First, it is very easy to suppose a great difference in the circumstances which induce several parties to join in one release. Besides the difference in amounts, there must often be a great difference in the kind and prospective value of the securities with the respective parties. If one bank had advanced ten lakhs on "Elphinstones," and another the same amount on "Alliance Financials" or "Frere Land," the relative position of each after the release was signed would be very different. This difference might prove the superior judgment or the luck of one manager over another; but when we consider how large a proportion of the deposited value even of Back Bay shares has proved a "flimsy" value, there is not much in this plea. It avails little in presence of the sweeping losses and subsequent releases that are now discussed. The apologist of the managers, whom we have quoted above, remarks that their "defence is not impaired by the daily increasing value of the securities which have been handed over by the lucky speculator." Well, let us suppose the most be made of that; does any one think it likely that the "securities," estimated at 19,64,000 rupees, against "liabilities" 42,95,000 rupees, will ever reach more than a saleable value of twenty-two or twenty-three lakhs? The fact still remains, that the practice complained of had grown to an extent which imperilled the savings and realised property of thousands of people, and lowered the general credit of Bombay, both in the eyes of the public at home and the native population here. . . . . .

This is a question which concerns managers, directors, and shareholders, in the order that we name them—for though shareholders are the real sufferers, we do not hold them free from all blame. They knew in a general way what was going on, and ought in many instances to have combined to obtain specific information. Yet their indifference does not in anywise diminish the responsibility of those who had undertaken the administration of the funds of others. As to the general question, however, we cannot add to what was said in these columns some two months ago. The particular instance referred to by "A Lark" to-day is equally applicable to the main point as was that of the "Lucky Speculator;" for, though the "release" in this *un*lucky case was by the open method of a short voyage in a deckless boat, yet a huge deficit remains, and shareholders are left in the lurch.—*Nov.* 3, 1865.

IV.—A "Financial Manager" freely states that he is a Manager of one of the institutions to which he thinks "A Lark" has referred in connection with a certain release from an enormous debt; but he asserts his willingness to submit his own conduct to the "severest tests of propriety and honour." Here, then, is one instance of the frequent cases to which we referred the other day, when the circumstances which induce part of the creditors to agree to a release may be quite different from those which influence the rest—and it may be the majority—to avoid any close scrutiny into the debtor's affairs. It should be remarked here, however, that our correspondent all through has his attention occupied with the question of releases and settlements. That is only the latter half of the subject under discussion; and though "A Lark" has chiefly drawn attention to that part of the matter, it has been our object to refer more to the commencement of the mischief. . . . . .

It may be as well to revert to that portion of a "Financial Manager's" letter which has a little more permanent interest than the rest. He urges that the proper course for "aggrieved shareholders" is to apply for information to Directors, and, we suppose, to make this application privately and singly. It could be wished, indeed, that there had been much more of such vigilance and individual firmness displayed in these matters some ten or twelve months ago; but it is drawing on our simplicity to believe that, if this inquiring spirit had then been displayed, it would have produced any practical fruit. The "aggrieved shareholder," if not a man of very stern countenance indeed, would have been sharply told to wait until the annual meeting, and, in the meantime, to mind his own business. The managers of joint-stock companies, and in this term we include the directors, are, during intervals of many months, independent of anything that shareholders can do or say. . . . With regard to some of the small financial companies, it is needless to refer to instances in which the inquiries of a few shareholders could only have taken the form of accusations, in support of which all the requisite evidence was in the keeping of the accused. With regard to the large banking institutions, the "investigations" of individual shareholders would have as much effect as private remonstrances would have on the Directors of the Great Western or Great Northern Railways at home. Even at annual or half-yearly meetings, shareholders are without the organisation that is needed in order to check the judicious prevision of the directors. So that the newspapers become almost the only, and certainly the most effective, medium through which, when needful, shareholders can enforce a feeling of responsibility on those to whom their property has been entrusted. It is not only in Bombay, but in Calcutta and also at home, that the working of the joint-stock principle requires to be carefully guarded from deterioration. In Bombay we deal in lakhs, and nothing less is worthy of notice here; but at home, where men struggle and toil with only paltry thousands at stake, there have often been strictures from the press on joint-stock management much more severe and with closer personal reference than anything we have written. A daily journal would be of little service if anxious to please everybody, and that at all times. We have no doubt those managers and directors, like our present correspondent, whose conduct will bear to be "submitted to the severest tests of propriety and honour," will eventually thank us for having stimulated the proper parties to apply those tests. When men have always done what is right and prudent in any special capacity, they are invulnerable to the criticism which drives some others of the same profession into the shade.—*Nov.* 6, 1865.

V.—The Directors of the Mazagon Land Company are, as it seems to us, thrown upon their defence in regard to one very important point connected with the call they have recently made. As might be expected, the shareholders are unwilling to pay the call just at present, and protest against the threat of forfeiture which is held over them as the alternative to non-payment. Pressed with complaints and demands for explanation, the Directors have issued a circular to the shareholders in which they set forth their justification for making a call during this time of severe depression. . . . . .

The present Directors will, no doubt, for their own sake be glad to further any inquiry that might exhibit the position of the Company when they accepted office. During the disappointment and indignation which obtain at present amongst the shareholders of more than half the joint-stock companies in Bombay, it is possible that their present Directors may receive somewhat hard measure. In the cases where these Directors have held office since the formation of the concern, the official acts should, of course, be thoroughly scrutinised; but it will answer no good end to make of recently elected Directors vicarious sufferers for the sins of their predecessors. The trouble and anxiety that they are likely to have, as in the case of the new Mazagon Directors, will probably for some time act as a sufficient deterrent from persons too lightly accepting responsibilities with the nature of which they are imperfectly acquainted. Having made these qualifications, however, we may remark that the present is a time in which Directors and Managers of all joint-stock companies may fairly expect that the course they have taken will be investigated by their constituents. It is, no doubt, very negligent of shareholders, who, in times of prosperity, leave their investments to chance, as if no laws had ever been passed for their guidance and protection; but if they will learn in no other

way, the prospect of calls instead of dividends will drive them to the study of the Joi Stock Companies' Act. Nor must Directors complain of this. It is an honour to b entrusted with the command of enormous sums—the aggregate savings of their neighbou —but that honour involves responsibilities with the true nature of which few persons i Bombay seem to have been acquainted. From all we hear about the promotion of th Mazagon Company, it seems that a proper investigation will show that responsibility, i the proper sense of the term, was one of the last things thought of by its early Directors What was then done ought to be made known. What is the best course for the share holders now is a different question.—*May* 15, 1866.

LONDON, NOT BOMBAY BANKING.

"THE Commercial Bank Corporation of India and the East" is mainly a Bombay institution; and it is in Bombay that the chief interest centres as to its history, present disasters, and possible future fortunes. This city has sinned very grievously in matters financial, but it seems a little hard on us that the suspension of the Commercial Bank—perhaps the heaviest blow that has yet fallen on Bombay—should have been brought about by circumstances with which the city at large has nothing to do. Losses that were inevitably brought on the Bank by the back-wave of speculation, and again by the fall in cotton, had for the nonce destroyed its profits and crippled its resources; but it was speculation in China and the recklessness of the agent there that caused the suspension of the Bank and the most serious embarrassment that has ever been felt in Bombay. It is excessively disappointing to find that the very foresight of the Commercial Bank's Bombay Manager has—through the stupidity of another agent in the far East—become the proximate cause of the Bank's overthrow. If the Manager here had not—in his prudential care for the security of this, the chief branch—obtained an unusual amount of cash from London, the drafts from China would have been met by the head office, and probably time enough would have remained in which to prepare for the crisis of severest pressure in Bombay. . . . . .

But amidst the anxiety and confusion of to-day, it is of little use to guess what may be the future course of the Bank after its present engagements are liquidated. Instead of pursuing such an unprofitable inquiry, it will be to better purpose if we recall some of the more prominent incidents in the history of the institution. The Commercial Bank Corporation is not a juvenile concern, of mushroom growth, but, being established in the year 1845, it may claim to have attained its majority. Its subscribed capital at starting was 50 lakhs (£500,000), and its direct operations were confined to Bombay. The London Joint Stock Bank was the agency for England, and certain mercantile firms acted as agents for the Corporation at Calcutta and in China. These arrangements are indicative of the character borne by the Bank during its early years. During the days of its infantile innocence the Corporation conducted itself modestly, never declared large dividends, and was regarded as decidedly dull and slow. Probably those deeply interested in the Commercial are just now in a mood to wish that it had always retained the unambitious characteristics of its early years. It must have been owing to some deviation from the sober maxims of its early directorate that the first misfortune of the Commercial Bank was brought about: this consisted of heavy losses consequent on the Bank's dealings with the Union Bank of Calcutta—a speculative and somewhat disreputable concern—together with the losses by merchants also ruined through the failure of the Union. This misfortune suffered by the Corporation sent down its shares to 25 per cent. discount; but the Directors promptly showed a disposition to meet the case. They bought up a considerable number of the depreciated shares, and then cancelled them, thereby reducing the capital of the Corporation from 50 lakhs to 37½ lakhs (£375,000). When the capital stood at this figure the Bank had invested largely in Government 4 per cent. paper at or about par. This stock was held to a great amount by the Corporation when Government issued the large 5 per cent. loan to provide funds for the Punjab war; and the old paper was depreciated to such an extent that the Bank lost all the reserve fund at that time accumulated. Some little time afterwards (about 1854) that reduction of the capital was reversed, and greatly to the profit of the Bank. Confidence having returned, and the times being prosperous, the Directors were able not only to re-issue the

shares formerly cancelled, but they sold them at 15 per cent. premium, the profit so gained being formed into a reserve fund; and the capital again stood at 50 lakhs.

On the Charter being obtained, the capital was increased to one million sterling—an extension very easily accomplished, seeing that some 10,000 shares were sold in London at 40 per cent. premium. About ten lakhs (£100,000) of profit was netted by this means, which, in addition to other 7 lakhs (£70,000) then accumulated, went to form a noble reserve fund. As remarked by Mr. Connon at the meeting in London: "It is not for the present board to say anything against the Commercial Bank of India—for they took over from that bank £73,000 reserve, £16,000 insurance fund, and £69,000 undivided balance," &c.

We have thus in our narrative brought the plodding concern of ancient Bombay to a splendid position of world-wide opportunity for the making of money; and taking account of that position as held by the Corporation in 1864, it may well be asked—why was not this position made one of impregnable stability? The investigations already commenced in London will, when completed, furnish a full, and possibly an instructive reply to this query. Some will consider that the weakest timber of the Commercial Bank was laid in 1863, when an agency was opened at San Francisco. But the intention in this step was reasonable enough; the object of stationing an agent in California being to secure for the Bank the lucrative advantages necessarily attendant on the purchase of bullion in San Francisco, where it is not wanted, and remitting it to China, where it is in great request. It appears it did not suit the tastes of the agent to stick to that simple but profitable business. His ingenious mind, in spite of the commonest maxims of banking—which, by the way, was not his business at all—led him to squander the funds of the company by advances on mining shares—quartz gold mining being, we suppose, with the exception of seeking for diamonds, the most precarious occupation under the sun. The California agent has managed to get rid of some £200,000 in a year or two; and "the inspector of agencies," to whom the San Francisco agent owed his appointment, had himself at Shanghai sown the funds of the Corporation broadcast. In Bombay, the Bank had its losses last year along with the rest, though, as Mr. Angus comforted the London shareholders by remarking, "the position of the Bank at Bombay presented a favourable contrast with other banking establishments *there*." Alas for the comparison! "he public at home have as yet no adequate conception of what is the "position" of some other banks in Bombay."

The faults of the management of the Commercial are only those of the present day—a random selection of responsible agents—a disregard of the decencies of commercial character in the choice made—a lavish expenditure on incidental items and show—and, above all, the utter neglect of a habit and system of rigorous, frequent, and periodical supervision. In short, the monetary and general joint stock business of the present day appears to be conducted on a principle exactly the reverse of the homely proverb—

> "He that by the plough would thrive,
> Must either hold himself or drive."

If shareholders do not vigilantly watch the disposition of their capital, they will find that those who exclusively undertake that duty for them must ever and anon remunerate themselves or squander the funds at a ruinous rate.—*May* 28, 1866.

II.—In connection with the stoppage of the Agra and Masterman's Bank, various statements have appeared in some home papers, tending to the inference that the final blow which overthrew the Bank came from India. We fear the Directors at the head office have not been so careful as they should have been to prevent this misapprehension obtaining credence. It was known as a fact, well established on general grounds, that the Indian portion of the Agra Bank was all but impregnable; and, on the other hand, as we have recently pointed out in reviewing the general management of the company, there has for long been tangible evidence that the European directorate has been treading in unsafe paths. On this account, perhaps, it might not be unwelcome to the head office to see absurd rumours in the newspapers about "lying telegrams" to India or unexpected demands from India having had a fatal effect on the reeling fabric at home. Thus we find in the *Bankers' Magazine* for July the following circumstantial statement:—"A

lying telegram had been sent [from London] to Calcutta [no date stated] announcing that the Bank had failed, and this . . . produced a run which the local resources could not stand. The Managers telegraphed for assistance, which the Directors, fighting gallantly against heavy odds, were unable to give. Suspension *had* become inevitable." Yes, suspension was inevitable; not because of anything as connected with India, but because of the improper position and the reputation of the head office. . . . . .

With regard to Bombay, it is well known that, while every confidence was felt in this branch as such, a feeling of uneasiness arose some weeks before the stoppage, but which was generated entirely in London, and needed no lying telegrams to account for it. The first difficulty felt by the Bombay Branch was a direct consequence of that uneasiness; but it was foreseen by the Manager here, who, as a measure of ordinary precaution, telegraphed to London about May 28th to mention that, though "easy for a time," he should shortly require assistance. . . . . .

The Bombay Branch of the Agra Bank could without difficulty have met all claims upon it. Except a small balance of a little over four lakhs, all its floating deposits were paid off over its counter before the fiat from London closed its doors. As the *Bankers' Magazine* says: "Had the Agra remained as it was, an Indian bank with a London office, but doing much of its business through London bankers, it would have been standing now." We have in previous articles pointed out various considerations that support this view, and nothing can be plainer than that the Agra's failure was entirely a European one, and that, if anything could have saved it, an accurate knowledge of the strength and resources of its Indian branches would have supplied that confidence in its stability for lack of which it fell. As a general proof of this view, we may refer to the statement of Mr. Cannan, the accountant, quoted in the letter of our London Correspondent. From that it appears the London losses were twice the amount of those at the branches, though these included the French deficiencies; and while in the total account of assets and liabilities there was a total surplus from branches of £1,279,084, there was a deficit of £128,480 at the London office. Of that surplus we have no doubt the Bombay Branch could show a large proportion.—*July* 30, 1866.

AN IMPROVISED BANKRUPTCY ACT.

AMONGST the various salutary functions conferred on our Municipal Commissioner is a very extensive and arbitrary power of whitewashing. It was hoped that great sanitary benefit would accrue to our crowded city from the free application of this facile method of superficial purification, and it is admitted that the municipal regulations for this purpose "have worked well"—a test which always satisfies an Englishman as to the wisdom of any or every legal provision. By a similar test, however, we find that another new purifying regulation in Bombay is coming into great disrepute. Though intended by its original framers for a different purpose, its provisions have been so perverted as to make of it a self-acting organization for the promotion of another kind of "whitewashing," the moral and commercial effects of which are likely to be as mischievous as those of Mr. Crawford's brush are satisfactory. We allude, of course, to the very familiar Act xxviii. of 1865, which was passed in order "to provide for the more speedy liquidation of insolvent *traders'* estates in Bombay," but which is being largely used to enable ruined and heretofore reckless *speculators* to wipe off all record of the steps by which they arrived at insolvency, and, having done that, to help them to take their place again in the ranks of prudent and honest men. The Act itself may not be so much to blame for this, and if fairly worked may be made available for the honest purpose for which it was designed; but in the present circumstances of Bombay it is evident that the Act offers extraordinary facilities for unprincipled insolvents misrepresenting the state of their affairs, and practically defrauding their *bonâ fide* creditors to a serious extent. In an ordinary state of society these evils might not have followed from the working of the Act; but when, as now in Bombay, the claims of commercial morality are very feebly felt and the sense of pecuniary responsibility has suffered eclipse, the class of insolvents to whom we allude can find ready assistance in turning some provisions of the Act to very unwarrantable purposes. . . . . .

As we have said, the Chairman of the creditors' meeting is the pivot on which the

whole proceedings in liquidation must turn. He has the power "to determine the right of others present to vote;" he "reports the resolutions adopted by such meeting to the Court;" and he alone has authority to file these resolutions in the Prothonotary's office, and to advertise them in the *Government Gazette* and other papers, all "necessary expenses incurred by his authority," and of which he is the sole judge, being "payable by the trustees out of the estate." . . . Unfortunately, the Act omits to provide any particular method for the election of this non-official Commissioner in insolvency. He may be pitched upon at random; or, as is more usually the case, the careful previous selection of him by the insolvent himself is the most essential step in that system of packing and imposition at creditors' meetings which is fast making of Act XXVIII. a by-word in Bombay, and of which a striking instance is reported in another column. The election of the Chairman being accomplished, and he alone having the power to decide who are and who are not entitled to vote, as also to receive or reject any proxies that may be tendered, everything generally goes smoothly along to the conclusions arranged beforehand between the insolvent and some of his least reputable and perhaps merely constructive creditors. The Act permits a simple majority "in number and unsecured value of the creditors present" to resolve on the all-important point whether the estate shall be wound up by trustees under the Act or not; though, by way of contrast, it may be named that the English Bankruptcy Act of 1861 ordains that similar resolutions shall only be valid if carried by three-fourths of all the creditors both in number and value. . . . . .

The mischievous and misleading effect of this false start with an insolvent's accounts must be evident when it is observed that the Act provides no opportunity for subsequent checking of the accounts by the creditors, except in Sec. 21, where the trustees are required to file half-yearly statements in the Prothonotary's office, which are then to be open to the inspection of curious creditors. This is very inadequate even as compared with the ordinary practice of the Insolvency Court, where creditors have at all times free access to the accounts, and they are far more likely persons to detect fraudulent entries than are trustees under this Act. Again, Sec. 11 ordains that if in course of liquidation it is discovered that the insolvent has "cooked" his accounts, burnt his books, or otherwise acted fraudulently, the trustees are "to report the same to the Court," so that the offender may be arrested and imprisoned. As a practical test of the working of the Act in the present commercially demoralised state of Bombay, we may ask, is it in the least degree likely that trustees appointed in the way they are now chosen will do such a public service as to carry out this section of the Act? It is difficult enough at home to obtain trustees for insolvent estates, with character and ability enough to work them impartially. Here in Bombay, where a large proportion of liquidators are, or ought to be, undergoing liquidation themselves, it would be absurd to expect that the Act can be administered with that firmness and faithfulness that its promoters calculated upon when they sought to supersede the slow Insolvency Court and to save the time of the Judges. Those who are cognisant of what passes at these insolvency meetings know that we have given only an inadequate description of the evils that are prevailing. There is most urgent need for the Executive at once to suspend the operation of Act XXVIII., if, fortunately, that power is reserved to the Bombay Government. We feel satisfied that no practical inconvenience would in consequence arise in the working of the Insolvency Court, and that by its suspension an effectual check would be given to practices that are seriously deteriorating the already enervated commercial morality of Bombay. The Act only has a tenure of existence until September, 1867; but, at the present rate, it bids fair to have provided long before that time for the whitewashing of all the duskiest "insolvent traders" in Bombay of every race and creed.—*Aug.* 1, 1866.

A GOOD RIDDANCE.

TO-DAY Bombay takes leave of a very conspicuous and troublesome acquaintance—not an old friend, for it is a very modern invention—we mean Act XXVIII. of 1865, on which all honest men will feel great satisfaction in bestowing a parting kick. But here let us remark, we would not say a word to wound the feelings of any who have involuntarily become connected with the operations of that statute. Undoubtedly there have been some honest but unfortunate men who, acting under advice, have submitted to its operations, and

there have been some men, even amongst its corps of liquidators, who have striven to act firmly and fairly by all parties concerned. It is the Act itself which we denounce and dismiss, as one of the most unfortunate and mischievous morsels of amateur and exceptional legislation that India has witnessed for many a year. The complicated blunders comprised in its enactment were recognised as soon as it came into practical operation; but, with most reprehensible weakness, the Local Government and the High Court refused to make the slightest attempt to suspend the Act; or, if they did, the Supreme Government, with cynical indifference to the interests of social and commercial morality, declined to help Bombay out of the pit which a few of its prominent citizens had digged for it. . . . In this respect Act XXVIII., and the grotesque history of its brief and unhonoured sway, may have performed the sorry service of constituting a beacon which must leave without excuse all future Indian legislators, amateurs, and others, who may say to themselves, "Go to, let us make a bran-new Bankruptcy Act, and show those English law-makers that we know how to deliver creditors and save assets out of the grasp of attorneys."

We would fain say of this mischievous Act, Peace to its *manes;* but there is not yet room for such a valediction. More than sixty estates, representing an amount of indebtedness that we dare not compute, which this statute has removed from the direct cognisance of the Courts, still drag along in the hands of administrators who, though practically irresponsible, hold an immense amount of property under their control. . . . But we were scarcely prepared to find such a bold assertion on behalf of the Act as that "the progress made (under it) is at railway pace compared with that sink of waste and delay, the Insolvent Court, and its adjunct, the office of the Official Assignee." It is sufficient to ask, how many estates have been finished off by those tribunals, even under their unreformed state, whilst Act XXVIII. has disposed of *two* only? A strong Government and a vigorous Justiciary would have reformed "that sink of waste and delay" very speedily, instead of permitting a resort to the weak expedient of devising a useless and injurious statute. But it ought to be known that the said tribunals, or those connected with them, were stronger than the Local Government and the Bench together, insomuch that it was in deference to the occult influence of the "sink of waste and delay" that the Act which is now dismissed with ignominy was made as bad and as inefficient as it possibly could be framed.—*Sept.* 30, 1867.

SAINT ANDREW'S DAY, 1866.

SAINT ANDREW'S DINNER is now, we suppose, to be set down as one of the institutions of Bombay, and if the report which appears in our columns of the proceedings on Friday night last does not do justice to it, we cannot be expected to succeed here in rendering it famous. It is our duty simply to chronicle the event, and to speak of those principal incidents in connection with it which Scotchmen may be glad to remember. There can be no question that the Chairman, the Hon. Mr. A. J. Hunter, well performed his really arduous duties. It is anything but a holiday amusement to have to make half-a-dozen or more speeches in the course of an evening, all appropriate to the point in hand; while it is a physical feat of no small mark for any one standing where the Chairman did—beneath the statue of Mountstuart Elphinstone—to make himself heard over our crowded and be-tapestried Town Hall, a building which is contrived with the intent of deadening and not transmitting sounds. Mr. Hunter in his speech—the one in proposing "The pious memory of St. Andrew"—gave hearty and intelligent expression to those fraternal and national feelings which ever form the bond of friendship and unity amongst Scotchmen when meeting together on this their festival day. In thus speaking of the better and higher aspects of this convivial gathering, the Chairman, we feel sure, spoke on behalf of the croupier and all responsible promoters of the banquet; if a few individuals on these occasions do forget the habitual gravity of their race, that must not be placed to the account of St. Andrew and his more circumspect adherents. In adopting the toast, "The memory of Wallace and Bruce," the sentiment of nationality was perhaps a little overstrained for these days of the remorseless school of historians; but the learned gentleman who was compelled to stray on Tytler's ground whilst striving to support the fame of those ancient heroes, fought through

his task with a bravery and perseverance worthy of Bruce and—of a better cause. Of the other national toasts, "The Literature of Scotland" is the one which suggests the most cosmopolitan and enduring thoughts. It was spoken to by Mr. J. M. Maclean with excellent effect, in spite of some tumult around him, and an atmosphere which was certainly very different from that of "Dryburgh's cooling shade." We need give no higher praise to Mr. Maclean's speech than is implied in referring all our readers to the report of it, which will, we doubt not, be duly conned and thoroughly appreciated.

The absence of Sir Bartle Frere was a great drawback from the meeting; but he proved his good-will by taking pains to write an excellent letter to the Chairman that was read to the meeting, and in which "the Scotch artisans and mechanics" as well as "our Macintoshes and Malcolms" were duly remembered. The Commander-in-Chief, Sir Robert Napier, the most prominent public guest, gave a good soldierly address in response to the toast of "The Army and Navy," and was well received on this, the first, occasion of his appearing at a public dinner since his accession to his present post. The account of his introduction to the Bombay Army without one officer on the Staff, and the subsequent rout of ten or twelve thousand of Tantia Topee's men by the charge of five hundred, formed one of those striking episodes which always arouse enthusiasm when told by an actor in the scene, as was Sir Robert; though, as he modestly averred, he had nothing to do but give the order.

Of the miscellaneous speeches, the one in toasting "The Press" was not the least notable, and was worthy of a place at an earlier hour than that allotted to it, when it would have been more fairly heard. . . . The proposer did not make the usual mistake of after-dinner speakers in giving way to indiscriminate eulogy; and, indeed, so far as we could gather the tenor of his remarks at the time, it seemed to us that he would have been well fitted for the post of censor of the press, if his lot had been cast in the times before it was discovered that the press is the only effectual law to itself. . . . Mr. G. M. Stewart, in responding for "The Merchants," proposed by Mr. A. R. Scoble, spoke in a hopeful spirit of the commercial prospects of Bombay, and in a tone that seemed to give some promise that "healthy prosperity," as he said, may return before long to our humbled community. . . .

We believe that Sydney Smith was the author of the calumny that "nothing short of a surgical operation could get a joke into the head of a Scotchman." It is very clear that the reverend canon and joker was never a guest at a St. Andrew's dinner. The other evening the mere hint of a joke was sufficient to evoke consuming laughter, and there was certainly no lack of hilarity. Let us hope that when next St. Andrew's memory is so honoured, "the feast of reason" may be in still greater proportion to "the flow of soul" than it was on this occasion.—*Dec.* 3, 1866.

THE BANK OF BOMBAY:

ITS STRUGGLES, FALL, AND RECONSTRUCTION.

THE annual general meeting of the Bank Proprietors on Monday last has not attracted much attention amongst the public. . . . The report in these circumstances was quite of secondary significance; the real importance of the meeting centres round the very clever and ingenious speech made by Mr. Hannay, the Chairman, but which he, with becoming modesty, styles "a few remarks upon the management of the Bank, before and during the very trying period through which we have just passed." In this remarkably artistic address, even that word "before" has its use, for Mr. Hannay has not failed to use as shadows in his pictures those slow "good old times" before 1856, when "three lakhs was the limit of personal security." As the Chairman gaily reminded the admiring shareholders, those were the days when the Bank did "very little good," when "Bombay was a very different place" from that emporium of wealth in which we now live. The sleepy directors of those times used to pay 5½ per cent., and, what is more, the shareholders were "content." Now, including the present blank half-year, the average dividend is 12½; therefore, in effect, the Chairman asks, are not these times of noble dividends better than those dull days of which the best that can be said is, the Bank did "no harm"? Thus Mr. Hannay's speech derives its telling effect from the wide historical sweep in which he indulges; and it must be admitted, that in

averaging the dividends since 1857 there is an appearance of fairness. Yet it must have occurred to the shareholders, as soon as they emerged from under the influence of Mr. Hannay's well-arranged sentences, that the question before the meeting that day was not as to the constitution and general principles of the Bank, but simply—had the management of the past half-year been judicious?

The Chairman was quite aware of this, but he preferred not to grasp his nettle too quickly. The historical retrospect was continued to a very recent period, including a warm eulogy on the late Chairman, the departed Mr. Birch, who, it must be admitted, gave unmistakable proof of meriting Mr. Hannay's praise as "the ablest financier it had ever been his good fortune to meet in India." Mr. Hannay might have added, "or anywhere else;" for, if reports be correct, Mr. Birch proved his ability, in knowing when to leave off, and his foresight, in retiring from Bombay with a secured fortune, rivalling in amount those of the nabobs in the old days of the Company. This, of course, entitles Mr. Birch to the praise which men readily accord to those who do well to themselves; but the only evidence of Mr. Birch's influence on the prosperity of the Bank that Mr. Hannay vouchsafed was, that "under him" the practice of investing in Government securities was discontinued. . . . At this part of the speech there are "breakers ahead;" and after Mr. Hannay's quiet remark, that "greater latitude was given to the Secretary," he at last plunges into the seething foam, thus: "In 1864, when Bombay was in the hey-day of prosperity, loans were granted to the then considered good men with a *free hand*." Yes; but 1864 was some three years *after* the time when Mr. Cowasjee Jehangir's proposal was made; and not only were the circumstances of the community quite different, but the Bank Directors had taken into their confidence another and, as they thought, probably a more "sagacious" adviser. . . . . .

Here we may mention, what seems to us, the fallacy underlying Mr. Hannay's speech and the middle sentence of the eighth para. of the Report. It seems to have been overlooked that so much in business matters depends on *degree*. It is not sufficient to show that the principles on which the Bank worked were sound, or that its plans of management were sagacious; but the test is, were the obvious limits of prudence observed in given circumstances? Mr. Hannay had imposed upon himself no light task; it was that of showing that the difference between no dividend this year and one of 16 per cent. last year was due to unavoidable circumstances. This, it appears, is the chief circumstance that the Directors had to contend with in the early part of this year: "the applications for discounts and loans were enormous." How does the Chairman say this was met? He says that, "with a view to check this, the Bank rate was raised, week after week." Here we think that any shareholder might very fairly have urged that this was not the best method to take; it is indiscriminate, and, as the result has shown, is ineffectual. It is an expedient which may suit for ordinary times, and one that immediately affects legitimate commerce, but is wholly inoperative to check reckless speculators. The Chairman very properly protests against the criticisms of those who are wise after the event; but we claim exemption from that category, having urged this view months ago. A high rate of interest would check the applications from the "purchasers of produce," of whom Mr. Hannay is careful to assure us the bulk of the Bank debtors *then* consisted; but we imagine that, even at that period, a large proportion of the "produce" was the produce of the fertile brains of "promoters." It was the easiest thing that could be, for the Directors to resolve that the rate of interest shall be advanced all round; but it was the most difficult thing for them to exert keen discrimination and firm moral courage, as must be done when they say, "this application must be reduced by one-half, and that man, or that financial, shall not have any at all." It is this direct, personal, and practical course which really tests the manager of a bank. . . . . .

The Chairman next volunteers a chivalrous defence of Mr. Premchund Roychund, or rather of the Directors, against the allegation that the great broker has been the Director-General of the Bank. The defence is, that for ten years past his advice has been sought by the Directors, and also by every "bank manager in the place." Such a line of defence—another of the dexterous touches of the report—carries its own condemnation with it, though the Bank Directors form only one group of the crowd of offenders. Would the bankers of Calcutta or Madras have joined in such universal dependence on the judgment of one man? We think not. It is not only contrary to common sense, that a man without any special business training should have had the requisite talent for

such a position, but it is also contrary to any ordinary estimate of human nature that such an absurdly exaggerated influence as the followers of Mr. Premchund have thrust upon him, should not have been abused. . . . The skilful arrangement, and somewhat too vindicatory style of Mr. Hannay's address, must be penetrated through by any careful observer who may desire to store up the few ears of sound instruction which may be gleaned from the history of our speculation and panic. The Directors estimate that the losses of the half-year will not exceed thirty lakhs; but in reference to this estimate it seems safest to repeat the Hon. Mr. Foggo's laconic remark, when "he hoped the Chairman's anticipations would be realised."—*Aug.* 11, 1865.

II.—The small measure of amendment in the Bank of Bombay's Charter forced on the Directors by the Government of India has been passed by the local Legislative Council pretty much in the shape in which it was first introduced, for an important amendment proposed by the Hon'ble Mr. Hunter was lost by a majority of two votes. The object of the Bill is to deprive the Bank of the liberty formerly permitted, and so terribly abused, of allowing advances to be made on the shares of Joint Stock Companies. Mr. Hunter having,—as indeed all Bombay has,—a lively sense of the mischief and ruin that have been caused by the system of "granting loans with a free hand," and without restriction as to amount, proposed to supplement and improve the Government Bill by adding a clause to restrict the amount loaned to any one person or firm on personal security to three lakhs of rupees, the proposition being afterwards modified by an extension of the amount to five lakhs (£50,000).

This clause, it appears, was courteously submitted by Government to the present Directors for their opinion. Their reply was read at the meeting of Council held on Monday last, and served to open the discussion on the subject. The Directors in their letter say, they "are strongly of opinion that the amendment proposed by Mr. Hunter will operate most seriously against the interests of the shareholders." They consider that "questions such as are referred to in the amendment should be left entirely to the discretion of the Directors, and that in such matters they should be wholly unfettered." This is certainly a frank and modest proposition to come from a Bank that, in the exercise of an unfettered discretion in dealing with the money placed at its disposal, contrived in less than two years' time to lose nearly a crore of rupees! The present Directors are not responsible for these losses; but they are not yet in a position to claim unlimited confidence either from the Government or the public, and it would certainly have conduced more to confidence on all sides if the Directors had refrained from an assumption of dignity that in the circumstances by no means becomes them, and still more suitable would it have been had they favoured the public with something in the shape of a reason for the "opinion" they so "strongly" hold, and so curtly express. . . . . .

We regret to observe that His Excellency the Governor threw the weight of his well-earned influence and authority into the scale against Mr. Hunter's amendment. . . As regards mercantile firms, His Excellency need be under no apprehension of any in Bombay going hat in hand begging for accommodation. When the Bank had exhausted the five lakhs limit, it would have had but very indifferent reasons for going to Government to beg for permission to make further advances. If the restriction of limit were left out of the Act under the apprehension that the Bank might be tempted to evade and commit a breach of its provisions, because it did not like to go up to Government for power to do so, we must say the reason was singularly weak and certainly not entitled to much consideration. The special case put by Sir Bartle Frere as a crucial test of the operation of a limit imposed on the Directors by the Charter, is one that admits of a conclusive reply. He supposes the case of a native merchant who had so overreached himself by engaging in extensive transactions in cotton (why not in shares?) that he could go to the Bank and solicit assistance beyond the limit imposed, and in making his application could so couple it with the threat or warning that, if his huge demand was not complied with, his insolvency would pull down several other banks and firms—all debtors to the Bank—and thus bring ruin on the city. We can only say in reply, that no man has a right to place himself in such a position. Still more emphatically would we assert that if any suitable method can be taken beforehand to save the Bank from being placed at the mercy of so imprudent or reckless a speculator, that precaution ought to be taken and the inducement afforded by a possibility of the Bank acceding to such a request,

ought to be placed beyond the reach of a speculator's calculations. The Bank of the Presidency was never intended to subserve any such purpose; it is the coffer of the State, the bank of deposit for trustees and other non-traders; it is the one monetary institution which ought to stand as a rock amidst the fiercest commercial excitement. As to the interest of the shareholders, they might well afford to dispense with an excessive rate of dividend; but as a class, they can least of any other afford to live in terror of losing their principal. Therefore, "in the interest of the shareholders," respecting which the Directors are very properly solicitous, it would appear that the supposititious case put by His Excellency before the Council is one from the possibility of which the Bank of Bombay ought to be fortified if legislation could do that.—*Sept.* 8, 1866.

III.—On Monday evening the Directors of the Bank of Bombay applied for, and the Executive Government granted, that guarantee to the depositors which, in our paper of that morning, we had said would be needed so soon as the Directors felt any uncertainty as to the ability of the Bank to meet "all immediate claims upon it." Bombay has, by this interposition, been saved from the extreme financial humiliation which must have befallen the city had our State Bank declared itself unable to meet the current demands upon it. There is now breathing time allowed to the commercial community, and fair opportunity given to consider what is the best course to pursue. Though the Government promise to "support the Bank to the full extent of their available resources from the present date to the termination of the renewed agreement," it is very evident that the matter cannot stop where it is. The present depositors—who own the smaller and fixed deposits—will, indeed, feel at once assured, and there is quite sufficient even in the qualified promise of Government to warrant the large depositors taking back their funds to the Bank, if they see fit to do so. But something more than security will be thought of now, for that has been obtained only by the extraordinary and exceptional step taken by Government; and the bankers and independent merchants of the city may fairly consider, whether self-respect and a due sense of business propriety will accord with their dragging on for a twelvemonth under the present provisional and indefinite arrangement. . . . . .

It is probable that the long-strained confidence of business men and the forbearance of the banks finally gave way when the publication of the weekly return dated February 16th—wherein the formal reduction of capital was first expressed in figures—called attention to the essential weakness of the Bank. This matter-of-fact consideration, in conjunction with the sudden closing of branches and other temporary causes, led to the withdrawal of deposits in one week, to the extent, as we see from the current return, of one crore and seven lakhs. Depositors who took trouble enough to compare and scrutinise the few items which the Bank's returns supply, have been driven to the conclusion that not only is the whole of the Bank's capital locked up, but that a considerable portion of the deposits are unavailable; and there are strict accountants who believe that not only is the whole capital of the Bank irretrievably lost, but a portion of the deposits also. That such an opinion can be entertained at all, must be attributed to the persistent reticence of the Board in declining to state the extent, and describe the character of the securities they hold. In the absence of such statement, those who have only the weekly returns to guide them—together with the ominous report from Mr. Stuart, the Treasurer of the Bank—made their calculations without reference to the securities that the Bank may hold, which have thus come to be regarded as merely so much "flotsam and jetsam." . . . . . .

It has been evident for several months past to all impartial persons that nothing can be done to rescue the Bank until a complete separation from the affairs of 1864-5 shall be effected. In October last a letter written by Mr. S. Shapoorjee appeared in our columns, which probably the Directors thought somewhat extreme then, but which it is now evident embodied only the sober truth. We make one quotation from that letter, which will, perhaps, command readier acceptance to-day than it did at the time it was written:—

To hope for the return of high values for properties throughout Bombay within the next few years is, in my opinion, a mere delusion; and I must say I deeply regret to observe that the Government, by their latest minute on the Bank of Bombay, have given colour to these false hopes. Nothing could be more ill-judged; for even in the few weeks which have elapsed since the audit committee revised the estimate made by the Directors, values have been *still further depressed.*

The last remark might now be repeated with emphasis; and if it be yet possible to extricate a small portion of cash to recommence with, the sooner reconstruction is undertaken the better. The step that the Government has at last taken cannot be retraced, and the next must be to collect some fresh capital for a new Bank having all the rights and privileges just conferred upon the old one, which will then have to be put under some economical arrangement for liquidation. Of course, some of the present Board might be Directors of the new Bank. And here, in passing, let us remark that the present Directors deserve credit for the strenuous exertions they have made to right their barque. Had they been willing to seek for impartial counsel, some of those exertions might have been better spent; but they have done their best in a struggle that was hopeless, and they may now surrender with a good grace. Whatever objections may be raised to the course we have indicated, there can be no possible escape from such a result, sooner or later; and if the measure be undertaken at once, in an open, business-like manner, it is very probable that it will cause a revival of confidence throughout the community.—*Feb.* 27, 1867.

FIRST PROPOSALS FOR AMALGAMATION WITH BANK OF BENGAL.

IV.—No resolution respecting the proposed amalgamation of the Bombay and Bengal Banks was proposed at the Proprietors' Meeting yesterday. The prolonged conversation which took place between the Directors and the few shareholders present was useful in explaining the position in which the Board stands with regard to the Calcutta proposal. As the Chairman stated, it simply amounts to this—the Directors are unanimously of opinion that the proposed amalgamation is feasible, and that, subject to the modifications specified in their last letter to Bengal (April 4th), and dependent on certain adjustments in detail to be settled with Mr. Dickson personally, it is most conducive to the interests of the shareholders. The Directors are necessarily committed to their own proposals, and must meet Mr. Dickson on that footing. But, at the meeting yesterday, they were formally made aware that there is a strong feeling amongst the shareholders not only against the scheme of amalgamation, but in favour of a definite and prompt movement towards reconstruction of the Bank. . . . The Chairman said the Board was not sanguine enough to think capital could be raised in Bombay sufficient to insure the retention of the Government business. Many people think the contrary; so let the Directors put the matter to the test. This might be done in a week. Let a circular be sent round to all resident shareholders, asking them to say what number of shares they will take up in a new Bank of Bombay at Rs. 500 each—half of that sum to be paid on June or July 1st, the residue being secured by the deposit of the old share as representing the present assets of the Bank. . . . . .

We are at a loss to conceive what one of the Directors could have been thinking of when he intimated that the Board was almost afraid to trouble the Government any further. As Colonel Marriott said, the Executive, both as a director and as the largest shareholder, is alike responsible and interested in the best course being taken for the interests of the Bank, to say nothing of the community of Bombay. Tenfold more than any other party in the matter is the Government of Bombay accountable for the disasters which have impoverished the shareholders of the Bank, and by so much more is it under obligation to assist in the reconstruction of a new Bank, between which and the present one there shall be a great gulf fixed. A correspondent of ours, whose letter appeared on Saturday, signed a "Victim of Government," and who had invested a lakh of rupees in the Bank wholly because of his faith in the Government guardianship of his interests, is but one of thousands who have grievously suffered by the *laches* of the Executive in regard to its responsibility in this matter, and it will never do at this time of day to be told that Government is weary of attending to the conditions of its grossly neglected trust deed. A passage in the Directors' letter of April 4th may serve to suggest a practical point to the question—what can Government do in the matter? The Secretary of the Bank writes: "My Directors believe that arrangements may be entered into with this Government by which the proposed advance of 65 lakhs (previously required from the Bank of Bengal) may be reduced to about 17." Now, whatever this means, it clearly implies that the Local Government is already prepared to give some direct assistance in the way of advancing capital towards the amalgamated Bank. It will therefore do the

same, and—if it be properly applied to—a good deal more, towards the erection of a new Bank of Bombay. We trust that this broad hint revealed by the correspondence will be duly acted upon; and if but half-a-dozen of our leading citizens, native as well as European, form themselves into a committee to confer with the Bank Directors and the Government, something practical will speedily be done. Judging also from the excellent spirit displayed at the table yesterday, we cannot think that the Board will do anything to impede a movement which promises a far more satisfactory solution of our trouble than does the amalgamation scheme. There is now also an excellent opportunity for our new Governor to build for himself a durable monument, by aiding in the reconstruction of a new Bank of Bombay in place of the old one, which has crumbled into ruin beneath the nerveless hand of his predecessor.—*April* 17, 1867.

V.—The vote at the meeting of Bank Proprietors on Tuesday will, we presume, be considered to close all discussion for the present. . . . We have been accused of raising "an opposition of no very scrupulous character," because we have "over and over again audaciously asserted, in order to mislead public opinion," that the Directors have not throughout been of one mind in thinking amalgamation to Bengal better than reconstruction in Bombay. In triumphant refutation of our "audacious assertion," we are pointed to the fact that the Directors present all voted on Tuesday in favour of the Bengal scheme. Our contemporary perhaps does not understand that the vote of a minority might be given in deference to the wishes of more urgent colleagues; and that, while amalgamation is opposed to the better judgment of this minority, the claims of expediency and the accidents of their position might weigh with them in supporting their colleagues who had committed themselves in advance to Mr. Dickson. The lack of personal independence—a quality always scarce in Bombay—may also have had a good deal to do with the vacillation displayed by some of the Board; and to that must in part be attributed the outward show of unanimity displayed by the Directors in opposing the proposition for a new Bank, though that was supported by a majority of the shareholders. Of the 137 votes (proxies included) given in favour of amalgamation, 98 of them were given in by the Directors themselves; so that, taking shareholders' votes alone, there was a majority of 95 in favour of reconstruction.

The present difficult position of things presents a case for some special method of inquiry and conference between the shareholders and the Government. This was attempted through the former Shareholders' Committee, but the action of that body, as we have remarked above, was stifled by the passive opposition of the Directors. Some other committee will now have to be formed, as proposed in Mr. Macdonald's resolution, but it need not be confined to shareholders. It ought to include some of those who have applied for allotments in the new Bank, so that the community may be fairly represented, and action can be taken untrammelled by the Directors; though at least two of the present Board might consistently enough lend their aid in the deliberations of such a general committee. If such a free and independent body were at once drawn together, its members would be ready with some definite plan of action before the Bank proprietors are again called to vote, or in the event of the Board acknowledging that they cannot carry through the negotiations with Bengal. It will doubtless conduce to the future peace of the Bombay Government itself if such assistance as it is at liberty to give were granted to this new committee, which, we presume, will shortly be appointed. The retrospective inquiry that is threatened on behalf of several influential shareholders may prove anything but pleasant for the past and present Government of Bombay, and it would probably be the most prudent and every way expedient course for the Executive to give what support is in its power to some practical plan for reconstruction. That may be readily carried through without the scandal which might be raised during the protracted discussions and references inseparable from the carrying out of any scheme for amalgamation.—*June* 6, 1867.

VI.—Now that the Local Government has virtually put its veto upon the ill-advised scheme for Bank amalgamation, it is to be hoped that there will be tolerable unanimity amongst all those whose efforts are available towards the establishment of a new Presidency Bank. The efforts that have already been made towards this end have been the

reverse of a "miserable failure," when it is considered that subscriptions for many shares in the new Bank have been offered, in spite of the passive opposition of the Directors, and the cold and reprehensible neglect of the Local Government. Some thousands of shares were applied for under these discouraging circumstances, and the applicants have the satisfaction of feeling that they did their duty then, and also of knowing that they have secured precedence on the list of proprietors of a new Bank of Bombay. Whilst the Directors of the present Bank are busy extricating themselves from the consequences of the mistaken step they took in committing themselves without reserve to Mr. Dickson's proposals, we would recommend other investors to register their applications for shares in the new Bank. . . . As to the somewhat exacting terms that had been named by the Government of India with regard to the large proportion of paid-up capital, there can be little fear but that requirement might be abated on the circumstances being fully explained. Supposing 100 lakhs could easily be obtained before next March, wholly irrespective of the assets of the old Bank—the shareholders in which are entitled to every consideration—it would be financially a serious error to start the Bank with more capital than it could be certain of using profitably. The Government of India is properly anxious for the perfect safety of its deposits, but that end is to be accomplished by more direct and appropriate means than stipulating that the Bank shall have an undue amount of capital. No doubt this and all other difficulties can be speedily arranged when a united good-will is shown towards the establishment of a strong local Bank, which will be bound to attend to its proper business, and that only.—*July* 6, 1867.

VII.—The financial atmosphere of Bombay is becoming clearer, and the prospect of unanimity in an effort towards the establishment of a new Bank of Bombay is like a bright streak in the commercial firmament. With the aid of the old Bank, Bombay fell; with the help of the new one, it will arise again from its present depression; but time and much labour must be bestowed on this undertaking. The announcement that the Bengal Board had applied to the Government of India for leave to establish a branch of their Bank here, and their refusal to allow an independent audit of its affairs by any one representing the Bank of Bombay, are the last nails in the coffin of the amalgamation scheme. Bombay has made many and grievous mistakes in finance; but, happily, she has been saved from crowning them all by a public confession of incapacity, and by an abdication of those financial functions which must form an essential portion of her own commercial organisation. All this would have been involved in the subordination of Bombay local banking to a Bengal Board; and we trust the meeting to-morrow will clear the way for the adoption, by all concerned, of a manlier and more hopeful course. . . We may add here that we would urge on the investing public a prompt application for shares in the new Bank, so that they may not only secure themselves, but show to Bengal and the Indian Council that there is some true public spirit still left in the island, and that we are not quite bankrupt in sound financial enterprise. There is one subject relating to the affairs of the present Bank in regard to which the Board might, we think, venture to impart a little general information at to-morrow's meeting. . . . . .

As to Mr. Dickson, we may venture to express our thankfulness—though not quite in the emphatic manner adopted by Dr. Johnson's printer on his sending home the last proof sheet of the dictionary—that "at last we have done with him" in his character of a public financier. As a practical bank manager, though by no means a perfect model, he will, we hope, always retain the respect of the public, and we trust the Bengal shareholders may long have the benefit of his careful and vigilant management. As a professed reformer of national commercial finance, we imagine that his brief career is closed. He entered on that career armed with the minute of March last, in which he proposed to revolutionise the commercial monetary system of India; and this he did on principles which are reactionary on the one hand, and utopian on the other. He closes that career with the attempt—for which no doubt a majority of Bengal Directors are equally responsible—to steal a march *viâ* Simla, and thereby pin into a corner both his own shareholders and the public of Bombay; and thus there is an end of Mr. Dickson as a public man, though we repeat he will ever be esteemed for his private character, and valued for his practical business abilities.—*July* 15, 1867.

THE GLAMOUR OF 1865 AND THE GLOOM OF 1867.

THE annual meeting of the proprietors of the Bombay Bank which is to be held to-day is an occasion of no common interest. It may be regarded as the last act in a drama in which some one or other of the leading characters may be expected, with their speeches proper to the immediate occasion, to join in something like an epilogue that may throw light on the "strange eventful history" of the Bank, and serve to explain much of the "business" gone through by players in previous acts which the audience has not been able to follow. As for the present Directors, it must be a relief to them, as it is to the public, that this is the last of a series of meetings unsatisfactory to all concerned. Enough has been sacrificed on the shrine of official reticence. Before quitting the stage the Directors owe it to themselves, as they owe it to their shareholders, to cease the fencing and by-play of former meetings, to drop the hackneyed phraseology of previous addresses, and to state, without fear or favour, all the circumstances within their knowledge which have brought about the ruinous loss of 150 lakhs of the Bank's capital.

This figure may possibly startle some who yet retain any sensibility to surprise; but we believe the Board is determined to touch bottom at last, and it is said that the Directors will to-day own that 50 lakhs is the only safe estimate they can offer of the Bank's present assets. It must be observed, that this pitiless but business-like appraisement is made on a principle the reverse of that which has characterised the Directors' course from the beginning of their disasters. This time the shareholders may really venture to trust in the possibility of a margin, but this dismal result presents a moving contrast to the Directors' pleasant talk in January last, of the probability of there being a surplus which might go towards "the creation of a new reserve fund." The significance of the present meeting can only be realised by those who are able to take a retrospect of the Bank's affairs since the first announcement of disaster at the annual meeting in August, 1865. The proper text on which the proceedings to-day must form the fitting commentary will be found in the ingenious and extraordinary speech delivered by the deluded Chairman of the Bank two short years ago.* Any thoughtful person who will be at the pains to turn to that invaluable address—invaluable because in it are crystallised, as it were, all the misconceptions and financial folly of the two years that had gone—will not only derive much grim diversion from its perusal, but may reap permanent instruction from the reflections which must be prompted on re-perusing Mr. Hannay's eloquent vagaries. It was his part to justify the great extension of the capital, the whole of which was then scarcely paid up; to apologise for the absence of a dividend; and to extenuate the then estimated loss of 30 lakhs, which he said "may turn out to be much less;" and he had also to justify the total revolution in the management of the Bank which had been inaugurated in connection with bringing in the new Charter in 1863. All this Mr. Hannay did without stint; and the historical value of his speech consists in the completeness, not to say hardihood, with which the financial theories of 1863-4 are therein set forth. To-day these theories and the system of banking inaugurated under Act X. of 1863 are to be brought to the final test; and we trust the present Directors will be as bold and thorough in setting forth the disastrous demonstration as the Chairman of 1865 was in glorifying the "sagacious men" under whose counsel the "antiquated" old Charter was abolished. . . . . .

After all drawbacks the Directors doubtless can show a good claim to the thanks of the shareholders, for having borne the pressure of heavy anxiety and a world of fruitless labour. Let these be freely accorded them; but we think they have lacked courage to break with the past. With the weakness so common in modern society, from consideration to their predecessors, they seem one and all to have allowed undue weight to that conventional sentiment of mistaken loyalty and good fellowship which in so many instances conflicts with a proper sense of public responsibility. Thus it has happened that the Directors, since 1865, by wrapping themselves in the folds of official reticence, have incurred the risk of being indirectly identified with the demoralised banking of 1864-5. It will be remembered that at the annual meeting of last year, it was not until two or three shareholders charged the Board with having allowed the debtors of the Bank to speculate in cotton, and so extend ruin throughout Bombay, that the Directors

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* See pp. 141-3.

confessed that almost all the losses were on account of transactions in 1864 and the early part of '65. . . . . .

For it must be evident to the most casual observers that the financial demoralisation of Bombay is attributable to the reckless management of its great local Bank, more than to any one cause besides; therefore the required investigation into its past history concerns the public as well as the proprietors. The present Directors have striven to preserve the remnant of the shareholders' property, and their disinterested efforts will be appreciated; but, before taking leave of their post, public duty demands that they should take decided steps in order to prove that they have themselves now no desire for concealment. Unless this be done, they may run some risk of misconstruction. There is, moreover, another reason why they should desire to separate themselves entirely from the former era of the Bank's history; there is every probability that, at the instance of proprietors at home, a Commission of Inquiry may be nominated by the Secretary of State. Would it not be every way more satisfactory if the Board, before resigning its charge, were itself to take the initiative, and pass a resolution requesting the Local Government to order a retrospective and final investigation. If this course were taken, it would require, in order for the work to be done thoroughly, that Calcutta and Madras should each supply a member of the committee. Until the result of this day's meeting is known, no one can calculate with certainty upon obtaining in Bombay men of sufficient independence and impartiality.—*Aug.* 5, 1867.

THE NEW BANK OF BOMBAY: RECONSTRUCTION.

ONE of the peculiarities of the wonderful English people is the energy with which they go to work to repair a disaster. The virtue of foresight they do not even affect, and usually refuse to believe in coming mischief until a catastrophe arrives. Then every one exerts himself to search out the most hidden causes of the misfortune, and firm resolves are made on the spot that nothing of the kind shall again occur. This peculiarity applies particularly to administrative affairs; and, owing to circumstances which need not here be specified, it is more strikingly manifest in India. This contrast between heedless optimism before the event, and the anxious research and wise resolve after an irremediable misfortune, has been exemplified on a national scale by the Orissa famine, while locally it is forcibly illustrated by the sad story of the Bombay Bank, the dying speech and confession of which was pronounced by the Directors themselves yesterday. In the annual report which appears in another column of our present issue, the Board have at last made a clean breast of it. They have done with fancy estimates and "panic rates," and from the schedule of assets presented to the shareholders yesterday—showing a loss of three-fourths of the original capital of the Bank—it is evident there has been no attempt made to take a sanguine view of things. And not only have the Directors taken this business-like course with regard to the facts of the case, but, in accordance with the national characteristic to which we have alluded, they join in supporting an inquiry to settle the important question, "Whom shall we hang?" . . .

There will be other opportunities for commenting on the important document which the Directors have appended to their report, and which, though it does little more than recapitulate what has already been said in every variety of phrase, derives a special and permanent value from their authority. One word we must say with regard to Act XXVIII., to which they assign such serious importance in diminishing the assets of the Bank and in affording immunity to unprincipled insolvents. That improvised statute was condemned as soon as it was brought to the test of actual work. The mischief it was causing was fully exposed in these columns, and also by correspondents who had full acquaintance with all those evil effects that the Directors now attribute to it; but nothing was done by the Local Government to put a stop to the mischief except languidly calling for reports about the ill-favoured bantling. The impartial portion of the public were fully convinced that the most summary process of Executive authority was called for in order to the suspension of the Act, and had that been done eighteen months ago, it appears that the Bombay Bank would have been saved many lakhs of rupees. We trust the proposed Commission of Inquiry will ascertain how it happened that the Local Government—with apparently the grossest negligence—wantonly allowed this Act to run its course. The reference in the Directors' report to the closing of nine inland branches is suggestive of a

course of inquiry which, if the records of those establishments were placed at their disposal, could not fail to enlighten the advocates for the "universal note" and Mr. Dickson's State Bank for all India. We trust now to have done with the unwelcome task of criticising the affairs of the chief monetary institution of the city, and we turn with hope and considerable confidence to the new Bank, which must be kept wholly clear from the taint of the old.—*Aug.* 6, 1867.

II.—The gratifying intelligence that the Secretary of State "has authorised the Local Government to resume its old connection with the new Bank of Bombay" should have an encouraging effect on the community. This wave will bring the barque fairly over the bar, and there will now be nothing but smooth water before the ship, and a favouring gale behind it, if only the crew stand to their posts and are duly vigilant. As is well known, we do not attach essential importance to State proprietorship in the Bank; but this concession was needful to make our new institution thoroughly popular with the native community, and its being granted by the Secretary of State removes every obstruction out of the way. This result, after the prolonged and often unequal struggle maintained in these columns, is necessarily cause for our own congratulation, but that is as nothing compared with the deliverance which awaits the commercial community. It will now be relieved from the incubus of the old Bank; and the legitimate operations of local and internal commerce have every prospect of speedily obtaining that properly regulated assistance which only a strong and healthy Bank can afford. . . . . .

Something should here be said in respect of the liberal and considerate course taken by the Indian Secretary in Council in the settling of this difficult question, and in which we feel tolerably certain he has been earnestly supported, not only by Sir Bartle Frere at home, but by Sir Seymour Fitzgerald and the Government of Bombay. . . . . .
—*Dec.* 10, 1867.

III.—Sir Stafford Northcote, or the Indian Council, is a little too hard upon Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, in putting on his shoulders the final responsibility of the Local Government deciding to take shares in the new Bank of Bombay. It is, in this single instance, a reversal of that policy of imperial centralization against which such loud and often misdirected complaints are made. But the exception is an instructive one. Here is a question in which the Secretary in Council has had the most ample information spread before him, and if there were any purely Indian question, as this is, on which the Home authorities might think themselves capable of coming to a decision, it is the simple but important point of State proprietorship in banks. And the Indian Secretary, supported by the Finance Minister here, had indubitably made up his mind in a sense adverse to such policy, as is shown in the telegram in which he permits the Governor of Bombay—but at his personal peril, as it were—to accept shares in the Bank. After all, Sir Stafford Northcote deserves credit for the good sense displayed in his illogical decision. This is one of those numerous instances in the practical work of administration in which the right judgment can only be decided on the spot. It may be very absurd that native investors and depositors attach such extreme importance—make a *fetish*, as it were—of Government holding a few shares in the new Bank, but every one here knows that such a feeling is cherished in Bombay. Sir Stafford Northcote, though he is, perhaps, not so deficient in imagination as our very able Finance Minister, cannot understand the tenacity with which many even of the intelligent native citizens of Bombay cling to the conviction that it is a good thing for the Government to hold shares in the new Bank. But Sir Seymour Fitzgerald is face to face with the little impediment which has caused so much hindrance at the last moment. Better than a conclave of philosophers in London, he can estimate its special significance as turning the scale. Moreover, he is a man accustomed to look facts in the face; and he is a representative in whose discretion Sir Stafford can repose confidence. Therefore, supported by at least one member of his Council and the efficient Chief Secretary, he will be able without any undue anxiety to carry out the decision, the responsibility for which has been placed in his hands. It may now be safely assumed that the Government of Bombay will become shareholders in the new Bank; and when once that decision is recorded, nothing remains but for the registration to be effected and the allotments distributed.—*Dec.* 10, 1867.

THE NEW BANK OF BOMBAY AND ITS CALCUTTA CRITICS.

ON one hand, we have before us, an item of current news, the statement that the allotment of the first distribution of 10,000 shares to the new Bank of Bombay has been completed, leaving a large surplus of disappointed subscribers; on the other side we have a copy of the Minute of March last by the Secretary of the Bank of Bengal, in which that enterprising gentleman, after remarking that "Madras must follow" in the plan for the "proposed fusion of the Banks," declared himself "ready on very short notice to organise a competent staff to commence operations by opening a Branch (of the Bengal Bank) in Bombay." That plausible scheme, brought forward in "an amicable spirit," had on the face of it a direct attraction for the shareholders of the old Bank of Bombay; and though it received in the first instance the most influential support, further examination showed that it was a one-sided proposal, and that a far better course was open both to the shareholders of the Bank and the community of Bombay. That more excellent way has been taken. The capital required for a new Bank of Bombay has been subscribed by the community itself, or those connected with it; and its management, for good or ill, will be in the hands of men who are thoroughly acquainted with the requirements of local and Indian banking—a condition more likely to ensure safety and profit for the capital invested than would have been the case were "the supreme control and the rules and regulations for the conduct of the business resting in and laid down by the Board in Calcutta," as was proposed in the abortive Minute aforesaid. . . . The struggle for the financial independence of Bombay, in which we have had the honour to take so prominent a share, has now been carried through to success. This has been accomplished in opposition to the strongest influences which the monetary interests of Calcutta could bring to bear, though wielded by a gentleman of most tenacious will and high personal character. The Bengal leanings of the Government of India were also necessarily in favour of the Calcutta view of things. There was also in those high quarters a not unpardonable scepticism as to the possibility of any good financial organisation being constituted in Bombay; while, at a later date, a serious impediment has arisen because of abstract objections formulated by the able financial member of the Supreme Council, backed by the strong desire of the Home Government to withdraw from all the Presidency banks of India. Thanks to Sir Seymour Fitzgerald's moral courage and decision of character, that final impediment is now overcome. The letter from the Chief Secretary formally announcing that Government will take 1,200 shares appears in our paper to-day, and on the 14th prox.—the day after the resolution to wind up the old Bank must be confirmed—the new Bank of Bombay will open for the transaction of business. This being the successful position of the measure, for advocating which we are so roundly abused by our Calcutta contemporaries, it is not in any way needful to undertake any serious refutation of their extraordinary misconceptions and clamours. . . . . .

Our Calcutta contemporary, it appears, has forgotten the Minute of last March, in which Mr. Dickson proposed his utopian plan for a State Bank of India, and when he wrote as if it were a very small thing to "absorb" and "fuse," under the Calcutta Board, the whole internal banking business of Bombay and Madras. It is the veriest squeamishness to say that any public man (and Mr. Dickson is as much a public man as Mr. Laing was, or Mr. Massey is now) who comes forward with proposals of this nature shall shelter himself under the screen of a fluctuating, irresponsible Board. Of course the personal and the financial friends of the Bengal Bank Manager may well feel a little chagrin at witnessing the total collapse of the ambitious and speculative scheme of last March; but they have no right to vent their chagrin in raising the cuckoo cry of "personal abuse" against those whose public duty it has been to show the fallacy and risks pertaining to the grasping Bengal proposal. Our contemporary wishes the Bengal Board had "not been so reticent" in regard to the correspondence between themselves and the old Bank of Bombay. That has not much to do with the matter in hand, otherwise we should suggest that the friends of the Bank of Bengal should have been less disingenuous in regard to the old correspondence respecting branch banks on the debateable ground between the Presidencies. If our contemporary, now under notice, will refer to a paragraph on this subject supplied by a correspondent, which appeared in our yesterday's paper, and also to another a week ago, he will see that in regard to the

old story referred to, he has himself been the victim of a "misrepresentation persistently made or blindly believed." As to the pretended necessity for an Agent of the Bank of Bengal in Bombay, that has been effectually disposed of, and we trust to have heard the last of that ingenious little scheme. If any public question of importance should arise in connection with the relations between the different Presidency banks and the position of the Government towards them, we shall be glad to discuss it according to our lights; but we hope to have done henceforth with the querulous and contentious aspect of the question which has been raised afresh by our Calcutta contemporaries, as if by concert and under one personal impulse. As to the Secretary of the Bengal Bank, we still entertain the high opinion we have always cherished when regarding him as a practical bank manager, invaluable in his rank. Though we may consider him as an unsafe guide in matters of currency and national finance, it is needless to say that as a business man we regard him as worthy of great personal esteem.—*Dec.* 17, 1867.

BOMBAY AND ITS BANKING CAPITAL.

ONE would have thought it impossible, whilst recent experience is speaking so plainly, that any journalist in Bombay should write under utter misapprehension of the simplest questions connected with banking business. And yet there are writers who, it seems, can form no estimate whatever of the due proportion between the amount of banking capital and the actual commercial wants of the city. One of our contemporaries, the other day, after denouncing the Viceroy because he refused to allow the Secretary of the Bengal Bank to tear to shreds the charters of the Presidency banks, proceeds to remark as follows, respecting an establishment here of a branch of that bank: "Such a branch would have been equivalent to the introduction of a large amount of new capital into Bombay, and would have been one of the greatest boons that could be conferred upon this city in its present shattered condition." And much "vexation of spirit" was expressed by the writer because of the "arbitrary stretch of prerogative which has excluded this city from the privilege of having a great and powerful bank opening its doors in our midst." This privilege, be it observed, was to be enjoyed in addition to the use of the new Bank of Bombay, which is nearly ready to begin business. And in the same strain another contemporary professed great delight at the prospect of the Bengal Bank bringing a large portion of its four or five crores of idle cash to this very tight money market, and of "the facilities and accommodation the Bengal Bank would afford to the business of the merchants of Bombay;" and the writer adds, with unaccountable simplicity, "on these grounds we have already cordially welcomed the opening of this important agency." Now let it be borne in mind that "the business of the merchants of Bombay" is the end that requires to be served, and that only by banking accommodation and facilities. There is no question in this connection of that "accommodation" which speculators would all wish to have; nor, on the other hand, of the urgently needed and legitimate demand for the release of unproductive investments and the discharge of indebtedness. That, we admit, can now only be accomplished by the advance of new capital wherever it may come from, or capital that can be spared for the purpose.

To call out just now for additional facilities and new capital to supply the current and legitimate wants of trade in Bombay, whether export, import, or internal, is to show that deplorable delusions exist as to our present commercial position. When people pretend to write on this subject they should show that they have made some attempt to estimate, first, the extent of trade that is being done, and, second, the amount of banking capital which is at present available for the legitimate demands of commerce. . . . .

Lest we should tempt some hasty critics to undertake a bootless task, we will try to explain how it is that, while we have shown there is abundance of funds for banking and trading purposes in Bombay, being that portion of capital which is popularly styled "money," there is also needed some measure that would release a large amount of capital that has been prematurely "fixed"—that is, invested too rapidly in houses, lands, and reclamations. It should be obvious on the face of things that there is no inconsistency in the position we have here taken up. The two kinds of capital pertain to different classes of people, and are applied to totally different purposes. The trading capital is exposed to risk, but claims higher profits, and its varying amount is often determined by

circumstances altogether independent of the contrivance or wishes of its owners; as, for instance, the decline in the price of cotton has virtually increased the total amount of the floating capital of Bombay by thirty per cent. Fixed capital, on the other hand, while it brings a smaller rate of profit, must yield a certain and positive return; and any fear of risk to the principal destroys all confidence and unsettles every relation dependent on it. That is the position in which Bombay finds itself just now. Capital has been invested at too high rates, and much of it in directions where it must necessarily be unproductive for a few years. It is only what are strictly the savings of the community that can safely be invested as fixed capital; and that natural limit has been enormously exceeded in Bombay during the last five years. Undue or inconsiderate investments in some directions have disturbed and depreciated even the legitimate values of real property in every direction. Hence, the enormous mass of mutual indebtedness under which the city vainly struggles cannot be adjusted, distributed, or settled. That real property, if forced into the market now, must be sold at a price much below the cost of production, or any other permanent test of actual value, every one knows. There are illustrations of this on every side; we may mention, at random, the well-built bonded warehouses at Colaba, which, a few months ago, some one bought for one-third or fourth of their value. The "Grant Buildings" the other day fetched only 2½ lakhs, though, before prices went up, they had cost six to build, and the last owner had given twelve lakhs for the property. Thus, while there is plenty of money ready to be advanced on twice the quantity of cotton that is likely to come forward, there is comparatively very little capital indeed that is available for investing in the mass of real property that is still hanging over the market, the money value of which requires to be distributed and allotted amongst creditors, so that they may again discharge their own obligations. The liberation of one or two millions of locked-up capital, and which would be effected by the State repaying the outlay on the Elphinstone and Victoria properties, is exactly the kind of relief most needed in Bombay. As for "accommodation" to careful traders, and "banking facilities" for legitimate commerce, there is even more than is absolutely needed in Bombay at present.—*Nov.* 18, 1867.

THE BANK OF BENGAL'S ENCROACHMENTS.*

THE Deputy Controller-General is now the performer of the day in the protracted farce in which the Government of India kills time and serves the interests of its provincial and private clients by sham minuting and reporting on the Bengal Bank's Agency in Bombay. That gentleman's formidable designation serves very well for popular use in the solemn trifling by which the Financial Department of the Supreme Government has lowered itself to the level of a speculator's parish cabal; and his report will be used as a buffer or cork-fender between Sir Richard Temple and the Secretary of State. To allow a mere administrative functionary to become the exponent of the Supreme Government in a matter on which hangs the whole question of the Indian Presidency banks, is about as absurd as it would be to call upon a sergeant-major to indite a minute on the political policy for the North-west frontier. It is not long since the sub-department of the Supreme Government known as the Bengal Bank moved to have the Advocate-General of Bengal asked to find an attorney's excuse for the glaring breach of public faith involved in the unlimited and unrestricted "collection of outstandings." Of course that polite and pliant functionary advised the Bengal "debt collectors" to go on as before, and to make hay whilst the sun shone—that is, so long as the Secretary of State could be hoodwinked.

Now we ask once more, how long is this farce to go on? We wish it were shown to the satisfaction of the public of Bombay that its Government has done all that can be

* The Presidency banks of India are a somewhat peculiar institution—similar to, and yet unlike, the Bank of England; but their constitution may be understood by those who read this group of extracts in conjunction with those, a few pages back, describing the successful struggle for reconstruction of the Bank of Bombay. There are three of these quasi-State banks—one for each of the old presidential divisions of India—but the geographical boundaries of their operations not having been precisely defined in their respective charters, there was an opening for the daring attempt by the Bank of Bengal to annex the whole field of the Bombay Bank—an attempt defeated only after a protracted and determined struggle.

done in this matter. Was Lord Mayo fully informed on the subject before he could be tampered with by Sir Richard Temple, Sir H. Durand, and other inveterate Bengali partisans? It is impossible the Duke of Argyll can be acquainted with the facts of the case, that he can be aware how the orders of his good-natured predecessor were set aside, or that he knows how the whole system of the Presidency banks in India is being subverted by a side-wind. Still less can he suspect that this is being done solely in deference to the personal interests of the shareholders in one of them, because it happens to be afflicted with a plethora of capital which it cannot use profitably within the limits prescribed by its charter. Were the Duke to follow out the history of this Bengal Bank case, he would see that, laudably anxious though he be to increase the authority of the Governor-General, such authority is always liable to be used adversely to the interests of the larger part of India so long as the Supreme Government is so largely dominated by Bengal influences. Were the Duke of Argyll to bethink him of taking counsel on this subject with his now aged predecessor, Lord Halifax—the one man who fully understands the polity and relationships of the Indian Presidency banks—the present invasion of the Bombay Bank's field and the ostentatious defiance of Home authority would not continue one month from date. Lord Halifax would point out that the Bengal Bank has violated its understanding with the State, and that its charter may be revoked at any time—a contingency for which the Bengal Bank shareholders must of course have long held themselves prepared. It would probably tend much to the Duke's enlightenment—as regards the impunity with which the Bengal Bank has been and is permitted to overpass its assigned limits and place itself above the law—were he to call, confidentially of course, for a return of the Bengal Bank shares held now and during the last two years by servants of the Government of India. . . . . .—*April* 9, 1869.

II.—In referring to the humiliatingly partisan course followed by the Supreme Government in the matter of the Bengal Bank's lawless competition in this city, the *Madras Times* very properly gives prominence to the administrative aspect of the question. The rights and interests of the shareholders in the new Bank of Bombay alone furnished sufficient ground for the peremptory winding up of the Bengal Bank's "collection of outstandings," before the defiant step of purchasing costly premises in Bombay was taken by Mr. Dickson. The indefinite and serious risks, both to commercial and State finance, which are incurred by the unwieldy capital of the Bengal Bank being spread over provinces with which Calcutta has no natural trade connection, and the competition of that State bank with the other two that are bound up with the Imperial finances, are palpable evils which a Finance Minister of ordinary prudence and impartiality would have nipped in the bud. By this we mean, that as soon as the purchase by the Bengal Bank of premises here, the trafficking in bills, and the opening of new business, revealed the deceptive and designing nature of the pleas put forward in order to get foothold, Imperial interests demanded the most rigorous interpretation being put on those pleas. By promptly insisting on those pleas being tested, the Government of India would have avoided the false position it now occupies. More serious than these considerations, if possible, are those connected with the attitude into which the Government of India has drifted between the Secretary of State, the Government of Bombay, and the new Bank of Bombay on one side, and on the other the shareholders of the Bengal Bank. It is more than ever desirable that India should be governed in India; but there have been few instances of late years showing more forcibly than has this crucial test of the Bengal Bank's encroachment on Bombay, how difficult it is for the Supreme authority in India to act with firm impartiality when financial interests are concerned in the province with which the Executive is so closely associated. Now, it is seen that the Secretary of State's orders can be coolly defied, or, what comes to the same thing, parleyed with and postponed indefinitely at the instance and in the interests of the provincials concerned. . . . So far from legislation being needed in order to remove the intruding Agency from Bombay, it is much more likely that, if strict justice be done, there will require a Bill of indemnity and compensation for the injury caused by the Bengal Bank's flagrant violation of the spirit and scope of its charter. In bar of a measure of this kind, the Bengal Board can only plead the "consent" of unwary and favouring administrators, who, little to their credit as such, were caught with the far-reaching guile of Mr. Dickson's letter of November, 1866.

The end of this struggle must be nearly at hand, when the Government of India will vindicate its self-respect and the Secretary of State his authority. In order to leave no excuse for continuance of the State-supported competition to which the new Bank of Bombay is so unfairly subjected, its Directors have announced the issue of the full amount of its subscribed capital, thereby complying with the letter of the charter, though no doubt, as bankers, they regret to acquire as capital the funds which they could readily obtain in the shape of deposits. Notwithstanding the certainty of the Bengal Agency being about to be disposed of, we are not surprised that some vigilant people hold the belief that that great leviathan, the amalgamation snake, is only "scotched, not killed." This augury is founded on the fact of the Bengal Bank's unnecessarily large capital, which cannot be made to return an Indian rate of interest whilst the Board honestly confirms to the terms of its charter. The shareholders should inquire how the capital came to be so much larger than is needed in the legitimate operations of the Bank. They would then find that there is no ground for the State to revolutionise its system of Presidency banks, merely in order to recoup the Bengal shareholders for a decline in premium, which almost inevitably follows from former injudicious policy on the part of their own managers.—*May* 27, 1869.

III.—Our two Calcutta contemporaries who have been whistling to keep up the courage of the trespassers on the banking preserves of this Presidency, are welcome to such transient consolation as they may find in our yesterday's note of the interview with the Secretary of State. His Grace appears to have been taking lessons in the fine art of receiving deputations; and, though necessarily a little stiff and awkward as yet, he succeeded in maintaining to the full the correct deportment of a reticent Minister who has to consider not only Cabinet colleagues, but also a Council. The Duke had just gone through that process of rapid conversion in regard to his own power over the Indian revenues, on which he was pleasantly rallied by his peers, Salisbury and Cairns, in the debate reproduced in our paper two days ago. He was probably that very week about to have a set conference with Lord Halifax on the whole subject of the Indian Presidency banks. Having just been set right by his Lordship on one Indian financial question, his Grace would be chary of again subjecting himself to a mental wrench in regard to another subject on which Lord Halifax is sufficient of a master to be more than a match for a troop of Mr. Dicksons and Sir Richard Temples. Hence the Duke's prevailing thought appears to have been that he should not commit himself; but this very caution only renders the more significant his Grace's assurance, to the effect that however open to criticism the partisan attitude of the Supreme Government in this question might have been aforetime, it would thenceforth be found that the Viceroy and his colleagues were in earnest in desiring the withdrawal of the Bengal Bank's Agency from Bombay; . . . but no revision of the system of Presidency banks can possibly grant to the Bengal Bank impunity to violate the policy of the charter by which it enjoys its privileges. This is what is done every week any separate Bengal Agency remains in the Bombay Presidency, and the Duke of Argyll showed that he knows sufficient of the question to be uncomfortably conscious of the false position into which the authorities have been entrapped.

With regard to the outcome of the renewed consideration of the system of Presidency banks, we hazard no prediction. If anything would precipitate a decision in the direction towards which the Duke of Argyll personally inclined—that is, the withdrawal of Government from all connection with the banks—the occasion might be found in the insidious method by which Mr. Dickson obtained "consent" to set up a rival establishment in Bombay, and the present dogged resistance by the Bengal Board to orders of the Secretary of State and to the strongly expressed wishes of the Government of India. . .

We do not care to dwell on the real difficulty present, no doubt, in the mind of the Duke of Argyll, but of which he could not openly speak to the deputation. He had evidently then become aware that the Government of India had been, at least temporarily, overreached; and it is easy to imagine the disgust of the somewhat haughty peer in feeling that a great department in this country had been placed in a false position, and that the Supreme Government must for the present appear as the subservient colleague of a Board of Bank Directors. If our high-minded contemporaries can exult

over this situation, they are welcome to do so; but we are none the less sure that the pettifogging feat henceforth to be remembered by the term "collection of outstandings," will have done much to diminish the baneful predominance of Bengal provincialism in the counsels of what should be the Government of India. . . . Let those concerned be comforted, for the shareholders of the Bank are quite satisfied as to the "pledges," if that be the proper term, given not only by the Bombay, but by the Supreme Government. Moreover, the draft Charter of the Bank of Bombay has been "in print" many a month, and if the writer in the *Englishman* will restrain himself, he shall see it on publication. We scarcely need remark that the deputation were mistaken in their impression that the Bengal Bank has laid hands on the treasuries under the Residency of Hyderabad. It is no fault of that encroaching institution that this was not the case; but that the attempt was frustrated, affords strong evidence in corroboration of the Duke of Argyll's assurance, that the temper of the Supreme Government is changed for the better in regard to the unseemly policy of the Bengal Board.—*June* 11, 1869.

IV.—The "Fourth] Report" of the new Bank of Bombay, which appeared in our columns yesterday, is at once concise and perspicuous. No one conversant with the course of trade in Western India could expect more than a minimum dividend for the latter half of the year, and the report reminds us of the well-known adverse circumstances of the past season which, in curtailing the profits of legitimate trade, have tended to restrict the ordinary operations of the Bank. These are the times when bankers are tempted to step aside from the narrow path of strictly safe business; but it is needless to remark that the new Bank of Bombay is not likely even to go near the way of temptation. "No bad debt has been incurred during the half-year," and notwithstanding the increase of capital, a fair dividend has been made without indenting on any reserve funds or anticipating resources. In these respects the new and vigorous Bank presents a favourable contrast to its overgrown sister institution and unfairly patronised rival. . . . . .

The question, then, is simply this, are those finally responsible for Indian administration—the Secretary of State and the Supreme Government—likely to yield a position regarded as indispensable to the financial steadiness of the country, merely because that position is mutinously and irregularly assailed by the commercial Directors of the Bengal Bank? And if the authorities were weakly inclined to surrender the financial position, it would still be to ask, are the shareholders in the Presidency banks and the mercantile community generally prepared to see those institutions separated from State connection, supervision, and support? This is the result which the Bengal Board is driving at; and though, in the false position into which their Bank has been allowed to drift, such desperate means of extrication may commend itself to the Directors and their ambitious Manager, it is high time they took the shareholders into their confidence. It is very probable that the captain and mates are taking a cruise of which the passengers would highly disapprove; and though the latter may have no legal ground for demanding to be taken into council, they ought to be allowed to fully understand to what they are being committed. Are the Bengal Bank shareholders prepared both for disendowment and disestablishment? If they raise the cry of free banking, they must be prepared for all the perils and chances of ordinary joint-stock management. . . . . .

It is not an uncommon thing in the case of a merchant leaving his business to sons, or when partners separate from a firm by mutual consent, for those concerned to enter into strict legal agreement defining what counties or countries shall be reserved as the exclusive field of trade for each party concerned. Suppose, in the course of a little time, one of these mutual agreeing parties, happening to come in for some windfall of capital, should think it needful "for his own special safety"—that is, for the increase of his profits—to poach on the preserves of his brethren. Of course he could plead "free trade" principles on his side, and might resolutely refuse to see why he should not do as he liked with his own. Probably, however, in the case of this private raider, some enlightened judge might be found who, by the use of terms forcible though polite, would convince him that no consideration of what was required for his "own special safety," no vague talk about general rights, no audacious taking advantage of opportunity, would avail to excuse him in tearing a

compact to shreds, or in despising the conditions of a well-understood agreement. Probably, having enjoyed some profits from his stealthy or bold transgression, he might raise the cry of "coercion," as is now done by anticipation on behalf of the Bengal Bank. Yet in that case, the decree of the Court would be executed without reference to the groans of the grasping but disappointed trader. It is a small thing to expect the Supreme Government of India to act with the impartiality and firmness which would be expected from an ordinary court of justice. . . . . .

What decent defence can there be for an insidious encroachment, the two great pleas for which are—first, that for a few weeks towards the close of 1867 the Bank required to "collect" certain insignificant "outstandings;" and second, that a few months later it purchased certain premises without asking leave, and was not ordered by the Supreme Government to sell them at once? There is another plea not put forward, but it is a strong and sound one—defiant self-interest. The triumph of this force one could understand, but not under an Imperial administration whose firmness was equal to its regard for good faith. The new legal member of the Supreme Council is free from some hindrances which slightly interfered with Mr. Maine's willingness to carry out the Secretary of State's wishes by way of a short Act; and were the Viceroy firm enough, this course could be taken by Mr. Stephen, and the reproach would be removed in a month. But, as we have intimated, there are still more direct methods of enforcing the will of the Supreme Government—if it had the will.—*Jan.* 25, 1870.

V.—A Calcutta contemporary shows some signs of perturbation because the Old Bank of Bombay has been revisiting the pale glimpses of the moon. Here we may make a note in passing, that as the old lady flitted across the scene the other day in care of her keeper, Mr. Liquidator Rodgie, she presented a much better figure than might have been expected after the desperate attempts at revival towards the close of 1866, when it seemed likely that the unlucky shareholders might have to pay for the costs of winding up rather than receive anything back. As it is, more than Rs. 100 per share have been returned. As to the case of the continuously holding old shareholders—and they have a case, though they are jeeringly asked whether it is one of which the Courts can take cognisance—we have not much to say about it at present. It is mainly one of private interests, though it turns upon the question of public responsibility, and, painful to remark, may affect a couple of lakhs or so of public money. Our Calcutta contemporary gratuitously advises the old shareholders to go into Chancery. We think it was Horne Tooke who was reminded by the smooth-spoken officials of his day who detested agitation, that the "Registration Courts were open" to him and his troublesome friends: "Yes," replied the radical lexicographer, "I know, but so is the London Tavern." Now that the victims who confided in Government and its bank directors have got a spokesman at St. Stephen's, they may not find it needful to trouble the Court of Chancery.

Turning from this semi-private question, we come to that which is purely a public one—the transgression by one department of the Supreme Government of the legal and impartial attitude which that Government was bound to maintain towards the three Presidency banks. Our brief notice of this subject last week would have been quite sufficient but for the response it has evoked appearing in such an unexpected quarter. . . . The establishment of an agency, virtually a branch, of the Bank of Bengal in this city, competing, as it must, with the Government Bank of Bombay, is a flagrant transgression of the terms and privileges accorded to the Calcutta institution. So extreme is this violation, that we should not wonder to see an attempt at justifying it based on the assertion that there is no clause in the charter forbidding such transgression—its framers never having dreamed that any course so audacious would be attempted or permitted. But the "high contracting parties" never took account for the conjunction of Sir R. Temple as Finance Minister; Mr. E. H. Lushington, as Financial Secretary and Chairman of the Bengal Bank Directors; and Mr. George Dickson as Manager of that institution. Under this extraordinary coincidence of celestial influences, Bengal, or its Bank, "cried for the moon"—and got it. The astute Manager was permitted to entrap the Supreme Government into allowing assent to pass by default; and thus it happened that a solemn law and ordinance was disregarded in furtherance of the private interests of shareholders in the Bank of Bengal. . . . . .

In the meantime, we have not again referred to this matter as a grievance—though to the old-new shareholders it is a very palpable one—but as a striking proof how hollow is the Simla watchword of decentralization. At the very period when the central administration was preparing to make itself famous by relinquishing some of the irritating control it has so uselessly exercised in minor matters, it permitted its most influential department to abet and carry through an intrigue on behalf of certain local financial interests in Calcutta, in defence of which the same central administration now exercises all its negative power. The Supreme Government, in relation to the most important commercial institution in India, falls back on the device of the last ecclesiastic Government in the world, and pleads—*non possumus*. This may not be dignified, but it is perfectly in character with the present financial *régime*. . . . . .—*May* 3, 1871.

VI.—It shall not be our fault if we are drawn into any renewed discussion in regard to the pretension of the Bengal Bank to do as it likes in spite of its constitution as a quasi State Bank. The way in which its late astute Secretary contrived by dint of a plea which, at best, could only have temporary appositeness, to get foothold as a competing Bank in Bombay, and the fact that the Secretary of State long since condemned that intrusion and decreed it should cease, are all matters of history. There has not been, as alleged, any new move on the part of "the supporters of the New Bank of Bombay." . . . . . .

There is one notable fallacy which runs throughout a recent article in the *Pioneer*. It is one very characteristic of the provincialism which quietly assumes that the claims and pretensions of Calcutta are the interests of India, and that the provinces and persons more immediately within the influence of the Supreme Government have an undoubted claim to whatever preference or pecuniary favour is in the power of the Viceroy to give. It was only under the pressure of that strong Bengal influence which ever and anon biassed Lord Lawrence's policy, that the Bengal Bank could have stolen the march it did in 1867-68. The fallacy in the columns of our Allahabad contemporary to which we allude is that of substituting "the Bengal Bank" for the "system of Indian Presidency Banks." Thus this misleading pretension runs:—"The position which the Bank of Bengal holds in the Indian commercial system;" "The Bank has come to be regarded as the ultimate source of credit in the commercial transactions of the greater part of India;" "The Government of India is fortunate in having an institution like the Bank of Bengal already existing," &c. The writer has here got hold of a sound principle, but in applying it falls into a mere narrow, local groove. . . . . .

It has been our argument all through, that in the Presidency Bank system India has a "strong financial institution on which credit may lean." Those who understand the federal basis on which that system rests—and it is of no use speaking to others on the subject—are well aware that for each of the three Banks to set up competing Agencies in each of the three Presidency cities would speedily dislocate this imperial institution, and not only "might (but would) involve the danger of a financial crisis." This is the "explanation"—which the Allahabad writer is, on his own confession, "incapable" of conceiving—why the Secretary of State, and, we trust, the Viceroy also, is determined that the Bank of Bengal shall not have the use of the Treasury balances to enable it to compete with another Presidency Bank. The notion that such a one-sided and disintegrating policy would be permitted, is a striking manifestation of Bengal provincialism.—*Jan.* 8, 1874.

VII.—One or two recent articles in the Calcutta press induce us rather unwillingly once more to allude to that much-vexed question, the local Agency of the Bank of Bengal. Our contemporaries, by the most perverted sophistry, affect to hold the Secretary of State responsible for all manner of consequences that must ensue from the enforcement of his order for the withdrawal of the Agency, and denounce his treatment of the Bank of Bengal as "contemptible, mean, and hardly honest." Now, many persons are apt to overlook facts, and to accept specious arguments adroitly put forward as fair representations by an unprejudiced writer; and it is for this reason only that we revert to the question. It cannot be supposed that the Secretary of State, the India Council, or the Government of India, had any end of a personal character to serve in relegating the intrusive Agency to its own Presidency; but much obloquy may be thrown upon one and all of these authorities by the circulation of unscrupulous statements, and we therefore would show, for instance, how untenable is the position assumed by the *Englishman*.

It is asserted that the meaning of the Secretary of State's order is simply that the Bank of Bengal's business in Bombay shall not be managed by an officer of its own, appointed by the Directors. But the truth is that the Agency has no right to be here at all. Its presence in this city is due to an audacious usurpation. . . . Therefore the order for the withdrawal of the separate Agency is but a tardy act of justice to the new Bank of Bombay. It merely requires the Bank of Bengal to retire from a position into which it stole under false pretences. If there be "meanness" in this, our readers will be able to judge whether it is the Secretary of State or the Directors of the Bank of Bengal who can be accused of conduct barely honest.

If the Bank of Bengal be compelled to withdraw its Agency, the Secretary of State is reminded by our Calcutta contemporaries that it is more easy to pull down than to rebuild. Ominous language this, the import of which we can only guess at. . . . And it exhibits an entire misapprehension of the history and facts of the case when the *Indian Daily News* represents that the Secretary of State ever intimated his "intention of not interfering any further," and that the "stipulation is renewed," our contemporary is careful not to say "made," "at an almost critical period of the Bank's career." The India Office and Supreme Government long since took up this position, which, now the "critical period" duly referred to in "former correspondence" has arrived, neither of those authorities can possibly depart from.

The simple truth is that right has at last conquered might; and we congratulate the Bank of Bombay in having adopted and steadily pursued a policy which has at last realised such a result. The best thing the Bank of Bengal Directors can do is to bow to the Secretary of State's order, endeavour to forget the past, and work harmoniously with the other two Presidency Banks in India.—*Jan.* 10, 1874.

MODERN SANITATION IN BOMBAY:

CLEARING THE WAY.

HAVING already briefly noticed the Municipal Commissioner's Report for 1866, and bespoken attention to its comprehensive and important contents, we now turn to the Health Officer's Report, which, though subsidiary to Mr. Crawford's, itself forms a distinct and complete treatise. Dr. Hewlett has the advantage of addressing the community after it has learned at least the alphabet of sanitary science. No one can now affect to be ignorant of the main facts relating to the extent, physical characteristics, and aggregate population of the island; neither can any one be insensible to the dangers of overcrowding, or of the misery that is inflicted on all classes by defective drainage, unwholesome food, and contaminated air or water. The Health Officer's Report will, therefore, find readers who can readily appreciate what has been attempted, and form some conception of the importance of what remains to be done; but we imagine few will be prepared for some of the revelations contained in Dr. Hewlett's thin quarto. Some years ago a certain clever Mrs. Crowe strung together, in the form of a book, all the strange and startling ghost stories she could find, and entitled her work "The Night-side of Nature;" but Dr. Hewlett might with far more reason have called his dreadful record "Researches on the Night-side of Bombay."

He tells us of those unpleasant circumstances that are in some way or other inseparable from all town life, but from all mention of which every one likes to turn away. The Health Officer's Report is, however, the proper place for these things, and it must be admitted that Dr. Hewlett has made full use of his opportunity. If his pages make fastidious people shudder, they should arouse amongst thoughtful people—especially amongst influential native gentlemen who are the only permanent residents—an untiring determination to do all that can be done to sweep away these abominations from the island. Besides determination, there is needed careful study and much considerate forethought. . . . We shall require, in addition to the Vehar Lake, another system of water-works rivalling the Croton Aqueduct of New York, or Loch Katrine system by which Glasgow is supplied. We are told in this report that the dense jungle of habitations known as the native town, covers an area of 60,660 acres only, giving a space of six and a-half square yards for each of the 449,891 people who there reside. . . . Bombay has, far more than Calcutta, an indisputable claim for Imperial aid in the matter of municipal and sanitary improvements, and will, no doubt, receive such assistance; but

if all other sanitary reforms are to be carried out to the complete extent just indicated there will be sufficient left to strain the resources of the Municipality for a generation to come. And yet disease and death wait upon no financial convenience. Such is now the position of sanitary science that—supposing we could always insure money being wisely spent—the bills of mortality must bear a corresponding but reverse proportion to the outlay on sanitary improvement. . . . . .

The task of the grave-digger is one that never ceases for a day, and unless some municipal arrangement were contrived for the removal of the dead out of the island, and that at a very small cost, the classes whose funerals are by far the most numerous must be allowed to bury within a walking distance. Dr. Hewlett, if he could have his way, would get over the difficulty by adopting universally "the most cleanly method of removing the dead"—speedy reduction of the remains to ashes by means of intense heat—but only a comparatively small proportion of society is ready to acquiesce in this facile method of removal. We are glad, however, to observe that it is intended the Municipality shall assist those of the poorer classes who are willing so to dispose of their dead. The Health Officer expresses a strong objection against the continued maintenance of the Parsee Towers of Silence on their present site; and though no one would wish to interfere with the peculiar practices of our Zoroastrian fellow-citizens in this respect, it would be a great advantage to the community if they could be induced to accept some remoter site; but we are astonished to find Dr. Hewlett suggesting the Flats as an alternative. Judging by his report, and the pictures in it of his flock of feathered undertakers, a considerable portion of that deplorable region already merits the designation of "Golgotha." As a satisfactory conclusion to our remarks on this dismal subject, we may congratulate the Commissioner on his having finally arranged the picturesque and suitably situated European cemetery at Sewree; and we trust that by means of some economical arrangement with the G.I.P., the spacious site at Matoonga may be made available for the Portuguese community. . . . . .

No great and general improvements in sanitation are likely to be carried out effectually unless numbers of persons who have much leisure and some wealth at their disposal become imbued with an intelligent public spirit, and cordially co-operate with the Commissioner and Health Officer. We believe that there is not a little of this spirit growing up in Bombay, some of which finds exercise in the zealous voluntary labours of the Standing Committee of Justices. There has always been a fund of active benevolence to draw upon in this community, and from that will probably be supplied the additional hospital accommodation which Dr. Hewlett shows to be so urgently needed. The funds for the long-promised European General Hospital are now provided by the Supreme Government, and it remains for our Local Executive to press forward with the building. The striking improvement in the rate of mortality shown in the figures for 1866 would seem to cast discredit upon the dreadful account of our sanitary affairs as depicted on many pages of Dr. Hewlett's Report; but the explanation, we believe, is, that both are true—the death-rate relatively so at least. The humidity of the Bombay atmosphere tempers the scorching heat of our tropical sun, and the salubrious sea-breeze drives off or neutralizes the foul odours which arise from low-lying sites and the undrained and overcrowded portions of the island, which have, as yet, an inexhaustible disease-producing capacity. Since 1864, the overcrowding in the more pestiferous portions of the city has been much abated, and to that circumstance, together with some decrease in the aggregate population (thereby disturbing the arithmetic of the calculation), must be attributed most of the diminution from 30·62 per 1,000 to 20·50; but we think still more of it is due to the municipal reforms that have been introduced under Mr. Crawford, especially those worked by Dr. Hewlett and his staff of European Inspectors, whose arduous labours he very properly notices.—*May* 18, 1867.

VARIETIES OF TRADE NEEDED FOR BOMBAY.

CAN Bombay now hold its own in the commercial world? This is in effect the question put in another column by "Merchant," and in which he endeavours to show that, in face of the now certain and permanent decline of cotton prices, Bombay and its producing territories are thrown back to the position this Presidency occupied seven years ago. "Merchant" seems to think, indeed, that we are worse now

than, then, inasmuch as before the American War "we were doing well," in the best commercial sense of the term. That is, both agriculturists and merchants were turning their attention—as we would say, with varying success—to every new source of production that promised to yield profit from its export. Saltpetre was being manufactured in Sind; coffee-planting and the coffee trade from the Malabar Coast were actively pushed forward; hemp was being grown, gunny cloth and other fibrous products were being utilised; some had begun to cure hides and sheep-skins; so that Bombay promised to rival Bengal in the multiform variety of its exports. All this intelligent activity was manifested in addition to the steadily increasing trade in oil seeds, wool, and a few other staple products for which there was a steady demand, not in any way liable, as it is argued, to reaction, as is the case with our grand cotton trade, that has swallowed up all the rest. "Merchant" points to the certainty that cotton being our sole staple, our total export values will shrink very seriously during the ensuing season, while we have no other products that can fill up the gap in any appreciable degree. He compares this state of things with the expanding variety (not the aggregate extent) of our exportable resources seven years ago, and asks, mournfully, if not reproachfully—"Who can tell what progress we might have made in six or seven years, if the American War had not broken out, leading us to almost ignore every article of export except cotton?" We have fiddled upon one string; and now, when that is relaxed or broken, the music of profitable commerce is no more heard in our streets.

Although there is one obvious and reassuring reply to this discouraging statement, it yet embodies so much of fact that we should be glad for the plain truth to be fairly looked at by every one concerned in the trade of Bombay, and all development of the industrial resources of Western India. . . . . .

It is true that the ryots who have sown cotton this season, especially in districts where the breadth under good food crops is inadequate, may suffer a certain amount of loss. But, even by the theory of a "Merchant," they will only lose the difference between the higher profit they might have gained by growing oil seeds or finer products, and that which they will get from their cotton crop; for we hold that even in the most adverse result, wherever good cotton has been sown, the ryot will have a working profit this year also. If the agricultural population and those immediately connected with them—the producers of this Presidency—are not only uninjured by having devoted their energies to one exportable product during the last three or four years, but are in a better position than ever to avail themselves of their largely increased facilities, there is then no cause for permanent despondency.

There is, we admit, pressing occasion for increasing the variety and the exportable value of our productions, as well as for improving our means of communication, which are still so poor, and also our shipping facilities. Our correspondent does good service in calling attention to the great need for new agricultural enterprise, and we know the practical turn he has tried to give to his remarks will not be lost sight of by those who have influence with our producers. The cry that has been raised at home for giving us a Minister of Agriculture and Commerce points to an urgent want, though the demand is somewhat misdirected. Our revenue Commissioners and Collectors are the real working Agricultural Department of India—at least in Western and Central India—and in this Presidency they have already effected far more than could ever have been done by any theoretical Minister of Agriculture on the continental fashion. We are much mistaken if the more intelligent and energetic amongst them are not already casting about for methods of increasing the elements of commercial success by multiplying the variety and raising the quality of other products besides cotton, though that great staple for a long time to come is sure to get the lion's share of attention. At the forthcoming Agricultural Shows at Broach and Akola, pains should be taken to have exhibited as many as possible of any plants which are likely to increase our export list of dyes, drugs, and fibres; and we doubt not the Chamber of Commerce will do what it can to aid in evoking the yet unappreciated treasures of Indian jungles and forests. This is one part of our task for the future, but a far more important and more pressing work is that of spreading our three months' rainfall over the whole year, and so rendering the food of the people secure, and enabling them to cultivate at will the most profitable class of products. As Colonel Strachey, the Commissioner for Irrigation, will shortly be due in this Presidency, we may hope that at last something will be done on an adequate scale to increase the productive power of the soil in Western India.—*Oct.* 12, 1867.

THE EASTERN OR THE WESTERN CAPITAL.

FAR be it from us to say anything unnecessarily to wound the *amour propre* of our Eastern contemporaries, or of Her Majesty's servants in the other Presidencies; but the Calcutta press is so determined to be angry and peevish about the arrangements made by our Commander-in-Chief for the Abyssinian Expedition that we are compelled to humour it to the top of its bent. . . . Sir Robert Napier, though originally a Bengal Engineer, is a Queen's commander, and being peculiarly well qualified, and conveniently located for carrying into effect Her Majesty's behests, what more natural and proper than that he should be entrusted with such duty, just as fully and implicitly as if he had been in China or at Malta, and operations had, in either case, to be undertaken against Japan or Egypt? Why should the attention of the Indian authorities be needlessly called away to affairs that only concern them remotely, when those affairs can be effectively attended to by an officer in the "smallest Presidency of India," acting in conjunction with the oft-times snubbed Local Government? It is true that in consequence of the expedition, certain internal arrangements of Indian troops will engage the attention of the Commander-in-Chief and that of the subordinate administrations; but this will only involve a few changes and dispositions similar to those of the ordinary reliefs. There was no occasion, on this account, for the whole framework of Indian military administration to be put under strain for what concerns political India only so much as it concerns Ceylon or Australia. We have at various times, and in divers shapes, set forth these matters of fact as inculcating a common-sense view of the Home Government's proceedings, but our humble efforts at conciliation are of no avail. Still our Bengal contemporaries aver that their clients are trampled upon, and—with a thinly veiled contemptuous lip-honour which, for the nonce, they accord to the Viceroy—they assert that the Supreme Government is humiliated, and that it has changed places with that of Bombay! Some ten days ago we published, as told by our Simla correspondent, the chief facts connected with this chance rivalry, and though his version necessarily put the case strongly on behalf of Eastern India and the Commander-in-Chief, the statement showed that there was really no case at all. And, notwithstanding the ominous hints muttered by the *Friend* as to certain papers having gone home by the mail that are intended to make Sir S. Northcote uncomfortable, we feel tolerably certain that Sir John Lawrence knows better than follow the querulous cue and "note of provinciality" sought to be forced upon him by a portion of the Calcutta press. . . . . .

There is one apparently serious assertion in this string of scolding on which we must remark in passing. Something is said about Bombay "as the smallest of the Presidencies, having to draw on the rest of India for supplies." We have already remarked on the ambiguous sense in which the *Friend* has used the term "resources"; but we must remind our Bengal fellow subjects that they are contributing to the Imperial revenues of India considerably *less* than their equitable proportion, while Bombay contributes annually to the national fund two millions sterling more, relatively, than do the population of Bengal. So if it were any question of handling or disbursing Indian funds, "the smallest of the Presidencies" (the people and the land) which is also the most productive financially, has the primary claim. . . . If we use the term "resources" in the sense of appliances needful for the purposes in hand, it will be found that Western India was so well supplied in the matter of steamers and transports, that a charge of needless improvidence may possibly, when Parliament meets, be brought against the Home Government. Already the pioneer party and advance brigade have gone, to be followed on the 23rd by the Belooches and other troops from Kurrachee; but there has not been the slightest difficulty in taking up or purchasing in this port a flotilla amply sufficient for this purpose. In all probability, the greater portion of the vessels now on the voyage to the African coast may be back in Bombay before the rest of the troops from this Presidency, with the Commander-in-Chief's staff, will be ready to leave. Even if this should not be the case, we imagine it would not be difficult again to take up in Bombay a sufficient number of steamers and transports. Where, then, was the necessity for the 18,000 tons of steam vessels and other transports taken up in such hot haste by the authorities at home, just as if Bombay were a decaying port without any local resources? Probably the War Office had consulted some retired merchant who had grown up in the notion that Calcutta and Lower Bengal are all India, and that nothing but a few cotton ships would be found at Bombay.—*Oct.* 17, 1867.

BOMBAY AND INDIA AT THE PARIS EXHIBITION.

THE Report from the "Special Commissioner for the Government of Bombay at the Universal Exhibition, Paris, 1867"—a fearful title we promise never to write out again—is a document which demands some little notice. Next to the "admirable catalogue" of Mr. Eshwuntrao K. Palekar, that gave to the Bombay contributions the only fair chance they appear to have had, and for which Dr. Birdwood would generously award the gratuity of Rs. 1,000, the Report itself is, for Bombay, about the best result of the Exhibition. It is by no means full of smooth sayings, nor is it crammed with compliments, or dressed off with conciliatory apologies. Far better than could be done in any holiday essay of that kind, it tells us the plain and unpleasant truth as to the poor figure which Western India was forced to cut in the vaunted "Exposition Universelle." It pushes aside some of the trappings of the imposing Napeolonic bazaar, and proves that, while they affect to manage things better in France, there are no shams so complete as those under the "copper captaincy." In justification of this conclusion, we have only to refer to the description given in this Report of the hopeless confusion and blundering that resulted from the peremptory political order that the jurors should make their return before the 1st of May, though the Exhibition was never fairly exhibited until the middle of June. What could possibly come of this, except such results as those trenchantly recorded by the Bombay Commissioner—that "the ignorance of some of the persons of their duties was incredible," that gentlemen of recognised authority on certain classes were docketted for other departments "of which they were as ignorant as any persons of their great knowledge could be." After all this imperious mismanagement, one can well believe that "it is impossible to exaggerate the falsehood of the silver and bronze jury [medals?] awards." In all probability, the honest, though ignorant juror who relegated his trust to Dr. Birdwood, who "commiserately awarded three gold medals, four silver medals, and three or four bronze medals," more nearly fulfilled his duty than did his brethren. Most of them might almost as well have distributed their awards under the guidance of a showman's wheel of fortune.

This picture of the shady side of the grand Exposition, this rubbing off the gilt from the Imperial toy, more nearly concerns the European history of the affair; but the question ought to be cleared up, as to whose was the fault that the whole of India had only allotted to it (according to this report) a narrow space represented by a triangle barely 25 feet wide at the base. This corner piece, again, was encroached upon by the Mauritius and West Indies; and seeing that the Bombay contributions were also put out of countenance by the "pearl and gold of India's kings, barbaric," from Cashmere and broad Hindostan, we can only conclude that we have to thank the catalogue and the Commissioner for the large amount of notice obtained by the inadequate collection sent from Western India. It would appear that the Government of India must have been at fault in omitting to make sufficiently early and peremptory demand for space. Or was it because no application was made at all by the Supreme Government, that the whole contributions of this continent had to be crammed into the space obtained only by dint of the "anxious and persistent" requests from the Commissioner and the President forwarded through the Bombay Government? It is pleasant to observe that Dr. Forbes Watson—himself formerly a Bombay medical officer—did all that could be done to remedy the apparent insuperable difficulty for want of elbow-room in a space shaped like an elbow. This is one of the things that must be thought of next time; but before the Committee is dissolved, we trust that its persevering President, the Hon. Mr. Foggo, will catch the man who sold the cotton trophy. Of course he will also take good care to reclaim from Calcutta the grand prize for cotton which, if it does not belong to Bombay, might as well be sent to Brazil or anywhere else.

Dr. Birdwood's Report is specially valuable as being a very effective finger-post for future exhibitors and committees. . . . The hint as to the absurdly high merchantable price of Cambay stones is worth consideration. Not long ago Dr. Birdwood, when called as an "expert" in a case in the High Court, proved that these agates are not "precious stones," seeing that in Guzerat they are little less plentiful than the Porebunder building stone itself. The *Builder* and other architectural authorities at home have long been calling for some suitable decorative adjunct for public buildings—a material that would not "take" the soil and dust of the London atmosphere. According to the Doctor's own

evidence, there is, two hundred miles north of Bombay, abundance of this excellent material, which, if arrangements could be made for cutting and polishing it on a large scale, might soon form a valuable addition to our export trade. Yet these agates seem to have been sent to Paris ticketed at the prices charged here by the poor peregrinating borahs, and without any intimation that they could be supplied in quantities like marble. But there is no limit to the development, both in variety and in extent, that yet awaits the export trade in Indian raw produce. With regard to local exhibitions as a direct means towards that expansion of our commercial resources, the remarks made by the Commissioner are worthy of practical attention by the Committee, and afterwards by the Chamber of Commerce. If we would take our proper place in the world's fairs, we must encourage local and provincial exhibitions, for by that means we shall bring to notice an immense variety of new industries, and reveal as commercial products numerous commodities now known only to the scientific world. We need not therefore ask excuse for again bringing into notice the following suggestive passage from Dr. Birdwood's Report :—

I think that now advantages of exhibitions are becoming better appreciated by the natives, and that they are beginning to recognise that Government does all it ought to do in assisting exhibitors by providing a responsible agency and the additional cost of freight. But they naturally require to be *stirred up, instructed, and encouraged*, and that by the same means which have been found so successful in Europe in encouraging industry and art, and which led at last to the realisation of International Exhibitions—namely, a regular succession of local, agricultural and horticultural shows, and exhibitions of manufactures and fine art. We ought every cold season to have a horticultural show in Bombay, every rains an agricultural show in the Deccan, Guzerat, and Southern Mahratta country in rotation, and every three months I would wish to see a bazaar held in the Town Hall of Bombay, of blackwood, and sandalwood carving inlaid work, Cambay stone work, and native cotton, hempen, and silk fabrics. Every few years also there ought to be a great Indian Exhibition held at some of the great seats of commerce or Government.

The Government of India, by making a liberal grant for the forthcoming Exhibition at the remote station of Akola, has shown that it only waits for intelligent and zealous local efforts in order to encourage this policy. The late ruler of the Central Provinces and now of the Berars is well able to look after his own territory, but we could wish his zeal in this direction were more generally imitated. The Revenue Commissioner of our Northern Division, Mr. A. Rogers, has already made great exertions towards the promised Broach Exhibition, and he has been zealously seconded by the principal Collectors in Guzerat. But we could wish that a little more trumpeting had been performed in anticipation of this project, for it is one that comprises all the elements of success, and only needs a little more active zeal being manifested in this city. In dwelling on this social and industrial movement mainly as it affects Western India, we would do so rather by way of friendly rivalry with all other parts of India. We should be very glad indeed to see our quiet but sure and steady brethren in the Madras Presidency take up the practical suggestions embodied in the quotation just given, for we are sure they would work them out well. And as to wealthy Bengal and the rich N.W. Provinces, with their vast level plains and facilities of communication, they would easily eclipse all the rest of India in the modern art of getting up exhibitions.—*Nov.* 20, 1867.

CULTURE OF COTTON AND OTHER EXPORTS.

THERE is always great uncertainty in India as to the agricultural facts of the day, and how prices and profits are distributed amongst the ryot, the dealer, and the exporting merchant. This haziness must continue to hang over all our current economic circumstances until we have either a Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, a Statistical Bureau for the whole of India, or some well-digested plan for each Presidency by which the Boards of Revenue, through the Collectors, shall gather, arrange, and publish monthly records of all the statistics that relate to changes in prices and the labour market, in production and commerce.* Neither of the two former institutions is likely to be set up; and though the plan just hinted at is perfectly feasible, there is

* Since the date when the above was written, an immense advance has been made in the collection and classification of Indian statistics, of which valuable function Dr. W. W. Hunter is at present the "Director-General." But there is still need for more accuracy and detail in respect of agricultural statistics.

no hope that any efforts will be made to draw up a scheme and prepare the few papers requisite for carrying it out.

Meantime we must pick up information as we can, and apply it partially, if it is impossible to do so completely. The question has often been asked during the last few months—will it pay the cultivators in Western India to continue to produce cotton now that it is likely to decline to the price of seven years ago? It is needless to ask, will the cotton trade be remunerative to our merchants? for—leaving aside the ups and downs of speculative trade—it is a matter of indifference to them what are the articles which they are called upon to transfer between Asia and Europe. They must obtain an average remunerative profit on their transactions, or they and the capital employed by them will leave our shores. The cultivators cannot and will not remove; for if there were no exportable product by which they could make "pots" of rupees, they would cultivate more grain, keep more cattle, and sit happily under their own plantain and palm trees. . . . Now, supposing the fact to be that the cultivation of seeds would pay ten or twenty per cent. better than that of all but the finest exotic cotton, what an enormous advantage it would be to every interest in this Presidency, and to the *Sircar* above all, for seeds to be substituted for cotton in all suitable situations! We conjecture—for no one can tell without making special investigation—that it might make a difference to this Presidency of ten to twenty millions in next year's returns. And yet neither the Chamber of Commerce, nor the Revenue Commissioners, nor the Government itself, has any chance to give out a distinct utterance on this simple but very important practical question. We have alluded to seeds as being, except opium and wool—both of which are merchandise rather than agricultural productions—the best known product in our list of exports, and one with which the ryots are already familiar.

But we have scarcely more than opened the catalogue of valuable productions which this Presidency is capable of yielding. It is probable the prices of dyes and drugs are much higher now than ten years ago; and if so, Bombay has not only failed to progress in this lucrative commerce, but has retrograded. In 1857-8 we exported a total of Rs. 17,10,000 under these designations; but in 1865-6 the total was only Rs. 14,12,000. Indigo, we presume, is included under the head of dyes, but the amount must be contemptibly small, compared wtih the facilities that exist for its production in this Presidency. We observe in a report from Major Prescott (to Mr. Rogers, the Revenue Commissioner) regarding the township of Neriad, there is a strange story concerning the cultivation of indigo. The soil in this township, and we should suppose a large portion of Guzerat, as Major Prescott says, "is peculiarly suited" to the plant. It was cultivated there very largely in the early part of this century, but a certain "Maharaj" denounced the poor "koonbies" for their dreadful iniquity in causing the death of millions of animalculæ which are destroyed at a certain stage in the preparation of the indigo plant. Is there not a lesson in this story? We would not have the Revenue Commissioner enter into controversy in order to upset the Buddhist theology, so that the *koonbies* (peasants) might again cultivate indigo in peace of mind; neither would we have them taught to purchase profit at the risk of impiety. But education of many kinds has made much progress in Guzerat since those days, and we cannot think it has rendered the cultivator any less, but more amenable to instruction in matters that legitimately relate to his interests. Major Prescott remarks that, in the same pergunna, tobacco will yield a profit of Rs. 300 per acre, and yet the total exports of that article from Bombay in 1865-6 only amounted to Rs. 3,75,000. We feel satisfied that if there were adequate pains taken to look into such matters, the articles in our list of exports might be largely multiplied, and that the value exported, not only of dyes and drugs, but of country silk, gums, spices, and other valuable products, might be very greatly enhanced. There is an inexhaustible mine yet to be worked in these directions in one part or other of this Presidency.—*Dec.* 2, 1867.

IMPERIAL OR CIVIC MUNICIPALITIES.

"THE age of great cities" was a current phrase twenty years ago; but we are yet far from having solved all the difficult problems which have accumulated around us with the rapid and still accelerating increase of town populations. Strenuous exertions have been made by energetic and far-seeing men to check the evil effects that seem almost

inseparable from the massing together of the poorer classes of society; and, though the organic question of drainage has been settled only to be re-opened again, irreversible progress has been made towards general agreement on the principle that the health of towns—that is, the vigorous life of all classes of citizens—must be maintained at any endurable cost. This principle has been advocated with a steady earnestness that, amidst all our pretensions and mistakes, does honour to the century. The impulse in this direction, the "blows for life" delivered by such men as Dr. Southwood Smith, Mr. Edwin Chadwin, Mr. Arthur Helps, and, perhaps, a dozen more scarcely less eminent in the cause of sanitation and municipal improvements, have undergone scarcely any abatement. Indeed, the sound doctrines of those men have often been discredited by the undue zeal of their disciples. . . . . .

Making the needful allowances for essential differences between Asia and Europe, between torrid and temperate climes, it is from the progress or blunders of great capitals, like London and Paris, that Bombay and Calcutta may best learn what to imitate and what to shun. In the English capital there is an extraordinary combination, though more often an antagonism between ancient and modern systems. Ward-motes and vestrymen struggle hardly for the old forms of popular parochial government, while that all but irresponsible body, the Metropolitan Board of Works, is familiarising the public with something like imperial control of civic works and local finance. In Paris we have seen a splendid municipal experiment carried out with all that logical completeness in which the French delight. The outward results—albeit plainly connected with political and dynastic designs—were dazzling to the beholder. All the world which worships success bowed before the genuis of Baron Haussmann; and have there not been Bombay Justices who sang his praises and bade us imitate the Napoleonic edile? Fortunately for us, perhaps, such essay was beyond our reach; though, had such a programme been possible, our Municipal Commissioner was the very man to carry it out. Whilst every one was admiring and wondering at what the city of Paris could do, the collapse came. After the debates in the French Chamber following the exposure by M. Thiers a few weeks ago, and the subsequent discussions in the press, the imperial and purely autocratic system of municipal government stands irremediably condemned both on social and economical grounds. . . . . .

Our readers need not quake at the thought of our here re-opening the much battered question of municipal taxation; neither do we now care to follow the various lessons taught by the disastrous failure of the grand imperial Municipality of Paris. We bring this forward amongst many other circumstances of the time to which we have only alluded, that all go to show how peculiarly opportune is the present period for promoting such an inquiry as that which it is proposed the Bombay Government should undertake. It is not denied that it has reference to questions that affect other communities than the million of souls in and about the island of Bombay. It is probable that a well chosen Commission, such as the Bench has asked for, would, after its session, be able to contribute some appreciable addition to the yet imperfect science of modern municipal administration. In this prospect of incidentally serving a permanent and in some sense an imperial purpose, we do not see any good reason for Sir Seymour Fitzgerald's Government declining to grant, or for the Justices to refrain from asking for a full and adequate inquiry into the affairs of the Municipality.—*April* 14, 1869.

TOPOGRAPHY OF BOMBAY ISLAND.

THIS irregularly-shaped island of Bombay, presenting as it does a curious variety of topographical peculiarities, and comprising within its limits the extremest extremes of valuable building land or garden-ground, and sterile soil or desolate foreshores, offers a somewhat intractable field for the work of the scientific surveyor. But however difficult the task, the necessity of its being carried out effectually has long been recognised as imperative. The rapidly growing value of land in the island, under the pressure of commercial necessities and the demand for house-room, has given enhanced importance in every way to the rights of property-holders, the claims of Government or the Municipality, and the disputes of rival holders and legatees. The exceeding intricacy and peculiarity of the various land tenures in force within the limits of the twenty or

more square miles contained within the united island, had long engaged the attention of thoughtful men with a view to their classification and revision in the interests of the modern population. The first complete sketch of this subject, the difficulties to be overcome, and objects to be accomplished, was, we believe, that drawn up by Mr. R. H. Showell, when Acting Collector of Bombay in 1860. Still the work was delayed, there being no adequate legal power to support even a thorough scientific and topographical survey, though a good deal was accomplished in 1865 by a party in connection with the Great Trigonometrical Survey of India. There was a legal power to measure for revenue purposes. The Revenue Survey Act (No. I. of 1865) is not made applicable to the Presidency town. The city surveys in Guzerat were conducted until last year under a resolution of Government; and in the Bill then passed to legalise and expedite those civic surveys, it is provided that "this Act does not apply to the city of Bombay." An autocratic Government, in a matter of such urgent public moment, would speedily have cut through all prescriptive and traditionary obstacles, and proceeded by way of decree and proclamation. Our rulers are eminently law-abiding, and would leave a province to the risk of inundation or drought, rather than move in advance of statute or prescribed regulation. Thus the survey and mapping out of the city and suburbs of Bombay—a measure essential as a basis of very much on which modern urban civilisation rests—might have had to be indefinitely postponed, were it not for incidental but effectual assistance afforded by Section 62 of that much-abused Act II. of 1868. Under that clause the Commissioner is empowered, after due notice given, "to enter and inspect, and measure" any "houses, buildings or lands" liable to municipal rates, as are all properties and beneficial tenancies in the island; and this power the Commissioner, of course, can delegate to another on his behalf.

Some time in 1865, soon after the Act came into operation, the Commissioner "appointed" Major Laughton, an officer experienced in the work of the General Revenue Survey, to make such measurements and observations as were needful for the due assessment of the municipal rates. In this instance the mathematical axiom is rendered with a difference. The less was made to comprise the greater. By means of the data acquired in course of measuring in order to the due assessment of municipal rates, Major Laughton is able to work out a complete civic survey, which is all but scientifically exact. The surveyor is not able here, as under the City Survey Act, and in the regular mofussil survey, to call upon the owner to define his boundaries; so that the Bombay maps are not necessarily so serviceable for the use of the courts and private claimants as are the survey sheets and sunnud maps in the cities of Guzerat. In a large majority of instances, a polite request from Major Laughton has sufficed to induce the owner voluntarily to point out the limits of his property. The absence of legal certainty as to the demarcations of individual properties does not detract much from the value of the work as a public survey. Every street, lane, and projecting portion of building, every tank and well, every water-supply and fire plug, and the very palm trees in large compounds, are distinctly delineated on the maps. In the densely-populated districts of the native town, where four or five yards of superficial area have to suffice for each individual, the survey has been closer and more elaborate than in any plot comprised within the work of the Ordnance surveys at home. . . . The surveyors had never been accustomed to such fine work as a city survey requires; so that altogether Major Laughton had a very perplexing and troublesome work to start with, but his assistants appear to have rapidly adapted themselves to their new work. Under his direction it has been accomplished by native agency, his party consisting of twenty Brahmin surveyors, a few native draughtsmen, and one or two European assistants. The advantage of having Brahmin surveyors will be obvious, as the entrance of any other race or caste into houses and compounds would have given rise to endless trouble. It would, indeed, have been impossible for the European assistants of the Trigonometrical Survey to measure private property in the native town, and the cost of that agency would have been much greater. Neither could that department have surveyed the inhabited portions of the island with the minuteness which characterises the operations of Major Laughton's survey. Under the Trigonometrical scheme the island would have been taken into the general map of India, and the salient points would have been (will be, we presume) accurately stowed in Colonel Walker's wonderful archives, but no mapping of streets or demarcation of private properties would have been attempted.

The cost of this useful, and in some sense invaluable, work will not be small—something over two lakhs of rupees. In the first year the outlay was about Rs. 32,000; since then it has been a little over Rs. 44,000 yearly, and that rate of expense is likely to continue until the close of 1870. During the first season the cost of the Trigonometrical party was Rs. 65,000, but this would probably be debited to the general Indian survey account. The Municipality contributes a total sum of Rs. 75,000 towards this survey. . . . . .

Let us here sum up what has been done. The great Trigonometrical Survey party, under Colonel Nasmyth, consisting of the usual European staff, commenced the triangulations of the island in November, 1865. That they completed, with about half the "traversing." Major Laughton's party commenced the detail work in October of the same year, and have to the present time surveyed about seventeen square miles, which represents about four-fifths of the whole quantity of work. The whole of the native town has been completed except Sonapore. Of outlying portions there remain to be surveyed the P. and O. dockyards and the village of Mazagon, the Elphinstone reclamations, Kumballa Hill, a part of Malabar Hill, and a portion of Girgaum. The measurement of the Fort has yet to be commenced, and also that of Colaba. Major Laughton, we observe, has proceeded to Europe on leave, and it has not been stated what officer will supply his place. Probably some experienced man may be drawn from the staff of the Trigonometrical Survey, and such an officer would be at home in the "contouring" and "hill sketching" that has yet to be done.—*June* 10, 1869.

II.—The Survey of Bombay Town and Island, commenced in November, 1865, and finished in November, 1872, is a great and valuable work well done. Already, when describing the splendid maps of the island which present the visible result of the surveyors' labour, we have in general terms explained the objects and results of the Survey. The papers now placed at the disposal of the press, more especially the report itself by Colonel G. A. Laughton, serve to throw a flood of light on the history and topography of our island, which are of interest to every one, while the investigations into, and decision upon, titles and tenures must compel the close attention of property-owners, conveyancers, and revenue officers. We cannot claim to speak of the strictly professional aspect of the work, or we might add, that the technical and scientific features of this conjoint city and field survey, comprising, as it does, an extraordinary variety of work, will attract the notice of engineers and surveyors who may have time and opportunity to trace it in detail, test its accuracy, and admire its execution. The resolution (which we print in another column) is very meagre in its remarks on the professional management of the undertaking; but, perhaps, it was thought by His Excellency in Council that the full and conclusive testimony on one side of a practical engineer like Mr. Ormiston, with large local knowledge, and, on the other, of a thoroughly scientific critic like Colonel Walker, R.E., comprised the utmost that could be said in appreciation and approval. . . . . .

We need scarcely remind the authorities that, in view of the financial operations to which the report and resolution point, everything is to be gained by popularising the line of research and reasoning which the Report opens up. Besides the Bombay Revenue Survey Officer, who has had by far the largest share of the work, it is necessary to mention one or two others who have borne an important part in its earlier stages. In 1864, Colonel (then Captain) W. Waddington examined the old maps of the island, made some preliminary inquiries into tenure, and reported. The Government of India was communicated with, and in 1866 it was agreed that the work should be commenced by a party of the Great Trigonometrical Survey Service, in charge of which the late Lieutenant-Colonel Nasmyth, R.E., was appointed. After his illness and untimely decease, this work was carried on by Major Haig, of the same service, who completed the triangulation of the island, with the computation of the traverse points, and about two-thirds of the main traverses. But the Bombay Revenue Survey party under Colonel Laughton had also commenced at the same time as the men of geodesy, whom they soon overtook, and overran with the theodolite, cross-staff, and measuring chain. On comparing the separate traverses of the two parties, it was found that the results were all but identical, and Government very wisely determined that the rest of the work should be done by the less expensive and more facile Revenue Survey establishment. . . . Here we should mention that after some preliminary

experiments on scales of ten feet to the mile, the scales finally adopted were 100 feet to one inch for the open country, and forty feet to one inch for the inhabited portions of the island.

As might be expected, this measuring up of all our coasts to the present high-water mark reveals enlarged boundaries. We have been accustomed to speak of Bombay Island as comprising rather more than eighteen square miles. According to the quotient which Colonel Laughton considers the most strictly correct of three which only slightly differ, we have now an area of 22 square miles, 105 acres, and 4,149 square yards. The increase, we should suppose, is more than half due to reclamations—encroachments on the sea, at how terrible a cost obtained our citizens can compute—and the rest must be put to the account of inadequate measurements in former times. . . . These tenures are shown as nine in number, reckoning each kind of "Batty" ground and "Toka" land separately. The most extensive of these classes of holdings are those under the "Pension and Tax" tenures, and comprise nearly one-third of the whole island, the greater portion of it being built upon. The origin of these terms, following older authorities, Colonel Laughton finds, respectively, in "*pencao*," a Portuguese word signifying sums as paid in liquidation and final satisfaction of claims for rental; and "tax" being the ten per cent. additional, levied by the East Indian Company on all ground rents in 1758, as some compensation for the "prodigious expense" incurred in building the Fort walls and other works of defence. The "Committee on Rents," a sort of Special Commission, which sat in 1837, was of opinion that "nothing short of some great emergency could justify any deviation from the existing rates" of this "Pension and Tax" land. Yet some slight advance was subsequently made; and Colonel Laughton considers that the right of Government to increase its ground rent is clearly implied, though much qualified by customary and prescriptive limitations. This reference to the tenures, though essentially a part of the subject, is a digression here, for it would be impossible in the compass of a paragraph to deal to the slightest advantage with so complicated and difficult a subject. It has been discussed and settled as far as possible in the exhaustive reports of Mr. Warden, Mr. Le Messurier, and Mr. R. H. Showell. . . . . .

There are several points in connection with Colonel Laughton's Report on which we should like to have said more. Notably amongst these is the very high testimony which he accords to the facility with which his native assistants took to the work of city surveying, the rapid progress they made in the more scientific portion of their task, and the excellent temper with which they met the numberless difficulties that had to be contended with in the busy streets and crowded lanes of the city; but the subject is one worthy of separate notice. In conclusion, we inquire, where has this report been during the last eight months? Who, or what department, is to blame for its being so long withheld from the public? . . . . . .—*July* 21, 1873.

THE FUTILE AND HATEFUL C.D.A.

OUR Health Officer's Quarterly Report, being the one for the first quarter of 1871, is out in good time, and, as usual, contains much that is of interest to the dwellers in this city. There have been vague rumours, and something more, of epidemics being in our midst; and though somehow Bombay never is fairly hit by these threatenings, it is satisfactory to turn to the pages of this Sanitary Gazette, where we may be sure Dr. Hewlett will tell us the worst. It is his duty to do so; and if to laymen he may seem to magnify his office a little, he will readily be forgiven. In certain divisions of this island cholera is always liable to appear, and during the last quarter there has been some little excess in the total mortality from that cause. This has not been serious, only 146 deaths in all, which is only one-fifth of the average for twenty years past; but it is 132 more than in the first quarter of 1870. . . . . .

But it is just the point and burden of his report that he finds himself quite unable to meet small-pox by special defensive strategy. He laments that an Act to make vaccination compulsory "seems as far off as ever," and until that be done, he considers that "the mortuary returns must still continue to be sullied with deaths from preventible disease." There are two other barricades which the Health Officer would erect if he could—an isolated special hospital, and quarantine laws. . . . . .

No doubt, if the sites were granted, "that eternal want of pence which pesters public men" would still interpose an obstacle to the establishment of the properly isolated

hospital on Belvidere; but cannot the Health Officer discover any possible "savings"? It strikes us there is one gross extravagance brought within the purview of his report, but which he passes over without note or comment. He says: "The Superintendent of the Contagious Diseases Act has kindly furnished me with the following returns," which are given. A more complete declaration of utter failure was never issued; and on referring back through the quarterly reports of the Health Officer, it is easy to see what a waste the expenditure on this institution is, compared with the good that might be effected by the same amount if applied, as Dr. Hewlett suggests, to the prevention of diseases which are involuntarily acquired. . . . . .

If Government do anything in the matter at all, they ought to put an entire stop to this farce of the C.D.A. Possibly, if a more experienced officer had been appointed to work this peculiarly difficult experiment, it might have dragged on for a quarter or two longer with some show of work effected; but we believe the detailed history of this extravagant organisation would prove, still more forcibly than the bare figures we have given, that it is vain to attempt to grapple with the evil thing in this wide open city. Possibly the Health Officer's establishment might, if duly empowered, do something to curtail the mischief; but after this utter breakdown of the separate scheme—lavishly supported as it has been by the ratepayers' funds—no one can be very sanguine on the point. Reference has just been made as to what the Local Government might do, or refrain from doing, with respect to municipal expenditure; but until the Justices resign *en masse*, as they ought to have done two years since, we do not anticipate that the Executive will either care or find time to look into the civic affairs of Bombay.—*April* 26, 1871.

BREAKDOWN OF THE BOMBAY MUNICIPALITY.

FOR nearly two years past the Bench of Justices has done little or nothing more than fulfil the functions of a record committee; and this duty it has performed fitfully and carelessly. This is not so much, if at all, the fault of "their Worships," as "a Stranger," who, in our columns, has tried to follow out the history of the new Corporation, sometimes seems to imply. Up to the close of 1867, or a little later, a fair proportion of the resident members of the Bench struggled manfully against the odds which fate, the heavy demands of modern conservancy, and Act II. of 1865 had piled up against them. As it is, the hopeless contest has long since left them so disunited and apathetic, that if the "crisis" now brought to their notice were twice as serious as it is, or the "deficit" were thrice as formidable, they could do little else but register the proposals of our able Commissioner and his friends on the Finance Committee. . . . . .

It is vain to hope for very extensive retrenchment under the present system. If the Justices were as jealous as they are apathetic, they could do little to help themselves under the statute in virtue of which they sit. . . . . .

Here are a dozen officers receiving an average of Rs. 1,332 per month; but of these four, whose salaries are *fixed by the* Act, receive an average of Rs. 2,125 per month. The assessment and collection departments appear to cost a lakh besides; and the fixed irremovable charge for "interest and sinking funds," which must in great measure be attributed to the present system, is over three lakhs. In fact, it is utterly impossible, while the present *régime* is maintained for the city, to get from under its difficulties. . . . . .

Altogether, then, we do not see that much can be gained by troubling the Legislative Council to repeal the drainage section; while the little fuss that would be made about any such perfunctory performance, might be pleaded as an excuse by the Executive for yet longer deferring the evil day, that must come at last, when the whole Act will be swept away, and the municipal constitution entirely remodelled. Instead of pottering about the drainage contribution, the measure plainly required is the suspension of the unworkable constitution, and the supersession of the present Municipal Executive by a special Commission. But the Bench will never find courage to ask for this, if "their Worships" sit until Doomsday.—*May* 8, 1871.

The True Reformer.—Dust in the Eyes.

II.—There is an old country proverb at home which runs—"A peck of March dust is worth a king's ransom." The agricultural doctrine of which this is a terse popular expression, has no significance in these climes; but for a special local purpose we may

paraphrase the saying somewhat in this fashion—"A bushel of May dust is the best municipal reformer." As Mr. Disraeli sententiously remarked during the Church debate the other day, "We are governed more by rhetoric than logic." Our local orators, both Native and European, have inveighed against excessive municipal expenditure, and complained of its comparatively small results; committees of the Corporation and of the Legislative Council have laid bare the particulars of our civic waste and impecuniosity; the Supreme and Bombay Legislatures have passed special laws by which a large part of our civic revenues have been put in pawn; both the English journals and all the Native papers have explained the causes of our Corporation's troubles, and pointed out the dire consequences of overrunning the municipal constable. But all these circumstances have been powerless to effect any change; the ratepayers have been divided and hopeless; and, the Bombay Government being utterly indifferent in the matter, it has seemed to be tacitly understood that the Municipal Executive, under whom the city's financial downward course has been so steady and rapid, is to have another three years' lease of irresponsible power granted to it, so that the city might go on as before under the modern high pressure system. Such was the situation when, under the exigency of a new financial crisis—this time mainly forced on the city from without—the Commissioner, pushed a little by the Finance Committee, set about severe reductions, to the dismay of the Health Officer, and with an evident determination to let "their Worships" and the public personally feel what retrenchment means. And this policy has been felt in the tenderest part of the human organism—the eye. That is, it has been felt by the more closely-worked and uninfluential sections of the community who are compelled to remain in the island, whilst the more fortunate and powerful portion of society who in the merry month of May congregate at Matheran and Mahableshwar have escaped the benefit of the recent practical demonstration in municipal economy. There has, however, been quite sufficient of "the public" left in Bombay to permit of the new remedy working the desired effect. Men who for months past have patiently endured all the bumps and thumps which the "cuppy" and "knobby" state of our roads can inflict, who heard with comparative indifference that extensive repairs were going on at Vehar, who deemed the Bench a mere debating society, and who noticed without a qualm the monthly intimation that the Commissioner had paid over the enormous portions of our revenue hypothecated to the State creditor, have been suddenly moved to municipal zeal by getting a little dust in their eyes and throat. . . . The most palpable result of losing the cattle power has been that the streets and broad roads on the Esplanade have not been watered; hence, as we have intimated, the lieges' eyes have been filled with dust. But "see how unreasonable men are," as the Commissioner exclaims: "you have been clamouring for retrenchment, and immediately the luxury of watering the roads is stopped in consequence of such retrenchment, you complain of me worse than ever!" More illogical still, whilst shouting and stamping because of this plague known as retrenchment in the eyes, the Justices and the general body of ratepayers are more unitedly disposed than ever before to denounce the costliness of our municipal system, and to demand a thorough change in the whole of our civic administration.

It would not be difficult, if it were needful, to trace the other causes, besides the surface one of dust, which have concurred to promote in our very incohesive community an unusually general desire for long delayed and much needed municipal reform. This present temper of the public mind acquires especial significance from the circumstance that it is just now, after protracted delays, that the papers relating to the reconstitution of the Bench have been issued to the public. As it has turned out, these reports and minutes could not have been issued at any more favourable juncture since January, 1869, when the Bench, in appealing to Government on the motion of Mr. Currey, confessed that it had exhausted its powers for dealing with municipal affairs and controlling municipal expenditure. In these days we are constantly reminded that in the ordinary work of administration, finance is everything; and the minutes now issued under Mr. Maxwell's name will be tested mainly in the light of that maxim. It is mainly in this respect that the Commissioner's own minute—which may best be regarded as a "dissent"—stands out from, and in opposition to, the rest. We might make some allowance in this respect, because of the date of Mr. Crawford's paper, but in the covering letter—though that is dated August last—he must be understood to speak his present sentiments. He is the only representative of the autocratic policy of Mr. Cassel's Act of 1865. He thinks it

"essential that the principle of personal responsibility should be maintained"—a principle which, as we have seen, has in effect permitted Mr. Crawford the greatest freedom from control that the most ambitious public man could desire, and has attenuated all responsibility so completely that we only recognize it on going back to the constitution of the Bench, for which, as the Commissioner aptly remarks, "the Government has of course always been responsible." . . . . . .

By the publication of these minutes, the Bombay Executive is now left without any further excuse for its long-continued neglect of the municipal affairs of this city. More than two years ago the responsibility for investigation and action was fairly placed on His Excellency in Council. An attempt was made in March, 1869, to evade that responsibility by a note from the Chief Secretary to gain time; and when, a month later, that responsibility was again pressed home, a desperate but ingenious and skilful effort was made, in a letter from an able Acting Secretary, to shuffle off the load; but there it remains to this day, having become somewhat more ponderous meanwhile. Sir Seymour Fitzgerald is fortunate in that the opportunity he put aside in 1869 of rectifying certain notable mistakes of his predecessor, and of founding an economical and therefore durable municipality, is now once more renewed. Let him now accept the task voluntarily and with statesmanlike readiness, or it may be forced upon him.—*June* 5, 1871.

III.—Those who think that a considerable proportion of the resident "Justices for the Town and Island of Bombay" have long since done all that could fairly be expected of them in the unsuccessful attempt to make Act II. of 1865 subservient to the art of self-government, cannot with any decency be characterised as "impatient." It is a very trite remark to say "that no man or community can hope to acquire it (the art of self-government) without long and severe labour and patient endurance of many annoyances and mishaps." We should not have thought it possible for any one but an Under-Secretary to question for a moment that, during the six years our new Corporation has been at work, a large proportion of its members have loyally paid the price of "long and severe labour and patient endurance." But what has been gained by it? They would have been amply compensated for their pains if any definite step had been made towards self-government, even in a modified sense of that term. Under the pressure of immediate necessity, caused mainly by a grave mistake of the Local Government, considerable reductions have been hastily decided upon; but, as we showed on Monday, these have been made very unevenly, and the enforced arrangement in no way exemplifies healthy and natural corporate action. The longer the present municipal system is worked, the further it takes the city away from any chance of naturally reaching a position in which confidence can be felt and good work can be done. It is evident to every one who has paid continuous attention to our municipal history, and there is now no hope except in an entirely fresh start. . . . . .

Well, let the history of the Municipality be followed from the date of that report, and it will be seen that, in spite of the clear *exposé* of the unfavourable financial position then attained, and the sound proposals made by the Committee towards reform, the downward process went on until, at the end of the next year, the Legislative Council had to pull up the runaway coach—with a loan and bill of hypothecation. After that, the Town Duties plaister was applied, and wonderfully soothing that has been; but it also has lost its virtue, and the Bench again finds itself in the low valley of financial difficulty.

It is to be hoped that the energy and research which Mr. Anstey has brought to bear on the single and peculiar questions in the Police section (6) of the Act, will not be allowed to divert the Bench from the broader issues before it. Notwithstanding the weight of that eminent counsel's opinion, the Justices would be ill-advised to spend their strength in litigation, when they can gain their point by business-like passive resistance. But this question of the Police is only one of a dozen more, in which, if the Bench has any self-respect left, it must soon take a determined stand. By far the most effective strategy would be to leave the field for a while to the Local Government, which in municipal affairs has hitherto signalised itself solely by the exercise of "masterly inactivity."—*June* 14, 1871.

IV.—By its continuous disregard of municipal affairs, and its policy of letting them "drift," the Bombay Government has allowed the Bench of Justices to come to a pretty pass. That institution has long enjoyed a not undeserved reputation as a "debating society"—with the Commissioner as representing the extreme right, and Mr. Nowrojee Furdoonjee as the extreme left; and now, at one bound, it is about to place itself in the position of a supplementary Legislative Council. And why not, indeed? The Bench has long since found itself powerless to attend to its proper business. All its attempts to scrutinise and control expenditure past, present, and to come, have been effectually thwarted and utterly baffled. Its appeals to Jupiter—not preferred until after the Justices had done their best—have been not disregarded, but derided. So why should not "their Worships" set about their own reconstitution, and proceed to a little amateur legislation on their own account? The mountain will not budge, so the movement must come from the other side. . . .

The promoters of this movement have abstained from giving the slightest personal complexion to it; and if anything could do that, it would be our daily contemporary's chivalrous declaration that, "if Government and the ratepayers were to search the Presidency round, they would not find a better man for such a post than Mr. Crawford." Much might be said in support of this estimate of the Commissioner—up to a certain date, and with one big exception. We have, for instance, before us now, the letter from the Commissioner in November, 1865, in which he replied to the resolution of the Bench referring back to him the Budget for 1866. There was at that time, and during the most of the first three years' tenure of office, much to admire in Mr. Crawford's proceedings as he strove, in conjunction with Dr. Hewlett, to rescue the city from the consequences of its unswept and untended condition. We supported him heartily at that time, and often urged all that could be said on behalf of sanitation and the principles of modern conservancy. We do not say that public health and civic improvements vital to the well-being of the masses can, like gold, be bought too dear; but it is quite possible for a city to pay much more for these great objects than is needful to secure them. Speaking generally, it may be said that by the time the Commissioner's renewal of office was due, it had become quite apparent that Bombay had been overborne by the new system, and that its magnificent municipal outlay, though disposed as much as possible to strike the eye, had failed to secure adequate permanent results. And since the close of 1867, the increase of indebtedness, with the corresponding deficiency in results, has become patent to every one. All this is not to be placed to the debit of the Commissioner. It is the system of 1865, which is too grand and too costly. . . . . .

Mr. Crawford has wonderful adaptability about him, and it is within the range of possibility that he might, under a new constitution, fit in both as Commissioner and executive conservancy officer; but how can we spare Dr. Hewlett? The worst thing we wish Mr. Crawford would be to see him provided for in some fertile Collectorate, now slumbering under the quiet supervision of some Civilian of the olden time. We should be willing to wink at a few steps of supersession, so as to have opportunity to witness the transformation that might come over such a province after two or three years of Mr. Crawford's energy and strong common sense had been expended in its districts.—*June* 23, 1871.

V.—In referring to the subject to be taken up at the Municipal Meeting to-day, we can only repeat in other words many things that have been said over and over again in these columns and elsewhere. Now that every one is stirred up to take a lively interest in civic polity and finance, it may seem somewhat ungracious to remark that we cannot see a prospect of much good arising directly from debates amid tumultuous gatherings in the durbar room. But it was long since demonstrated—and this is perhaps the most emphatic condemnation of the present municipal constitution—that the Bench is powerless to conduct its own proper business, and it therefore must be utterly helpless to reform itself. Under the present constitution of the Corporation, it would be quite possible to get a resolution passed to the effect—"that on the whole Act II. has worked admirably, and that as an executive officer the present Commissioner is above price." Just now, when a little daylight—though not nearly sufficient—has been let into our municipal chaos, it would be difficult even for the mofussilites to agree to a proposition of that sort; but some very similar to it have at one time or other been snatched from a complacent

majority. Every one now admits, at last, that the patient camel is overborne; and, probably, if the Bench passes anything at all, it will express its opinion to that effect more or less emphatically. . . . . .

Some correspondent of ours yesterday reproduced the old fallacy about the extravagance of the municipal executive having been permitted and condoned by the negligence of the Justices. This is a fine argument for the too facile pen of an Under-Secretary, but we have long since shown its inapplicability, not to say groundlessness. It is one that has occasionally been put forward by new members of the Bench, who know nothing of the immense efforts that have been made by first one and then another section of the Justices in order to secure the due fulfilment of the controlling and revising clauses of the Act. . . . And any one who turns to that noble and lumbersome quarto of 237 paras., with a host of appendices, must admit that so far as the clear perception of their position and duties by the Justices, and their resolves to abide thereby, are concerned, the Municipality would have been to-day in a position the reverse of that it now occupies if those resolves could have had fair play. Why has this not been the case? Because the composition of the Bench allows of one section being set off against another, and the whole being placed utterly at the mercy of the autocratic Commissioner provided by the Act, and who has been maintained in his position by the Bombay Government in spite of anything the Justices could do or say to the contrary. . . . . .

In a small community like this—small in respect of its European residents—important public questions are sometimes placed on false issues through weak talk in deprecation of "personalities," talk which is in itself most gratuitously personal. If a majority of the resident Justices consider that the present Municipal Commissioner has long since shown that, because of his spending qualities, he is quite unsuitable for the post he holds, they have not only every right to express that opinion in a formal way, but they are bound to do so. That issue, however, is not before the meeting of to-day; it is the system, not the man, which is to be condemned. Again; if we are to refer to this foible of personalities under another aspect, we may remember that in this city there have been times when a public movement or a public work would receive less or more of favour because this or that merchant or firm happened to be prominent in connection with it. One may hope that the time has gone by for any display of this sort of "lad-like" humour. If any efforts to move the heterogeneous elements which compose the Bench can be of service, any respectable citizen who essays to arouse and concentrate those efforts deserves the thanks of the whole community. Once more as to this phantom of personalities: it has always been seen and admitted that the new Corporation has had to work its way under heavy disadvantages imposed on it from without. For three years it had struggled on under the notion that the city was inevitably committed to an outlay of a million sterling for a huge sewerage scheme. Happily, that bug-bear has taken itself off by this time. The commercial depression and excitement to which Bombay has been alternately subject during the last six years, have been eminently unfavourable for the growth and maintenance of local public spirit and general municipal zeal. Again, there is the huge Vehar millstone of nearly 40 lakhs with which the new Corporation was started in business, and which still burdens all its financial prospects. Full allowance is made for these extraneous or unavoidable obstacles to municipal progress and solvency; but over and above all these, there has also been long continued and flagrant mismanagement, for which the Act of 1865 has afforded all but unlimited scope. Under this incubus the city has long groaned unavailingly, but another effort is now being made to shake it off. We must wish it success.—*June* 30, 1871.

THE NATURAL OUTLET OF THE MALABAR COAST.

MERCHANTS in Bombay will not be much grieved to notice that efforts are being made to raise Fleetwood, the Lancashire seaport, into a position that may enable it to compete with the Mersey, and abate the pretensions of proud Liverpool. There is not, indeed, much likelihood that the total trade of that splendid estuary will ever decline from the high-water mark it has already reached; but Fleetwood may provide for that natural increase of commerce, and especially of the cotton trade, which, if crowded into the Mersey, must become subject to increasing charges, delays, and inconvenience of all

kinds. There is some little analogy between the relations of Fleetwood to Liverpool and those of Carwar to Bombay, but there are also essential differences; and when these similarities and contrasts are duly taken into account there is much to cause regret that there should be any risk of our subsidiary port being neglected or sacrificed. Fleetwood may, to some extent, be a rival to Liverpool in checking the otherwise irrepressible cotton trade on the Mersey, and new financial interests may grow up on the sea-coast. This could never be the case with Carwar as regards Bombay, any more than Port Canning, if prosperous, could reduce the existing trade of Calcutta. This port on the Malabar coast, if once connected with the interior, would, by means of cheap coasting traffic, considerably feed both the markets and export trade of Bombay; while, by inexpensive railway communication tapping Mysore on the south-east, the Madras territory and Nizamate on the north-east, the new port would largely add to our general commerce, both coastwise and foreign. On the other hand, most of this newly-developed trade of the southern Deccan, and all the European commerce inward and outward through the new port, would always remain dependent on Bombay. To use a modern term, convenient though not etymologically correct, the trade of Carwar, though much of it a clear addition to the commerce of India, would always be "financed" from Bombay. This city has, therefore, the strongest interest in desiring the speedy prosecution of the most promising plan for opening another gate for the commerce of Western and Southern India. . . . . .

Not realising how much more valuable the agricultural products of those fertile southern districts would become if cheap means of communication with the outer world were provided for them, our remote directors-general are forgetting that the new port is the root of the whole project, and seem inclined to fall back on some paltry scheme for a mere local railway above the Ghaut. We do not think that anything so aimless or futile could be sanctioned; but possibly it may be proposed, by way of excuse for shelving the complete and comprehensive project which would give a new outlet for the products of immense and fertile districts in south-western India.* The one great consideration that weights the decision in favour of the S.M.C. Railway is, that it would afford ready access to the sea for a large and steadily increasing quantity of export products—cotton, and many valuable articles of much smaller bulk for Europe, grain of all kinds for the Bombay markets. No one understands better than Colonel Strachey that this "through traffic" could not afford the several hundred miles of railway rates, including Ghaut charges, that it would have to encounter in being dragged to Poona and Bombay. . . . If the merchants of Bombay have not public spirit enough to promote a project of this kind, and if the central Public Works Secretariat is too remote to form an accurate estimate of its conditions, it is not for us to give ourselves much concern in the matter. . . . . —*March* 22, 1871.

THE SUEZ CANAL AND UNFAIR RAILWAY RATES.

THE figures quoted the other day by Mr. Bullen Smith, Chairman of the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce, showing the quantities of "piece goods"—that is, cotton and other British textile manufactures—brought through the Suez Canal, are conclusive as to the success of that means of communication for all the lighter and more valuable imports into India. During the first four months of this year, out of 202,000,000 yards of unprinted calicoes, and 4,500,000 pounds of yarn, imported into Calcutta, 183,000,000 yards and 3,500,000 pounds came through the Egyptian channel. Mr. Smith did not quote the corresponding figures of Bombay imports for the same period, but he was good enough to mention that 96 per cent. of all our plain cotton goods have come through the Canal. But the Calcutta Chairman's object was not merely to show the supremacy of the Canal over the Cape route. He desired to comfort his fellow merchants with the assurance that, notwithstanding the Canal, they could hold their own import trade with the regions so awkwardly designated the North-west Provinces. As the sea voyage from Suez to Calcutta is two-fifths longer than to Bombay, it was not unlikely to suppose that

* Thanks to the obstinacy of the then Secretary of State (Duke of Argyll), the project to open the natural outlet from the Southern Deccan was frustrated; and, instead of that complete plan, a roundabout and costly scheme is now being carried out to adopt the port of Marmagao, in Portuguese territory, instead of our own port of Carwar, though this is much nearer our fertile provinces in British territory.

this western port would have a very considerable advantage over the eastern one, situate as that is fifty miles from the sea, and on a river of troublesome, if not dangerous, navigation. . . . There must be some other explanation of the exclusion of Bombay imports from the N.W. Provinces than that surface one glanced at by Mr. Bullen Smith. The artificial cause of that exclusion is sufficiently well known amongst merchants here, and we need not go into the details of the subject now. The obstacle is not one of distance, time, or natural cost. It is one of railway policy alone, though the line which runs from Calcutta to Allahabad is just as much part of the general Indian State system, just as much a public and as little of a private institution, as the one from Bombay to Jubbulpore. One of these lines charges too little on its down traffic, or the other charges too much, or perhaps both err, and in contrary directions infringe the implied contract with the public which the guarantee carries with it. We are not about to discuss the merits of the policy followed by each railway respectively, but merely wish to make plain that, so far as the import trade is concerned, the seaboard advantages of Bombay are nullified by the action of the two railways—the G.I.P. being apparently desirous of throwing as much through traffic into the hands of the East India Railway as possible. . . . One step further in this absurdity: Jubbulpore, though little over 600 miles from Bombay, is nearly 850 miles from Calcutta, but a truck of Manchester goods may be brought from that port to the capital of the Central Provinces for nearly Rs. 100 less than the same quantity of merchandise can be sent thither from Bombay. Under these circumstances, there is not a little satire in Mr. Bullen Smith's remark, that "it is not surprising" the quantity of piece goods sent from Bombay up to Hindustan is "quite inappreciable." How long this preposterous state of affairs is likely to continue we would not like to guess. The Bombay merchants—who are at the same time resting supinely under one of the most monstrous financial impositions ever threatened to be laid on a port—are a long-suffering race; but as it is more than a year since this railway embargo was referred to in our columns, and otherwise publicly denounced, we may suppose it is being well looked into. . . . . .—*June* 7, 1871.

PORT TRUST CHARGES ON TRADE.

BEFORE the Bombay Port Trust Scheme can be transformed into any rational working plan, or, indeed, before it assumes any definite shape at all, we are likely to have some extraordinary illustrations in the curious and difficult art of Anglo-Indian financial administration. At present it is only a vague and monstrous taxing scheme, which, with remarkably well-sustained persistency, our local administrators are forcing through ell by ell, as if they were bent on demonstrating how oppressive and absurd are the orders forced upon them by the central financial bureau. The present head of that institution is not plagued as other administrators are, who are weak enough to consider that there must be a certain fitness in the means to every end that is worthy to be obtained. Sir Richard in this Port Trust business appears to have been backed by another Richard—then and now also a power behind the Viceregal throne—but the method adopted is pre-eminently that of the Finance Department working under blind subservience to orders from home. This policy has been obsequiously followed at Calcutta and Simla during the last three years, and we are sorry to see the Government of Sir Seymour Fitzgerald is giving support to it without open protest. Verily, decentralisation and provincial independence is a dream!

After the Elphinstone Company's property was purchased by the State—a transaction which the public innocently thought would be left to rest on its own basis and results—the Finance Department saw its opportunity for doing a clever sum in simple addition and subtraction. They called upon the P.W.D. in this Presidency, asking them to put down a list of every conceivable outlay connected with the harbour or foreshore, whether contributed by imperial, special, or *port* funds. Whilst this plot against the commerce of Bombay was being secretly concocted, we do not think the slightest reference was made on the subject either to the existing Harbour Board or to the Chamber of Commerce. But this course is according to one of the most favourite maxims of Anglo-Indian financial administration—"Scarborough warning; a word and blow, but the blow first." . . . .

Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, in course of the debate on Act v. of last year, floored the representatives of wharf companies—who, as merchants, demurred to voting a practically

unlimited rate of public bunder fees—with the remark, that the first thing a private pier or wharf company applies for is a concession of the right to charge fees and tolls on goods and passengers in transit. It might be retorted, and probably was, that, whereas Government always reserves a veto over the maximum rates chargeable by private companies, there is no one to put a veto on any toll or tax the all-powerful *Sircar* may think fit to levy; and if, in addition to that, the great wharfinger is to be allowed to impose his rates on all bunders in the island, the Finance Department might as well set about printing a few reams of Government notes for the purchase of what is not yet its own. And supposing such a course could be pursued, where would it end? The official but unpublished Port Fund account is already surcharged to such an extent, that if the average rate of cost of the whole harbour estate were to be somewhat reduced by acquiring all the remaining private bunders at the price actually spent on them, the shipping trade of Bombay would never produce the revenue needful to meet the interest charges. As it is, there are six lakhs at least (£60,000 per annum) to be added by extra fees to the present receipts of the port before the interest on the present scheme can be met. How this is to be done, no one can tell; for, if up go the port charges, down go the trade and tonnage. . . . . .

It is now the turn of the merchants; native firms as well as European should at once organise a determined opposition to a scheme which, if carried out, will cripple the trade of Bombay and inflict incalculable injury on its commercial interests. No mere modifications will make it even tolerable. It is drawn up, as we remarked before, like a mere addition sum, and might have been produced by a calculating machine. There is no principle in the arrangement. The purchase of the Elphinstone property was one question; that of settling what outlay is proper to be charged against the harbour funds is another, and quite a different one. The fifty or sixty lakhs cost of the land reclaimed for the G.I.P. Railway station has as much, but no more, right to be charged against the harbour revenues of Bombay than has that of the twice-built Mhow-ke-Mulla viaduct, or any other work on the Bhore Ghaut. And the Land Estate of the Elphinstone Company ought to have been made over to the Collector of Bombay for him to make the best of it.—*June* 19, 1871.

ONE LIFT FROM SHIP TO SHORE.

CAPTAIN COOK, that most practical of navigators, occasionally made mistakes, and one of them has become historical. One fine day, when his ship was sailing up the eastern shore of the territory afterwards named by him New South Wales, on "going below" to dine, he desired, as usual, that he should at once be called if any notable change in the aspect or direction of the coast-line came into view. Presently the word was passed down to him that the look-out man saw a harbour. Cook was on deck in a trice, scrutinising the coast through his glass, but could make nothing of the slight indentation visible from the poop. Turning to one of his officers and pointing up to the "A.B." at the masthead, he asked—"What's that fellow's name?" "Jackson, sir," was the reply. "Oh, then," said Cook, with the utmost scorn for the poor tar, as he returned to his interrupted meal, "put down Port Jackson, a harbour for boats." As we all know, under subsequent exploration the Port Jackson, despised of the great navigator, developed into Sydney Cove, one of the deepest, most readily accessible, and securest harbours that sea-going ships find in their voyage round the world. We are not about to compare the natural harbours of Sydney and Bombay, but will just glance at the actual condition of each as available for shipping, for this only is of any consequence to commerce. As to Sydney, it is sufficient to quote this succinct description of its harbour facilities: "Ships come close up to the wharves and stores of the town, their cargoes being hoisted from the ship's hold into the warehouses." But the visitor to this island finds at once that in this year of grace 1871, the port of Bombay, in spite of its great natural advantages, is still in the same category as that in which Cook too hastily classed Port Jackson—"a harbour for boats." Nothing is stronger than its weakest part, and the most important link of a chain cable is the last. So with Bombay harbour; as regards the proper conditions of a modern port, its score or so square miles of sheltered anchorage are of no account until sea-going vessels can be brought alongside to discharge or receive their cargoes. . . . . .

This fact would be very humiliating to our citizens and merchants if they had not over and over again shown fair willingness, and made several attempts, to abolish this reproach. It is not necessary to recapitulate the various reasons why this has not yet been accomplished. Neither are we about to balance the respective claims of piers and wet docks. Either of those contrivances would suffice for us, and for the trade. If either of them were constructed, the stigma would be taken away that this is but "a harbour for boats." What we have to remind the public of just now is, that an artificial obstacle has been thrown up, which virtually forbids all further attempts to bridge over that gap between hatchway and shore of which we have spoken. This has been done by the Government of India as projector and creditor-capitalist, followed obsequiously by the Bombay Government as executive engineer and traffic manager. We refer, first, to the preposterous scheme of the Supreme Government, by which the port is to be saddled with a capital debt approaching three millions sterling; and, second, to the Act passed last Session at Poona, whereby the Bombay Government entered into trade as wharfingers, and resolved to levy tolls and fees on every person, parcel, and package passing over not only their own existing wharves and piers, but over any other they or private capitalists and traders may construct. It is very likely that in passing Act v. of 1870 the Bombay Legislature superseded the behests of the Imperial Parliament. That question we leave to the learned doctors of the British Constitution. It is sufficient for us to know that if that Act be carried out with all its inexorable pressure, it will perpetuate the reproach that Bombay is only "a harbour for boats." . . . . . .

It is solely because such an impossible capital account has been drawn up for the long projected but necessarily abortive Port Trust, that Bombay is condemned to remain a mere "harbour for boats." No doubt the Chamber of Commerce is delving away underground about this depressing business; but it is high time appeal should be fairly made to the public. One member of the Chamber's Committee some time since drew up a useful minute on the subject; but if he could have felt that he was at liberty to deal freely with it, like any open public question, the tone and terms of his argument would have been much more decisive. At any rate, it is quite certain that neither the Chamber nor the city can long endure in silence to see forced on this port the huge embargo which, if not greatly modified, will condemn Bombay Port, for all time to come, to the unenviable distinction of being only a "harbour for boats."—*Sept.* 12, 1871.

Port Trust Charges on Private Enterprise.

II.—The letter headed "The Bombay Pier Company," copy of which appeared in our yesterday's impression, signed by Sir Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy on behalf of the Board, will sufficiently explain why the project to give Bombay a good landing and shipping pier "hangs fire." The projectors find themselves debarred by the burden of an extraneous and artificial charge which would have to be levied on all merchandise passing over the pier they intended to build. Government has granted a "concession," receiving therefor a very handsome sum of ready money, but has weighted the concession with a condition that defeats the chief purpose aimed at by the promoters. There is not much need for us to spend any pity on the purchasers of the property. If they had chosen, as they yet may do, to utilise, without much further outlay, the storage and building ground secured by them, their investment would probably yield an ordinary rate of return. But having invited investors everywhere to join them in transforming this private concession into a useful public work, one long needed in Bombay, the whole subject becomes a public question of some urgency. It is just that part of the enterprise which relates to its public purpose that becomes impracticable because of the terms imposed by Government. The object, but not the reason, for the imposition is well understood by everybody. Up to last year the only landing place worth naming over which the State held control was the "Town bunder"—that is, the wharves and basins backed by the Custom House. This was spoken of as a "free bunder," as no charges, other than those actually incurred for cranage, warehousing, or similar special services, were levied. Of course all Customs duties were there paid; and out of these funds or the general imperial revenues were defrayed all charges for maintaining the wharves and keeping clear the approaches from the harbour. Last year, the State having become

proprietor of the extensive sea frontage of the Elphinstone works, Act v. of 1870 was passed, whereby bunder fees and tolls—charges similar to, but somewhat higher than, those levied by the Elphinstone—were imposed not only on that property, but on the Town bunder and all other points of the foreshore where the State had not relinquished its power in favour of some private interest or joint-stock company. . . . . .

Before the (proposed pier) Company can pay interest on its own capital and working expenses, it is bound to levy from its customers funds that go to pay interest on the capital invested in "any wharf or bunder the property of Government." It is manifest that unless the site at Colaba is much more favourable than any other in Bombay harbour, or piers and docks are to pay twice as well in Bombay as elsewhere, this surcharge upon its own necessary rates would check traffic, and, therefore, discourage investors. . . . . .

Many calculations have been made, during the Dock Commission of 1867 and at other times, in order to show the excessive cost in charges and interest entailed on trade by our bungling cargo-boat system; but it is doubtful whether the most extreme of those calculations include all the loss incurred, especially by steamers, when detained a week or fortnight more than is absolutely needful. If this pier at Colaba, or any other, were made, it would attract steamer traffic and speedily cause a demand for another place at which other ships could be brought "alongside." Steamship owners at home have, we understand, expressed much satisfaction on hearing that Bombay was likely to have a pier; and if but the incubus of bunder fees were lifted off the Colaba project, we have no doubt the requisite capital would be found for it, although, instead of the seven or eight hundred actually applied for here, no shares had been taken up in Bombay. But it would be a worthy object for Government to evoke what little genuine public works enterprise there is in Bombay; and unless this be done now by revising the impracticable terms offered to the only tangible project before the public, it is much to be feared that, as Sir Jamsetjee and his colleagues remark, no other such work will "be carried out by public enterprise for many years to come." Meantime we have a Port Trust, but though it offers to sell a lot of its property, no one knows when it was formed, where it is to be found, who are the trustees, or what is entrusted to them. All this time Bombay is still only a "harbour for boats."—*Oct.* 12, 1871.

CALCUTTA AND BOMBAY TRADE RIVALRIES.

THOUGH we cannot pretend to have gone through much more than half the Memorandum, by Mr. H. Rivett-Carnac, on the Interchange of Railway Traffic—between Western India on one side, and Bengal with Upper India on the other—since the completion of the through lines, we must not allow another day to pass without calling attention to this elaborate and timely official return. Great were the expectations regarding the accession to Bombay commerce that would accrue from the opening of through railway communication with Northern and Eastern India. Though those anticipations, were, somehow, considerably sobered down by the time their Excellencies met at Jubbulpore—when Sir Seymour Fitzgerald made a very good speech on the subject—much disappointment has been felt at the comparatively poor results since the opening of the line. But that a great improvement has been taking place during the months immediately preceding the monsoon, and still more since the rains, is obvious to all who have noticed the weekly traffic returns of the G.I.P. in our columns. The considerable increase there apparent has been simultaneous with a heavy decrease in the traffic of the E.I. Railway; so that, on the surface, it looks as if the G.I.P. had really diverted and absorbed a considerable portion of the Ganges railway business. We do not think this transfer is nearly so great as the gross figures of the two returns would lead one to think. If goods from Upper India and the Ganges Valley find a better market at Bombay than Calcutta, they must still travel over a large section of the E.I. line, and if the market is a better one, more goods will be put on the rail. How far Peter has been robbed to pay Paul, and how far each railway has increased its share of traffic between east and west, is the question which Mr. Rivett-Carnac—on behalf of the great and copious Etcætera department—has set himself to answer in all its bearings. . . . . .

When the up-country—or, as the railway men insist on saying, the "down"—traffic

of the year ending June last is only 75,244 cwt., one-eighth of the receipts *towards* Bombay, what can traffic managers do, and how shall the guarantee be made up? Of course every one hopes this state of affairs will change; and the report shows that there was a great improvement last half-year in the trade from west to east. The total traffic for the half-year was 55,359, of which all was sent from Bombay except 10,630, maunds. We hope to give further attention to this suggestive report. Our Chamber of Commerce can scarcely fail to make some practical use of it towards working out the problem in which the merchants of Bombay have just now a very pressing interest,—namely, how to find new markets that shall be profitable and safe. This compilation, which must have cost the author a world of pains, might be commended to the attention of the State Railway Department, and especially to any of its members who may still be halting in opinion between the light and heavy systems—between the narrow gauge, suited for our miscellaneous commodities and light through traffic, and the present "standard" gauge, suited only for a small crowded country like England. The pursuit does not lie in Mr. Rivett-Carnac's way, but, we dare say, he could give the Railway Department some help towards ascertaining what a terrific amount of "dead weight" has been occupied in "hauling" the commodities he has enumerated. Such a calculation would disclose what Colonel Strachey might truly describe as "a hideous waste of power."—*Sept.* 28, 1871.

II.—The speech of Mr. W. G. Hall, the President-elect, at the Chamber of Commerce, the other day, being mainly retrospective, presents few topics which we have not discussed during the last six months. Yet we cannot do less than draw attention to the address as one which, within moderate compass, presents a review, at once full and concise, of the chief events and changes that have affected commercial affairs in Western India during the last business year. The commercial traditions of the mercantile adventurers who came to India to trade, but remained to rule, are fast being forgotten. Their place has been supplied by a very miscellaneous but free and independent community of European traders, whose operations—incomparably more extensive than those of the honourable board of old—fill so large a space in Indian affairs, that we have almost come back to the starting point, so as to regard commerce as the final cause of British presence and rule in India. Certainly, without the personal and national profit gained by means of the special facilities afforded through dint of our political power in this country, the political and military power itself might not long be regarded as worth retaining. And though immediate trade prospects are discouraging, our commercial stake in the country is likely to increase on every side; therefore, the transactions and controversies annually reviewed by the Chairmen of the Chambers, at the three great Indian ports, have far more political significance than is usually claimed by themselves in their matter-of-fact treatment. Of course the several mercantile communities have their rivalries, which, as we who are out of the game can see, contribute to the general advantage. The Bombay Chairman of this year quietly gives the "Roland" to last year's "Oliver" of the Calcutta Chairman. Mr. Bullen Smith had congratulated the merchants of the Hooghly, or mildly commiserated those of Bombay, on the fact that scarcely any Manchester goods went from Bombay beyond Jubbulpore to the N.W. Provinces; but he omitted to state the reason why. Mr. Hall now supplies it, in the statement that, though Jubbulpore is 230 miles nearer to Bombay than to Calcutta, the railway carries piece goods to that station by roundabout route at preferential rates which are equivalent to a profit of two and half per cent. on the goods. . . . . .

The Chairman's remarks on the urgent question of railway extension were to the point, and might with advantage have been amplified. It is satisfactory to notice that the new policy in railway construction which we have so long supported is fully appreciated by mercantile men. As Mr. Hall puts it, "as far as we are concerned, the narrow gauge will carry fast enough for us, and the cheaper the first cost the lower the rate of carriage will be." He alluded to the objections raised on strategic grounds, and thought the commercial advantages outweighed them. But the case is far stronger than that. The fact is, we should never get strategic lines at all if we waited for railways costing £12,000 to £18,000 per mile: the country would be ruined in the attempt to provide defence against imaginary, or, at the best, remotely possible foes. . . . . .—*Oct.* 6, 1871.

MR. T. C. HOPE'S MUNICIPAL INVESTIGATION.

A FORTNIGHT since we had to examine the Municipal Commissioner's Report for 1870 in the light of the auditor's report for that year and 1869. Now, we have to look at all three, and a good deal more, in the light of the report from the Government Committee recently appointed to thoroughly investigate the financial position of the Corporation, and explain authoritatively how the city stands. It must be eminently satisfactory to our readers to find that firm ground is reached at last. More than three years since it was obvious to every impartial observer that the high pressure municipal system of 1865 had proved a disastrous failure; and on the ground that, in these matters, finance tests everything, we have, since an early period in 1869, constantly urged that nothing could be done to any purpose in municipal matters until—as unanimously urged by the Bench on Mr. Currey's motion—the Bombay Government should take up the whole subject, and place the city at a new point for departure. This is not done yet. . . . Above all, the Bombay Government is bound to abandon at once that attitude of alternate indifference and antagonism towards the Corporation on one hand, and unlimited indulgence towards its executive on the other, which have had such a very large share in fostering the extravagance and accelerating the ruinous "progress" whose results are now revealed.

Let us look at some of these results. Our readers will have an opportunity of perusing the report of Mr. Hope and his colleagues for themselves. So complete and artistic are its proportions, that we feel considerable disinclination to break up its unity and analyse its separate portions. But for good practical reasons, on which we need not stay to philosophise, this rough process is needful in order to popularise and give effect to the conclusions arrived at. In stating the principal totals of the report, as we have already done more than once, our aim has been to avoid exaggeration and to deprecate any alarmist feeling. Now that the facts are known, we can afford and desire to treat them coolly; but this is in order that they may be looked at fully and fairly. . . . . .

The Committee show that the 15-lakh loan would have sufficed to clear off the deficiency, save Rs. 1,40,073, had it not been for fresh—and we dare say unsanctioned—expenditure of nearly 6½ lakhs on markets, &c. In 1870 things went worse by 1¼ lakh; but, instead of that, a recovery of more than 2 lakhs might have been attained, were it not for the excess on ordinary items, and again in those much vaunted markets, amounting to nearly 3½ lakhs. This was the demand partly met by the abstraction of the Sinking Fund. In the present year the gulf yawns wider than ever. The Committee say that "the financial position will have further deteriorated by Rs. 7,10,796." . . .

The Committee have done their work; but they have not gone an inch beyond. They state conclusions, but draw no inferences, and leave to others to make deductions. In this respect the first duty lies with the Government of Bombay. For nearly three years its gaze has been carefully averted from the hopeless and all but abandoned struggle by a few of the citizens to arrest the mismanagement and reckless expenditure of the Commissioner. But Sir Seymour Fitzgerald and his colleagues can no longer plead ignorance—ignorance which a day's impartial and peremptory investigation would have dispelled any time since those evasive official letters were written during the first half of 1869. They now know, and all India knows, that the law has been violated by our municipal officers; formal restraints have been systematically spurned; unauthorised expenditure has been incurred and concealed to a very serious extent; the public creditor has been placed in jeopardy; costly outlay has been promoted without anything approaching to adequate results, while many most needful works of civic improvement remain in abeyance; and the people of this most populous city in India, where modern corporate institutions might be expected to work best, have been disgusted with the very name of municipality, to such an extent that years must pass before the requisite confidence and spirit of co-operation can again be evoked. If the Government of Bombay, in face of all this, desire to retain in office the man whose characteristic boast it has been that he was "responsible" for everything done, then Sir Seymour Fitzgerald and his colleagues must be prepared for a struggle with the Government of India and the Secretary of State which will not conduce to the prosperity and glory of this Presidency.

But we do not assume for a moment that the Government of Bombay has not already estimated the full force of the grave conclusions brought to light by the Committee of Investigation.—*Oct.* 16, 1871.

THE MUNICIPAL REFORM VINDICATED.

II.—No doubt Mr. J. A. Forbes made a few mistakes in June last when, comparatively new to the subject, he brought his indictment against the management of the Bombay Municipality. Those inevitable and unimportant shortcomings have been all obliterated by the report from the Committee of Investigators, which makes any past inaccuracies by outside critics look quite insignificant. And if any one felt hesitation as to whether Mr. Forbes had performed a great public service or not, that feeling of dubiety must be entirely removed by the publication of his letter to H.E. Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, which appeared in our paper yesterday. Some points of that document may be open to criticism, but, as a whole, it is invaluable as speaking the word that is wanted, and clearing away all excuse for hesitation. The Bombay Government has been in a fog long enough about municipal affairs, and the only way out of it is to take some such sharp decisive step as that suggested by Mr. Forbes. This is, in brief, for the Local Executive at once to take the management of the city into its own hands until some satisfactory course can be decided upon, both as regards finances and organisation. To do this through the Collector of Bombay would be a suitable method of utilising existing machinery that ordinarily works much under its power, but which ought at all times to be capable of making any sudden effort that may be called for in the exigencies of this island city. . . . . .

Nothing could be more suitable in the present exigency than for the Local Government to show its substantial good-will towards the Municipality by providing it with house-room. It is, indeed, high time for the Bombay Government to exhibit some effective and practical willingness on behalf of the much abused and neglected Corporation. We do not wish to add anything to what Mr. Forbes has so forcibly said in pushing home on the Bombay Government responsibility for municipal mismanagement. For the last three years we have steadily pointed out that the Bench was powerless, and that the whole duty of control and supervision had passed over to the authority which had affected to grant it. The only conclusion to be drawn from this proposition just now is, that the Government, which created the Municipality and allowed it to drift amongst the shoals, is bound to use its utmost effort to extricate the unfortunate craft. This is the refrain of Mr. Forbes' letter, and its practical outcome is well summed up in the following para.: "All that is asked is—permission to occupy for a year or two an empty building; the loan for a few months, without interest, of a hundred thousand pounds; and lastly, what is cheapest of all, though perhaps of the most vital importance, the cordial support, and more especially the *immediate intervention*, of Government in clearing the town of a great scandal, and organising an entirely new system of municipal administration." It is certainly this "lastly" which is both of pressing and permanent importance. Unless an entire change of method and policy is introduced into municipal working, unless some outside authority is exerted to enforce a more economical spirit in the *de facto* municipal executive, the Corporation must still drift week by week into further embarrassment. . . . . .—*Oct.* 24, 1871.

REPLY TO BOMBAY GOVERNMENT EXCUSES.

III.—The Ratepayers' Committee is to be congratulated on the partial but notable success of their flank movement. The course they adopted the other day in memorialising the Government of India direct, was, of course, very irregular, and quite contrary to the "usual routine" of humdrum negotiation between the Indian public and its rulers. We do not overlook the circumstance that the Bombay Government resolution we published yesterday bears date the 18th, which being the day of the ratepayers' meeting, cannot be positively alleged to stand as an effect of that cause. Yet, as the natural history of Government resolutions has yet to be written, there is room to make the remark that, like any other documents not finished at a sitting, this or any other resolution may be either ante or post dated by accident or design. And in the present instance, as it was

well known some days before the meeting that the lieges intended to appeal from the "satrap" of Bombay to the "tetrarch" of Calcutta, we shall not err much in suggesting that, though it had not been thought necessary to reply to the Justices' manful resolution of December *fifth*, the imminence of an appeal from the ratepayers direct prompted the desire to put in an appearance where the indolences, caprices, and self-complacency of local authorities are of little account. We are bound to notice the apologetic resolution now issued, though it is little more than a recapitulation of the pleas formerly put in by the Bombay Government in mitigation of the sentence passed by public opinion because of its *laches* in regard to municipal affairs. . . . . .

If the document be looked at merely within its own four corners, there is much to approve in it. As a literary composition, and a well-reasoned argument from the premises laid down, it will pass as an excellent piece of desk work. But it does not closely fit the facts; it does not accord with the real history of the city since the close of 1868; and it is discouraging, rather than helpful towards that organic reformation for which the city still waits with such remarkable patience. It is an important admission that "His Excellency in Council" now sees that much mischief would have been averted had some modification of the Act been introduced early in 1869, and if checks or expenditure had then been made more precise and tangible; but why was not this done? . . . .

We will concede this much, that, had the present Chief Secretary been on the spot in the first half of 1869, matters might have turned out differently; but he was not, and it has required almost a revolution to effect what could then have been brought about by regular and orderly processes. For the fatal inaction and the delusive optimism of 1869, the Chief Secretary of that period and his superiors in the Executive must bear the sole ultimate responsibility. Those who know the actual circumstances of the time,—how from a variety of causes, well understood by the public, the Commissioner could defeat or evade any action of the Bench which ever so remotely threatened his position—must, according to their humour, be indignant or diverted at the palaver about "powers of the Justices" scattered over paras. 2 to 6 of the present Resolution. . . . . .

This leads us to say a word or two on a topic which has necessarily puzzled the writer of the Resolution, seeing that he had only dumb, unannotated papers to guide him. He finds that the Act grants large powers of debate and voting, and that there has been much show of exercising these powers. "Earnest and able members of the Bench have from time to time brought forward propositions" adapted to avert the evils that have befallen us; but, somehow, these have come to nothing. It says something for the pains taken by the drafter of the Resolution, that he perceives these weighty movements have been turned aside on such frivolous pleas as that they were not quite necessary, or "inopportune"—as reforms generally are to those whom they disturb. Did it not occur to the writer to guess—if he has never happened to witness the farce—how this weak and impotent result should be the only outcome of the "powers" he finds put down on paper? Does he not know that of these Justices, whom "His Excellency in Council" is made to lecture once more, fully one-third of the available voters were connected with the Commissioner by service or other official ties; that another third, comprising most of the wealthy and influential native citizens, had been rendered satisfied with "things as they were" by means of the fiscal compact come to at the close of 1868; and that of the remaining third—who might be supposed to represent that ideal "earnest and able" Bench ever in His Excellency's eye—more than half were constantly coming and going, and were therefore no match for the municipal Executive and the demi-official time-servers, whose interest it was to keep fast hold of the thread of affairs and be on the watch to oppose any investigation into the Commissioner's tangles? What, in the name of common sense, is the use of talking about "the authority already possessed by the Justices," when such "authority" could be jockeyed or neutralised at every critical juncture? Every one, from the Hon. Mr. Scoble, the Chairman, downwards, has been demanding a revision of that miscellaneous constitution of the Bench which rendered enforcement of responsibility impracticable. It is only a few who have steadily demanded an inquiry into the administration itself. As soon as that inquiry was granted—nearly three years after it was first asked for—the much belauded and bolstered up system collapsed. The writer of the Resolution is so incautious as to refer to the four committees which were appointed by the Bench in 1869, in sheer despair of Government granting the only kind of assistance which could be of any avail. "His Excellency in Council" is now made to

ask the innocent question, why were the reports not presented in due course? . . . The well-known fact that the late Commissioner could dominate the Bench has sometimes been referred to derisively as—"so much the worse for the Justices." But it is tolerably notorious that the late Commissioner also dominated the Bombay Government in respect of nearly all local affairs: shall we therefore say—so much the worse for His Excellency in Council?—*Jan.* 26, 1872.

The New Municipal Act.

IV.—Mr. Matthew Arnold, in one of his cynical and trenchant essays, points out as one of the besetting weaknesses of his countrymen that they have an inordinate faith in "machinery." On this ground it must be admitted that the framers of our new Municipal Act are model Englishmen. Anything more elaborate and complicated it would be difficult to contrive. It is "wonderfully" made; and if the Legislative Council does not very largely reduce the number of "bearings," the results of its working cannot but be fearful to contemplate. Not that there is any danger of the apparatus running too fast. What is to be dreaded from the working of the cumbrous machine as at present devised is waste of power, needless antagonism, checks on public spirit, and, finally, a civic deadlock. It is difficult to recall any former Governmental organisation to which the new constitution may be compared. The Bench of Justices, chiefly out of which materials are obtained for the new structure, is itself *sui generis*, an anomaly and a very peculiar institution. If we must have a comparison, the new municipal constitution may be likened unto an amalgamation between a Venetian oligarchy and one of the English corporations before the Reform Bill era, when a few hereditary burgesses and aldermen elected each other.

But here is the Bill, and we shall have to make the best of it; for the obsequious "additional members," after more or less show of debate, will carry pretty much what the Executive desire. Therefore, let us enumerate the principal wheels, cranks, and pulleys of this cunningly devised organisation, so that we may trace wherein its motive power consists, and where we are to look for its guiding and regulating movements. . . . . .

From these ranks, then, there are to be chosen—first, thirty-two, nominated by the Governor in Council; and thirty-two more are to be elected by their fellows after Government has had its pick. Then comes in the new element, the "tub thrown to the whale" of popular representation. There are to be sixteen citizens not Justices, eight of whom will be nominated by Government, and another eight are to be elected by a certain narrow constituency of ratepayers, who, of course, may include many Justices. By an odd freak, the sixteen ratepayer members of the Corporation, both nominated and elected, may be persons of less substance and lower status than the ratepayers who are permitted to vote for them. The sixteen are qualified by the payment of any municipal rates and taxes to the amount of fifty rupees; but those who are to elect eight, of the sixteen, can only be qualified by the payment of that sum as house *owners!* This placing of the cart before the horse, we must presume, is the result of an oversight; because if not, it introduces a novelty in the methods of representative organisation. . . . . .

And now, when we have got the corporation of eighty, let us see what is to be done with them. Considering that of the resident Justices, many of them are frequently absent from Bombay, that number would not have been much in excess for supervising the affairs of the city after the requisite number of committees had been told off. But no, there must be another filtration; and from the corporation of eighty we see the Town Council emerge. Very complicated is the process by which this important body at last struggles into being. Henceforth each year will in Bombay be closed by the exciting scenes consequent on the very mildly contested elections of the thirty-two and eight members of the Corporation; then the new year is to be ushered in by the choice of the twelve Town Councillors. Of these, the chairman and five members, of whom two are to be of the eight elected ratepayers already mentioned, are to be nominated by the Executive Government. The other six, including again two of the elect ratepayers, are to be chosen by the corporation of eighty. . . . . .

The Corporation is to hold at least four meetings in the year, and thirty members are required to form a quorum. But the Corporation is only the fly wheel of the machine;

the working cogs are the Town Councillors. These devoted public servants are to meet at least once a week, and though they may meet six days if they like, they will only get Rs. 30 each on Saturday night; and this *douceur* is only to be given to each member "who actually attends such (weekly) meeting from the beginning to the end thereof." Here, it seems to us, is a provision which may enable a strong-willed minority to bring to terms a majority of hungry or dyspeptic councillors, much in the same way as the boot-eating, obstinate juryman has been able to bring round the wiser eleven who had the misfortune to be locked up with him.

Now, having done our part to save many busy or indolent persons the trouble of making out what is the new civic constitution proposed, we might leave the public to work their own way through those provisions of the Bill which bear on the transaction of business and control of the municipal fund. But nothing has been said about the Municipal Commissioner. . . . Under the new scheme the Commissioner will have plenty of power and quite sufficient scope for minding his own work. But his opportunities for making the worse appear the better reason, for cajolery, and other parliamentary tactics, are all swept away in the line—"he shall not be eligible to be a member of the Town Council." For anything to the contrary laid down in the Bill, he may, however, be eligible as a member of the Corporation, where he will be at liberty to practise those arts by which nominated Justices and other brethren with weak spines are so apt to be beguiled.

We should have remarked on the prominent position that is given to the Accountant, who is also Secretary to the Town Council. It seems that it will be with this officer rather than with the Commissioner that the Corporation is to be brought more directly in contact. It would say little for the framers of the present measure if they had not profited by the experience gained under Act II. in the matter of contracts . . . and that course always affords the best security for the taxpayers. Under the present Act no one knew where the common seal of the Corporation was to be found; but, under the new one, very elaborate regulations are prescribed as to the manner in which the great seal shall be used. Yet nothing is said about leases!—*March* 27, 1872.

V.—As it seems that the new charter under which this city is to be ruled will not be submitted for the consideration of the citizens themselves, we must make the best we can of the conflict of opinions between the small official majority of the Select Committee and the three dissentients. The whole Bill, with its flock of quiddling regulations and crowd of supererogatory provisions, is such a jungle, that we cannot be expected again to wade through its 304 sections, albeit the Select Committee has here and there pruned its redundancies. Still, we suppose, we must make the best of the perplexing situation into which everything concerning the city has been allowed to drift. Because in the first half of 1869 the Executive Government of Bombay grossly neglected its duty as supervisor and trustee, the whole municipal machinery was thrown out of gear, men's minds became unsettled, and thus we have to make an entirely new machine instead of replacing a few cogs and screws, as would have sufficed three years ago. And now, when the new engine is brought out, it reminds us all too much of our monster road-roller, sometime deceased—it is very imposing, big, and heavy, but clumsy, costly, and ill-fitting in its essential joints. In the Bill now before Council we have old foes with a new face; and though Government avow their intention of relinquishing autocratic power and making the municipal executive really responsible to those whose welfare is affected by its action, the fact is plain on the face of things, that, as the Hon. Mr. Forbes so aptly remarks, "the Bill is characterised by a marked distrust of the whole system of municipal government which it inaugurates." . . . . . .

But, again, as we have to make the best of things, let us see how much the official members of the Select Committee have conceded, or what perversities they have withdrawn. Their best card is put in front—namely, revision of the proposed Venetian constitution, and extension of the franchise (how ancient that phrase sounds to some of us English politicians of the olden time!); and we have already duly acknowledged this liberality, which is remarkable, considering the quarter whence it comes; but the ratepayers, whose appetites have been whetted, are, like the workhouse boy over his soup, calling out for more franchises and more repeal of restrictions and disqualifications. . . . . .

Turning to the elements of which the revenue is composed, we much regret to see that a majority of the Select Committee appear disposed to treat the revised town duties as an integral part of the city's income; but it must be remembered that these were revived only to stop gaps caused through municipal extravagance and neglect by the Bombay Government. These imposts have only been restored under exceptional circumstances, and we trust the Corporation will abolish them for ever as soon as the city can feel that its legitimate resources are sufficient for its needs. At any rate, we trust a firm stand will be made in support of the Hon. Mr. Forbes's protest against the introduction of the cotton tax, which is avowedly a transit duty. The grain duty, in spite of the system of drawbacks, has already operated as such to a considerable extent.

Another protest, in aid of which we trust the Chamber of Commerce, Tradesmen's Association, and all other public bodies capable of such action will join, should be lodged against the proposed imposition in this city of a heavy permanent burden in the shape of the wholesale exemption from municipal taxation of Government buildings and property. This is a large question—one that affects Calcutta, Madras, and other Indian cities in common with this; and, therefore, we hope that some united movement may be undertaken in order to relieve our expensive *régime* of modern municipal conservancy from this artificial burden which is imposed on it by the exemption, partial or entire, of State property. It is not needful to extend our criticisms at present. . . . . .—*Sept.* 2, 1872.

THE PORT TRUST AND ITS HUGE DEBT.

THE publication of the chief portion of the papers relating to the purchase of the Elphinstone property, and the financial negotiations between the Governments of India and Bombay in regard to the formation of a Port Trust, will serve to clear up a vast amount of misunderstanding. But once more we are constrained to ask, why were these documents not placed before the public at an earlier date? There was not the slightest substantial excuse in this instance for the absurd regulation of secrecy being maintained a single week after receipt of the big letter from the Government of India, dated September 8th, last year. It was generally known that numerous printed copies of that document were in the hands of the Financial Department here; but, according to official superstitions, it would have been something like high treason for even Sir Seymour Fitzgerald to place that document and its predecessors before the public. . . . . .

Our business now is to find out, if we can, where the trade and finances of the port have been landed by the discussion commencing with Colonel Kennedy's letter of February 1st, 1869, copy of which appeared in our columns on Friday last. The next step is to refer to the letter of Colonel Trevor, dated June, 1870, copy of which will be found in another column to-day. . . . . .

In this letter of Colonel Trevor's, that battle of adjustments sets in, which, though not yet decided, we must here skim over lightly. The battle opened, as we all know, with the demur to pay for the land on which the G.I.P. Railway has its goods station. Colonel Trevor put the objection thus: "It can hardly be contended that the inhabitants of Bombay are to be taxed to the extent of Rs.1,80,000 every year, for the benefit of the general public of India, or that they should pay, as suggested, by instalments in thirty years 40 lakhs of rupees to the Government of India for a portion of their own foreshore. This Government believe it is only necessary for them to draw attention to the injustice of this demand to ensure its immediate remission by the Government of India." So far from any remission of this demand having ensued, it would be observed in the last letter from the Government of India, dated 5th of last month, that authority "desires it may be fully understood that it has in no respect withdrawn" from the flat refusal with which the request for the remission was first met. But whilst thus consistent in its obstinacy, the Supreme Government has made a certain concession which must, for the present, be set off, as far as it will go, against the intolerable oppression of having to purchase "a portion of our own foreshore" by uncompensated exactions on trade. As this concession is the most important that has been obtained during the controversy, we will turn to it, though out of the order in which it arose. Colonel Kennedy, in his letter of October last, after remarking that this Government's contention against saddling the trade of the port with the imperial charge for a railway terminus "has never been met on its merits," proceeds

to propose that instead of the railway station (called "Waree Bunder land" in this correspondence), there should be made over to the Trust, without charge, the Apollo Bay Reclamation and certain land in Moody Bay—in all, about seventy acres. . . . This costly and comparatively useless public work thus presented to the city will be of little avail to enhance the income of the port, but it is a very important relief to get the 17¾ lakhs it represents written off from the capital debt. There is another 10 lakhs also conceded in respect of the debit for right to levy wharfage fees on the railway's frontage. And the unprofitable Moody Bay Reclamation is to be taken under management of the Trust without interest being charged until after a period of ten years. . . . . .

Indeed, the grand grievance is, that after the port has been saddled with this enormous burden of nearly three millions, "the main feature of the undertaking which His Excellency in Council had in view—namely, providing for sea-going vessels of large tonnage, deep-water basins in which they can load and discharge (or piers for the same purpose)—is wholly lost sight of and put aside." Worse than that; it is quite plain that, had it not been for this Port Trust scheme, the steamer trade would have already been in a fair way to obtain a pier that would have met almost all its present requirements. The semi-personal contention between the two Governments is of small consequence to the outside mercantile world at present, or to the citizens of Bombay; but it is plain that, in the interests of the public, the final settlement should in some way be taken out of the hands of both the disputing parties. The Government of India has the Government of Bombay "on the hip," inasmuch as the latter in 1869 forgot that they were about to pay for more than they should receive—that the Imperial revenues had already profited to at least half a million in respect of the sum demanded by the Elphinstone shareholders. But as the transaction has now gone past the two Governments, the public must have its authoritative say in the matter, and that fiat will compel the transfer of the half-million to its proper head of railway capital. . . . . .

The Chamber of Commerce will, we presume, at once set about obtaining a more explicit statement than this correspondence affords of the burdens now being imposed on the trade of Bombay.—*April* 1, 1872.

II.—Bombay may be forgiven if, in welcoming Lord Northbrook, it does not forget the very strong claims which this port has on his Lordship's favourable consideration. Though an old story, it is high time it were entering on a new phase. The Government of India appear to have been ready to admit so much; and, lest amidst the three confluent streams of personal influence now flowing through our city—from the efforts of our departing and arriving Governors, and possibly of the new Viceroy—Bombay should obtain something like its fair share of Imperial aid, an experienced officer of Bengal Engineers was sent to act the part of Cerberus. We cannot complain of the selection made in this instance. Whilst Colonel Fraser will, we doubt not, faithfully serve the Indian Pluto who revels in his overflowing Treasury, he is a man superior to provincial bias. We gather that he is proving himself quite willing to see the most valuable port in India well served, if that can be done without such sacrifices as have from time to time been lavished on the Hooghly and Calcutta. . . . . .

When the last Viceroy landed in Bombay, a large joint stock company held possession of the most important part of the foreshore. The shareholders had spent nearly two millions sterling on the property, but a considerable part of that huge sum had really been spent for imperial, public, and general purposes. . . . . .

The burden of the Port Trust scheme became a crushing one when its schedule of capital had debited to it charges for useless works which our mercantile community had never asked for, and for which trade can never be induced to pay. It must be owned that the Supreme Government of India has shown some disposition to be reasonable in respect of such abortive reclamations as in Moody Bay, and comparatively useless works as those of the Wellington, Apollo, and Arthur bunders. If, then, the new Viceroy can promise some further relief in this direction, Bombay will thank him; but no settlement can be arrived at until the cost of the G.I.P. goods station shall be transferred to the Government of India's account of land grants to railways.

But apart from all disputes as to cost, and the final arrangement of accounts, there are one or two practical questions which press for speedy settlement, and the merchants of

Bombay will be glad to hear that Colonel Fraser and Lord Northbrook have agreed on some plan to meet the urgent wants of this entrance-gate of the Indian Empire. All are agreed that we cannot go on much longer with the antiquated system of cargo boats, and without any pier or wharf on which passengers can land direct from the ship. We must have ships brought alongside. Whether this be done by means of piers or docks is a question which, though in itself of secondary importance, may make a couple of years' difference in the way it shall be answered. . . . Supposing there were time for Lord Northbrook to look round him in Bombay—which there is not—his willingness to look into this pier question might be taken as a fair test of his independence, self-reliance, and readiness of perception. As it is, he will be so surrounded with Elphinstonians, past and present, that there is little chance of his even getting to know that an independent and self-supporting pier is a possible project for Bombay.—*April* 29, 1872.

III.—As some weeks must elapse before any decisive official action can be taken towards giving effect to the resolutions passed by our Chamber of Commerce on the 5th, we are still in good time in commenting on what passed at that meeting. . . . . .

Let us go back to the second stage in Mr. Bythell's history or "statement of facts," which he thought it "absolutely necessary" should be laid before the Chamber. It is admitted that the terms and objects of the Elphinstone purchase were known to every one in the middle of 1869. The Chairman admits that when the Bunder Fees Act was passed in the autumn of 1870, it was quite understood that the port was to be debited with some two millions sterling, on which four and half per cent. was to be charged, the principal to be repaid in thirty years. Mark those dates. The Chairman says that "negotiations were in progress during a period of two and half years with a view to changing the whole nature of the harbour accommodation, without the trade being asked once for an opinion as to whether the expenditure and the proposed changes would be beneficial or not." Why, then, in the name of common sense, did not the trade "express its opinion," if it had one? It is the veriest fudging of an excuse to say that there was "only rumour or insufficient statements to go upon." A mere tithe of the information that has been in the hands of the general public since July, 1869, would have warranted the Chamber in storming both the Governments of Bombay and India until some definite and authorised assurance should have been furnished as to what infliction the port was to expect. . . . . .

Opportunities for remonstrance were also thrust upon our merchants. The dulness of trade in Bombay almost ever since the purchase of the Elphinstone estate should have incited public-spirited men to protest, again and again, lest the port should be overborne and lose all its relative natural advantages, as it now seems likely to do. Nor can it be pleaded that figures and statistics were wanting. We have already alluded to the astounding totals which were mentioned incidentally in the Legislative Council at Poona in August, 1870. That was before Sir Seymour Fitzgerald knew that his favourite bubble of transferring the Baroda Railway terminus to the eastern side of the island had burst. Very early in April, 1871, there appeared in this column a circumstantial statement showing the extent of the evil intended against Bombay, under the paltering guise of a Port Trust. Of course we could not then explain that our article was based on official and authoritative documents; but if the Members of the Chamber turn to it, they will find it tallies with Colonel Trevor's letter of June, 1870, which forms one of the chief links in this correspondence that did not come into the Chamber's possession until March of this year. The Chairman says, "The possession of that correspondence has changed the Chamber's position very materially." It would be more to the point to say that the prolonged indifference of the mercantile community of Bombay to the broad and notorious facts forming the pith of that correspondence, placed us entirely at the mercy of the authorities, and, as we have seen, shut up the Chamber to the foregone conclusions embodied in the resolutions now "unanimously" passed. The first time the Committee come before the public on this question of enormous local importance, they meekly advise the members that "we cannot ask and cannot expect the Government of India to make any further remission of our debt," and "that we ought now to accept our position, and make the best of it." Why, this adverse position is in many degrees due to the procrastination and want of public spirit evinced by the mercantile community of Bombay—native as well as European. Mr. Bythell puts the chief financial error in a true and striking light when he says that the Port Trust is paying £1,900,000 for a property which cost only £1,200,000, and yet he went on to exhort the

Chamber to "accept the position." Had that body moved, as it ought to have done, in the early part of last year, a resolute stand could then have been made to throw that 70 lakhs back on to the charge to which it belongs—namely, the Imperial railway capital account. But now, the Chairman says, it is too late, and not a single member must venture to insist on that obviously required adjustment. Neither was a single speaker found to point out that the Land estate ought to be separated from the Dock estate, and made over to the Collector of Bombay. With regard to the second and larger portion of Mr. Bythell's speech, that in which he vindicated the character and usefulness of mercantile boards for harbour administration, we can have nothing to say that is not in high praise. . . . . —*June* 12, 1872.

IV.—The more the course taken by the Chamber of Commerce at its meeting the other day in regard to harbour improvement is considered, the more will it be regretted on behalf of the permanent interests of the port. It was perfectly intelligible and proper that the associated merchants should say to Government—"Now we have been striving and hoping for harbour improvements for years; by your purchase of the Elphinstone property, and levying of heavy present and prospective charges on shipping and traffic of all kinds, you have superseded all other efforts towards better harbour accommodation; therefore we urgently request that you will at as early a date as possible provide us with some means of bringing ships alongside." Instead of taking an impartial position like this, the "unanimous" Chamber, after some very unnecessary condonation of the financial pressure needlessly put on the port, proceeded to urge Government to carry out one particular plan of harbour works which will cost at least one million sterling, which cannot be made available for commerce under three years at the very earliest, and which is so extensive as virtually, if adopted, to exclude any other or smaller plan being attempted. The course taken by the Chamber cannot appear business-like to any impartial lookers-on. . . . . .

When we consider the subject financially, the dereliction of duty on the part of the Chamber appears to us very striking. They might have moved to some purpose fifteen months ago, if only by way of sternly demanding to know what evil the two Governments were meditating against the port; but now, under the pressure to obtain a unanimous vote in favour of one particular engineer's project, the Chamber surrenders at discretion, accepts the 70 lakhs railway station as an appanage of the port, and portions of several other properties that can never be remunerative. It would have been quite consistent for the Chamber, whilst urging Government to get on with some useful work and do it quickly, to protest by resolution against being debited with the 70 lakhs for the station and some of the other unprofitable lots. But no; these easy-going merchants said—"The Government of India has been very civil, we will not press the Viceroy further." This lame and impotent conclusion was mainly owing to the whole discussion having been placed on a wrong issue, to begin with. . . . . .

For reasons, sound or otherwise, our merchants generally have expressed vehement objections to the Elphinstone purchase, and yet here is one of them standing up without contradiction amongst his fellows, who, on their behalf as it were, accepts the responsibility of that outlay, and says—"Never mind; put another million down the shaft, and then we shall strike oil." We feel persuaded that the burdens now being fastened on our trade will go far to nullify those natural advantages of our position which—considering that our port has no large river behind it, and that we are dependent on costly railway communication with the interior—must be economised and utilised to the utmost, if Bombay is to maintain her supremacy as a great eastern emporium. It is not yet too late, perhaps, for individual citizens to do something to mitigate the effects of the Chambers' too enthusiastic resolution. . . . . .—*June* 18, 1872.

Docks and Piers: Committee's Report.

V.—It would be both interesting and instructive if any one would take the trouble to draw out a parallel between the Bombay dock and pier problem, as it stands now and as it presented itself to the Committee which sat in 1867, when the test question was—"Shall we accept Mr. Russel Aitken's plans for closed docks in Moody Bay?" . . . The Elphinstone and Musjid basins, described in Mr. Ormiston's replies to Colonel Fraser, are

planned on the principle of going below the natural level of the harbour, and dispense with that cheap facility which is afforded by such rise of tide as we have in Bombay. . . . .

The figures given by Mr. Ormiston in his recent paper would appear to afford a higher average; but as they are so mixed up with the question of datum, and his own scheme to get 20 feet below low water, it is difficult to make out what is the average or prevalent rise of tide. We are still inclined to coincide with the majority of the Committee and Maculloch, the economist, in thinking that as "Bombay is the only port of consequence in British India, in which the rise and fall of tide are so considerable as to admit of the formation of extensive wet docks," that exceptional advantage ought not to be abandoned without stronger and more special reasons than have yet been advanced in support of such a sacrifice. . . . The Sassoon dock, though only intended as a boat basin to serve the coast cotton trade, is to be fitted with gates to impound the tide, and will be able to accommodate two or three of the smaller steamers and square rigged vessels. Now, if the private capitalists who have this work in hand would only have courage to take full advantage of the position, and put their dock cill as low as it can be placed, they might, whilst putting a little more money into their own purse, do an immense service to Bombay by practically testing two or three moot points which must otherwise be bandied about in controversy until settled by much more costly experiments. . . . . .

Throughout these discussions, now continued during several years, we have contended that it is a mistaken policy to rely solely on one large scheme, either of docks, basins, piers, or wharves. This harbour is so large, the physical conditions of its foreshore are so varied, and the natural distribution of its trade is so imperatively required, that no one scheme will suffice to meet the work of our commerce without laying on some portions of our trade a burden too grievous to be borne. We want all available appliances—piers, docks, basins, and jetties; but the adoption of the big project now before the public would shut us up to one method only. Here it is worth remarking, when we observe how both sections of the 1867 Committee avoided all examination of pier or jetty proposals, that since that period the shipping trade of Bombay has been in great measure revolutionised. The few sailing vessels may now be left to take care of themselves; it is for steamers alone that our harbour engineers have to provide. This again helps the vote in favour of piers. . . . . .—*June* 5, 1872.

NEW BANK OF BOMBAY: ITS CHARTER.

AN opportunity was missed by the shareholder of the Bank of Bombay (Mr. Macfarlane), to whom last Wednesday was entrusted the sometimes formal duty of proposing that the thanks of the proprietors "be given to the Directors and officers of the Bank for their management of its affairs." The business of the Bank has not only been "very successful" during the past year, but that immediate success has been attained whilst adhering to sound principles and following most careful methods of management in detail. Much evidence of this was referred to in course of the Chairman's speech, but it was open to any shareholder to dwell upon the subject for a few minutes in a tone and with emphasis which it would be manifestly impossible for any member of the Board to use. . . . .

It is with reference to the steady observance of sound banking principles by the Manager and Directors that we think the attention of the public might have been suitably bespoken by one or other of the shareholders. We have often done our utmost to stimulate close criticism at the annual meetings of Bank shareholders, but whenever there is ample room for discriminate commendation, such should be given. As remarked at the meeting, excessive prejudice and much exaggeration obtains in many quarters regarding the mercantile tone or business morality and solvency of bankers' clients, in Bombay. Some of our critics are apt to forget that, notwithstanding the shearing given us by the census men, this island still contains the largest and most diversified business community in India. The native cotton dealers may be speculating, and compromising their losses to an enormous extent; the Mussulman merchants who trade with the Gulf, Sinde, and Africa may be losing money; but these and half a dozen other trade movements, besides the alternate "bulling" and "bearing" which goes on amongst the noisy but astute brokers of our share bazaar, may all be proceeding without the Bank of Bombay being affected in the slightest degree. In the first place, there is the steadiness which, in common with the other two Presidency banks, is ensured to the Bank of Bombay by the

fact that, though standing in the very midst of the torrents and eddies of the exchange business between India and the outer world, it cannot, because of its very constitution, be affected by the ebb or flow of those troublous waters. But, as we are painfully aware, it is possible for an institution engaged only with internal exchanges and local advance to get very far wrong if it once departs from the plain good rules always observed by safe and successful bankers. And it is because the report and the Chairman's comprehensive address furnish abundant evidence of those commonplace but invaluable rules having been faithfully acted upon by all concerned, that it is worth while our referring thus late to the proceedings reported in our last Friday's paper.

It is high time it were well understood that Bombay has long since obliterated all ground for the stereotyped reproaches which some ill-informed writers keep in stock. Where, not in India alone, but in any country, is there a banking institution that can boast of fifteen millions sterling turned over with only Rs. 6,000 of past due bills, and those duly "provided for"? . . . . . .

As to the backwardness of the Supreme Government in granting a charter, that grudging, obstructive course is only too much in accordance with the attitude of the upper powers, or rather of the Financial Department, which, as regards the Bank of Bombay, has more than once usurped the prerogatives of "His Excellency the Governor-General in Council."

Will Lord Northbrook, we may here pause to ask, prove himself strong enough to break down the abuse and the misuse of that high Executive formula by ministerial subordinates as, for the time, Sir Philip Wodehouse has done? This query, of course, applies to a hundred more affairs besides those of the Bombay Bank's charter; and we must confess to some anxiety until it be proved how far the new Viceroy is the man to grapple with the Secretariats.—*Aug.* 12, 1872.

THE BOMBAY BANK SHAREHOLDERS' CLAIMS.

THE battle of the Bombay Bank victims has not been well fought in the House.* Mr. Gregory, who had charge of the case, no doubt did his duty by it, but there had been no strategy exercised beforehand. It is possible we may find men of both parties amongst the seventy-eight who voted for mercy to the fleeced and confiding shareholders; but if proper exertion had been used, some Liberal speakers might have been obtained. It was impossible to produce any impression on Government without showing a phalanx of united Radicals and Tories, the former sufficiently numerous to cause anxiety to the Ministerial whips. . . . As to the Solicitor-General's rhetoric about "innocent taxpayers," that is all nonsense. Innocent taxpayers had to pay for the Bombay Government's blunders in the matter of the Oriental Steamship Company, and they have to suffer for every culpable railway accident. This is the question—whose was the default; were Government officials responsible for the Bank's money being squandered? Mr. Gladstone appears to have put the matter on this true issue; and though, in his opinion, the connection of Government was insufficient to carry penal responsibility, that is only an opinion which is open to fresh argument and challenges the statement of the opposite view. Our opinion has always been that the good faith and direct responsibility of the Bombay Government were distinctly pledged when in 1866 the Act was passed which declared the value of the shares to be Rs. 500 each. The Committee have not been content to rest their case upon that moderate issue; but, if they do, it may yet be found strong enough for the Courts.—*May* 7, 1872.

II.—We do not know what to make of the debate on Mr. Gregory's motion, suing for "favourable consideration" to the shareholders in the old Bank of Bombay. As usual, the non-official speakers are badly reported. Mr. Gregory is made to speak of "Mr. Robertson, the Solicitor for the Government," of "Mr. Robinson," the Secretary of the Bank; and, on describing the approach of the catastrophe in May 1865, he says, "at last a creditor at the bank, named Carnac, failed." Mr. Grant Duff appears to have asserted that the vital condition "guaranteed by Government" as applied in the draft

* According to Reuter's Telegram.

charter of 1863 to the shares on which the bank might advance,* was struck out by "Messrs. Scott and Fogg." Though only one letter of the latter gentleman's name is docked, the effect is very odd; and we are also much mistaken if our cautious friend, Mr. George Foggo, can be held responsible for that fatal stroke of the pen, the more so when it is remembered that in 1863-4 he made a better stand than any of the Directors against the dashing policy then in vogue, and lost his seat at the Board because he was voted too slow for the times. But these superficial mistakes are of no consequence compared with the misunderstanding and misconception shown by speakers on both sides with regard to such essential considerations as the peculiar position held by an Indian Presidency bank, the ruinous effects which necessarily followed from the neglect or culpable blindness of the Bombay Government, and the lack of vigilance and determination shown both by the Government of India and the Secretary of State. As both Sir Stafford Northcote and Mr. Gladstone, arguing off-hand from English circumstances, are "quite prepared to admit that the connection between the Government and the Presidency banks is a mistake," it is not likely that either of those statesmen can comprehend the bearing of the case presented to the House, and which will be again and again urged on the Government of India. On this branch of the subject it is sufficient to remark that the best Indian administrators still remain of the opinion, that, whatever sternly logical bankers of the West may think, the peculiar institutions called Presidency banks are necessary as the pivots of our Indian local mercantile credit.

But the question in dispute is, does the Government connection as the largest shareholder, its holding one-third of the directorate, and exercising a general control and power of audit, commit the State to a moral obligation to preserve the capital intact, and indemnify those who in 1863-65 reposed full confidence in that supposed obligation? This proposition is scouted by the scornful Under-Secretary, and is repudiated scarcely less contemptuously by Sir Stafford Northcote and the Premier. . . . . .

When Mr. Grant Duff speaks about the "very people" who schemed to obtain the unrestricted charter of 1863, and says that these "very people" now come "whining to Parliament" for relief, after having partaken of the advantages of 12 and 16 per cent. dividends, he errs from the facts as much as he sins against good taste. The "very people," whether directors or influential borrowers from the Bank, who urged on the addition to the capital, and egged on the Board and its officials to employ the funds of the Bank more freely, are quite other persons than Mr. Gregory's clients. Those whom Mr. Grant Duff denounces are the splendid sinners whose rise and fall is traced in the Commissioners' report, and written in many of our local chronicles. The applicants for relief are the confiding, absent, or uninfluential shareholders, who, though completely overborne or disregarded at general meetings, thought that, in any case, the *Sircar* would see that they should not suffer serious loss. It is the *victims* who are now suing for some scanty compensation; and it is adding insult of the keenest nature to the heavy injuries they have now endured for seven long years, that they should thus have cast in their teeth the profligacy of the speculators they were powerless to oppose, and the stolid negligence of Government officials, who failed to display the slightest scintillation of original business talent, and who shirked all independent action. But, says the chivalrous and high-minded Grant Duff, these "whining" and ruined shareholders clutched at dividends of 12 and 16 per cent., and did not then offer to share their advantages with the taxpayers. Why did not the honourable gentleman tell his audience how many years these extravagant dividends were paid? Of course not. He only wanted to make a point; but it is spoiled as soon as the fact is mentioned that there were only three half-yearly dividends at that high rate, and most likely the last ought to have been a blank. . . . . .

But the member for Elgin, like a large-souled man, prefers to stand by "the great public of taxpayers, not the little public of shareholders." This argument is a very telling one in the House, but Mr. Bouverie fairly turned its flank when he pointed

* The powers of the Bank as regards advances collaterally secured by hypothecation of shares in joint-stock companies, were similar to those embodied in the Bank of Bengal's charter and in the Bank of England's statutes. These powers were qualified by a "wise and prudent resolution," adopted in August, 1863, moved or seconded by Mr. Foggo, to the effect that advances in respect of shares should be made by express sanction of the Board only, and not by the Secretary. But this functionary evaded the restriction with impunity at a later period, when, amongst both Government and mercantile Directors, were several who had themselves plunged largely into share speculation; thus every restriction, both expressed and implied, came to be flagrantly disregarded.

out that if pushed to its conclusion, it would debar Government or its agents being held responsible for pecuniary damages in case of any misconduct whatever. . . . .

We have the highest respect for the sentiments expressed by Messrs. Denison, Dickinson, and some others, who, while denouncing without stint the conduct of those guilty of the malpractices described, shrink from spreading the loss over those whom the Finance Minister represents; but if some of the facts we have just named had been brought to their notice, they would have seen their way to coincide with Mr. Eastwick in urging that, "in the interests of the people of India themselves, the money, or some part of it, should be paid." Sir Stafford Northcote and several other members started with the avowal that this is a question in which the national honour is concerned, and the character of our administrators demands that some reparation be made. But in this respect the tone of the debate sank almost as low as the key-note in which the Under-Secretary tried to pitch it, after he thought Mr. Gregory and his seconder were disposed of. That fine old English gentleman, Mr. Henley—whose speech, together with Mr. Bouverie's, is unaccountably omitted from several of the reports—hit the mark when he said "the public in India looked on Government with a very different eye from the people of England, and attributed a very different degree of responsibility to any matter in which Government had a finger."

This is a subject we have often had to deal with before, but on the present occasion we have had to follow the course of the debate—a necessity which has prevented our stating the case half so strongly as it might be put. This is not now needed here; and for home opinion, there are those letters that appeared in the *Standard* about the middle of April, and which leave nothing to be desired. . . . . .—*May* 31, 1872.

RUSTOMJEE JEEJEEBHOY:

BENEFACTOR AND INDUSTRIAL PIONEER.

BOMBAY has to deplore the loss of one of her notable citizens, who, though for some years past removed from active life, has not been forgotten, and will always be remembered in connection with those palmy days of this city which, just now, seem departed never to return. We refer to Mr. Rustomjee Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy, second son of the first baronet, and younger brother of the present Sir Jamsetjee. . . . He dies at the comparatively early age of fifty. His later years have been passed under the dark clouds of ill-fortune and heavy disappointment; and while the gains of a successful career have been swept away, the loss of his wife, the intelligent associate of his days of prosperity, has deepened the gloom which during the last three years has settled upon our once active, enterprising, and ever-benevolent, public-spirited citizen. But amidst all his depression and reverses, it must have been an unfailing consolation for him to remember that in the days of prosperity he had not only scattered his gifts with unsparing hand, but made secure provision for many permanent benefactions that will conduce to the welfare and happiness of our community during many generations. Seldom could the ancient words of the afflicted patriarch Job be more fitly applied than in Mr. Rustomjee's case—"I delivered the poor that cried, and him that had none to help him. The blessing of him that was ready to perish came upon me; and I caused the widow's heart to sing for joy." The public benefactions made by Mr. Rustomjee amounted to some 11 lakhs (£110,000), when the frost of adversity came down upon him; and those who are likely to be well informed on the subject assure us that the sums disbursed by him in private charities have amounted to as large an aggregate besides. . . . . .

Not only was Mr. Rustomjee notable for the benevolent gifts he made, but he ever cherished an intelligent desire to extend the industrial resources of Western India. From this motive he entered with zeal into the Victoria Museum project, and sympathised heartily with Dr. Birdwood's plans for developing through that institution a complete, permanent, economic, and technological exhibition for this Presidency. And though a blight settled down on this, in common with so many other excellent schemes conceived in Bombay during the early years of last decade, it is interesting to know that in the seclusion of later years Mr. Rustomjee, with such little strength and slender resources as remained to him, has been steadily working at various industrial investigations. He had, we believe, all but succeeded in demonstrating that it is feasible to cultivate the

Manilla hemp (*Musa textilis*) in Western India, and to prepare it on a large scale for the export market. He had bestowed similar attention on the Aloe, or Mexican *agave*, which grows profusely, but now utterly to waste, in so many of the most barren tracts of India. And in regard to the competition between the Rhea fibre machines now going on at Saharunpore —an experiment in the prospect of which the late Viceroy took deep interest—it is very likely that such success as is likely to be there attained will be due indirectly to efforts made and outlay incurred by Mr. Rustomjee several years ago. In these respects Mr. Rustomjee's quiet perseverance while under the cloud of sickness and misfortune affords a lesson to many men of wealth and leisure, both here and elsewhere in India, who ought to be the pioneers of industrial, sanitary, and social improvement—not by the harsh, repellent methods of official routine, but by the quiet and gradual processes of practical experiment worked out by personal example.

One of the best memorials of our departed citizen is supplied in the terms recorded by members of the Executive Government when Mr. Rustomjee retired from the Legislative Council and public life in 1866. . . . . .

The following is from the joint minute of Messrs. B. H. Ellis and C. J. Erskine, dated June 6, 1866: "By his [Mr. Rustomjee's] widespread benevolence he has acquired great influence among all classes in every part of Western India, and it will not be easy to find as his successor in the Legislative Council one who so fully represents the feelings of the community to which he belongs, and of the people of Bombay generally."

Mr. Rustomjee had knighthood conferred upon him by H.M. the King of Portugal in acknowledgment of his large benefactions at Damaun, and his efforts towards agricultural enterprise in the Goa territory, where at one time he had a large estate.—*April* 15, 1872.

COTTON MILLS AND LIFE COMMISSIONS.

PROBABLY a large proportion of our readers, having no direct interest in spinning and weaving of any kind, may not wish to be troubled about the cares of shareholders or dazzled with the schemes of capitalists who have all but trampled the life out of joint stock enterprise in Bombay. . . . The Legislature has long since drawn a distinct line between private firms and public companies, amongst which latter class the "Bombay Royal" has been duly enrolled, being subject, moreover, to all the provisions of Act x. of 1866, in pursuance of which ordinance the scheme now proposed has to be carried out. Not only does the "Bombay Royal" clearly belong to the class of public companies, all of whose operations challenge public criticism, but, as one of the largest industrial undertakings in Bombay, it is a great fact worthy the notice of the politician and administrator. Except the Coorla Mills, which are already virtually absorbed by certain acquisitive capitalists, the "Bombay Royal" is the largest concern of the kind in this island, its capital amounting to 15 lakhs, its spindles and looms numbering 35,300 and 680 respectively, and it employs a thousand persons. Thus, while it is of little consequence to the general public what dividend the shareholders in such an undertaking may draw in any particular year, it becomes of much consequence to the permanent interests of our island community whether these and all similar mills are managed in such a way as not only to nett a continuously good profit, but so that a considerable portion of that profit shall be distributed amongst that class of thrifty persons of small means from whom it is the object of the joint stock system to draw the larger part of the funds required for those industrial and trading enterprises which are beyond the reach or customary inclination of private capitalists. . . . .

Mr. Nursey Kessowjee demands that he shall be fixed there during the term of his natural life, and salaried at a remuneration also fixed according to certain rates, from one-fourth to half an anna per pound on all the yarn and cloth turned out of the mills. In order to place the said Nursey beyond every mischance, it is provided that in the event of the Company being about to be dissolved, the first step in settling affairs is to provide the said capitalist with a pension, the amount of which is to be apportioned exactly according to the annual sums which the commissions aforesaid may have previously yielded. Then, not only is this extraordinary claimant to have the lion's share of the profit, but he is to have all possible power that can be wielded by or for the Company. The article of association which, in the usual way, reposed power in the Directors to engage employés and make contracts, is to be rescinded in order to transfer such power to the said Mr. Nursey, who, in his chair in the

Board-room at Parell, may thereafter declare "I am monarch of all I survey." Over and above the profits, emoluments, and patronage to accrue to the cotton lord of the Lal Bagh, he will, of course, in virtue of his position as biggest shareholder, draw such dividend as may chance to accrue after the Company has been bled at every vein by the beneficiaire's commissions. Such is the transformation that is to come over the Bombay Royal Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited—and which will now be more limited than ever. . . . . .

This brings up the one difficult question to be faced—how far is the law capable of protecting a minority who are voluntary shareholders in a company, and whose control over its operations must, in the main, be limited by the fractional amounts of their pecuniary interest in the concern? We have been accustomed to consider that Act x. of 1866, if only shareholders would do their duty by it, is fully adapted to protect their interests. This proposition, it seems, may be fairly called in question. Perhaps, however, there is some provision by which even special resolutions may be rescinded. Mr. Nursey is reputed to be wealthy; but in spite of this league he is making against all the chances of fortune, he may sometime decide to sell a large portion of his shares, so as to reduce himself to a minority in voting power. If, then, the majority rescind these special resolutions, what will become of the lifelong commissions and the annuity? Possibly in this way Mr. Nursey may eventually find himself checkmated; but this is a clumsy fashion of securing or recovering the rights of small shareholders; and we should like to know if the Act does provide some more excellent way to restrain the schemes of big proprietors.—*Sept.* 11, 1872.

THE BARODA RAILWAY COMES INTO ITS OWN.

AT last the Baroda Railway is to get the long-promised access to the harbour side; and this is to be done without—as seriously intended during the last gubernatorial reign—running the line through a ditch ingeniously invented, as if in scorn of the Supreme Government's exhortations to economise in railway construction. This curious contrivance to sink the line to "mean sea level" on its course in front of the Band-stand, was connected with what the Government Resolution styles "a comprehensive scheme of reclamation"—in fact, the carrying out of the more speculative portion of the Back Bay Company's grand but abortive project of 1864-5. It is now discovered that "financial difficulties attend the measure;" just as if rock or some natural obstacles had cropped up unexpectedly. And seeing that the present Resolution bears date September 30th, it may really be that the financial conscience of the Bombay Government received a severe twinge when its Consulting Engineer presented the prospective bill of costs, amounting to nearly a million sterling, that must be incurred by reason of the recent grievous disasters on the Baroda line, and the consequent sacrifice of traffic. Yet, though the unfinished and costly B.B. and C.I. Railway may be regarded as a sad sinking fund in its present condition, that is no reason for denying to it such natural advantages as are fairly available to it in accordance with its original plan. One of the more obvious and important of these is facility of access to the harbour side, and the location of its terminus close to the sea.

The Resolution, which we now publish in another column, puts an end to the wearisome see-saw that has been kept up for seven years past in regard to this very plain public works question. The terminus, instead of being on the wharf made for it in front of Grant Buildings, is to be located on the Gun Carriage Factory ground—an estate for which the Bombay Government of 1864-5 refused 75 lakhs. The factory itself cannot yet be given up, but the Company may obtain access to the harbour land side as soon as they can get their rails run across the Colaba road from the main line and the present cotton ground. At least, this is how we read the orders of Government; but the Colaba road is afterwards to be diverted, and Middle Colaba will have to be reached by an over-bridge, as proposed, we think, by Mr. Mathew. This will cross the line just to the south of the old Cooperage—one of the few remaining relics of the Company's Bombay—and the plans for the bridge are to be submitted at once. Another old relic will also be swept away in the approach to the Gun Factory, namely, Mrs. Hough's house—obtained at a cheap rate by virtue of powers under the Public Purposes Act—which, together with the grove of cocoa-nut palms and other fruit trees, are to be cleared off under the supervision of the Collector. . . . . .

The costs of the level crossing, the over-bridge and its approaches, are to be debited to the

B.B. and C.I.'s capital accounts—an arrangement to which the guaranteed shareholders can have no objection; but the remainder of the Colaba road diversion will be undertaken by Government—a distinction which makes little difference to the Indian taxpayer, but not a little to the Bombay citizen.

It appears that, after all that is said about Government undertaking this or the other part of these extensive Imperial works, the Esplanade Free Fund, that refuge of the destitute and resource of the extravagant, will have to sustain the whole of these national charges; to quote the closing words of the Resolution—"The Esplanade Free Fund will have to bear the cost of the roads and reclamation referred to above." This, be it known to the world, is a fund contributed by the trade and industry of Bombay, and which, as is justly considered, ought to be applied in relief of municipal taxation. But in this instance our local authorities, apparently without a struggle, surrender it to the all-absorbing, all-demanding centralising Supreme Government.—*Oct.* 9, 1872.

II.—For seven long years, nay, we might say for as long and weary a period as the patriarch served for Rachel, has the B.B. and C.I. Railway Company been striving to get to its natural base, the sea. Like two of the new lines, the Rajpootana from Delhi, and the Indus Valley from Mooltan, the Bombay and Baroda Railway was begun upside down, and far away from its "shore end." At last this wrong is to be righted, and we congratulate the Company on the success which has crowned its perseverance in sticking to the text with which its board began. The Government Consulting Engineer has now "passed" the Colaba station as sufficiently advanced towards completion to admit of traffic being dealt with in it. Therefore, from October 1st, passengers may proceed from Colaba, on the southern neck of Bombay island, all the way to Ahmedabad, in far northern Gujerat. Though there will be thousands of cotton bales that will perform this 310 miles journey, very few passengers will ever do so. But as far as the passenger traffic is concerned, the completion of the line to Colaba will prove of very considerable local importance. It will afford a cheap and ready means of transit from the populous portions of the city on its north-western side, relieving the crowded bazaars and facilitating business transactions in the cotton season. With the opening of this terminal station, efforts will, we understand, be made by the Agent to expand and further accommodate their general "local service" of trains which run through the island of Salsette and into the northern Konkan, a little beyond Bassein. . . . . .

But the extension of the Baroda Railway right up to our harbour side re-opens proposals which, in spite of that very big lion in the way, the Port Trust, may result in considerable relief to the Bombay steamer trade. We allude to the offers made by the Agent and Chief Engineer of the Company—now, we believe, put in somewhat different shape and renewed—according to which they propose to erect a pier running out either from the site of their own terminus, or a little further north from the Apollo wharf of the Port Trust in front of Grant Buildings. One strong inducement for Government to favourably consider this proposal is that the Railway Company already possess nearly sufficient material in the shape of piles and girders wherewith to build the pier. And this is no mere flimsy jetty, but, according to the plans, must be a very substantial structure, sufficient to ship a considerable proportion of all the cotton sent from Bombay in a season, and also to land most passengers and mails. The accommodation for shipping is to be given by means of a double T head, to which, inside and out, eight vessels can be moored at once. The ships are to be in the direction of the stream, so that there shall be no difficulty in working their cargoes, whatever the state of the tide. As is well known, deep water can be reached from the Colaba site at less distance than from any other point on the harbour; but even here the pier will require to be 1,200 feet long. At that distance it is confidently believed that depths can be reached, commanding 24 feet at low water, which will suffice for all requirements. . . . . .

Whether these proposals, which are so promising for the trade of the place, will get any fair hearing is necessarily doubtful in the present anomalous condition of our harbour side affairs. We have spoken of the Port Trust as the lion in the way; but that was too far respectable a comparison. If it "keeps on" doing nothing to provide facilities for trade, while its levies and its embargo forbid others from giving us the "one lift from ship to shore," it can only earn the title of "dog in the manger." But this depressing and

ruinous policy cannot be maintained. It must soon give way at some point. We would fain hope that the demonstration which the Baroda engineers are ready to give of the feasibility of providing cheaper and handier accommodation for European shipping, may prompt His Excellency Sir Philip Wodehouse to make an effort to relieve the port of the nightmare from which it cannot be relieved by any probable extension of trade. Should this emancipation be brought about by reason of the Baroda Railway coming into its own foreshore, we may justly feel some satisfaction in the result, seeing that this journal has steadily upheld the policy of distributing, rather than concentrating our large staple trades. —*Sept.* 29, 1873.

COTTON AND OTHER PRODUCTS.

LAST Friday we gave a small extract translated from a vernacular daily, in which the writer, deploring the adversity that has befallen many connected with the staple trade of Bombay, attributes the present decline of our prosperity to "European firms paying prices [for cotton] in Bombay larger than those ruling in Liverpool." He remarks that "the number of European firms dealing in cotton being great, the rivalry is, of course, very hot"; and he avers that this "scrimmage," as the football men say, amongst European traders has "driven out native merchants from the field." The Guzerati writer does not discriminate between merchants buying cotton on their own account, and shippers or consignors; and in various respects the paragraph being incomplete, it does not admit of exact correction or reply. When the native journalist states that "the cotton trade of Bombay is not *bonâ fide* trade, but speculation," there is a "good deal in" what he says, but there is also a good deal out of it which is very important to be known. The writer—like many more, who, whilst writing and talking so much about the decline of Bombay, fail to explain why the city takes so long in being ruined—is speaking of the cotton trade as it was, of the old easy-going methods, which merchants, some European and many native, by adhering to them too long, have found very unprofitable. It has been too much the custom for native merchants to buy only by sample, and with little or no inspection of the bulk; and, on the other hand, for some European firms and banks to accept risk on consignments with little regard to the intrinsic value of the shipment, and depending really on the presumed, but unspecified resources of the consignors.

Those who still drift along with this loose slovenly system have usually a spice of the speculative spirit in them, and are always hoping that cotton bought for eightpence here when quoted a fraction less in Liverpool, will, somehow, turn out to be worth ninepence when it arrives. . . . . .

Successful merchants are men who not only understand their business, but assiduously attend to it; and in these days, when the course of trade between Europe and India may be said to average little more than six weeks, and when the telegraph permits of the completion of transactions within as many days as months were formerly required, international trade demands, and in some cases receives, a mode of treatment which in precision and promptitude resembles scientific operations. If the statement were true that "the European firms of Bombay have mostly monopolised the cotton trade and driven out native merchants from the field," and in so far as it is true, the cause must be sought in the superior business aptitude displayed by European merchants in the special circumstances of the present time. Doubtless some Parsees and Banians will gradually get into the new methods of doing the European cotton trade; but, as some years will be required before they can accommodate themselves to the new way of business, native merchants will, in the meantime, find it most to their account to sell their cotton on the spot, make sure of their money, though at a small profit, and forego all risks. Many of them are not willing to do this. . . . . .

Having thus, in effect, put in a protest against the cry, "Down with cotton," which every other man in Bombay is now repeating, it may be well to consider a moment how much substance there is in this popular clamour. Seeing that there is at last an eager and appreciative audience, we wish it were possible for us to reproduce one tithe of what—in days when nothing but cotton was thought about—has appeared in these columns urging cultivation of other products, and prompting search after "neglected sources of wealth." If half the exclamations now uttered on these topics really indicate so much intelligent determination, it would "pay" some one to look through our files, so as to ascertain in what

direction the cotton-haters must look for the investment of their spare capital and the exercise of their hitherto ill-spent energies. But no searcher of our columns will find that we ever counselled the sacrifice of cotton, unless something less bulky and more valuable could be grown in its stead. Many times has the improvement and better treatment of the staple been advocated, but we believe it has yet to be shown that any export product that can be grown as "rotation crop" in Western India will serve our purpose better than the fine kinds of cotton. If the cultivation of these varieties be made to supplant the short-stapled, dirty sorts which have brought the name of Surats into such disrepute, then some good will be done; but to throw up the cultivation of cotton in order to urge on rash experiments in other productions, would be suicidal. And even so simple an operation as the substitution of one kind of cotton for another requires some outlay, considerable in the aggregate; but whence is the capital to come? The chief reasons on behalf of multiplying the varieties of our exports are social rather than commercial; it is the ryot's interest, rather than the merchant's, that we have to think of. . . . . .

It will not do to affirm that, owing to the tenure of land in Western India, this diversion of capital to agriculture is impracticable. There *are* ways in which the fertilising streams might be turned into the thirsty mofussil; but this would require close study, much patience, and considerable taking of trouble,—all of which your British merchant hates most fervently. Indigo was once produced in Guzerat to a considerable extent, but the cultivation of the plant was put down by a maharaj, or some faqueer preacher. Jute might be grown largely both in the Guzerat rivers and near the back-waters of the Malabar Coast; but probably the "sunn" hemp, which for thirty years past has been crying out to be exported, might suit still better. The books of Forbes Royle, and half a score more, teem with suggestions towards extending our export list and improving the condition of the ryot; and Mr. Allan Hume, of the great Etcætera department, in reply to any sensible inquirer, will supplement those suggestions with the latest possible information. But two requisites are still wanting —first, on the part of the capitalist, European or native, the faculty of much painstaking; second, as regards the ryot, a sensible addition to his capital. Whence shall come these?—*Oct.* 24, 1872.

THE NEW MUNICIPAL ACT.

TO use once more a useful phrase which is fast degenerating into a slang term, the Municipal Budget left behind by Mr. Peile is eminently one that pertains to a transition period. . . . The old Act has for three years past been condemned to extensive amendment under three heads—of reduced cost in administration; more control over the executive; introduction of some self-acting citizen organisation. The new Bill effects as little as could be done in any of these directions; but whatever may become of it, the steps taken cannot be retraced. The extravagant scale of remuneration under the old Act will not be reverted to, nor will the unlimited spending powers enjoyed by the first Commissioner be permitted to any other man. Therefore, whatever may happen to the Poona Bill, we may count upon sufficient facilities being in some way granted to the citizens for expressing their views on the provisional or transition Budget now put before them.

In any case, there is a big bill for them to meet, and there is no time to be lost in ascertaining if any abatement can be obtained, and, then, how the ways and means are to be supplied. Mr. Peile, perhaps a little too much after the fashion of revenue officers, assumes that there is no help for it, but that everything put down in the account must be paid. And it is well that we should face our difficulties; so let us glance at the principal items that now frown upon the ratepayers of this city. First, there is that terrible dead-weight of debt and interest. Rs. 7,44,965 out of a total expenditure of Rs. 32,88,958 "has to be appropriated for interest and repayment of debt." . . . . . .

It may be remembered that when, in virtue of Sir Philip Wodehouse's wish not to press unduly on the city, the term "surface drainage" was embodied in the Bill, our elder daily contemporary took occasion to point out that "the law" knows nothing of that phrase which is so well understood of engineers. It appears that the dread entity, "the law"—being, we presume, that train of superstitiously followed precedents called English common law—insists that the word "drain" means sewers, and fails to take account of essential differences in climate, physical circumstances, and climatic conditions. As the Bazalgette *cloacæ* have not quite decimated the juvenile population of London by diphtheria and

scarlatina, we "must," say Mr. Peile and Mr. Justice Green, "contemplate" similar works for Bombay. This is a nice prospect, but is one that should be looked at. . . . . .

It may be as well to refer here to the entry in the Budget of Rs. 21,899 for the "Marine Street sewer." The sum is not a large one, if any good were to be done by it; but how if the contrivance in question is but an extension of a noisome poison retort? The said sewer is, we suppose, needed to complete "the Fort system of experimental drainage," if, indeed, that horse-leech scheme ever can be completed; but we submit that before another rupee is voted for this sewer, an independent inquiry should be instituted in order to prove whether these Fort drains have done more harm than good. Deliberately devised for the reception of night-soil, they are, we believe, constructed almost as well as any sewers need be, and money enough was spent on them; but there can be no mistake about their noxious influence. The "experiment" has succeeded to demonstration in that respect, though in a large number of the Circle houses the water-closets have been nailed up and the safer primitive method reverted to. Several deaths from diseases new to India have occurred within the influence of the pestilential "experimental system," and it is too probable that other cases of similar diseases manifested on Malabar Hill and elsewhere have had their origin in the "Fort experimental drainage system." Before this Marine Street sewer is put in, we claim, on sanitary grounds, for the intervention of an authoritative and impartial inquiry into the working of this hydraulic sewerage, which is now poisoning the atmosphere of several of the more confined streets in the Fort.

To step from this odoriferous topic to the Commissioner's remarks written justifying the high grants proposed for the Health Department seems quite in order. . . . The death returns, being absolute statements, are not, we know, affected by the revelations of the last census, which showed that our municipal authorities have been getting credit for a much lower rate of mortality than really existed. But is it not possible that the higher bills of mortality displayed during the last few months have been due rather to some better plan of collecting facts, and enumeration of them? Is it not very likely that just as many deaths took place in previous years, but that they were not brought to account? This, and several other close questions relating to the vital statistics of Bombay, would be brought out by an inquiry directed along the lines followed by the Health Department; and it is exceedingly desirable such an investigation should be promoted before the din of electing the new Corporation arises. . . . . .—*Oct.* 26, 1872.

The Police-rate Injustice.

II.—There is one subject in respect of which all our citizens are agreed in their case against the higher powers on behalf of the Municipality and in the interest of the ratepayers. We allude to the arbitrary arrangements regarding the Police revenue and expenditure. In these, Bombay city realized the bitterness of that piece of statecraft, the sham decentralization of the Temple-Strachey *régime;* but now in the present Bill the hardship then inflicted and the despite done to the most elementary notion of civil rights are stereotyped. It is impossible, indeed, that there can be permanence in a measure which compels the citizens to pay all the expense of its constabulary, whilst denying them the slightest voice in determining the organisation or fixing the extent of the force; but such is the law at present, or as sought to be fixed by the Bill III. of 1872. All we can do now is to accumulate testimony against a scheme which arbitrarily affects both the revenue and expenditure side of the Municipal accounts. An arrangement which is essentially and utterly unconstitutional can never stand, were it to receive the sanction of Governor, Viceroy, and Secretary of State twice over.

Strong in this conviction, we think it well worth while to draw attention to the concise and careful statement in this Police question made by the Hon. Mr. Mungaldass on the occasion of the third reading of the Bill, as reported in our paper of Saturday last. Though not occupying more than a quarter of a column, we venture to say that the honourable gentleman's statement of the case on behalf of the Municipality is irrefutable; and, regarded as an alternative proposition, it is all but exhaustive. If, as put by Mr. Mungaldass, Government declined to allow the Corporation any control over the police expenditure, then the autocratic authority ought so far to impose a check on itself as to assure the citizens that the three per cent. entered in the Bill as the maximum figure of police rate shall not be exceeded in outlay; while, if that limit is disregarded, it is very clear that the excess should be provided from other than city funds. . . . But we have already sufficiently indented on the Hon.

Mr. Mungaldass's speech, and the topic we are discussing is one too grievously familiar to our citizens. As finally put by the honourable gentleman, the case stands thus: the yield of the three per cent. police rate would be Rs. 3,92,000, to which add Rs. 12,000 to be raised by the new tax on fire insurance companies; but the expenditure, as it stands for 1873, amounts only to Rs. 3,77,000, so that there is a surplus estimated for. If Government, in its insatiable desire for patronage, chooses to increase police expenses above that limit, it is only just that the excess should be provided from other sources. Mr. Mungaldass's amendment proposed that the excess, beyond the three per cent., should be met out of provincial revenue. So entirely reasonable and fair is this proposition, that the vote against it could only have been prompted by hardihood and the imperative obligations of officialism. We are glad to see that six members of Council voted with Mr. Mungaldass, but there were seven on the other side of making the city pay to an unlimited extent for expenditure over which it has no control.—*Nov.* 6, 1872.

Exempting the Few, Taxing the Many.

III.—The Municipal Act of 1872 is already producing its bitter fruit of fiscal injustice and class aggrandisement. The Town Council propose a reduction in the house-tax of one per cent.—presumably without any corresponding reduction in expenditure. Not only has this class-dominated committee relieved the persons best able to sustain civic burdens of nearly two lakhs of taxation, but it has transferred that burden to trade and to the shoulders of consumers. It is true that only lakhs, and not millions, are concerned in this civic finance of ours; but the principles proceeded upon and the effect on rate-payers are not only of vital importance within the area affected, but also as furnishing an example, for good or ill, to other large Indian towns. Considered in this light, if we are to find a parallel to the action of the Town Council in this, its first essay in apportioning municipal burdens, we must go back to the worst times of the old Tory and Corn Law Parliaments. Of course, we are aware that the Council only manipulates the Budget as presented by the Commissioner, and that the Corporation will have to pass the final votes on revenue and expenditure; thanks to the narrow franchise under the Act and to the deplorable mistake of counting only one vote from each elector, the same overwhelming class bias which is conspicuous in the Council also overbalances the Corporation. . . . .

No attempt appears to have been made to revise or keep down the larger salaries; and much remark will be elicited by the contrast between the princely Rs. 1,950 of the Commissioner of Police and the Rs. 850 for the laborious auditor and accountant. This latter figure may be about the "present market price" for an able accountant, but we believe the incumbent was given to understand that his salary would be Rs. 1,000. However, this is merely a personal question; and we may here take leave for the present of the whole discouraging subject of our "reformed" municipal polity.—*Oct.* 25, 1873.

A WHITE ELEPHANT FROM WESTMINSTER.

EVERY effort and project towards utilising, more comprehensively than hitherto, the great natural advantages of Bombay Harbour, necessarily invites attention. The tendency with old habits and settled interests is, indeed, rather against proposals which concern "the other and larger half of the harbour." Merchants are accustomed to have their godowns within a stone's-throw of their offices, and the existing establishments of the Dockyard and Bombay Marine have always repelled the notion of their being exiled six or seven miles off to the inhospitable shores of Butcher and Hog Islands. We are not anxious just now to bring on the era of their banishment; but it is well known that the India Office—without any careful consultation with experienced persons on the spot—some time ago resolved to carry out a very important experiment in marine and mechanical engineering on the shores of Hog Island. This is the project to provide appliances whereby the large Indian troop-ships may be lifted out of the water to be repaired and scraped. Instead of the old plan of floating the vessels into an excavated dock, out of which the water is afterwards drawn by tide or steam pumps, the vessels themselves are to be lifted by means of Clark's Hydraulic Lift—a marvellous apparatus used for some years successfully at the Victoria Docks on the Thames. . . . The Lift would raise a weight of 6,000 tons five feet in half an hour; and, indeed, there is no occasion to doubt

the effectual force of a power which raised the Britannia and Conway tubular bridges. One argument strongly urged by Mr. Clark in favour of his plan is the short period occupied in constructing pontoons and Hydraulic Lifts compared with the time consumed in excavating and building masonry graving docks. It is to be feared that this advantage will be neutralised in the present instance, when all the material has to be brought from Europe, and where inconceivable difficulties arise in constructing and working complicated machinery. These difficulties had scarcely been fully appreciated by the India Office when, with very inadequate inquiry, the bargain was struck with Mr. Clark; and it may yet be two years before the troop-ships can be cradled at Hog Island. With the exact terms of the contract we are not acquainted, but it seems rather a one-sided bargain that the patentee and contractors are not made to share the responsibility of working the system under these new and untried conditions. The sum which it is understood is to be paid for the one pontoon and Lift complete is £240,000. For this sum competent engineers on the spot could have excavated and finished three ordinary graving docks, which would have held the three troop-ships at one time, and been available at reasonable charges for all other ships. Had this contract, which is virtually adding another quarter of a million to the cost of the troop-ships, been one likely to be canvassed in Parliament, we are inclined to think more pains would have been taken to arrive at certainty beforehand. But though they are only Indian revenues that are concerned, we trust some of our vigilant friends at home will keep an eye on the progress of the costly experiment.*—*June* 22, 1869.

THE PRINCE OF WALES IN INDIA.—A PREMATURE FORECAST.

MANY have been the statements, surmises, and contradictions recently abroad in the Indian Press relative to another Royal visit to this country in the course of next year. It has not seemed to us worth while taking part in the balancing of conjectures, wishes, and objections that this proposal has elicited. The whole thing is very intangible, and the discussion has its base in air. Probably the following extract from one of our private letters from home will be found as near the mark as anything that has yet been written on the subject:—"A telegram comes from India to the effect that the Prince of Wales is to go there in 1871. The facts are these: Sir Seymour Fitzgerald wishes him very much to open the Grand Oriental Exhibition at Bombay in the cold weather of 1871. The Viceroy has invited His Royal Highness, who would himself like to go. But this is a question for the Cabinet to decide; and my impression is, that they will not hear of it." Our correspondent adds, sententiously, "and I think they are wise."

The wisdom or otherwise of such a visit we need not discuss here; but if it is to depend on the holding of an International Exhibition in Bombay within the next two years —on such a scale of magnificence as we have heard hinted at—there is not much chance of the Prince seeing Bombay, unless he chooses to come in *mufti* as Baron Renfrew. As to our Grand Exhibition project, the Emperor Napoleon has given that the death-blow. What our speculative cotton merchants have left undone towards the embarrassment and depression of Bombay, the European war will effectually supplement. No doubt in due time the city will rise again like a cork; but nothing short of the discovery of gold diggings in that faithless Toolsee Valley, or a pearl fishery on the Prongs, will avail to restore us to the Exhibition level within the short space of eighteen months. So that imagined glory must fade away into the dim future. Another consideration is, that, as Exhibitions have been a little overdone, it may even be possible to make Princes too common.—*Aug.* 6, 1870.†

* The experiment has been condemned by results, and is a standing caution against Indian public works—especially where large ironwork contracts are concerned—being initiated in England. By the time the Lift was set up, the success of the Suez Canal had been demonstrated; and it was then found that the troop-ships could pass through it, as they have done ever since; so that there has been no difficulty in their being repaired at Portsmouth. It was also found that, thanks in great measure to the skill and care of the dock-masters at Bombay, these huge vessels could be taken into the old graving dock there. Thus the outlay on that "White Elephant," nearly £400,000, was utterly thrown away. There is just now (1884) some talk of its being purchased, at a very low price, by the P. and O. Company for repairing their vessels.

† Noting the above date, it may be well to record here that, as all the world knows, the Prince entered on his tour through India in November, 1875. As to Grand Exhibitions, Calcutta had the first turn in 1882-3, while Bombay bides her time in 1887, having consented to wait until after the Imperial Colonial and Indian Exposition, due in 1886.

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LARGE SLICE OF BOMBAY TRADE IN DANGER.

THE cotton exports of the Berars may be taken in round numbers at 200,000 bales. All this produce comes through Bombay; it comprises some of the finest samples of the Indian staple; and, altogether, the Berars cotton field is of immense importance to the Bombay trade. Our merchants would be considerably disconcerted if they were told that, by some new scheme of communications, the Berars cotton exports, or a considerable portion of them, were about to be diverted to Calcutta, the import demand for those provinces being also to be fed from the Hooghly, or, say, from Cuttack. We have seen what pains the Chamber of Commerce has taken to induce the G.I.P. Railway authorities to meet them in rates of carriage and provide facilities for doing trade between this western port and Hindustan proper. But the commerce that could be done by Bombay merchants beyond Jubbulpore and west of Allahabad, at least the export trade, is very small compared with that of the Berars.

Now our mercantile friends must not be discomposed about their Oomrawuttee and Hinghenghaut. We do not think that either the Mirzapore extension or the Raepore tramway will, in our time, disturb the flow of these staples Bombay-wards; but a commerce three-fourths in amount that of the Berars, and which Bombay claims as her own, is at this moment in danger of being diverted to the eastern coast of India. . . . The trade to which we refer, as being from half to three-fourths as valuable as that of the Berars, is that of the Dharwar districts. The exports of the two cotton-fields in 1871 were, respectively—Berars (including the Central Provinces), 274,340 bales; and Dharwar, 148,100 bales. This figure for the South Mahratta country is considerably more than the yield of Broach and Surat, or Guzerat proper; and as the present season is a very favourable one, we may anticipate that in 1873 the Dharwar and Compta exports may creep up towards 200,000 bales. . . . . .

Well; we believe, the Madrasees, or certain energetic men of that ilk, are now pushing on the Bellary to Gudduck project, and under precisely the same personal circumstances as those which the then excited popular opinion in Bombay associated with the original project for the rail from the Malabar Coast to the Dharwar districts. But the circumstances of the Bellary line do not include the one grand advantage of *direct* communication between fertile grain and cotton districts, and the *sea*. Here let us quote a line or two from the *Bombay Gazette* of 1869: "A railway from Carwar into the Dharwar region would immensely strengthen our position in the Southern Mahratta country, in a political as well as a military sense; for it would provide a base that could never be touched while we hold the *sea*. . . . Here the true principle was adhered to (by the Commission of 1846)—to get by the best and expeditious route *to the sea*." The Madras gentlemen who are now working underground so assiduously will, we trust, have some difficulty in persuading even the impulsive Duke of Argyll that it is a sensible thing to drag produce over 400 miles of railway to a bad port on the east coast, instead of over 130 only and to a good port on the west coast. Nevertheless, great is the power of underground persuasion; and if a large slice of trade that ought to belong to Bombay goes to Madras, the future merchants of this port will have to bless with a vengeance the gallant 22 of last July's Chamber. . . . . .

We will just state the distances referred to, premising that our figures are the cart road routes: the railway might be ten per cent. shorter in each case, though we believe the gain in mileage would be much greater on the route to the sea:—

Gudduck to (the sea) Carwar	135 miles.
Do. Sholapore	200 ,,
Do. Bellary	110 ,,

To make the comparison complete, we must remind our readers of the railway distances to the sea from Bellary and Sholapore respectively. In the former case it is 305 miles; in the latter, equal to 314—this is adding the 32 miles for the extra ghaut traffic charges. Thus it will be seen the Madras roundabout line has the advantage over the Bhore Ghaut utilization by *nine* miles, to which may be added somewhat cheaper working to set against the far better port of Bombay. But again, when the Sholapore and Bellary extensions are added respectively—200 in the former case and 110 in the latter—making 514 to Bombay and 415 to Madras, the scale turns largely in favour of Madras; that is, if the national credit and the producers' profits must be wasted on *any* circuitous route. . . . . .

But what comes of these strained and wholly artificial comparisons when we point out,

for the fiftieth time, that at the end of the 135 miles from Gudduck, the heart of the Dharwar district, and passing through the great mart of Hooblee, is a safe port, and the open sea? By the direct route, with only one-third of the railway distance, the cotton and grain of fertile Dharwar get to that cheap highway of nations, the open sea. To minds free from local bias, the question of the alternative route for the export and import commerce of the South Mahratta and Canara districts does not admit of argument; and we trust that when the two Madras emissaries get to Westminster they will find the truth made plain to them. . . . . By the way, where is Mr. Havelock's report on the Carwar project? It ought to be a document of very great value in all our present Indian railway problems.—*Jan.* 29, 1873.

MADRAS OR CARWAR?

II.—Frequently we have had occasion to notice the commendable qualities that may often be traced amongst the public men of Madras, both in and out of the Services. If we could only shut our ears to the family jars, and those too frequent petty abuses in the dispensing of patronage of which our contemporaries there let us hear, perhaps, a trifle too much, we would rather go to the southern Presidency than elsewhere in search of dispassionate counsel and sound conclusions on most topics of general interest in India. The Madrasees have solved one chief division of the irrigation problem; they built their railways and work them more cheaply than can as yet be done in other parts of India; and, at the Presidency city, they transact their foreign trade behind an ever rolling surf and with shipping appliances that must date from the days of Noah. The practical, thrifty, yet withal wide-awake characteristics of the Madrasees come out, also, when they apply themselves to the topic of internal communications—which is nearly the most important of all the industrial and commercial questions of the day in India.

When a few Bombay merchants, not knowing their own interests and ignoring that of their successors, stirred up their too easily prejudiced brethren to try to substitute, for a simple practical project which will give something like a fair trade to Bombay, one of the most wasteful schemes ever devised for the transport of produce, then the Madras men, or two or three of them, saw their opportunity. Mr. L. Strange and his memorandum on the extension of the Madras Railway from Bellary to the Dharwar districts would never have been heard of, but for the extraordinary proposal to "utilise the Bhore Ghaut incline" as a means of communication between those remote districts and the sea. Though it seems to us that the statement of Mr. Strange's proposal—to haul produce 400 miles to a bad port, when a good one might be reached over a line of 200—is sufficient to condemn it, we must not forget that this minute by a Madras merchant was fatal to the extravagant notion of dragging 150,000 bales of Dharwar cotton nearly 600 miles round by Poona and Callian. It is true that this proposal is again dallied with in a weak and fitful way in paras. 50 and 51 of the Committee's Report; but no impartial authorities responsible for the expenditure of public money, and taking thought for the claims of the producer, would ever accede to such an unnecessary sacrifice in the price of produce. . . . . .

It appears that in the second portion of his paragraph the writer gives up the case which he assumes at starting. The "decision arrived at by the Bombay Committee" is, "that they express an opinion in favour of a railway from Carwar to Bellary which practically meets the case" raised by Mr. Strange for the exploitation of the country between Bellary and Gudduck. But, as the *Mail* correctly remarks, "Mr. Strange's estimate is based on the supposition of a line from Gudduck to Bellary, not from Carwar to Bellary." That supposition being diminished by the decision in favour of the latter project, what becomes of the 135,000 bales—including, we may remark as a speculative touch on the part of Mr. Strange, "65,000 from the whole of Dharwar proper"—which the Madrasees in their vision beheld whirling away to the surf-bound port? It must be plain to most observers that not only will the 135,000 prefer the shorter ride, but that all of the 20,000 bales now going over the Madras line, which are produced around Bellary, will also be drawn westward by the irresistible attraction of cheaper rates. It would appear from Mr. Strange's statistics that there is very little export cotton grown east of Bellary, near the Madras line; but there must be grain, seeds, or, perchance, more valuable articles which will better bear a long railway ride; and it becomes a tolerably easy calculation as to how far the suction of Carwar will operate along the Madras line. Thus, the whole distance from sea to sea being 532 miles, Carwar may be expected to draw produce 265 miles; and this, it will be observed,

would include not only every mile up to Bellary, but 70 miles on the Madras Railway—that is, as far as, or beyond the junction at Goondacul. . . . We will put the whole case in such a comprehensive shape, that our reasonable friends at Madras must admit the unwelcome conclusion towards which we pointed in the brief query that has furnished the *Mail* with its text. The distance from Carwar to Gudduck will be 144 miles; and to reach the outside of the Dharwar cotton fields, other 50 miles towards Bellary might be taken, so that the total distance to Carwar would be 194 miles. Even supposing that the Madras Railway could carry for 1¼ annas per ton per mile, the cost of cotton from the Dharwar districts to Madras would be:—

Total cost railway and shipping per ton at Madras	Rs. 36 1 9
As compared with Carwar	Rs. 25 5 3
Difference per ton in favour of the Malabar Coast	Rs. 10 12 6

Now will not our Madras friends be satisfied on the main question?

The writer of the paragraph we have quoted appears to be convinced in his own mind, but puts forward two or three pleas by way of breaking the disappointment to Madras. These are—(1) The south-west monsoon will arrest shipment westward, and therefore divert much of the crop to the eastern port; (2) the bulk of the crop would not be ready for shipment until after the break of the monsoon; and (3) the line may be commenced from both ends at once, and as Gudduck can be reached from Bellary before it can from Carwar, "Madras will in all probability have to ship the bulk of the Dharwar crop for a time." To take the last first: one of the special facilities for making this line, as recognised even by the unwilling reporter, is that it can be commenced from the sea as a base for the supply of all foreign materials. Besides this, it may be remarked that Mr. Shaw's estimates allow for the expense of carting permanent way material to the top of the Ghauts, so as to commence and work the paying and easy portions of the line as soon as possible. Hopes numbers 1 and 2 may be disposed of in a line—there is abundant evidence to show that square-rigged vessels, and especially steamers, can enter and leave Carwar harbour at all seasons of the year, except in the few days just at the burst of the monsoon.—*Feb.* 21, 1873.

THE HIGH COURT BARS THE WAY TO JUSTICE:

THE MEDITERRANEAN BANK EXTORTION.

THE Hon. Justice Green* disappointed a good many persons in the city last Tuesday when, in the case of one Nusserwanjee Shapurjee Parakh, a victim of "the Mediterranean Bank," his Lordship barred the way to the Court of Chancery—the tribunal where the decree he was administering had been passed, and in the city where the rascality connected with the said Bank was concocted. We know nothing of this Mr. Nusserwanjee; and the great majority of the wretches still awaiting execution on behalf of the swindling institution which Mr. Justice Green so tamely allowed to have its way, must be persons of no social account, but every one in Bombay knows how grievously they have been wronged. It is not so much their cause that has to be considered as that of English commercial morality, and, above all, the functions and obligations of our highest Court of Equity. We submit that in this instance it was not only in his Lordship's power, but that, sitting as a Judge in equity, he was bound to make way for the effort apparently being made once more to bring the discreditable business of the London and Mediterranean Bank to the test of close and impartial revision in the Court where the order of July, 1866, was made without adequate information. In raising this question as to the fairness and wisdom shown in the decision of Mr. Justice Green, we do not care to travel beyond the record, as contained in our report of last Wednesday, where may be read in brief Mr. Inverarity's able argument checked by Mr. Macpherson. The application was for a postponement of the case, in order that the defendant, Mr. Nusserwanjee, might obtain evidence by means of a Commission to England. His counsel contended that the amalgamation of the London and Bombay Bank with the insolvent concern called the Mediterranean Bank, being a fraudulent act, was void, and therefore the amalgamated Company in which he says he is not a shareholder could have no right to sue him. Mr. Inverarity, moreover, put forward

* The Judge spoken of in the above extract—the Hon. Philip Green—ten years later perished in the earthquake at Ischia.

this very substantial-looking contention—namely, that the winding-up order of July, 1866, was obtained without defendant's knowledge, and that the circumstances connected with the amalgamation, especially the absorption of an insolvent concern, were not brought to the notice of the Court of Chancery when its order was made. In reply to this, the Judge in the first instance demanded that the defendant should pay the amount of claim into Court, and though he was not then ready, it seems he was willing to do so. On the counsel going on to describe the fraud practised on the Bombay shareholders, his Lordship again stopped him by saying that the Bench had heard all that before in the case of Hormusjee Pestonjee. This the counsel admitted, but replied that in his client's case the defence went much further, inasmuch as he entirely disputed the validity of the winding-up order, and only asked permission from this Court to go forward and substantiate his contention in London. Mr. Inverarity further observed that there had been no opportunity of contesting that order, and urged that now that step should be taken. . . . . .

The decree fell like a steam hammer; and though Mr. Inverarity again pleaded for stay of execution pending the result of proceedings to be taken in England, the Judge was inexorable, and gave the liquidator his pound of flesh.

The result of this case is very discouraging to those who believe that our Courts of Equity are open to all who can afford the immense expenditure of time and money which is required to push a case through to judgment. Here at last had turned up one of the victims of a destructive swindle, who was possessed of means and was apparently prepared to test the validity of the decrees that have caused untold suffering in Bombay, but the High Court repels him and bars all chance of redress. The wealthy contributories have compromised their calls and left in the lurch all their poorer fellow sufferers. This course might be precedent, but it certainly looks shabby, and this aspect of the shareholders' woes was also known to the learned Judge, who has, on more than one occasion, allowed expressions to escape him indicating that he cherishes a just feeling of reprobation against the iniquity involved in the amalgamation with the Mediterranean Bank. Why, then, did not his Lordship, when the chance was afforded him, give opportunity for research to be made and justice done? It is bad enough to have the Asiatic and Commercial Banks still harassing the people; but the pillage by the London and Mediterranean is so utterly scandalous that our Judges and Courts would be more than justified in allowing every technicality, every available plea, to work in bar of any further spoliation of the unfortunate shareholders.—*Feb.* 12, 1873.

THE BLACK ART AND THE PENAL CODE.

THERE appears to be a good deal of misunderstanding as to what is being done amongst counsel and legal functionaries in regard to what is likely to be attempted in the matter of *Regina* v. *Pestonjee Dinshaw* and *Succaram Raghobah*, so that it may be as well to explain the position of affairs without needless technicality. And here let us remark that the public care nothing for legal quibbling and technical definition such as some clever person has applied to our paragraph on this subject in Saturday's paper. It appears we committed a grave error in speaking of a "re-trial," which, we are assured, "is wholly out of the question, and cannot be asked for." Considering that many importunate and impertinent persons are constantly asking for what they are not at all likely to get, it might be possible that the said Pestonjee's friends, if he has any, would in their ignorance apply for a "re-trial." It seems we ought to have said a "review" of the trial, or of some portion of the procedure connected with the hearing, summing up, and charge or verdict. . . . .

It will be said, why should such pains be taken on behalf of Pestonjee, whom more than half the city holds to be guilty of a heinous crime, and of whom no one can be found to speak a single good word? That query may be met by pointing out that on the law and on law-makers rests the responsibility for allowing this attempt at rescue and relief being made. Pestonjee has succeeded in drawing towards himself such a chorus of detestation, and has provoked such an unanimity of reprobation against him because of his general misconduct and cunning acts, that the popular vote would cut short all discussion as to this particular decision by the sentence—"Serves him right." But the law, which is just as well as stern, acknowledges that even convicts may have rights, and this argument equally affects the little known Hindu called Succaram, against whom there is no popular cry of vengeance. British law was not made for either of these men, but for society at large, which it aims to secure from harm and menace; but it aims to do this without perpetrating injustice in any

particular case. Moreover, though the proposition be trite, it must be repeated—to wit, that moral guilt is one thing and criminality is quite another. The popular mind, imbued as it is with honest impulses, and anxious that the right should prevail, is constantly apt to confound the distinction between sin which stains the soul, and offences against society which bring a man within grasp of the law. None of us can hesitate for a moment in pronouncing the soldier morally guilty of the crime of murder who presented a loaded musket at his comrade and only missed blowing his brains out because in his hurry he had forgotten to cap the piece; but if we mistake not, the Bombay High Court held that the conviction of the would-be assassin could not be sustained under the section of the Penal Code (307) which commences: "Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge," &c. . . . Now, however certain we may feel, from the neat little drama in the fakir Kakeshaw's dingy lodging, so cleverly opened up to us by the police, that Pestonjee and Succaram urged the said Kakeshaw to do mortal mischief to the two De Gas, none of us believe that the course suggested was equivalent "to an act capable of causing death in the natural and ordinary course of events." We may consider that Pestonjee had full confidence in the potency of the black art, and that therefore he was at heart a murderer; but in nearly every section and illustration in the chapter of the Penal Code on doing bodily injury and homicide, besides "intention and knowledge" on the part of the culprit, the law requires that the "circumstances" shall be such as would secure the completion of the offence. This ordinance may appear to afford impunity to wicked men, but the law must be held to be wise, just, and true, though it often falls short of satisfying the virtuous instincts of society, and balks popular desires prompted by an honest feeling of moral reprobation.

It is not, however, for us to anticipate the course of argument that will be followed in case the "review" of which we have spoken takes place; neither do we care to philosophise on the subtle distinctions which jurists must draw in order to prevent the possibility of injustice being done even to reprobates. In this instance anything like sympathy for the culprits is out of the question, and we may rest assured.—*Feb.* 25, 1873.

GOVERNMENT SHIRKING ITS RATES.

THE debate in our Legislative Council on Tuesday is one that should be attentively considered elsewhere than in Bombay, though the pinch of the decision arrived at by the Council will be felt only by our own citizens. Apart from the general question of the equity and constitutional liability of Government property to be rated for local taxation—a liability which, we understand, Mr. Advocate-General Scoble still admits—there is the particular question, whether the Government of India really intends to act fairly by the costly municipalities it has set up in our chief cities? We appeal to the Supreme Government at once; for, in these days, the lack of moral courage in our public men is so obvious, and the power of social palaver to bring about weak and muddling compromises so overwhelming, that it is almost impossible to get public questions discussed and decided on their merits in the localities where they arise.

Remembering this enervating condition of the political atmosphere, all the more credit s due to our acting Municipal Commissioner, Mr. W. G. Pedder, for his clear statement of the Municipality's claims, and his firmness in maintaining them. . . . Colonel Kennedy admits that under the present Act, the amount justly due would be Rs. 53,750, and even if this sum were paid, it would leave the Municipality practically exempt from many obligations which the half-lakh section now passed will bring on the municipal fund.

We observe it was this last consideration which decided the Hon. Mungaldass Nathoobhoy to vote against the inadequate compromise; though we should have thought the case was clear enough without that. As we have had occasion to criticise the erratic and backsliding course occasionally taken by the Hon. Narayen Wassodeo in Council, we take pleasure in noting his spirited attitude on this occasion in opposing and voting against the fresh contrivance for squeezing the unhappy Municipality of Bombay. Sir Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy's short address was dignified and argumentative, and worthy of him as a prominent representative of the resident citizens. As to the Hon. Mr. Bythell's speech, we can only remark that it was simply deplorable; and none the less so because it was an echo of the Advocate-General's remarks, in which that learned gentleman announced his own defection. After reminding us that when the Municipal Bill was before the Council he upheld the only equitable course, Mr. Bythell proceeded, with a "but notwithstanding," to

whittle away the bough on which he was sitting. The proposition that trade will be burdened if the Port Trust is not forgiven its rates, like an insolvent or a pauper, is beneath notice as an argument; and we regret to see to what a pass our promising young mercantile member has been brought. Yet this argument, preposterous as it is, affords the only plea that Colonel Kennedy and his following can adduce for this audacious proposal to convey, transfer, or annex a considerable slice of the ratepayers' revenue.

It might be alleged that the Trust will not pay if it has to sustain its establishment and maintenance charges. Of course, it will not pay. It cannot pay so long as it is saddled with (1) the cost of a railway station that ought to be debited to the Government of India's railway land grants, (2) a huge slice of unproductive building land which properly pertains to the domain of the Collector of Bombay, and (3) a number of reclamations, boat basins, and mere tidal wharves, appraised at much above their commercial value. We repeat it, that this is no mere local question. Lord Northbrook and his Executive Council must seriously consider whether they will accept the responsibility of permanently overburdening both the Municipality and shipping trade of Bombay.—*Feb.* 13, 1873.

The Executive Neglects the Municipality.

II.—The Bombay Government, by its policy of "drift" as regards the new municipal organisation, is likely to bring both itself and the city into trouble. It will, of course, be understood that in anything we have to say on this subject we do not refer to the chance of pecuniary embarrassment and financial disgrace, such as culminated in July—October, 1871, as the direct and necessary consequence of the Bombay Government shirking its plain duty early in 1869. Subject to that reservation, we have to express our apprehensions that influences are at work, both negative and positive, similar to those which have in years past rendered healthy, intelligent, and active municipal life in Bombay an impossibility. Thanks to the good husbandry of the three able Revenue officers who, since November, 1871, have filled the office of Commissioner, aided by the vigilance and painstaking of the present Controller, the municipal coffers are well filled—so full, indeed, one could wish that rules would permit of a couple of lakhs being devoted to reduction of that debt which, month by month, sucks away so much of our civic income. The cash balances, according to the statement at the close of last month, were Rs. 2,35,360. But it is quite possible for a city, as for a kingdom, to have large cash balances, and yet be suffering from political atrophy, its public spirit dormant, and to see that activity for the general good which the citizens ought to exercise under a sense of responsibility, relegated to administrative officers who mature their plans, if they have any, and, as far as possible, carry them out free from all independent public criticism. Public discussion is often tedious. The "less instructed" are apt to come to the front in force. Many things are said which grieve the discreet; and able departmental officials derive much amusement of the cynical order from the spectacle of ill-trained persons struggling with the insuperable difficulties caused by imperfect information. But those are drawbacks of manner, and all lie on the surface. In the absence of free and frequent discussion and full explanation, grave mistakes are sure to be made, and false lines of policy are entered upon which it is infinitely more difficult to reverse under a close than an open system.

This is the unhealthy state of things which is fostered by the delay in putting the new Municipal Act into gear, and for that delay the Bombay Executive is wholly responsible. . . . To whatever cause it may be attributed, the apathy that at present prevails in regard to the affairs of the city is much to be regretted on public grounds, though, as already intimated, we can conceive that the state of quiescence might suit the purposes of some classes of clever officials who have been nurtured in a proper aversion to the *vox populi*. In the present Commissioner we have a man of very different stamp, and we could not be in better hands while going through this period of hybernation, when, from a variety of influences, the citizens are reduced to a comatose condition so far as municipal affairs are concerned. And yet it affords a striking illustration of the incalculable harm that may be done when constitutional organisation is allowed to fall out of gear, that it is, while under the care of an able Revenue officer like Mr. Pedder that, as remarked by a correspondent in our Monday's paper, "Bombay will be committed to one of the most deadly things within the history of the Municipality." We believe this terse description is perfectly correct; and we regret to say that no contradiction has been given to our statements of Saturday and

Monday regarding the monstrous nuisance which some person or persons are setting up in lieu, but in aggravation of the Chinch Bunder abomination, which, however oppressive, was comparatively harmless as regards the general health of the city. That this preposterous device of deliberately putting the worst kind of sewage into a drain and then sending the stuff to meet the western breeze at Love Grove, will be ten times worse than even the ill-managed Chinch Bunder arrangement, may be readily inferred on reading a certain passage in the Report by the Commission of 1869. . . . . .

On turning to Dr. Lumsdaine's evidence, we see that an effort was made by the Chairman to shake him in his evidence; but, though a man exceedingly ready to oblige, the Sanitary Commissioner could not be induced to imperil his professional reputation. He said: "I am no advocate for sewage being passed into drains. Gases generate, and I don't know how you are to get rid of them." After another attempt (this time by Dr. Hunter) to coax him into a qualified sanction for putting "much diluted sewage" into underground channels, Dr. Lumsdaine refused to ignore the deadly "difficulty of getting rid of the gases that are generated in the sewers." Here it occurs to us to ask if, as Sanitary Commissioner for the Presidency, Dr. Lumsdaine is not now armed with a strong recommendatory authority which would warrant him interposing to stop the terrible mistake that is being made? Now that the Justices decline to meet together to express an opinion, it is difficult to know in what quarter to look for help. We have always been inclined to make light of complaints about our Executive Government going to the hills, because their retreats are so near. But if Sir Philip Wodehouse has been allowed to depart to Mahableshwar without being informed of this pestilence-promoting scheme, his absence may become the cause of his term of administration being associated with one of the most deplorable and—we say it advisedly—inexcusable sanitary blunders ever perpetrated in Bombay. . . . . —*April 16, 1873.*

THE LAST REPORT UNDER THE OLD MUNICIPALITY.

"ANNUAL Report of the Municipal Commissioner of Bombay"—with what mingled feelings one peruses that legend! First, there is the superficial satisfaction on perceiving that the generation of huge quartos is at an end. The Commissioner now presents his own report, together with that of the Controller, Health Officer, and subordinate officials, all within the manageable compass of a decent folio. Weary are our reminiscences of those now abolished square cubits of margin and report; and still more dreary are our remembrances of fruitless surveys and excursions amidst the expanse of accounts presented, which only served to render one's estimate of the Municipal financial position more uncertain than ever. It is true that since Mr. Hope's Committee, of August, 1871, reported, there has been firm ground to tread upon; but, in truth, it has been very rough, and terribly encumbered with débris of the former sham and make-shift finance. That our former tasks, in examining that which ought to be the backbone of a Municipal Commissioner's Report, should have involved severe labour to comparatively little purpose, will be readily understood on reference to the remarkable statement we find in the opening of the Controller's Report. Mr. Thorburn there remarks: "Since the days of Major Thacker this office has not been asked to furnish any report." Of course the Investigation Report, and the discussions thereupon following, precluded the necessity for any such call on the Controller's Office for 1871; but one can only accept this confession by the reforming Controller as a striking proof of the utter uncertainty of the financial system under which the city was so long allowed to groan unheeded by the higher powers.

Leaving the details of Mr. Thorburn's simple but searching review for the present, we must note the results of the year's collections and disbursements. . . . . .

There is less occasion for us here to attempt anything like a review of the whole Municipal situation, seeing that it is virtually done in the chief portion of Mr. Pedder's own introductory chapter, which we present in other columns. Several of the subsidiary reports are each in themselves worthy of special notice, which we shall not be able to bestow upon them. We partially fulfil our duty in commending them to the close attention, not only of the present Justices to whom they are addressed, but still more to those who will have to take on themselves the responsibility of working in or with the new Town

Council. There is the report of Mr. John Hutchinson, the Assessor, which bristles with facts relating to the value of real property and the condition of the middle classes; that from Mr. Fellowes, the Collector, who had to cope with an accumulation of outstandings, and whose successful exertions are very justly commended by the Commissioner; there is Mr. Walton's interesting contribution, which comprises all about the Toolsee works, and the progress made with them up to the close of last year, the distribution of Vehar water, and sundry other matters of much practical importance. Last, and biggest, is the report of the Health Officer, extending to some 160 pages, in which—in addition to the usual distressing network of tables, together with certain impressive diagrams, the usual statements about garbage removed and drains cleaned out—there is much writing of a more ambitious order. Dr. Hewlett not only magnifies his office as usual, but enters into a retrospect of sanitary affairs during the eight years in which he has enjoyed the distinguished position of guardian over the public health of Bombay. There are many important truths set forth in this essay, and many points worthy of special attention; but the whole report is one that invites and will receive criticism. The general public and the Justices, who have such a lively recollection of the Health Officer's free use of the cudgel, when he wrenched from the Municipal exchequer a considerable sum in excess of what had been voted by the Bench, will not be likely to entertain such a high opinion of his classical sanitary disquisition as that expressed by Mr. Pedder.

We ought, perhaps, to have speeded the going and welcomed the coming guest—that is, the old and the new Corporation. In the former duty we have been anticipated by a contemporary in an article, most, though not quite all, of which coincides with our own view. As to the new Corporation, we cannot welcome it; first, because we do not know what it will be like; and, second, because the Act under which it will have its being seems carefully contrived to secure several of the most essential and ineradicable faults of the old system. But one thing is clear about the new *régime* beforehand—the Executive Government, through its Commissioner, its Chairman, and its nominated members, will be wholly responsible, for of effective popular control and of civic government there can be none.—*June* 23, 1873.

THE NEW MUNICIPALITY: FIRST ELECTORAL EXPERIMENT IN INDIA.

II.—With regard to our coming Corporation, there has at times since the debates of last autumn been so much talk about elections, voters, wards, candidates, and members, that most persons supposed all these details must have been settled, cut and dried in the Act. This is not the case. . . . It is under Section 306 of the Act (the last but two) that the Governor in Council is invested with the really large powers which are comprised in the drawing up of regulations prescribing the mode in which Corporations shall be elected and got together. It does not appear from the wording of the section that the responsibility and scope of this act of executive authority had been fully understood and foreseen. . . . Thus, it may be said that under this clumsy statute the Executive has been compelled to do the work of the Legislative Council on the one hand, and, on the other, to supersede one of the most obvious functions of the Corporation—that of preparing its own bye-laws.

However, we must now take these anomalies as we find them, and judge only of the results of what is decreed by the Executive and the Commissioner between them. In this way we came to examine how they have succeeded in distributing the electoral power which the law has conferred on a certain number of citizens—3,827, as the figure now turns out. . . . . .

Thus while, as we have seen, the Hindus are nearly 70 per cent. of the total population, their proportion as voters runs with the rest in this fashion: Hindus, 24; Parsees, 17; Mussulmans, 15; and all other electors, about 3½. The method of voting *en masse* being inadmissible, and the *corpus* electoral being small enough to be manageable, there was strong temptation to experiment on it, by what is known as the "Hare system," or some similar ingenious method of facilitating individual choice, and checking the power of majorities. But it was seen that these philosophic contrivances would at once puzzle the masses and throw more power into the hands of their astute and, perchance, designing leaders. Hence, rejecting both extremes in the allocation of the wards, if any principle has been

followed, it is the good old Indian one of rule-of-thumb, which, in this class of subjects, means common sense and adaptation to circumstances.*

The first instance of adaptation would be observed in regard to those remote and forlorn rural parishes of Mahim, Worlee, Parell, Sewree, and Seon. Pitiful have been the petitions and doleful the complaints from those districts to which the Bench has had to listen in former years; and, as will be seen from our table, the population is numerous enough to claim attention to the consideration of the Town Council. In those five parishes there are nearly 54,200 souls, including Sir Philip Wodehouse and staff; for, in this instance, extremes meet, and the rich and poor dwell together within the wide limits of Wards 9 and 10. In this latter ward, by an odd coincidence, the total number of electors is exactly ten, and, in awarding to these ten men one whole member, the Governor in Council has given the Mahimites an immensely greater proportion of voting power than is granted in any other ward. . . . . .

In Ward 4, the Mussulmans, if they stir themselves, will probably secure two of the three members, and the Hindus one. In Ward 7, the Norwood or Hampstead and Highgate of Bombay, where, out of a total population of 12,000, there are actually 81 European electors, out of a total of 178, and having three members, it seems likely that the ruling race will secure two seats, and the Parsees will probably carry the other one.

These speculations are sufficient at present. Perhaps the results of the ratepayers' poll will be so modified or hidden under the after processes of election by Justices and nominations by Government, that it is scarcely worth looking at the popular side of the scheme at all; but we should like to start fair under this curious Act, and it is as well to rest in good-humoured anticipations as long as we can.—*June* 28, 1873.

THE WATER-SUPPLY OF BOMBAY: THE DISTRIBUTION SERVICE.

THE advance of the hot weather causes attention to be drawn to the minor matters connected with our water-supply. More water is used for all purposes; and the question, how soon can baths, cooking vessels, and filters be filled, assumes very practical importance. As to the water carts, they must be filled even if householders' taps cease to run, and the usual cry for more street watering is being raised on one side, while, on the other hand, the demand is again made that old Neptune shall be called in to allay the dust. A few weeks back, an old correspondent, "Aquarius," again drew attention to the special impediments which exist to the facile utilisation of our present supply of water. It is the subsidiary mains, or—as we have, perhaps rather loosely, described them—the distribution pipes, that are too straight. The main, which is of 32 inches diameter as far as Byculla, is adequate to convey probably one-third more than our present supply. But as regards the greater part of the city lying beyond the end of the main, the capacity of the pipes joined on to it, and still more the next class which serve the several cross streets, are of such greatly diminished bore as seriously to check the flow of water, and thereby we lose much of the pressure which there is in the main just before entering the too narrow orifices. The rescue by Major Tulloch of the chart showing the reticulation of our water-service system serves to render this subject far more readily understood than heretofore. The single chart extant was, we believe, in a very dilapidated condition when taken in hand by Major Tulloch to secure its preservation by the lithographer's art; but now it may be examined by any one as Plates xiii. and xiv. of his Report.

It will be seen that the 32-inch main terminates at the corner near the Sir Jamsetjee Hospital; but, fortunately for the dwellers on Malabar Hill, a 32-inch branch has been laid —we believe quite in recent years—from the point just mentioned to Chowpatti; yet as this ascends the Hill it dwindles to 12, then to 8, and it is only 4 inches at the Point, where, on festive occasions, much inconvenience has been experienced, because of the dribbling rate of delivery. On the Mahaluxmi and all the outer side of the Hill, the supply is much curtailed by the main being only a six and five inch pipe, joined to the large main

* This anticipation proved incorrect. The device hit upon was that now described as the "one man one vote" system. Although from two to six members were given to several wards, no electors could vote for more than one candidate; thus at once restricting individual choice and virtually disfranchising the majority of the voters. This anti-popular scheme, working within a restricted constituency, resulted in the return of the wealthier candidates and of those most amenable to official influences. Thus the Bombay Corporation may be cited as a warning demonstration of the results of "proportional representation."

beyond the Racecourse by only an 8-inch main. Up to Pydhonhee, in the centre of our native town, where the second length of large main ends, the size is 28 inch, but there it diminishes at once to 19 in a branch as far as Memon Street, where it shrinks to 10, then to 8 inches at the head of Marine lines, having thrown off spindly connections of only 4 and 3 inches in Sonapore and other crowded neighbourhoods. Let us now return to the straight line leading to the markets and the Fort. The main commences at 18 inches from Pydhonhee corner, and shrinks to 16 on the Esplanade up to the Crawford Markets; after which, in the midst of the Fort, it falls to 12 and 10 inches in the Elphinstone Circle, then to 5 in Apollo Street, but 8 in Marine Street, and so on to Colaba, where it shrinks to 6, 5, and 4—to the grievous detriment of the military inhabitants of Middle and Upper Colaba. . . . . .

Hitherto we have hesitated to urge to action on this subject because the remedy required has seemed so costly and difficult of application; but on looking at this chart we see plainly what in the first instance should be aimed at, and that with as little delay as possible. As soon as practicable, the 28-inch main, now ending at Pydhonhee, should be extended to the Esplanade and into the Fort. Then a 20-inch and 16-inch pipe should be carried forward to Colaba Point. As to the first of these measures, the Fire Insurance Companies should demand it; and the Military authorities should insist on the other. The citizens may pray to the future Town Council for better street service as soon as they like. —*April 9*, 1873.

THE NEW COTTON MILL INDUSTRY.—DEFECTIVE MANAGEMENT.

IT has been very gratifying to witness the progress of a new industry in Bombay—cotton spinning by steam machinery. At least a couple of millions sterling are represented by the mills and machinery we see around, and the profits made, whether on sound principles or not is another question, have been large enough to satisfy even native Indian investors. But it is not pretended that the profits distributed, ranging from five to ten per cent., represent nearly all the profits made. There are commissions on sales, commissions on purchases, and commissions paid to agents. Some portion of these may pertain to the necessary expenses of working the business; but it is quite certain that if, as would be the case under a cotton lord of Lancashire, all these were brought into one treasury, the total nett return on the capital invested and employed would make such a handsome figure as would cause the eyes of the cotton lord aforesaid to twinkle with envy. But, somehow, in the East profits become more diffused, and it is difficult to trace in what directions the earnings of our cotton mills permeate. This might be the case under any organisation; but as affairs stand now with the cotton mills of Bombay, we outsiders can only guess in the vaguest manner what money is made and what becomes of it. And the relations in which the various directors, agents, managers, secretaries, and shareholders stand to each other become more puzzling than ever. We alluded just now to the English organisation of cotton manufacturing industry, where the individual capitalist, or a family firm, owns the whole fabric and stock, everything but the "hands" themselves, and, taking all risks, draws all profits made. These, never very large of late years, are kept down to a minimum by the operation of free and keen competition with other capitalists. It is only in very recent times that co-operative and joint-stock cotton mills have been started; and we do not gather that they have exercised any appreciable effect in modifying the amount or distribution of profits made in the cotton industry of Lancashire. . . . . .

It does not follow, however, that the cotton mills should not answer, or that they will cease to be profitable, now that the preponderating votes in the companies' meetings have drifted into the hands of a few big men. The men of money want not only to secure, but to increase their store; and as in striving to swell these incidental profits—those below the board, so to speak—they could scarcely fail to enhance those above board—that is, the dividends. But during the last year or two the high prices of cotton, and—though none concerned in the mills will admit this—the deterioration of the engines and machinery have made the total profits run low; and, of course, those above board—that is, the dividends—have suffered first and worst. Hence we may trace part of the troubles dire which have found expression at recent turbulent meetings of cotton mill shareholders. We say part, because it is tolerably evident that, however much the smaller shareholders may regret the want of a dividend, they or the capitalists in whose behalf they protest and vote feel much

more keenly the fact of having no share in those incidental profits, such as the commission and agencies which are absorbed by the large shareholder capitalists.

Out of the temper of disappointment and envy induced by these things, it seems to us that there is some danger of our cotton mill management, defective as it is, sinking into a still lower depth of confusion and over-reaching. . . . Now, if the cotton mill industry were going on in a normal condition, and the joint-stock companies were working healthily in Bombay, these propositions might seem reasonable and worthy of support. But when, as we have explained above, everything about it is in an abnormal state, and the supremacy of a few large shareholders has got to be the ordinary condition with these companies, it is in the last degree unlikely that these requisitionists can have any better system wherewith to replace the unsatisfactory but passable compromise that now subsists. It is very annoying for small shareholders to get no dividend, but it seems to us that things have got to this pass, that there is nothing for them to do but sell out and allow the large shareholders to become sole owners of the mills. We may remark, in passing, that this Bombay United appears to have been either fortunate or tolerably well managed. Its dividends have averaged about seven and half per cent.; it has a large insurance and reserve fund; and, what is very exceptional in the accounts of these cotton mill companies, it has written off a large sum for deterioration. For lack of this precaution some of the other mills must come to grief by-and-bye.—*June* 5, 1873.

II.—Spinning Mills are the order of the day in Bombay; and, amidst the general dulness which prevails, it is satisfactory to hear of any pursuit wherein capital can be tolerably sure of its recompense, and skill of its reward. All the stories we hear about 15 per cent. profits, besides large commissions to managers and extra beneficiares, are not to be accepted without considerable discount. There is, in most cases, much to be allowed for deterioration; something, perhaps, for bad debts not yet written off; and not a little for the increased price of fuel—a heavy drawback which has scarcely yet begun to show its effect on the figures of the balance-sheets. Yet, leaving a good margin for these deductions from the profits assumed as likely to be earned by the Spinning and Weaving Mills of Bombay, there is a sufficiently firm basis for the prosperity of this local industry. That there is still scope for the expansion of this trade may be fairly inferred from the figures given by the Colaba Company's Chairman in his address, which we published in full yesterday. Unlike many statistics we have had flourished before us in recent times, these come up to date—a point which is of essential importance, seeing that during the last three or four years, commerce, prices, and profits in British India have undergone much change and unsettlement. . . . . .

We do not think that the demand for Indian spun yarn and machine-woven country calicoes will be easily overtaken. It is true that when the coming low prices of American cotton begin to tell on the Manchester market, and if the Bank rate of discount keeps down, we shall probably have very large shipments of Lancashire yarns and "grey" goods to India. These supplies will none the less affect the profits of our local manufactories, because, as is most likely, they will entail losses on the speculative shippers. More important than these fluctuations of commerce is the question of the probable price of fuel—a matter which must be carefully pondered by shareholders and managers. To meet this the utmost pains will have to be taken in the selection and management of engines and machinery. Our impression is, that in this direction alone, in half the present mills, sums equal to a very respectable profit are frittered away for lack of competent skill and due vigilance. These shortcomings could not exist under a healthy and business-like system of management; and this, we must assume, all who intend to invest their capital in new or enlarged mills are determined to have. Men who have their investments locked up may be content to drift along with concerns conducted on faulty principles; but however good the spinning trade is, none who are free to choose will consent to see the returns from their capital frittered away amongst managers, agents, and employés of sorts. So it may be taken for granted, that if the promoters of new spinning mills expect to draw capital from the general public, they must have already made up their minds to start and work the new mills entirely on reformed principles. . . . . .

The other manufacturing project having its site on the Colaba estate, recalls the by-

gone glories of Bombay hopes and speculations. The promoters, to whom we now allude, propose to utilise the Bonded Warehouse buildings for a spinning mill; and negotiations are, we hear, in progress between two or three native capitalists to take over those excellent buildings and form a company for this purpose. As, however, their arrangements, we believe, involve some muddling stipulations about life managerships, it will be in vain for them to appeal to the public for any capital. They must in that case do it all with their own funds—a comfortable plan, for which they are probably prepared. Should these incipient plans fall through, there is, it seems to us, an excellent opportunity for some European or other business-like promoters to take up the project and show what can be done by clear, straightforward, and effective management. This possible mill in the Bonded Warehouse building would, of course, be independent of, and in addition to, the Colaba Company's own manufactory. There is room for both, and the rivalry of two such undertakings would be of service to the port, and, probably, to the shareholders also.—*July* 15, 1873.

ROUNDED WITH A SLEEP.

AN announcement amongst our "Domestic Occurrences" this morning will be noticed with much regret by most of our local readers, and must stir many grave and saddening memories, tinged with deeply interesting retrospects of Anglo-Indian life in this island city. We allude, of course, to the decease of Mrs. Hough, of Colaba, a lady, nearly ninety years of age, who, up to the last, formed in herself a lively and intelligent link between this, the second half of our century, and the manners, society, and events which crowded around the close of the eighteenth, with all its rich and portentous freight of European and Indian affairs. For sixty years or more Mrs. Hough has known and been more or less familiar with most of the leading persons in official and general Bombay society. The story of her life from year to year, though not specially eventful, would be, if properly told, replete with personal reminiscences, and, within a certain compass, historical or political interest. At first it bewilders one to consider what is comprised in having had intercourse with one born before the great French Revolution, and familiar, in her own personal recollections, with all the stirring events arising from that upheaving of society and great political catastrophe; and Mrs. Hough had, from her girlish days, been a portion of the times in which she lived. She has taken the keenest interest in the events around her, and, in the most distinct and picturesque manner, has been accustomed to assign to the actors therein their proper parts.

We are here alluding more to the local history of Western India in the early years of this century, some of her lively recollections of which were described in our columns only a few months since. Up to the last her faculties were bright, and her facility of expression such as would do credit to young ladies—or young men either—of one and twenty. But the long and busy life is over at last; the familiar and, of late, venerable figure has passed away from amongst us; and her hitherto unfailing vivacity is henceforth stilled. Mrs. Hough is inseparably associated with Bombay past and present, and the busy city pauses a moment to honour her memory.—*June* 25, 1873.

THE TOWERS OF SILENCE TRIAL:

CHISHOLM ANSTEY'S LAST CAUSE CÉLÈBRE.

THE verdict which concluded the business of the Criminal Session yesterday was, we believe, contrary to the general expectation. It will probably be cited as an instance of the mistake that is made when a thing is overdone. Had the two parties been allowed to fight it out in the Magistrate's Court, even with all the aid which the prosecution is supposed to have derived from our energetic police, the results would probably have been the conviction and a suitable summary penalty inflicted on that half-dozen or half-score indicated by the Judge in his remarks when discharging them, as "some of the accused." Without going deeply into the law of trespass, and the right of lawful tenants or landlords to use force in turning intruders off their property, there is no doubt that our Magistrates of Police will always be inclined to visit prompt and sufficiently "exemplary" penalties on those who assert and "enforce their rights" in a

way not likely "to preserve the general peace of the community." Had the case been allowed to take its course in the ordinary way, the Magistrate, finding the Penal Code ready to hand, would have had no difficulty in applying the law as to the alleged unlawful multitude which was so lucidly explained by the learned Judge yesterday. Here we may remark, in passing, how times are changed when we hear a barrister judge almost go out of his way to utter a well considered and emphatic testimony to the high value and immense serviceableness of that small volume comprising a full statement of the criminal law of the country. . . . . .

Only one incident need we refer to which could be supposed to have any influence with the Magistrate in inducing him to send the fifty men up to the Sessions. That was an overwhelming circumstance—namely, that the Executive Government had intervened between the parties; and, not content with the conspicuous and overdone zeal of the police, had directed the Public Prosecutor to take up the case, with the desire, as the Magistrate, in common with all the public, might reasonably suppose, of securing "exemplary punishment" to these ferocious Parsees. This was the single "extraneous circumstance" which alone rendered the case one of public importance.

We think the Judge might very properly have referred to the extraordinary position taken up by the Executive in regard to this originally trumpery disturbance. As the high official supposed to have incited to this false step is not here present, it need only be referred to in so far as the meddling in the affair is indicative of an unhealthy humour in the body politic—a keenly sensitive connection with the community through a few narrow threads, yet this consisting with semi-paralysis as regards all other connecting links with the general public. . . . The only justification we could conceive for the extraordinary course of opening the public treasury to support the prosecution of these misguided Zoroastrian Rebeccaites would be that the breaking down of labourers' chawls and the upsetting of contractors' tents had become a prevalent practice in this island. But his Lordship has assured us that such is not the case. Here is his testimony on the subject: "It is not as if there was a prevalence of these offences in this community. As far as my recollection goes, it is the only case of the kind that has taken place within the last thirteen years in Bombay, and it does not call for a very serious punishment. It does not bear that dreadful and serious aspect which has been put upon it by different gentlemen who have addressed you." After this statement from such high and impartial authority, no one will venture to deny that the "entertainment" of the Public Prosecutor in this case was a thing overdone. Few will now dispute that the order said to have been given by the Police Commissioner to arrest every man on the ground was also a thing overdone; the "cavalier's" fine feat of horsemanship in riding up the steps must be admired by us all as equestrianism, but still it, again, must be reckoned as also a thing overdone; the arrest of seventy men, and marching a large proportion of them handcuffed through the streets, was also a thing overdone. . . . . .

There is one other notable proceeding connected with the conduct of the trial which also strikes us as a thing overdone. We refer to the unusual, not to say extraordinary, course taken by his Lordship in essaying personal retaliation on the leading counsel for the defence. It is quite true that the Judge was well within his right, as he took care to show. He will be vastly applauded in society and at the dinner tables of our local Belgravia; but the premeditated sally will raise questions as to taste and measure. It is of the last importance that the Bench should do what may be needful to shield its reputation for impartiality, and freedom from preconceived conclusions; but one indispensable condition of such vindication is that the dignity of the office and the calmness which should ever reign on the judgment seat are in no way ruffled. It is open to question whether this condition is likely to be maintained when the Bench ventures on a course which reminds one of the tit-for-tat of common life, or the Roland for an Oliver of parliamentary combat. Here we may leave this episode, which will vastly amuse the town and attract attention in the remotest cities of Ind.

Yet we cannot forget the scenes of turmoil and struggle which the learned Judge's quotation has called up out of the rapidly receding past. The incident is one more striking illustration of the adage—"how the whirligig of Time brings its revenges." At the period referred to we have no means of knowing whether the (now) Hon. Justice Green contributed his quota of the unstinted applause which was lavished on Mr. Justice Anstey, then the idol of the day in the very circles where his Lordship's quotation will be

now eagerly welcomed. But we have a lively recollection of the opprobrium which we had then to endure because of our steady and determined opposition to the appointment of Mr. Anstey as a Judge. In describing the treatment and abuse which we had then to brave because of our sustained protest against the undiscriminating passion of the hour, we might almost adopt a similar strain to that in which Mr. Anstey on Tuesday made his personal appeal to the jury. We were credited, very unworthily of course, with the lion's share in the movement of which the memorial quoted from by Mr. Justice Green was the outcome. . . . . .

Whether Mr. Anstey has ever forgiven us we do not know, and are not careful to inquire; but, strange to say, from the same necessity of public duty which prompted us then, we now find ourselves bound to put in a protest against a needless excess in judicial rebuke. And in showing objection to the intervention of the Executive in the now famous Towers of Silence Riot case, we do not think we shall be regarded as dead to those constitutional principles which are and ever have been dear to Englishmen.—*July* 17, 1873.

CLOSE OF A STORMY LIFE.

THOMAS CHISHOLM ANSTEY appeared, until very lately, so full of vitality and nervous energy that when the news of his decease spread rapidly through our city yesterday morning, the announcement came with something of a shock. Since his last return from England he has kept very much to himself and his feline companions,* so that, except when in the Courts, he has been seen by very few. Yet it has been obvious to some—more especially since his urgently needed trip to Galle last cold weather—for months past, that, unless he should betake himself to complete rest in a temperate clime, the days of Mr. Anstey were numbered. Instead of seeking repose, he appears to have plunged more unsparingly than ever into the labours of his profession; and his exertions in a recent celebrated Sessions case—which, as remarked by him in Court a fortnight before, he looked forward to with terror—must have done a good deal to expend those ebbing vital resources which he resolutely refused to husband whilst there was yet time. We have been accustomed for some time past to regard him as a sexagenarian, but reference proves that he was still about three years short of the threescore. We may, therefore, consider him as cut off some years before the period to which, under easier circumstances, his originally strong constitution and wiry frame would have carried him.

It is, because of the long period that Mr. Anstey has been before the public, and the frequency with which his name has been brought into notice, that we have come to regard him as an old man. He was only 31 when he entered Parliament as member for Youghal, and then he had already attained considerable celebrity as a politician and author of works on law and political jurisprudence. His father was a colonist of Tasmania, but Mr. Anstey was a Londoner born (1816), and he must have been one of the earliest graduates of University College, then almost the only public institution in England where Roman Catholic students could obtain a liberal academic education. When he entered public life the great battle of Catholic Emancipation had been fought and won; but he entered with characteristic energy into the struggle for the removal of the remaining disabilities which fettered or irritated his co-religionists. . . . . .

If we were to trace in detail only the chief incidents of Mr. Anstey's career in Bombay, the review would fail to satisfy those who are intimately acquainted with our local history; whilst readers at a distance would not understand how events of little intrinsic importance came to be invested with such high local significance. The explanation of the apparent discrepancy must be sought in the intense individuality of Mr. Anstey, and the high personal popularity which, for some years, he enjoyed in Bombay. Politics, too, had something to do with this. He at once conceived and constantly cherished antipathy to the Civilian institutions of India, which, bearing the aspect of privilege, were naturally obnoxious to him; and it was too late for him to learn that a restricted Service and paternal or extra-constitutional Government regulations were designed to secure the protection and welfare of the masses of the Indian peoples.

* During the last year or two of his life, Mr. Anstey cultivated the society of—cats. It is said that so many as seventeen of these curious and interesting creatures used to sit at table in his bungalow on Kambala Hill, where he died.

With these races Mr. Anstey's sympathies were very slight; and though reared under and accustomed to battle against disabilities which had affected his own people and church, he cared little about the disabilities and drawbacks affecting the subject races here. For a considerable period he might be regarded as the centre and idol of the *soi-disant* English party in this city. We only recall this because it has an intimate connection with his elevation to the Bench in 1865, when, from promptings which it would not be well to analyse too closely, it was deemed necessary, as the phrase ran, to "teach a lesson" to those classes who, having profited much by the cotton and share mania of 1863-65, had also been most signally cast down by the panic that followed. From the very first we considered this appointment one of the weakest and most ill-considered acts of Sir Bartle Frere's Government, and, therefore, denounced it freely at the time. We need say no more here of the episode than that while it was the crowning period in Mr. Anstey's career, it also brought out those qualities in him that were least admirable.

On his return to the Bar suitors flocked around him again, and he re-entered on an exceedingly lucrative course of practice arising out of the confusion and litigation which encumbered our local affairs in 1867-8. In the latter year he returned to the West, and during his months of recreation was lost sight of by the public, until the Bridgwater election inquiry again brought him into notice under circumstances which caused much humorous comment, the laugh being mainly on Mr. Anstey's side. He returned to Bombay early in 1870. Since that time he has taken no voluntary part in public affairs here, and has seemed inclined to shun company of all kinds. Probably his health was never re-established, or it had broken down again under the exertions which he underwent in connection with the famous "Wahabee" trials at Calcutta in July, 1870. On that occasion Mr. Anstey was thoroughly in his element. The subject itself and the unfortunate Ameer Khan have, in virtue of the law of reaction, faded out of the public mind; but we believe that any biographer desirous of doing full justice to Mr. Anstey's forensic abilities and his repute as a constitutional lawyer, would find the best material for the purpose in the records of that notable State trial. On that occasion the advocate had to face a settled foregone conclusion in which some among the highest Executive authorities were known to participate; this prejudgment was also shared by a considerable portion of European society; and the supposed proof against Mr. Anstey's client had been accumulated by zealous police officers, specially detailed for the purpose, and having spies and secret service money at their command to any extent. . . . . .

It is not needful here to dwell upon the later incidents in Mr. Anstey's career—his growing antagonism to and estrangement from the Bench, or his great and successful effort against the Government prosecution in the recent "Riot" case. It is time to forget, as far as possible, his weaknesses and faults, and to remember his thorough independence of character, his energy and untiring industry, and to appreciate his vast store of legal and historical knowledge. Those who were fortunate to enjoy his acquaintance and inexhaustible conversation in his better days, now recall these things. They are all ready to own that Thomas Chisholm Anstey was a Templar whom the Bar have reason to remember with pride, and that he was one whom, with all his failings, none bred "within the four seas" need be ashamed to own as a fellow countryman.—*August* 14, 1873.

MERCHANTS' INDIFFERENCE TO PUBLIC INTERESTS.

BEFORE the very comprehensive speech delivered by the Chairman of our Chamber of Commerce last week fades out of memory, we ought to venture one or two remarks upon it. If excuse were needed for delaying in this duty, we might plead that the honourable gentleman speaks so fully and so well, that there is scarcely room for any one to follow him. Reflection, however, leads us to think that Mr. Bythell has not passed his degree as an historian, while, seeing that he takes such a complacent view of our present commercial position, and gilds the future with glowing hopes, he seems scarcely safe as a prophet of the day. . . . So long as the general railway guarantee has to be paid out of the revenues of all India, it was manifestly unjust that Calcutta should be placed within cheaper access of Jubbulpore, and even Nagpore, than was Bombay, though our port is nearer to those places, say, on the average, by 250 miles. The elaborate correspondence required to remove that abuse, and which was referred to by the

Chairman in his speech—appearing in our paper of the 19th March—tells much to the advantage, as might be supposed, of the men of figures and small profits.

On reading this close argument, a strong desire arises—would that but half-a-dozen British merchants in each of the Presidency towns could be induced to give exact and continuous attention to those revenue and finance questions which affect the millions of India, instead of never going into them, except when constrained to do so by their immediate trade interests! Perhaps this is a vain wish; and this is shown by the way in which the railway question is treated in another section of the same big speech. We can understand merchants, merely as such, shutting their eyes to questions of ways and means, in order to get their special end secured; but this course is, in effect, to leave the masses of the population and the future credit of British India to take care of itself. We have strongly urged, and shall again urge, that the B.B. and C.I. line be pushed upward from its base, instead, as the Chairman aptly remarked, of our seeing "such a ridiculous absurdity as the line being made from Calcutta round through Agra, Ajmere, and Pahlunpore to Ahmedabad." But when the speaker says, "We [the Chamber] have expressed no opinion as to whether the broad or narrow gauge" would be the best—next, states his own opinion in favour of the former, and then goes on to accept the estimate of £6,000 per mile from Ahmedabad to Ajmere, based on the cost of the peculiarly easy extensions to Wudwan and Patree,—a looker-on must conclude that the Bombay merchants, except so far as cotton and piece-goods are concerned, do not much trouble their heads to study the very pressing and difficult problem of internal communications in India.

With regard to the Chairman's unqualified defence and vindication of the Port Trust, its debts and all, we would not venture within the narrow space at our disposal to measure words with so fully furnished and so remarkably confident a champion. But we would suggest that it only requires two or three more speeches like that by the Hon'ble Mr. Bythell, in order to convince us all that the Port Trust incubus is actually the cause of such prosperity as is left to Bombay! We would point out, however, that the argument seems seriously open to question, when it is contended that the commerce of the port can afford to pay now by compulsion as much or more than it paid voluntarily three or four years ago. . . . . .

One word with regard to this reproach of supineness in respect of which—now that all the struggle is over, and without the Chamber exercising the slightest influence on the result—the Chairman seemed disposed to indulge in the satiric vein. He was certainly oblivious. We are now far advanced in the year of grace 1873. Act v. of 1870, under which fees were levied on bunders and wharves, "where none had been levied before, caused dissatisfaction in the mercantile community, and [we quote the Chamber's own words] the Committee were pressed to make representations on the subject to Government." They did not do so—did not stir a peg until July, 1871, as confessed in the Report, dated September 27th. . . . On April 1st, 1870, supplies were stopped by the Government of India, and all work on the Elphinstone estate was stopped. Within two or three days of that time, we stated, with tolerable accuracy, the amount of the debt which it was then proposed to thrust on the port of Bombay. From time to time during the months that followed we returned to the subject, urging the Chamber, as representing the mercantile community, to stand forward in the interest of the city. But, as we have seen, the Chamber, or rather its committee, refused to budge; so the whole task of the reduction was carried through, as the Chairman naïvely confesses, without the Chamber having had anything to say in the matter. Government had, indeed, received sundry spurs and warnings, such as, unaided, we or our correspondents could give; but all that time (about eighteen months) neither the Chamber nor its present optimist Chairman lifted a finger in the interests of the port and its future commerce. Those who cultivate the faculty of memory in regard to local history will bear us out in the opinion that the Chamber, at that period, failed in its duty. Let us hope it is now reinvigorated. —*July* 26, 1873.

HESITATING ABOUT DOCKS.

THERE can be no two opinions in regard to the proposition, that, now Bombay has got a Port Trust, the Trustees ought to move on, . . . for a large portion of the community, including a majority of the Chamber of Commerce, are in favour of

bringing ships into docks; and we do not know that on the Port Trust Board there is a single representative for piers and jetties. We may confess, for our own part, that we are of the minority who think there are several strong arguments in favour of piers; but that does not much matter, if only ships can be brought alongside, and that without more loss of time.

What, then, is being done towards giving the port some docks? We need not recapitulate the history of the matter previous to Colonel Fraser's general, but qualified, acceptance of Mr. Ormiston's plans for two huge tidal basins on the Elphinstone estate. Those projects have been tolerably well discussed, though not by any means, as we think, with the result asserted by a contemporary—namely, "universal public approval." Let that pass at present; but it is generally known that the Engineer to the Port Trust has provided an alternative dock scheme of somewhat smaller estimated cost; and the mercantile public are naturally anxious to know all about this, in the hope that it may afford a better prospect of the great end being obtained—one lift only for all goods in and out of Bombay harbour. . . . . .

But, apart from the pier question, it is tolerably understood that Mr. Ormiston is so far willing and capable to undertake small manageable works, that he is ready to transform the present Musjid basin into a small nine-acre dock, with but slight indulgence in the riskful vanity of channels lower than the sea-bottom; and this work could, no doubt, be carried out within a twelvemonth.

The details of this small interim proposal are studiously hidden away from the public, and it is not our object to advocate it, but only once more to demand that something should be put in hand, and that speedily. The merchants and shipping agents of Bombay have a right to remind the Bombay Government and its obstructive department—also the Trustees, if necessary—that had it not been for the Port Trust and its highly sensitive financial constitution, the Canal steamers would, by the end of this year, have had a good pier to supply their urgent need for cheaper lifting of cargo and quick despatch—this, too, provided by private enterprise, and with no tax, except for direct service rendered. Here is one fact which shows that time presses for something to be done, and at as small a cost as possible. In April and May of this year the tonnage in and out of Bombay was only 197,755, against 236,240 tons for the same months of 1871. It is plain that, in proportion as our sea-borne commerce shows a tendency to decline, we are all the more bound to facilitate its operations, and, if possible, render the port cheaper and more attractive. What will the Port Trust do? It has a Chairman of considerable talent and excellent judgment, and also several able members on the Board; but genius itself cannot enable men to rise above a false position.—*Aug.* 13, 1873.

II.—How few, or how many, of the members of our Chamber of Commerce are now thinking about that resolution passed by them in June of last year, humbly requesting Government to at once proceed with construction of docks on the Elphinstone estate? With scarcely a single dissentient, the Chamber resolved that, so far as it was concerned, the reign of talk should be over, and that of action should begin. An engineer, in whom the members had unlimited confidence, displayed a plan by which docks could be made for a certain sum and within a certain time. This the merchants accepted, not caring to spend time in waiting for further professional opinions; and, knowing that Government had promised to find the funds for the work, they requested, not to say demanded, that it should be put in hand forthwith. But June has come again and gone; and Bombay is not only without docks, but, apparently, as far from obtaining them as at any time this last ten years. We seem to have entered on a new phase of public opinion or feeling about our harbour side affairs. Is there any one of our merchants who still so far cherishes his convictions of June, 1872, that he dare venture to move the Committee, or call a general meeting of the Chamber to re-consider, re-affirm, and act upon those brave resolutions? We trow not. But why not? If the desire of our merchants for what is aptly described as "the one lift from ship to shore" was earnest and sincere; if they were so fully and clearly convinced, as their resolutions would imply, that Mr. Ormiston's magnificent tidal basins afforded the best or the only right method of superseding the lighterage system, why have they not met and resolved anew? . . . .

There is, indeed, sufficient in this to make us feel very gloomy; but every one knows

that as soon as the shipping season opens there must be a lot of business done for better or worse. . . . . .

Since the general circulation, early last month, of the correspondence relating to this question of "feasibility," not so much of the basins, but of the deep channel that would be required for ships to get in and out, it is not needful for us to state the progress of the official discussions or the arguments advanced on either side. Besides, our elder daily contemporary, filled with much zeal to uphold the "feasibility" view of the matter, has given in its leading columns copious extracts from the correspondence just referred to, this being done with the object of showing that the Port Trust Engineer *is* "the man for Galway," and that Colonel Kennedy and all who oppose the said engineer are either mere perverse obstructives, or not up to the mark as harbour engineers. We may very briefly state how the controversy stands—for it is standing, and it is likely to do so for a year and a day. In Colonel Fraser's review of the scheme, dated fully two months before the Chamber's meeting, he had fairly discussed whether the channels, when dredged to twelve feet below sea level, could be kept open at a reasonable expense. This is really what is meant by "feasibility." Colonel Fraser's own opinion was strongly in support of Mr. Ormiston's, to the effect that the channels would present no serious difficulty; but he recommended further inquiry about the Bute dock entrances, stated to be on a similar principle, and advised that an experiment should at once be undertaken to test the tenacity of Bombay mud, and the proneness, or otherwise, of the silt to fill up the channel when made. Here we should mention, in passing, that the late Mr. J. R. Maclean, C.E., a noted dock engineer and an excellent professional authority, also gave his opinion in favour of Mr. Ormiston's plans, which he saw in Bombay when he also inspected our harbour. But as Colonel Fraser, who was favourable to the plans, had said that an experiment was desirable, those who know our harbour and its mud banks still better than does the eminent lighthouse engineer, insisted that it was necessary. Accordingly, the Secretary to Government in Public Works Department suggested that an experimental channel should be cut; and it being "necessary to keep the cost of the experiment as low as possible," the channel was to be kept as small as possible—that is, at a depth of six feet below the harbour bottom, and from two to three hundred feet broad at the top. Mr. Ormiston, as desired, went into the calculations, to show the probable cost of such an excavation (Rs. 87,500), but utterly repudiated its value as an experiment. . . . . .

Colonel Kennedy, when his professional career shall draw to a close, may not have many mighty works to point to as his memorials, unless it be the Middle Ground Battery; but he has been highly successful as an objector, and no one can deny that this is not a valuable function in the servant of a Government prone to public works ambition. In this case we cannot but think that the gallant Colonel is in the right; not that we attach much importance to his individual opinion as such, but because in the present instance he follows in the track of many experienced men who are familiar with Bombay harbour and understand the action of silt. That this obstacle is no bugbear may fairly be inferred from certain passages in the last report of the Calcutta Port Commissioners, who find that even in their fast-flowing river, with its sweeping ebb current, the slight resistance induced by their jetty piles has caused an accumulation of silt, for the removal of which they are compelled to send home for a dredger, the arrival of which is just about due. . . . .

Lest any who forget the past should venture to class us as obstructives along with the gallant and obstinate Secretary in Public Works Department, let us assure them that it is no part of our plan to "stick in the mud." Our advice is to keep above it by all means. If tidal docks cannot be got speedily and at reasonable expense, then let us have piers; and, if we are in the stage of experiment, let us at once experiment on a jetty or two at different points in the harbour, so as to suit different trades. But just a word as to finance. It is impossible for this Port to get on at all with the Land estate tied round its neck like a millstone—that incubus *must* be removed. The Government of India, and not the commerce of Bombay, must sustain the risk of land speculations.—*Sept.* 18, 1873.

SIR BARTLE'S COSTLY PALACE OF ART.

IN Sir Bartle Frere's preface to his daughter's pleasant little book, "Old Deccan Days," he mentions how that the Sepoy sentinels at Government House, Dapoorie, used to salute any cat or jackal (we forget which) that happened to pass during the night, believ-

ing that the ghost of a long deceased and highly esteemed Governor of Bombay had taken lodgment in the dumb creature. But Dapoorie was sold ("irregularly," says Lord Lawrence) for £35,000, and thereby hangs the tale of another ghost—an irrepressible spectre which rises ever and again during the proceedings of the Finance Committee. This uncanny apparition—of course we mean the cost of the new Gunnesh Khind Palace—crops up at most unexpected corners to vex the soul of Mr. Fawcett and other members who cherish tenderness of conscience as regards public expenditure. It is not in any hope of our being able to lay this ghost that we thus venture to accost it; for it must be owned that it can be no spectre or castle in the air, commencing with its growth from an old-fashioned country house sold to Bombay speculators for £35,000, but which, under the fatherly care of two Governors, expanded into a stately pile in the Italian style, and gorgeously bedight within, all at a cost of £170,000. How this came to pass puzzles the whole college of committee-men and witnesses.

Perhaps Lord Lawrence, in the passage we reported yesterday, comes nearest to the mark; but, for all that, his statement leaves a good deal to be explained. His Lordship's account, brief as it is, would be amusing were it not for the thought that the lakhs of the unfortunate taxpayers would have sufficed to construct dozens of country roads and reservoirs. Lord Lawrence says he "severely reprimanded" the Governor of Bombay; and, as the building was very merrily pushed on, demanded an estimate, so that the Government of India might know what to expect. But the estimate was delayed, and the executive engineers were spurred on; thus defiantly rose the pile, whilst Sir John Lawrence left India without the estimate having been furnished; and, pathetically adds his Lordship, "meanwhile he [personal this!] went on spending more money." He does not think the Supreme Government could have done more toward pulling up the Bombay Governor and his Council. Thus, when a strong-willed man like John Lawrence confesses himself beaten, we must own that the examination has brought out one constitutional principle in Indian administration—namely, that nothing can overcome passive resistance; against that *vis inertiæ* gods and men exhaust themselves in vain. . . . . .

Though it is of no use bewailing a bridge already gone down stream, and though none can restore the six or seven lakhs needlessly spent on the grand residence which serves the Governor of Bombay for six months in the year, it may be as well to mention two circumstances which had a large influence in producing the excess over estimates—for, though the Supreme Government called in vain for them, estimates were duly prepared, and as regularly expanded from time to time. Of these two circumstances to which we allude, one has to do with the design; and, though we cannot pretend to treat it from a professional point of view, it is a matter worthy of notice by architects and builders. Not to be too positive on the subject, let us put our statement interrogatively. Is it not the case that the material was unsuited to the design, or, rather, the design to the material; for nothing could be more durable than the hard blue trap? The design is, we believe, entirely in the Italian style, comprising, in much detail, friezes, fluting, and finely smoothed ornamentation of various kinds, most of it being so far removed from ordinary observation that the effect is lost, though the cost is unmistakable. The design, not specially expensive as originally worked in comparatively soft and easily chiselled stone, presents quite a different aspect financially when worked out in hard, steel-defying basalt. Practical men can understand how this circumstance, overlooked in design and estimate, enhanced the cost in a way that no reprimand, no revision, and no retrenchment could avail to check. Whether the blame for this special and reprehensible oversight should rest with the favourite architect whom Sir Bartle Frere imported, or on the Bombay engineers, who, though they well knew the hardness of the material, forgot the cost of chiselling and smoothing it, we do not undertake to say.

The other circumstance hitherto overlooked, alike by examiners and witnesses, when the Gunnesh Khind apparition presents itself, is one that a Finance Committee ought not to have forgotten, as Mr. Fawcett and his friends have done in many more weighty matters than this of the Poona Palace. We refer to the notorious and general rise of prices in Western India, which, as ill fortune would have it, synchronised almost to a year with the building of the Gunnesh Khind villa. It would require careful examination of dates and accounts to ascertain how many of the 17 lakhs are due to the advance in labour and material which obtained from 1862-3 to 1868-9, attaining its chief intensity in those very years in which the palace was being pushed on most vigorously. To this cause

a considerable share in the enhancement of cost is attributable; but this does not necessarily demand censure on any one. Could it have been foreseen that the tide of high prices would recede as it has done since 1870, the building of the palace might fitly have been delayed with advantage to every interest concerned. But the impression prevailing amongst Sir Bartle Frere and his men was, that the forward wave would ever rise; hence the work was pushed on with the idea of averting still greater outlay. Of course we do not forget the share which downright rascality and incompetent builders had in adding to the cost of the Gunnesh Khind Palace; but, somehow, no one cares to tell the Committee about that. Probably, if the records of a certain trial held here in 1870 could be forwarded to Mr. Fawcett, he might gather some suggestive hints from portions of the evidence. The Committee have an unlucky knack of missing the most serviceable witnesses. Here is the Public Works Secretary of the Bombay Government, just returned from England. While there, he could have given most pertinent and valuable evidence, not only in relation to the Poona Palace which grew in spite of Lord Lawrence's severe reprimand, but also about the Council Hall that had to be restored, the Shirwal bridge which collapsed as soon as built, and that costly toy, the Hog Island Lift, for which Mr. Thornton avers the Bombay Public Works Secretary is mainly responsible. But Colonel Kennedy has escaped the inquisitors.—*July* 30, 1873.

AUSTRALIAN TRADE WITH WESTERN INDIA.

A CORRESPONDENT sends certain queries bearing upon our recently published excerpts from the Report on Bombay Trade in 1868-9, as recorded and arranged under the supervision of the Commissioner of Customs. Though the doubts expressed as to the accuracy of the returns might have been met by reference to any experienced practical broker, we are glad to give such general explanations as lie in our way; and these may serve to throw some light on matters which, being only spoken of in technical or formal terms by merchants and bankers, are not readily intelligible to the rest of the public, and often puzzling to those who have to approach such subjects from the side of theory and abstract principles. But here is the letter:—

TO THE EDITOR OF THE "TIMES OF INDIA."

SIR,—According to the Custom-house return referred to in your article of this morning, Ceylon has sent us during the year £702,000 in gold and £465,000 in silver, while Australia *appears* to have sent us nothing. If there is a hitch in the returns on account of the transhipments at Galle, there is some ground for doubting that we received so much in *gold* from China as £1,046,900, and also for thinking that we received more than £1,625,000 in *silver* from the same quarter. Can you tell us how much of the total £7,000,000 of silver was coined during the year?

November 24. B. R.

It certainly does seem a little strange, on the face of things, that there should have been absolutely no importation into Bombay of gold from Australia during 1868-9—not even a few parcels sent under misapprehension or without due calculation—but on general principles the official statement that we did not directly receive any Australian gold last year is intelligible enough. The circumstances affecting the exports of gold from Melbourne to Bombay are thus briefly referred to in an interesting paragraph by the Commissioner of Customs in 1862-3 (Mr. Inverarity) in the "Introductory Report of the Yellow Book" for that year:—"Bombay receives large quantities of gold from Australia, . . . and as she possesses little which she can give to Australia in exchange, the balance is usually met by bills on Europe." How is this—Bombay receives large quantities of gold from Australia, but has nothing to give in exchange? Why then should the Australians send much in 1862-3, and decline to keep up the supply in 1868-9? The Commissioner says the balance—probably nine-tenths of the whole amount imported—is paid for "by bills on Europe;" so that in that mystery, the working of the exchanges, must be sought replies to these queries, and the wherewithal to settle the doubts which "B. R." raises as to the correctness of the Customs' return. We find the course and rate of exchange at the two periods go far to explain the apparent anomaly; but, in the first instance, the querist must get some of his banker friends to explain to him how and through what channels, by the intervention of the bills on Europe purchased in Bombay, Australians can obtain useful commodities in return for the gold, glittering but useless to them, but valuable when sent here. The rates of exchange in Bombay on London three

to six years ago, as contrasted with the rates prevailing last year, not only settle the incidental question raised in the letter quoted above, but serve to indicate the magnitude of the commercial changes and crisis through which Bombay has passed. . . . . .

The returns show that this metal has been coming into greater favour here for some years past; and it is not at all surprising that China should be at least as ready to part with the *gold* received from Australia in exchange for tea, as with the *silver* required for its own enormous currency. Part of the balance due from China to Bombay is sometimes paid by shipments of gold and silver to Calcutta for sale on our account. Australia imports rice from Bengal and Burmah for the use of its Chinese immigrant population; and if "B. R." looks into the Calcutta and Madras returns he will probably find that those ports do attract some of the auriferous deposits of the great southern continent, but have nothing to send that the Australians care about. We are as likely to take their horses and timber as their gold, except when our rates of exchange in Europe make it worth their while to send it here; but what are we to pay them in? At present we can only pay them in bills by which they can pay for the European manufactures they import; but we hope as India increases the variety of her export articles there may be some that the Australians will prize, and by means of which we can acquire directly those supplies of gold we shall need as soon as our Mint-masters and currency experts sink their differences, and let us have ten and five rupee gold pieces. As to the amounts of silver and gold coined at the Bombay Mint, the sums are regularly published in the *Government Gazette*. . . . . .—*Nov.* 30, 1869.

CHANGES IN THE COURSE OF TRADE.

THE philosophical and somewhat hopeful remarks made last Tuesday by the retiring Chairman of our Mercantile Parliament will serve, for a while, as a set-off against the many jeremiads we have had of late regarding the alleged falling off in Bombay trade. We say "for a while" because, as the Hon. Mr. Bythell is well known to incline to optimist views of commercial and other public matters, many who read the report of his remarks will wish they had been backed up with figures. In one direction this was done by the speaker, and that very pertinently, so far as the single citation given applies to the subject. He stated that our exports for the three monsoon months of this year, June, July, and August, "are just about as large this year as they were in 1869, when the harbour was crowded with an enormous fleet." We could wish Mr. Bythell had given the figures for that and the succeeding years; the comparison would then have been more definite. It may be remembered that one day last week we gave the tonnage figures for three months, and the comparison showed a considerable decline for the wet quarter of the present year. And we were under the impression that during this monsoon more vessels than usual have left Bombay "seeking" that freight which they could not obtain here. Yet the Hon. Mr. Bythell, being a man of figures, must be correct in the bare statement that Bombay exports from June to August, 1873, have been as large, if not larger than in the corresponding period of 1869. We understand quantities and not values to be spoken of. How then are we to reconcile the apparent discrepancy—less shipping, but as much or more commerce? The comparison, though only partial and relating to a brief period, strikes us as one of some special interest, as it may serve to qualify or explain some of the retiring Chairman's conclusions. One of these is that, because of the extension of railways, our trade is being "done more and more in seasons;" and he points out that if by dint of rapid railway transit, cotton markets, and other modern facilities, the staple export is hurried off before the monsoon, we could not, even with docks or piers to aid us, have many bales to ship during the rainy months. And yet, somehow, our total exports in that period this year were as large as in 1869. We think the "somehow" may be thus explained: First, the monsoon of 1869 scarcely belongs to this era; the Suez Canal had not been opened; the junction of the Great Indian Peninsular with the East India Railway was barely effected; the Kattiawar extension of the Bombay, Bengal, and Central India was not undertaken; and branch lines in the Berars, with their cotton marts, had only just been got into working order, by the exertions, in great measure, of Mr. Rivett-Carnac. Second, in now pointing to these several increased facilities, it is not quite an accurate account of the matter for the late Chairman to say that

their sole tendency is to make Bombay trade more one of the season only. There is some effect in the opposite direction which has to be considered. The general tendency of these improved communications with the interior, working together with the readier access to European markets, is undoubtedly to induce earlier transmissions to Bombay and more rapid shipment. On the other hand, every one knows that the Suez Canal and the extra push shown by the Peninsular and Oriental Company in recent years have enabled shipments to go forward during the monsoon to an extent never thought of in 1869; and there is, besides, the minor consideration that the extension of railways, especially the union now effected with the East India line, enables many commodities to arrive here during the monsoon, because drawn from very different localities than the black soil district, where rain puts an absolute stop to country traffic. . . . But there is one little indulgence now enjoyed by the Indian producer and manufacturer which Mr. Bythell would like to see removed, and in remarking on which the narrower Manchester spirit crops out. He considers it unfair that the Indian cotton manufacturer "should be protected at the expense of the Lancashire manufacturers, who have to pay" an import duty of five per cent. on piece-goods. Let the new Committee of the Chamber take up this matter, by all means; but they must not talk about the injured Lancashire manufacturer. It is only the Indian weavers of calico who suffer to the one-twentieth part of their purchases, because production is artificially checked and price enhanced to that extent; but meantime the "protection" has been serviceable in enabling a new industry to rise up in India, thus preparing the way for the "boon and blessing" spoken of by Mr. Bythell. We need scarcely remind our readers that orthodox economists admit that an import duty is permissible for such a period as will admit of indigenous material enterprise and capital being brought together and fairly started in the race of international competition. This proposition has been urged with much force on behalf of the struggling Australian manufacturers; and without pushing the argument so far as it has been carried by Mr. David Syme and other able writers in defence of the really high protective duties of Australasia, we must admit that it affords a good plea in bar of hasty abolition of our small Indian import duties. It speaks well for the temper in which this fiscal question is likely to be treated by our merchants, that we find their spokesman quite anxious to suggest some substitute even to the extent of hinting at a one per cent. income-tax before sweeping off the million or so of revenue which the obnoxious import duty produces. . . . . .

The commerce of Bombay has had inflicted upon it an encumbrance of at least one million sterling, and a leading member of the Chamber thinks that the remedy for this monstrous state of things is for merchants to have some formal method, as in the Port Trust Board, of saying that they are willing to submit to the pressure! The depression of trade, of which we have been speaking, derives its most ominous significance from the dread that, in consequence thereof, the burden of that encumbrance checks all chance there is of any returning prosperity; yet, with this death's head at the feast, we have the retiring Chairman of the Chamber

> "Washing his hands with invisible soap,
> In imperceptible water"—

whilst he congratulates his fellow members on that cold-blooded line in the Government resolution, the other day, in which the irresistible masters of the Port graciously remarked that they were not yet quite prepared to condemn the commerce of Bombay to utter ruin! We trust that the Chamber has almost done with trifling of this kind, and that the Committee is prepared to unite in a vigorous and sustained effort to throw back on the authorities who entered into it, that land speculation which threatens so grievously the commercial future of Bombay.—*Oct.* 20, 1873.

HASTY LEGISLATION.

THE Press of this city cannot be reproached for being unable to follow the Bombay Legislative Council in its headlong course of law-making during the protracted Session which still continues. The list of Bills seems to stretch out in limitless perspective, like the line of Banquo's regal descendants. We shall never know when to expect the last. . . . The phrase, "it is better to settle all doubts," seems to imply that the

half-score gentlemen, sitting round a table at Poona, and virtually withdrawn from public observation and criticism, are competent, by passing certain resolutions, not only to supersede old Acts passed by the Government of India, and modify the scope of Acts of Parliament, but to override the codes, or evade established principles of jurisprudence and constitutional law. We venture to say that the prevalence of such a temper is unhealthy, and may lead to awkward complications. . . . . .

One inevitable effect of this hasty and too eager spirit of law-making is to make our honourables think it a small thing, but a commendable one, to continue in as many instances as possible to "withdraw whole classes of cases from the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts." We had hoped to see frequent and ostentatious use of this formula reproved by the Legal Member of our Executive; but perhaps he does not consider that he has yet had a good chance of doing so. We are no advocates of finnicking and wire-drawn distinctions either in pleadings or decisions; neither do we cherish any superstition in favour of judge-made law. On the other hand, the anxiety so frequently shown of late to circumscribe the action of our Civil Courts is by no means a good sign. That this tendency will be eminently unpopular may be inferred from the prompt and decided opposition aroused by the first mention of the Hon. Mr. Ellis's Civil Courts Revenue Jurisdiction Bill—an opposition which is likely to be redoubled now that the full scope of that measure is revealed. . . . . .

After the Bills are brought before the Council the time is far too short for any effective out-door debate, while that in the Council Chamber follows the drift given by the Executive after consultation *en bureau*, and, as usually happens, the non-official members are voted down in every division by pledged or official voters. This is a mere travesty of our British parliamentary system. With regard to the origin of Bills, there is another defect which applies to several, but it is one that is necessarily difficult to trace. That is, many of these measures which the Council goes through the form of debating are chiefly the projection and child of some energetic or pertinacious district officer. Should we have heard of the Tolls Bill this session, or would there have been such a tenacious hold kept on the provision to toll pedestrians, had it not been that a certain ambitious Collector has set his mind on having a big iron bridge which cannot be estimated to pay unless the wayfaring man be compelled to pay one pice for passage over said bridge? . . . . . .

It is very unfortunate for H.E. Sir Philip Wodehouse that his tenure of office should have fallen during such an epidemic of legislation. The Municipal Act alone, with its exasperating debates, was enough to dim the fame of any Governor; and now, after this Session of 1873, bristling with Bills as it does, he will require all his *bonhomie* and brisk business manner, together with the rapid disposal of many arrears, in order to regain for himself the favour and good opinion of the Bombay public. This personal view of the legislative fever and its results is, of course, the least important amongst the considerations that arise on a review of the Session. The irritation caused by the discussion of many of the Bills, and the worry that must attend the carrying out of several of the Acts, will not conduce to the smooth working of our ordinary administration, nor enhance the happiness of the people. The well-grounded complaints, which three or four years ago were raised because of the rapid rate at which the Supreme Legislative Council was proceeding, will now be turned against our Bombay Council, and with more effect, for the combined talents of Mr. Maine and Mr. Stephen would fail in an attempt to make out even a plausible case in justification of the baker's dozen of Bills passed at Poona this year, or now awaiting final disposal. . . . . .—*Oct.* 27, 1873.

OVER-LEGISLATION: THE PARLIAMENTARY EXPLANATION.

IT was in every way suitable that a brief explanatory address should be given, like that delivered by Sir Philip Wodehouse in his character as President of our Legislative Council, on the first occasion of its meeting in Bombay this session, and at its first sitting in the palatial halls of the new Secretariat. His Excellency's manner, too, was good, as it always is—frank in expression, but conciliatory in tone; slightly dogmatic in form perhaps, but in the gentlemanly style of the old school. Time, place, and circumstance being all in accord, it is just a little to be regretted that it will appear as if Sir Philip

spoke only in reply to the requisition for a town's meeting—that if it had not been for this somewhat tardy ebullition on the part of the public, the President would have held his peace, and merely gone on with sections and amendments as matters of course. We do not think it was so. Any public man with but half the apprehensiveness which our experienced Governor necessarily possesses, must have seen for weeks past that it was high time to excuse or justify what appears to everybody in Bombay as an undue quantity of law-making and an uncomfortably rapid rate of legislating. . . . . .

How, then, did His Excellency succeed in his vindication? To reply to this query is precisely the task which is set to the principal requisitionists of next Saturday's meeting, or rather to those who may feel called upon to speak on that occasion. After the fair and precise challenge thus thrown out to them no mere declamation or denunciation will be of any use. They must distinctly formulate their complaint—must test the proceedings of the Council as closely as possible by its own rules—must match the undoubtedly large mofussil experience of four of the official members, by, at least, equally exact knowledge of the people, and by intelligent appreciation of the exigencies of provincial administration. Having justified all formal objections, it will then be open to the speakers to criticise the policy adopted in the several measures that have been rattled through Council during the last two or three months. In doing this it will be needful that any orators who may be susceptible to the temptation of indulging in rhetorical effect should be on their guard against attacking the Bills as presented in their raw and crude condition, instead of dealing with the Bills as finally amended and adopted. . . . It was not practicable for the President in course of his chief address to notice more than half the Bills of this most prolific season, and it was beside the question for him to attempt to go into the merits of any of them. But as regards the incidental remark made in defence of the Tolls Bill, one might fairly apply to it the term "uninformed"; and we do this the more freely because it is high time the stock excuse often put forward for this measure were knocked on the head. We are all aware that scores of tolls now legalised have been levied "for years without the sanction of law." Complaints against them, and groans because of them, have abounded, though seldom reaching the height of our local Olympus; but are those tolls any more equitable, is the incidence of them on the cultivators who have paid for the roads in advance rendered just, merely because a demi-official committee sitting at Poona has passed a resolution declaring such levies to be legal? As "to no one being able to point out other or better means for collecting that amount of money for the preservation of the roads," we thought that the Advocate-General had pointed out that Imperial grants available for the purpose are not expended on district roads to nearly the extent that they ought to be. We trust that this hint of Mr. Scoble's will be followed up. It has frequently been our duty to point out how unequally this Presidency is treated in the allocation of Imperial grants, and it is inexcusable if, owing to oversight or want of discrimination on the part of the Public Works Department or other executive authorities, our ryots do not get the full benefit of such Simla doles as are offered in return for our copious Bombay land revenue. But we must resist the temptation to discuss details here. It was a proper thing for the President of Council to try to vindicate that body; it will also be a proper thing for our citizens to distinctly show at the public meeting where that vindication fails. There can be little dispute as to the abstract proposition—which occurs in one of our correspondents' communications last week—that "one law perfunctorily framed and hastily passed mars the effect of ten good laws."—*Nov.* 3, 1873.

THE PEOPLE'S REPLY.

II.—The Town meeting in our Town Hall on Saturday was a great and successful demonstration. The proper formality of the Sheriff being present the whole time was duly observed, Dr. Hewlett's compliance in that respect being very justly acknowledged by a special vote of thanks. The meeting was great in respect of the numbers and variety of classes and castes present; it was successful in respect of the unanimity and general good order of the proceedings; but, as might be expected from former experiments of the kind, it was hopeless for most of the speakers to be heard more than a few yards from the table. . . . This disability especially applies to the rather lengthy and presumably important address of the Chairman, Mr. J. A. Forbes, who, not having had

previous opportunity, was certain to utilize the present in order to justify his resignation of the honorary, but honourable and highly responsible office of legislator. That public confidence in him is as full as ever was unmistakably shown at this large meeting; and from the drift of the few observations he made in reply to Mr. Pedder's address it is easy to see that he bates not one jot of the determination and firmness which carried him through the severe task of Municipal revolution. The attitude then and now voluntarily taken up by this representative of the oldest European firm in Bombay is necessarily somewhat perplexing to the official mind. "Why should he give himself so much trouble? Why should any one go to work with imperfect information and inadequate tools, when we are willing to listen to anything he says and make such changes as are proved to be necessary? Above all, why should he take a course that may put wind in the people's heads, instead of using his influence—if he must attend to anything but business—in persuading them to be quiet and cherish confidence in what the ever well-intentioned *Sirkar* will do for them in due time?" There is much reason in this voice of the bureaucratic charmer; but, unfortunately, there is not quite enough argument for the occasion. . . . . .

Now and again some strong but irresponsible person has found and pointed out that the vessel of the State was drifting on to a lee-shore; and at those times the aid of such a strong man and his fellows has proved to be invaluable. Indeed, from the history of our times in free, public-spirited England, it would be easy to show that without the timely help of volunteers and outsiders—help not always proffered in the blandest tones and most regular form—the old ship would have "missed stays" and gone nigh to being stranded. . . . . .

Amongst the successes of the meeting we reckon the circumstance that Mr. Pedder asserted his right as a resident citizen to speak on the question in hand. Two of the subsequent speakers referred to what he had said, and no doubt the report of his remarks will provoke criticism; but this is just what we want. Mr. Pedder is in no way responsible for the provisions of the Salt Bill, though he is identified with its objects and reasons, being so far its author. Knowing all about the facts, it was perhaps not surprising that he considered a good deal of blatant nonsense had been talked on the subject; therefore it was all the more creditable to him that he did not disdain to go down amongst men who, he might suppose, were about to talk a good deal more. He referred with just pride to his report of 1870—not, by the way, a readily accessible document—in which the whole subject of salt manufacture, distribution, and consumption in Western India is thoroughly gone into. This report we fully described in a couple of articles about two months since; and—though, as Mr. Pedder proves by figures, it is no doubt quite true that a large amount of illicit transit and delivery has taken place in and through Bombay island—we showed that there are some grounds for distrusting his high estimates of smuggling for the rest of the Presidency. But discussion of details was superfluous at this stage; and in reply to Mr. Pedder's contention that as this reform in the salt excise had been talked of amongst revenue men for ten years, and his report was issued three years ago, it was an abundant answer to remark, that if the Government had, presumably, been considering the measure for three years, it is not reasonable to suppose that the general public could grasp its purport and tendency in less than three months. . . . . .

Those who perused our remarks last Monday in reference to Sir Philip Wodehouse's apology, and on Friday, in anticipation of the course to be taken at the meeting, will remember that while we spoke with considerable reserve, we directed attention to the more substantial business which had to be considered. Perhaps some may think that there should have been more direct and special criticism of particular measures that have passed the Council. Be that as it may, the address of Mr. Henry Bright, drawing a forcible comparison from the reiterated and protracted discussions which always precede the passing of Acts at home, and the exceedingly able, if somewhat too lengthy, speech of Mr. Kasinath Tilang, in which he so closely grappled with the official apologies put forward in Council, left little to be desired in justification of the larger political object of the meeting. When referring last week to the probable course that would be followed, we suggested that orators should put restraint upon themselves, lest they should mar the object they desired to serve; but one notable instance of this kind occurred. A certain Marathi gentleman, remarkable for his fluency of speech, very sensibly moved that words referring to the other and greater purpose of the meeting should be inserted in the

resolution relating to the memorial, which, by some oversight no doubt, spoke of the Salt Bill alone. This proposal was every way to the purpose, and was, no doubt, in accordance with the sense of the meeting; but the proposer, who was necessarily only half heard, wearied the audience by going into details about the Tolls Bill, so that his own amendment was lost sight of by dint of talking at the wrong time. So effectual was the mystification, that the European merchant whose own speech to a former resolution required the adoption of this amended form of the resolution on the memorial, jumped up to protest against the addition!—*Nov.* 10, 1873.

TWO PANICS—VIENNA AND BOMBAY.

IF communities could ever learn prudence and acquire financial foresight from studying the commercial errors of other nations or cities, then we might suppose much profit would accrue from perusal of the graphic and painstaking account of the Austrian financial crisis comprised in our Vienna letter in last Monday's paper. Bullionists blame the use of paper money; and currency doctors, whose panacea is inconvertibility, denounce the materialists who know no better than to call capital "money," and think nothing is money except golden sovereigns; but, when the fit of financial laxity comes on, communities composed of either or all classes of monetary theorists follow much the same course, and run in a similar circle of feverish business activity, inflated credit, crisis, crash, and panic, closing with the stupor of universal commercial distrust. Perhaps the only certain gain that one nation can derive from another in these matters is in its being thus plainly demonstrated that financial disasters have one common origin and development, though the circumstances in which they arise are infinitely varied. Due apprehension of this law does at least serve the purpose of keeping administrators, bankers, and other princes of the monetary world forewarned, and may often induce the wiser and firmer amongst them to stem the rising tide of financial folly.

Seldom has the essential similarity to which we refer been more marked than between the course of affairs in Austria in 1872-3, as described by our special correspondent, and that traversed with such disastrous results by Bombay in 1863-65. He does, indeed, give us credit for having had really a sound business basis to go upon when we started in our career of splendid error, and we must be thankful to him for this charitable view of our sad story; for, in truth, we are now very humble—in vernacular phrase, *bhôt ghârib*—and have little to say in our own excuse. The difference in starting was, as "Yorick" admits, much in favour of Bombay; except, we should remark, there was in the case of Vienna the more readily expansible productiveness of a European State and people to work upon. Bombay derived its influx and assistance mainly from without: the Presidency behind it had little industrial elasticity, nor can it have until irrigation and communications are multiplied fourfold. . . . For seven years or more, commercial Bombay, and, in less degree, its agriculture in the mofussil, had, in common with the rest of India, been reaping the advantage of enhanced prices in all our staples, partly owing to the general rise in prices, and partly, during the latter portion of the 1855-62 period, to the virtual suspension of the drain for "home charges." On this gradually formed basis of prosperity came the sudden addition to our income from the enormous rise in cotton, consequent on the American War. Here, then, was a pure addition to the wealth of Western India—often erroneously spoken of as if Bombay island absorbed it all—and, thereupon, we or our predecessors went ahead as brilliantly, and with, perhaps, more method in our madness than has been displayed by the dashing Viennese financiers described by "Yorick." Many have been the calculations to ascertain the total of the extra price poured through Bombay in the five or six years ending 1866, and we do not incline to make any laborious references on the subject, or travel over the ground again. . . . . .

Time heals all; but in Bombay this reads rather bitterly to us still; and the bitterness is deepened by personal regrets when we note this striking counterpart of our local history: "Every solicitor tried for a concession; every doctor, every merchant, went in for shares in some new society." This cuts too closely, so let us look again at the general comparison between Vienna and Bombay. In one respect there is a parallel in the regulations of the two cities affecting speculation, which is more striking than our correspondent could have supposed. Many of our citizens must have been reminded of time-bargains

and the Wagering Act by this statement—"Stock exchange debts not being recoverable by law, but being considered, like bets, to depend solely on the honour of those concerned, no transactions could possibly take place when once confidence was destroyed." We infer from this that the Austrian law ran to this effect long before the recent financial mania arose, and that speculators knew from the first that the Courts could give them no remedy. In Bombay, on the contrary, the "Wagering Act"—by which speculation, pure and simple, was put *hors de loi*—was not passed until the mischief was well afoot. And then, thanks to the mistimed efforts of Sir William Mansfield and two or three other sciolists of the time, the day for the Act coming into force was postponed—as if in cynical mockery of the widespread ruin which that wholesome statute might have prevented—until July 1st, 1865, the very day on which the "time-bargains" for "Back Bays" and other shares fell due and became recoverable. From our correspondent's remarks we gather that the chief effect which he notes as due to this immunity of speculative purchasers from process of law was that the panic became decisive and hopeless from the first hour of its setting in. But had he time to make further inquiry into the subject, it is highly probable he would find that the fact of sales of scrip for future delivery being non-enforceable had also very considerable effect in keeping down the number of such transactions and circumscribing the area of financial ruin caused by the crash. The "Wagering Act" of 1864 has fully answered its purpose in Bombay. Speculation for rise or fall of shares still goes on, and there have been thousands of time-bargains in the bazaar and share market since that Act was passed; but these transactions being unrecognized as legitimate contracts, the course of honest commerce goes on unaffected thereby. . . .

In these days of impatient readers and superficial treatment, few would imbibe the invaluable lessons proper to such an analysis unless they should be skilfully interwoven in some clear and exciting work of fiction. Mr. Alexander Shand, in that well-written novel, "Against Time," has hit off with great ability the salient features of the London speculations which culminated and collapsed in 1866. This letter from our special correspondent serves to suggest that if some author of equal power would write a new "Tale of Two Cities"—Vienna and Bombay—making his principal character live in Bombay from 1863 to 1866, and survive to go through the experiences of Austria from Sadowa to the Great Exhibition just closed in the city of the Kaiser, he would produce a book that every one would read, and that might inculcate lessons of financial management and foresight which no economist or statist could ever propound with effect.—*Nov.* 8, 1873.

A TESTAMENTARY OBLIGATION SHIRKED.

SHOULD the Municipality of Bombay undertake to pay Rs. 36,000 a year for the maintenance of the new Goculdass Tejpall Hospital? The Bombay correspondent of a mofussil contemporary has declared that the Municipality ought to do nothing of the kind, on the ground that the hospital in question is not wanted. The reason given illustrates the danger of giving weak reasons for conclusions in themselves sound enough. It is rather late in the day to consider whether the hospital in question is or is not wanted. It exists; and its existence, or rather the manner in which its existence was made a fact, entails upon the authors of its being responsibilities which render idle any discussion as to whether Bombay could not have got on very well without it. For our part, we have no hesitation in saying that the Municipality, in its present embarrassed condition, ought not willingly to accept the burden of maintaining this hospital, whether it be required or not; and we are the more clear as to their duty on this point because the responsibility of finding the necessary ways and means undoubtedly rests upon those who accepted and have laid out Mr. Goculdass Tejpall's money. That money was given for the building of the hospital on the understanding that they would provide—"out of their own resources"—for its maintenance as long as the sun and moon shall endure. This proviso, of course, precludes any terrestrial disturbance of the arrangement by even a convulsion of our planet—in or out of courts of law—and not even an eclipse can affect it in the smallest degree.

The origin of the trust, thus rendered perpetual, was this. In August, 1867, Mr. Goculdass Tejpall lodged Rs. 150,000 with the Government, and he sent a letter proposing that the money should be laid out in the building of a hospital, to be called after himself,

and to be maintained for ever by the Government and the Municipality. The Government never accepted this offer, and before anything was decided in the matter, Mr. Goculdass Tejpall died. He left a will in which the main design of building the hospital was still provided for, but with a notable difference as to the parties that were to be responsible for its maintenance. . . . No words could be clearer than these. "All" the expenses of maintenance are to be provided by Government "out of their own resources"— a condition obviously intended to preclude the possibility of the Municipality being saddled with a burden which it was at that time becoming painfully evident day by day that the local finances could not bear. The Government accepted the trust, and took the money. They built the hospital, which is now nearly finished, and they have a full right to manage it henceforth and for ever—and a clear duty to maintain it "out of their own resources." This duty, however, they show strong indications of a desire—to shirk. Last March they made a first attempt upon the funds of the Municipality, but the matter was then shelved by the latter on one plea or another. Now we find an item of Rs. 36,000 down in the Municipal Budget voted for the purpose of doing that which the Government are clearly bound to do. On the occasion of the first attempt to make the Municipality find the money, the executrix of the will of Goculdass Tejpall drew the attention of Government to the fact that the desire of her late husband was that the Government, and not the Municipality, should keep up the hospital, and that the provisions of the trust under which the money had been accepted were clear and definite on the point. . . . If Government have not taken the money under the will, under what instrument have they taken it? Under a letter containing an offer which had not been accepted at the time the man that made the offer died? It is hard to suppose that the legal advisers of the Government would advise such a plea to be set up. But even in that case it is plain that the Municipality could only be asked to pay half the cost of maintenance—provided they became parties to the acceptance of the trust at all—and they would, of course, be entitled to an equal share with the Government in the management. But the ground for the Municipality to take in the matter is marked out: the trust was created under the twenty-fifth clause of the will, and the Government, having accepted and used the money, are bound to carry out the conditions under which it was given.—*Nov.* 18, 1873.

THE COMING DOCKS.

THE rumour that His Excellency the Viceroy in Council has consented to advance the funds required for constructing docks on the Elphinstone estate is informally confirmed. This sanction is understood to apply both to the Musjid tidal basin and the Elphinstone wet dock, and thus the project of the Chief Engineer to the Port Trust, "taken over" from the Elphinstone Company, will be carried out in its entirety. This decision will, we trust, infuse some new life into our commercial community. In these our humble days the mere expenditure of four or five lakhs per annum in the island will be thankfully accepted; while the report spread abroad in the world that Bombay is about to do something grand for the accommodation of European shipping will go far to restore the fame of our city in the earth. . . . . .

Again, this veracious announcement about the Elphinstone docks, and the approaching construction thereof, is backed with a somewhat nebulous announcement by an up-country contemporary to the effect that the Supreme Government intend to make a clean sweep of "private enterprise" from our foreshore, and buy up all that it has not now in hand. This is to be done by virtue of the large powers always available under the Public Purposes Act. Thus, secrecy in one direction begets desperate guessing in another. It is true this would be the logical result of the position already assumed by Government in the Port Trust investment and constitution; but Governments seldom are logical, and perhaps it is well they are not. The argument that if the State enters into industrial enterprises, it must be a monopolist and not a competitor, has been urged with great force against the existence and policy of the Port Trust; but there has scarcely been time for that bold thought to ripen.—*Dec.* 3, 1873.

II.—According to a daily contemporary, the Elphinstone Wet Dock question has been brought to a conclusion by the consent of the Viceroy to Mr. Kettridge's project. Our contemporary makes the announcement presumably upon good grounds, but, accept-

ing the statement so far as it goes, no one need be in a hurry to consider the question settled. The official communication of the Viceroy's decision will, we are told, be made at once. But where is the decision of the Secretary of State in Council? Is Mr. Kettridge's dock so small a matter as to cost under or only ten lakhs, that the Government of India should be enabled to deal with it finally? It would not take long by telegraph to get the Viceroy's decision confirmed; but if the reference home be something more than a form, and the Viceroy's decision is only just made, is it to be supposed that nothing more in the way of confirmation will be wanted before the big dock, and the big dock alone, can be considered an accomplished conclusion, if not an accomplished fact? What about the channel, and the experiments to test its feasibility. . . . . .

How far Mr. Ormiston may have brought everybody *out* of Bombay to agree with him we will not venture to say, but very few competent judges familiar with our harbour are prepared to admit that it is a wise thing to found a dock so many feet below the bottom of the sea; and here lies the gist of the difficulty. The misfortune of the Port Trust is that it is bound up with a land speculation, and must be content, therefore, to accept a site for its dock in reference to that undertaking. Free from any responsibility in the matter of the Elphinstone Land estate, it is not to be supposed that the Trustees would have arrived at their present decision, instead of taking the work nearer the deep water and into the way of trade, and making it thereby a scheme calculated to supply the real requirements of the port, and, what is more, a paying scheme, which need not fear competition with the Sassoon or any small dock. It is much to be lamented that the Port Trust cannot abjure its character of Sindbad the Sailor, and be relieved of this Old Man of the Harbour before committing itself to delusive, because too costly docks from which the trade of the port must be so considerable a sufferer.—*Feb.* 3, 1874.

THE PORT TRUST BUDGET: THE WAY OUT OF THE WOOD.

WHEN the Chairman of the Port Trust was selected, we ventured to remark to the effect that if anything could rescue the undertaking from utter confusion and hopeless embarrassment, it was the choice that had been made of a thoughtful, firm, and experienced Engineer officer to fulfil the functions of that post. . . . The Chairman suggests that if the deficit must be met by compulsory payment, the levy should be placed on merchandise, as tending more to equalise the charges on trade. This may appear so as a matter of arithmetical calculation; but, however the burden be distributed, it must fall on commerce, and will *pro tanto* tend to aggravate that depression under which all our interests are suffering. Colonel Ballard sees this clearly, and, therefore, declines to recommend the imposition of any further uncompensated charges on our sea-borne trade. But an equilibrium must be aimed at, for, as the Chairman justly observes, until the Trustees feel themselves free from the anxious and somewhat degrading position of being compelled either to oppress their own customers, or thwart the efforts of other wharfingers or capitalists, they cannot fulfil the purely public function which they affect to administer —namely, that of giving their efforts to the general improvement of the port.

The revenue side of the account being hopeless, the Chairman turns to consider the permanent fixed charges. He proceeds to point out—what is plain to every one who looks fairly at the monster speculation—that the Trustees can do nothing to any purpose unless they are relieved of some considerable portion of the dead weight of interest charge pertaining to the land estate. He, therefore, makes the plain, straightforward proposal that 40 lakhs of the Trust's capital debt shall be transferred to the non-interest paying schedule. Probably, the Government of India will be shocked to hear this proposal; but to this complexion it must come at last. If the reply should be, that in case the interest-bearing debt were lessened to that extent, then an equivalent portion of the land estate must be transferred, we should strongly advise the Trustees to close with such a proposal at once. Colonel Ballard, in his comprehensive review of the prospects of the land estate, shows plainly that it is an investment for an empire, rather than for a dock company. This transfer at 4½ per cent. would give a relief to the extent of Rs. 1,80,000, thereby covering the deficit and affording a margin for the Trustees to work upon. There are several broad, general grounds on which this suggested absolute transfer should be made; and though we do not think Colonel Ballard's proposal goes far enough, it is a bold and business-like opening up of the only true way to a settlement. . . . . .—*Feb.* 20, 1874.

THE BEHAR FAMINE—IRRIGATION.

IT is quite worth while to refer back to the Famine Relief meeting in the Town Hall on Saturday, report of which appeared in our Monday's impression. It was scarcely likely that any new light would be thrown on the subject of the famine, and how to alleviate it; nor did any speaker attempt to show himself wiser than Sir George Campbell or the Viceroy. The topic is one that admits of oratorical display; but we have here no local Demosthenes nor fluent Babus, so the meeting escaped the infliction of having to listen to flowing periods and grand perorations. All the speakers, each in his way, was brief, business-like, and to the point. His Excellency, having been elected as president by acclamation, proceeded to state the case, giving a brief narrative of the relief measures adopted by the Viceroy and Government of Bengal up to the present time. To our readers, already familiar with every step of the anxious story, the speech will present no salient point for remark, unless it be towards the close, where Sir Philip referred to the present energy of Government in constructing communications and promoting public works in Behar. The spasmodic haste with which, according to some accounts, this is being done, might well attract severe criticism by way of contrasting the grudging, dilatory fashion in which public works, including those for irrigation, are ordinarily carried out, and the headlong speed with which tramways and metalled roads are now to be improvised. The remark of His Excellency, that in estimating for public works, especially those of communication, some part of the cost or interest should be credited as an insurance fund, may be a trite one; but the present calamity affords striking proof of the soundness of that principle. . . . . .

It may be remembered that, in December, when defining the limit of the tracts suffering from drought, we pointed out that north of the Ganges and east of the Gunduck there is scarcely a single irrigation work worth mentioning, although Behar and northern Bengal abound with streams or waterways which might be rendered of inestimable service, and for lack of which all India now looks on with anxiety and pity. In another column may be observed a description of two large irrigation projects for the province; but nothing is decided upon in reference to them. Whilst, however, we would enforce again and again the one great lesson of this Behar famine, and have thus seized upon His Excellency's passing reference to the subject, we would not forget that from the standpoint of financial equity, Western India has a far stronger claim on the central Government for irrigation funds than has Bengal. . . . Not all the special anxieties of the last few days prevent the people of Bombay from thinking of their suffering fellow subjects in the east; and we hope soon to return to the subject as one which demands earnest attention.—*Feb.* 18, 1874.

THE MAHOMEDAN ATTACK ON THE PARSEES.

IN the early part of last week the air was rife with rumours and reports, but only one scrimmage took place, and all the more enlightened part of the Parsee community were fast acquiring the confidence needful to carry them and their families through the ordinary business of life. Still, as our news columns testify, there are still large numbers of people who witness night approach with much apprehension. Both the Europeans and Hindus can perhaps afford to regard this trepidation as weak and foolish; but authorities responsible for the comfort and welfare of the whole community will not wish to neglect the fears or misconceptions of any large classes in our varied society. It would be short-sighted and weak to found a policy on the base dictum, *divide et impera;* but half of the art of Indian rule consists in dealing promptly with the claims, the menaces, or the fears of each caste and large sections of society as occasion arises. In this instance the fears of the Parsees were aroused a fortnight ago, and, as the result proved, with too much reason. The lower class of the Mussulman population not only menaced, but struck ere the spirit of turbulence was dealt with. Arrests followed, as a matter of course; and it is just in this commonplace fashion that the incarceration of 100 howling rascals is regarded by their *confrères*, who know the faith of Mahomet only by its name and the licence which they ignorantly suppose that faith gives to aggression and plunder. Arguing from mere general analogy, it was supposed that the arrests would cow and deter the Seedee and other *budmashes*. Not a bit of it! The armed troop, over 300 strong, which formed the funeral procession of Sunday week was quite equal to the enacting over again

the deeds of the previous Friday. The difference was, first, that there were a few police present to restrain them, headed by a resolute Inspector; and second, the Parsees were not altogether taken unawares. The evidence regarding the commencement of those hostilities is very conflicting, and probably may remain so to the end; but it is not quite irreconcilable. . . . . .

The Executive Government were very imperfectly informed of the state of affairs on the Saturday evening; hence they made the mistake which should never be committed by an Indian Administration—that of neglecting to deal with sectional difficulties in time. The fatal error seems to have been adopted of drawing too close an analogy between the course of civic commotions in Europe and in India. There the approved method with administrators of a military turn of mind is to allow the tumult to come to a head, and then dispose of it with a "whiff of grape-shot." Here, the hateful visage of riot should not be allowed to present itself as on Friday last. When it does come abroad the opportunity should be taken of the very first lull to confront it, not only with adequate material power, but with all the moral and personal forces of the Administration. Such an opportunity offered itself on Saturday night, but it was allowed to slip by to the great misfortune of the city. We should not, perhaps, thus hasten to endorse the lesson whilst it is fresh, were it not that further danger has now been obviated, at least for the present. The totally different arrangement about the other Mussulman funerals which took place on Monday last, and the ease and safety with which that little crisis was overcome, showed that the authorities have now got the difficulty well in hand.—*Feb.* 23, 1874.

The Nine Stitches Taken.

II.—The Government of Bombay having on Monday afternoon taken the nine stitches which one from the Police Commissioner last Friday morning would have saved, there must henceforth be an end of all apprehension about civic commotion. It is impossible that the wave of panic can subside at once, or so soon as it would have done on Saturday evening; but it has been going down fast since our general announcement yesterday morning of adequate precautionary measures having been taken. And from the hour of His Excellency Sir Philip Wodehouse's authoritative announcement in the Cowasjee Jehanghir University Hall, the whole city, including the excited Parsee community, has been rapidly recovering its wonted sense of security. Doubtless, our news columns, in their necessary faithful record of yesterday's occurrences, will bear some appearance of continued turmoil. There may also, for the next day or two, be a few sporadic cases of assault and battery; but the knowledge that Government has set its foot down, quite as much as the announcement of the irresistible physical force now at the disposal of the authorities, will reassure the panic-stricken and effectually deter the riotously disposed from any further aggression.

We do not for a moment underrate the gravity and, in one sense, the risk of the step Government have incurred in the interdicting for this year of the Taboot procession of the Mohurrum. There is no disguising the fact that thereby the whole Suni division of the Mussulmans must suffer some disability and deprivation because of the misdeeds of their ignorant brethren. But these outrages all respectable Mussulmans condemn as emphatically as do the European community. They will now understand there is nothing for it but to submit; and all Mahomedans whose opinion is worthy of notice will acquiesce quietly, if not cheer fully, in this precautionary and, tosome extent, penal measure. We believe the interdict is unprecedented, and it is quite possible that varying opinions may be held as to its policy and political propriety; but it is now the part of all good citizens to accept the decision as that of the Executive authorities responsible for the peace of the city and the preservation of subjects' lives. It matters nothing now if we think that whilst the disorder was in much smaller compass, it might have been checked, and in that case this severe repression of one portion of the population would not have been called for. Sir Philip Wodehouse's Government has taken its stand, and it is the duty of every loyal subject to support His Excellency in the step now irrevocably taken.

Without distinct authority for so saying, we may state our conviction that this suppression of the Mohurrum processions has the sanction of the Viceroy in Council. It is already plain, at any rate, to the reading portion of the population that the Bombay Government has abundant force at its back to maintain its order and enforce its decrees;

but special means should at once be taken—if this has not already been done—to make the ignorant multitude clearly understand what to expect. The order to keep the Seedees* in the harbour, supposed to be given on Sunday morning, does not appear to have been properly made known to them until yesterday; and we trust that ere these lines appear these dusky followers of the Prophet will have been told, and in terms which they cannot mistake, that there must be no play in this Mohurrum, whether they choose to work or not. As to our Parsee citizens, it is scarcely necessary to say that we trust all classes amongst them will endeavour to guard against any temptations which a sense of deliverance and consequent exultation may induce.—*Feb.* 23, 1874.

THE MUSSULMAN MASSES AND THE SIRKAR.

III.—The city is again, we trust, returning to its normal condition, though precautions cannot be relaxed, and there is much simmering beneath the surface. By and-bye there will be much of this above the surface; but when the Mohurrum shall have passed, the Mussulman masses having seen that the *Sirkar* must and will be obeyed, and when the Parsees' panic shall have subsided, we can do with any amount of excitement if it will only be content to expend itself according to approved methods, through the safe channels of the law courts and public discussion. But it is desirable that all false issues should be set aside, and that every care should be taken to arrive at a righteous judgment. Especially is this aim incumbent on all in authority. Seldom has there been an instance in Bombay when the exercise of independent and impartial judgment was more urgently required. This is not the less so because it is alleged by the community which has borne the brunt of this tumult, that a bias against them has been manifest in high places. Of course, it is out of all question to suppose that our public functionaries can be influenced by prepossessions in any particular decision to which they come in the course of their duty; but that some such bias has existed is patent to many observers. This is none the less, but more, to be regretted if such prejudice or dislike is also entertained by a large portion of the European community; but it is of the very alphabet of Indian officers' administrative lessons that at all times and under all temptations they shall, in their public acts, rise superior even to the suspicion of partiality or leaning against any particular class of the community. . . . . .

If any of the Zoroastrian club men of Saturday night could be identified, every one, decent Parsees included, would be glad to see them put on their trial for assault and battery; but the furtive way in which attempts have been made by some police emissaries to lock up a few Parsees in order to exhibit them as aiders and abettors, not only of Saturday's attack on the Seedies, but of the justly alarmed, though unduly excited Sonapore defenders, is a matter that requires careful watching by officials who desire to act justly and with discrimination. The firmness of Mr. Nana Morojee in refusing to give bail to certain Parsees charged with rioting, should meet with commendation; but this incident brings out in striking contrast the extraordinary laxity shown in letting loose the alleged ringleaders of the Khetwady disturbances on the 13th. . . . . .

Let it be known that Government is determined to discover the instigators or planners of the raid of Friday, the 13th; let liberal rewards be offered for the exposure of those who have afforded aid and comfort to the Seedees, Arabs, and Mehman rioters of the 13th and 15th; then the springs of civic disorder will at once be paralysed. Instead of depending wholly on repression from without, let the authorities go to the root of the matter and contract the forces of sedition from within. This can be done. We have ourselves certain names which might prove exceedingly useful and suggestive to an accomplished and circumspect detective. It should also be made known that the Bombay Government can command or obtain the services of men who are more than a match for the handful of miscreants who have brought incalculable trouble on this city, and driven an ignorant brutal mob to their own undoing. The necessity and enormous advantage of striking to the heart of this noxious humour in the body politic are so obvious, that we assume the authorities are already far on the track we have sufficiently indicated.—*Feb.* 26, 1874.

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* Stalwart African Mahomedans employed as stokers and labourers on steamers.

THE SUSPENSION OF THE TABOOT PROCESSION.

IV.—From the first we never concealed our conviction that the order for the suspension of the Taboot procession was a strong measure which only extreme necessity could justify. Of this necessity His Excellency in Council is the sole responsible judge, and his deliberate decision to this effect having been duly promulgated, it is the duty of all good citizens, Mahomedans included, to do their part in upholding the prohibitory decree. This sentiment is universally shared by all sections of the community who can think at all; and the public, as a whole, fully approve of the firmness with which Sir Philip Wodehouse has declined to accede to memorial after memorial praying that the ancient Mussulman carnival might be permitted under restrictions. It is well known to all but the most ignorant that the *Sirkar* has abundant force at its disposal to crush any overt attempt that may be made to infringe the order, or to stamp out any contumacy or resentment that may be displayed in consequence of the *Sirkar's* well-considered *zubburdust* (hard-handedness).

That is all clear: at the same time, we feel constrained to recur to the subject of our remarks yesterday. Apart from the plain and paramount consideration that if disgraceful outbreaks like this are to be prevented for the future, the instigators and covert abettors of the present riot must be identified, there are certain urgent reasons why immediate steps should be taken in that direction. This line of action is as much more urgent than are military orders, as prevention is better than cure. Indeed, to strike to the centre of the sedition would be the way to a complete cure not only for to-day, but for all future time in Bombay. Yesterday we were willing to believe that the authorities were already well entered on the track of research we have indicated, but we must confess that some more open assurance of such intelligent action being undertaken is much required to-day. . . . Neither the loyal public nor the dangerous classes have had a single sign given to assure them that the one thing needful has been done—that is, to mark down the secret leaders. To do this would be worth a dozen peace meetings and two regiments of horse. But time presses. For the needs of to-day and to-morrow it might suffice to exercise the powers of surveillance and surety-taking against certain semi-ecclesiastical officials, without whose consent, tacit or avowed, organized mob disorder cannot take place. As to the far more important political object of getting to the root and beginning of the whole affair, precious time has already been lost; and, as the correspondent of a Calcutta contemporary significantly points out, the materials for conviction are being rapidly dispersed. Here, again, do we feel the lack of some determined, experienced, and guiding mind. . . . .

The ratepayers have, indeed, to pay police rates; but the Municipality has nothing whatever to do with the organization or management of the Police. That rests entirely with the Local Government, the Supreme Government having some remote say in the matter. What little power in this way the Corporation had was carefully eliminated from the new Municipal Act; therefore sufferers by the riots will get nothing by kicking at Mr. Pedder's door. Their remedy should, in the first instance, lie against the officials and managers of the Mosque from the precincts of which rushed the ugly mob of Friday, the 13th. Failing to get evidence to connect the mob with the Mosque, the next resource will be to the Local Government, the real managers and principals of the Police; and it is from the "Provincial Funds" that compensation must be sought. If extravagant demands are not made, pecuniary recompense should be readily obtained in this quarter, and without litigation. As to the terror and anxiety endured by the weaker members of the Parsee community, and the dishonour because of desecrated shrines—for these things there is no remedy.—*Feb.* 27, 1874.

THE MORAL—FIRMNESS AND IMPARTIALITY.

V.—Order is restored. The firmness of the Bombay Government in stopping the street processions has been vindicated. So far as outward appearances go, all is tranquil, and there is now opportunity to look back on the local history of the last sixteen days. The extra force for the preservation of the peace will, if but for the look of the thing, be retained in the streets a few days longer. The greater part of the European community are quite tired of the subject, and wish that both parties, especially the Parsees, were at Jericho. It is intolerable, say they, that there should be so much trouble about a mere half-lakh of people, many of whom, seeing they speak English provokingly well and affect to

display public spirit, perhaps really share that quality, are disliked with that special kind of repugnance reserved for the behoof of poor relations or intrusive kinsfolk from a distance.

Still, as the Duke of Wellington remarked, though in a very different sense, "the country must be governed;" and admitting that the short list of broken heads, and the easy wholesale arrests by the police, speak poorly for the mob force, compared with what is seen after a jolly good election riot at Limerick or in the "black country," it cannot be denied that there was from the 12th to the 14th a temporary failure in the great art of government. It has blown over now, and the mischief was prevented from spreading; but there was sufficient manifestation of predetermined lawlessness to convince all competent observers that there was a defiant spirit at work, which, if longer disregarded, would have rapidly spread. Its manifestations were circumscribed, the snake is scotched; but no one can say it is killed, and, if the art of government is understood, that will yet be done. How, then, shall this be accomplished? . . . Perhaps we shall see more clearly the purely public and political nature of the question on review if, instead of the Parsees, we substitute some other sect or caste, as if that had been the mark for the rioters' animosity.

Take the Banians, for instance, who not unfrequently in the mofussil have become obnoxious to the Mussulmans, as these in their turn have sometimes been menaced by the Banians. What, then, would be thought of any district authorities if it could be alleged that after they had been warned of an intention on the part of the Mahomedan populace to fall upon the Banians at a certain time and place, this warning had been neglected, and the Banian quarter had been attacked before a single effort had been made by the head of the police to restrain the assailants? And let us suppose that, after the first attack, whilst a lull obtained, the Collector, Political Agent, or other superior authority, on being appealed to by the heads of the Banian community to make some authoritative declaration and take special precautionary measures, the said Collector were to fail to see the necessity for moving in the matter, and assure the unhappy Banians that the police were competent to attend to the business. Let us imagine, again, that the very morning after this interview, it were to turn out that the head of the police was still so little aware of the assailants' disposition, that he allowed a tumultuous, formidable mob of them to congregate and pass through the Banians' quarter, and a serious riot were to take place requiring all the available force of the police to quell it. Had, we say, occurrences like this taken place in Kattiawar, in Guzerat, or in the Southern Mahratta Country, what would have been the course pursued by the Governor in Council and by the Secretary in the Political Department? Would not an experienced and trusted servant of Government be at once sent down to institute an inquiry on the spot? Would there be the slightest hesitation in this course, even though some Gallio in high places were to suggest, as to the immediate sufferers from this disturbance, "Ah! they are only a few poor-spirited, vegetarian Banians; why did they not stand up for themselves?"

Of course such a sentiment would be frowned out of court at once. His Excellency in Council would not care to ask what was the caste of the people injured. It would be sufficient for him to know that the peace had been broken, and that, too, on a settled plan, and by a defiant mob mainly got together for the purpose. And if it turned out that the special Commissioner sent down found that the Collector had, at the critical time, implicitly trusted the reports of the Police Superintendent for hours or even days after lookers-on perceived that the said reports were insufficient and misleading, would he not at once suggest that this was a case for a thorough investigation, in order that the riotous element and scheme might, once for all, be traced to its source? And if the said Commissioner found that the "public opinion" of the district ran much against the looted Banians and strongly in favour of the worthy Collector and the jolly good fellow at the head of the police, would the representative of the Executive not also add, that in the interests of justice and healthy administration it was essentially necessary that the investigation should be conducted by skilful and experienced men from another division, and wholly unaffected by the "public opinion" of the disturbed district? The Bombay Executive would at once accede to this; and if the town where this premeditated riot took place were some conspicuous one, where an active popular opinion existed, such as Surat, Ahmedabad, or Poona, would it not be arranged that such an investigation should be conducted as far as possible with open doors? No doubt it would; and in all this the Bombay Government would only feel that it was doing its obvious duty.

In changing the scene from some remote mofussil town to the capital city; in giving up the supposed Banian sufferers of our illustration for the Parsees, who have been not only terrified, but badly hurt, and for the Zoroastrian communities whose shrines have been desecrated, is the necessity for prompt, searching, and independent investigation any less apparent? Does not this become tenfold more imperative? We are ashamed to have to notice the supposition that because of some cherished whim or personal and class antipathy against the Parsees, there is less chance of this scandal and offence against British administration being thoroughly looked into, than as if the organized rioters of the 13th and 15th had attacked the Banians, Bhattias, or Brahmins. This miserably petty partiality cannot obtain any influence in the councils of Government; and we may rest assured that the high character of British administration will, in one way or other, duly manifest itself in regard to the riot of 1874.

Apart from the commonplace aspect of this episode, which relates to the protection of the public and the efficiency of the Police Commissioner, there is the much larger subject of the premeditated design on which the outbreak proceeded. We have already given sufficiently broad hints on this branch of inquiry, and, for the present, leave it to be dealt with by a correspondent in another column. It is not needful to enter into any argument to show that of far deeper importance than even the police question, but connected with it, is this—how shall the State lay its iron hand on that lawless element which can be commanded at will by men who, when their religious bigotry is concerned, scorn our rule and despise the behests of law?—*March* 3, 1874.

BRIGHT TINTS OF BOMBAY:

From Mackintosh to H.R.H. Albert Edward.

WE must not omit to take passing note of a remarkably interesting paper in last Wednesday's *Gazette*, entitled "Poona and the Peishwas—a Retrospect." The literary merit of the essay is considerable, though very unequal. The historical portion, though abounding with facts, is heavily charged with denunciation of the Mahrattas; and it might be a useful exercise for some of our clever graduates of that race to show what could be said as set-off against the sweeping condemnation of their forefathers. But it is the opening and close of the essay in question that chiefly attract our attention to it. Here we find revived the ever-pleasing tradition of Sir James Mackintosh in Bombay—at his beloved Parell. It seems a century or two since this writer first read Mackintosh's vivacious and often touching memoranda of his life in Bombay. Though it all passed between 1804 and 1809, the men, the scenes, the surroundings, all fenced off by the weary voyages round the Cape, are at once so familiar and so far, that, as we dwell on them, one might be reading an episode in Morris's "Earthly Paradise." Let us dismiss the fascinating vision once more, and turn to the prose of the present day.

This we find supplied in the *Times of India* of this morning, which demands that the statues—or rather groups of statuary—of Wellesley and Cornwallis, in the procuring and sheltering of which Mackintosh took such lively interest, now suitably embowered in the Elphinstone Circle, shall be dragged out into the dusty highways of the city. There may be something said for this proposal, and our contemporary says it; but we cannot think the public suffrages will be with him. As it was left to this journal to remind the public of the existence of these statues when Sir Richard Temple spoke, by inadvertence, of the Prince of Wales's effigy being only the second statue in the open air in Bombay, we may be permitted to have a passing word on the subject. That is, we protest against the vulgarization of these masterpieces of Chantry and Flaxman by sticking them at the roadsides; while as to hauling the two Elphinstones (our contemporary mistakes the commoner for the peer) out of the Town Hall, the notion is worthy of an auctioneer. As to Sir Bartle Frere's, that may be sent—to the Zulus.

II.—During this last week the time has come for the floral glory of Bombay Island—the brief bright reign of the splendid flowering tree, the Goolmohr, which in crimson and scarlet, sparely set off by the feathery green of its foliage, gladdens the eye in nearly every compound and suburban roadside. It is told of the great Linnæus that when he

first beheld a Magnolia tree in full bloom he fell on his knees, in a transport of enthusiastic admiration, and thanked the God who had given the world such a vision of beauty. In like manner, if "natural piety" still found place on the earth, any ardent botanist from the sober north might be forgiven for going into raptures when, on arriving in Bombay at this season, the glory of the Goolmohr should burst suddenly on his sight. From a botanical friend we have received explanatory notes which will be read with interest.

[These need not be reproduced here. They comprise scientific description of the two kinds of Goolmohr which enliven the Bombay Esplanade in the later weeks of the hot weather, the *Poinciana Regia* and the *P. Elata*. See also Lindley and Moore's "Treasury of Botany," 1866, p. 910.]

—*May* 15, 1880.*

DOCKS AT LAST.

HIS Excellency Sir Richard Temple was in his element on our New Year's Day *fête*, the chief actor in, and head centre of the pleasing ceremonies and hope-inspiring proceedings with which Bombay signalised its new step in nautico-commercial progress—the actual entry of large sea-going vessels into the Prince's Dock, with its area of thirty acres. Sir Richard was the picture of modesty itself, when, in replying to Colonel Baker's toast in his honour as Governor of Bombay, he spoke of the high compliment implied in comparing him with several of his notable predecessors. And, no doubt, his mild protest was perfectly sincere; for he understands, perhaps better than any one else present, wherein lay the value of such administrators as the dignified and reserved "John Lord Elphinstone," or the strong and silent Sir George Clerk. Nevertheless, "tools to the man;" and Sir Richard Temple was the man for the occasion, as will be seen by newspaper readers everywhere on perusal of his own and Colonel Baker's speeches, or on reading the copious and, in many respects, effective descriptive reports furnished by our two daily papers. In the lofty open building where the generous luncheon provided by the Port Trustees was spread and the speeches were delivered, it was vain for any but a Boanerges to expect to be heard beyond a hundred feet or so. It is on occasions like these the public appreciate the inestimable service rendered by the broad sheet diurnal. To the expanse of print displayed in the papers of to-day we must refer those who desire to trace how Mr. Ormiston, the justly proud and successful engineer, vindicated his own prevision; how Mr. Glover, the flourishing contractor, showed that the pickaxe and wheelbarrow of Brassey's time have been superseded by the efficient mechanical appliances of our day; and how sentiment and social science were evolved from the story of the Dock and its inauguration by our resident American orator. Note should also be taken of two silent witnesses—one of whom was once a power in Bombay—who had the first hand in, so to speak, "creating the site" of which this fine dock is the centre and purpose.

It is now some thirteen years since the present writer took the side of the "one lift between ship and shore," when wet docks were first seriously planned for Bombay; so he may venture to confess to slight feeling of personal satisfaction on seeing the noble form of the Peninsular and Oriental Company's *Cathay* moored alongside the western or inner wharf of the Prince's Dock. But while the principle of a public work may be sound, and the engineering skill manifested in its execution worthy of high praise, mistakes in choice of a site, or financial complications, may cause the ultimate result to fall far short of a commercial success. The Prince's Dock is a fine structure, and the difficulties of the approach have been overcome; but the undertaking, as a whole, is immensely over-weighted with the "white elephant" of its landed estate, and the altogether extraneous cost of the railway reclamation. Either such fees must be levied on shipping as will injure the trade of Bombay, or the State must sustain the Port Trust deficits as it does for many of the guaranteed railway lines. For the present, however, no one can think of anything but the fine spectacle on Thursday, and the enthusiastic speeches, of which that of the mathematical Chairman of the Trust—who ought to have known better—was chief in its bold discounting of the future.

Some little mishaps that occurred on the first essay of using the Dock are such as always befall on such occasions; so we need not dwell upon them. . . .—*Jan.* 3, 1880.

* This and the remaining extracts are from the *Bombay Review*.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S WEEK'S WORK.

NO; we will not attempt any sketch of the Marquis of Ripon's proceedings in Bombay during the past week. At best we could only give a series of diminishing vignettes after the manner adopted by *Punch in India* in 1867 to celebrate the "assistance" rendered by its artist in inaugurating the Kennery Lighthouse. The dailies have well performed their functions as exponents of His Excellency, the still new Viceroy, and as chroniclers of his visit to Western India. From the Byculla Club dinner to the return to Parell yesterday (albeit one of them carefully omitted to say at which station the arrival took place) and the much-to-be-regretted attack of fever, the daily papers of Bombay have proved equal to their reputation. Their subscribers and the public generally ought this week to be specially grateful to the conductors of the sheet diurnal. For not only have these benefactors spread abroad every sentence uttered by his Lordship in public, and duly published all his goings out and comings in—for which service we do homage here—but they have given supplements galore, replete with the news and reports crowding in from Europe.

As last week we supplied, in advance, an alterative to the course of Lord Ripon's speeches, which have followed thick and fast during the week, we need now only add a remark or two. Without even approaching effusiveness, or reminding one of that mellifluous blandness that is exasperating to the robust British mind, his Lordship's addresses, never too long, have been apt, well spoken, and happy in their often unexpected turns of application. These qualities have been observable, from first to last, from Byculla to Poona, so we need not particularise. The impromptu manner of the brief remarks at the St. Xavier College on Tuesday, and the guarded but evidently thoughtful and sincere response to the excellent political address of the Poona *Sabha*, both indicate characteristics that may prove highly valuable in public debate, and in the arduous controversies of the bureau. Elsewhere we have referred to the civil circumspection with which His Excellency met perhaps the most exacting and disputatious address he has received during the whole course of his tour. That was very good at Poona yesterday; when, evidently beginning to tire of the much talking in public that inevitably falls to his Lordship's lot while travelling, he said: "I do not think that the Viceroy of India ought to be given to much speaking, and, certainly, I for one would much prefer that when my term of office comes to an end, the people of India should be able to say, 'Well, he has on the whole been better than his word,' than that they should say, 'He has used large sounding phrases, but has done nothing to give them a tangible shape.'" We cannot leave His Excellency better than at this point.

II.—The Bombay dailies, on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce, were very easily pleased when they accepted the civil remarks of the Marquis of Ripon as implying approval of the Railway portion of the Chamber's address. It was little more than a polite platitude for His Excellency to say he agreed with the Committee in thinking that a "uniformity of gauge on main lines is a matter of great importance." There are many other matters of great importance; and, amongst those of "great magnitude" to which his Lordship alluded, is the solvency of the railway system of India. He only too modestly disclaimed any wish to rest upon his own "individual opinion"; but, with his knowledge of the finance of the Indian railway question, he must have been almost appalled at the levity with which the Chamber's Committee treated this subject. To any one who, like his Lordship, is accustomed to view these questions of "great magnitude" in all their breadth and ultimate scope, the spokesmen of the Chamber must seem to have had broad-gauge on the brain. He was obliging enough to give the Committee credit for being "no enemy to the narrow-gauge system under proper conditions"; but His Excellency was giving his interlocutors too much credit. Nothing else but big and heavy railways will suit them; and break-of-gauge must be avoided for their convenience, regardless of cost—to other people, that is the Indian taxpayers. The absurd and exaggerated estimates, embodied in the address, of the cost and inconvenience of transhipment at one or two points in course of a long railway route, must have almost taken his Lordship's breath away. Logic is nothing to partisans such as the compilers of this address. Thus the absence of suitable open trucks on the half equipped Rajputana line, and consequent accumulation of timber and bar iron

at Saburmati, is debited to break of gauge! Then, too, the comparison, once more trotted out, between the first cost of the Wadwan extension of the B.B. and C.I. and that of the Rajputana line, is entirely misleading. If the address were intended as a serious argument, that portion of it would call for renewed refutation; but, as the passage is merely part of the hap-hazard special pleading against the more economical style of railway, it will only serve to weaken the Chamber's legitimate influence.

In another branch of the subject, one even more within the province of a mercantile body, the Committee seemed to try to show how far it could put itself in the wrong. The obvious principle, that the most direct practicable route to the sea must be most advantageous to every interest connected with the export trade, was ostentatiously disregarded in the address. We allude to the paragraph in which the preposterous proposition is put forward in favour of a railway from Dharwar to Dhond, to "open up (the) valuable cotton-growing districts" of the South Mahratta Country! It seems incredible that merchants, whose whole interest in this matter is concerned in obtaining easy and direct traffic with the interior for both exports and imports, should go out of their way—as the Chairman did more particularly in his spoken remarks—to advocate the more roundabout and costly means of communication between the coast and the producing districts. The only explanation, and a very sorry one, is that, as the extra cost by the more expensive route will fall on the producer and the revenue, the merchants care not a jot so long as their supposed convenience is served. With regard to this aspect of the railway question, a correspondent of much experience writes us thus: "'I had hoped that the Chamber of Commerce would have had the grace to say something in favour of the line from Karwar in preference to that from Marmagao, and was not prepared to find that there was any intelligent merchant who still questioned the expediency, not to say the *necessity*, of direct communication by rail between the S. M. country and the coast. . . ." The misfortune is, that when such short-sighted views dominate the traffic arrangements of any great emporium, its fancied superiority is doomed from that time. The consequences fall upon property owners and the resident community; while the mercantile partisans, who resist the changes and expansion which trade demands, can retire or remove their floating capital, and thus evade the losses which their narrow and selfish policy has invited. Our Chamber of Commerce has often had to complain of small official obstructions and delays in matters of detail; but when, in respect of large questions of public works and communications, that body cherishes narrow local prejudices, there is no wonder that it loses influence with higher authorities who are accustomed to survey such subjects as a whole.

With regard to the superficial remark by the Chairman about the "irregularity and inactivity connected with coasting communication," we may contrast it with one we once heard made by the late Captain Henry. Standing on the Kennery Lighthouse, and viewing the white sails of a crowd of coasting craft coming up from the south towards our harbour, he said: "Ah! where would Bombay be without that trade?" Here was the representative of one of the largest steamship companies in the world who could recognise the enormous advantage—nay, the prime necessity—of cheap transport for bulky produce. Men who cannot realize the force of argument behind that simple remark by our lamented and capable citizen, are not the persons to discuss large questions of trade communication with a Governor-General of India.—*Dec.* 4, 1880.

THE MARQUIS BEARS THE PENALTY:

BOMBAY EXONERATED.

THE incident of the week is the sickness of the Viceroy. Various bulletins, received since his departure from Bombay last Sunday night, will be found amongst our telegrams. We may as well quote here the one received from the Press Commissioner late last night:—

CALCUTTA, 10th, 5.5 P.M.—Following telegram from Allahabad was received in Calcutta at 1.30 P.M. to-day:—

The Viceroy has passed a good night, but there is no material change in his condition. Temperature remains the same; the pulse is somewhat higher; there are no signs of any specific form of fever.

None of us who know how depressing and prostrating are the effects of "a touch of fever" can think lightly of His Excellency's indisposition. On the other hand, this is

obviously only the inevitable acclimatisation experience through which all Anglo-Indians have to pass in one form or other. In all probability, his Lordship will feel more at home after this visitation has passed than he has hitherto done during his, as yet, brief sojourn in the tropics. The more serious aspect of the matter is the exaggerated significance which is almost certain to be attached to it in England, and especially amongst the governing classes, who are already prone enough to shirk their personal duties to India and the Empire. Probably, unlucky Bombay will be debited with his Lordship's fever; but that would be exceedingly unfair. After enduring the scorching heats of the Punjab, passing through the burning plains of Scinde, visiting the malarious desert of Kutchi, His Excellency goes through an immense amount of physical and mental exertion in holding levees and attending public gatherings in Bombay, is then taken to Elephanta in the dewy eve, and passes through the fascinating but perilous pleasure of an *al fresco* dinner, not in, but outside the caves, returning through the cold midnight air to Parell. As if all that were not enough to induce to exhaustion and invite congestion, the zealous and devoted victim is rushed up the Bhore Ghaut, driven about Poona, city and cantonment both, and is then rushed back again to another State dinner and evening party at Parell. Before this last stage of tension was reached the distinguished patient is compelled to give in. Indignant nature puts in her determined protest; all India is discomposed, and society in England is confirmed in its prejudice against the Indian climate. It seems to us that Bombay itself can have very little, if anything, to answer for in this result. It is high time this city and island were vindicated, and that His Excellency's advisers and Staff, the Court physician included, were put on their defence. By the way, is this last named personal adviser an Indian doctor? But, anyhow, there is now little, if any, cause for uneasiness; and we trust that before these lines reach our readers his Lordship's convalescence will be announced.—*Dec.* 11, 1880.

VALEDICTORY.

IN one of Lord Lytton's facile after-dinner speeches, finding it needful to repeat himself on some topic or other, he deftly excused the iteration by referring to the noted Puritan divine who made at least three several attempts ere he could finally say farewell to his flock. In like manner our readers must be reminded of "more last words from Mr. Baxter" by this our third attempt to bid them good-bye. But as the proverb has it, "third time pays for all," so they may fairly count upon this being the last number of the *Bombay Review*—subject to a still lingering remainder of reservation. That is, we claim to retain copyright in our title, and should the exigencies of public affairs seem to call upon us "to revisit the glimpses" of politics, local or imperial, we may, once or twice in a way, renew our colloquies with our constant readers and faithful subscribers. But this very conditional intimation is one in which our critics or detractors, if such there be, have more concern than have our friends.

For the rest we may refer students of current history back to our Epilogue, No. 52, November 29th, 1879, wherein are described the conditions that render difficult the maintenance of an Anglo-Indian weekly journal; also the objects and reasons that make such a serial a valuable element in the Indian Press if it could be sustained. Again, in our paragraph in No. 104, "Two Years Ago," certain natural regrets were expressed, between the lines of which some of our friends may read more than the outside world. But odds cannot be made even, and it is useless to struggle against the impracticable; though there are private considerations and other engagements that now precipitate our resolve to suspend publication. To our few advertising friends our thanks are very much due; while as to our subscribers, especially those from the first—which seems a long time since—our gratitude will be ever due. So once more—Farewell!

Happily, the anticipation with which we ventured to close our remarks last week on the illness of His Excellency Lord Ripon has been fulfilled. His Lordship may now be regarded as fairly entered on his convalescence.—*Dec.* 18, 1880.

'THINGS OF INDIA'

MADE PLAIN;

OR,

A JOURNALIST'S RETROSPECT.

By W. MARTIN WOOD

(*Formerly Editor of the* Times of India *and of the* Bombay Review).

TO CONSIST OF FOUR PARTS.

PART II.—Section 4.

"THE MOTHER OF FORESIGHT LOOKS BACKWARD."—EGYPTIAN PROVERB.

LONDON: ELLIOT STOCK, 62, PATERNOSTER ROW.
CALCUTTA: THOMAS S. SMITH.
BOMBAY: THACKER & CO., LIMITED.
MADRAS: HIGGINBOTHAM & CO.

1886.

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PART I.

1. Personal and Historical.
2. Public Works—Railways, Irrigation, Roads, Harbours.

PART II.

3. Bombay—Political, Commercial, Municipal, Social.
4. Native States and our Relations therewith.

PART III.

5. Finance—Imperial, Provincial, Anglo-Indian.
6. Central Asia and Frontier Affairs.

PART IV.

7. Land Revenue Systems and Social Statics.
8. Public Instruction, Scientific and Literary Topics.
9. Miscellaneous.

PART II.

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PREFATORY NOTE

TO SECTION 4.

"THE Native States of India, and our Relations therewith," as treated of in this Section 4, is not only one subject, but, as will be seen, comprises several divisions that are of very high political importance. In illustration of this remark, the last two selections may suitably be referred to. The former of these relates to the group of questions that arise whenever the fiscal measures or financial exigencies of the British Indian Government affect the revenues of native Princes or Chiefs, or the interests of their people. The latter article raises the difficult but pressing juridical problem of the constitution of some public tribunal, where cases between native States and the British paramount Power, between rival and jarring principalities, or between native States and their feudatory or privileged subjects, shall be submitted to open judicial process, instead of, as now, being disposed of by secret methods under bureaucratic executive authority. It will be obvious that the first of these divisions comprises the large field of treaty rights and Imperial obligations, the very foundations of the British Indian Empire. This subject is one of the deepest historical interest, demanding for its study the exercise of the clearest political intelligence and the most equitable sense of Imperial responsibilities. As bearing on these requirements, reference may be made to the opening extracts, and to those dealing with the general policy of the Simla Foreign Office (pp. 261-3, 267-71), with Mysore (p. 241), with Jinjeera and other small States (pp. 263-6, 287), with the Nizam and his great kingdom (pp. 247, 275-7, 293-6), with Kattiawar (pp. 271, 283-6, 302), and with Baroda (pp. 242-6, 304-6).

As it may be thought that undue space in this Section has been devoted to the latter two divisions of the subject, a word or two of explanation should be given. The geographical and direct political connection of those provinces with Bombay might suffice to account for the large share that their affairs claimed on the writer's attention. He had also frequent and direct means of acquiring special information regarding them. Besides these circumstances, there is the broader consideration that Kattiawar and Baroda present typical illustrations of the wide subject of this Section. The former, a peninsula of 20,000 square miles (more than the area of Greece), "teems with princelets," four of whom are of considerable importance, while many of the smaller ones are of ancient Rajpoot lineage and much political tenacity. Here, then, as will be seen, is a field for the exercise of great political tact by the paramount Power, as directly represented by the Government of Bombay. Possibly, many of the extracts may seem to exhibit the perplexity of the task, and the shortcomings of our Political Agents during the period under notice; but a journalist is "nothing if not critical." It may be freely owned that later years have shown in Kattiawar several instances of success in the political art, and a higher standard of responsibility amongst the Chiefs of that province.

With regard to Baroda, in this large and wealthy State we had an example of protracted neglect on the part of the paramount Power, of extravagance and deterioration in the native rule, followed—after a brief but promising experiment of internal reform—by a catastrophe of plot and deposition, which does not come within the scope of our retrospect. Subsequently, by exercise of paramount authority, reorganization and reform were forced on Baroda from without; and now, under the promising and well-trained Guikwar, that State bids fair to show what "India of the Rajahs" might be if our Imperial duties were well understood and faithfully fulfilled.

There have been, and still are, profligate Princes and corrupt officials in "our Vassal Empire;" but their evil influence will be checked and circumscribed in proportion as their people become more enlightened, and as the British rulers of India realise the responsibility imposed on them in administering that splendid Imperial heritage.

W. M. W.

4.—NATIVE STATES, AND OUR RELATIONS THEREWITH.

DALHOUSIE'S POLICY: REASON AND SENTIMENT.

IT is assumed on behalf of Lord Dalhousie, in an article by a Calcutta writer, that he displayed "a magnanimity but rarely equalled" in postponing for half a century the publication of his papers. We do not profess our competence to judge of the motives of his Lordship in coming to that decision; nor would it be profitable to discuss whether a subtle prudence could not be traced in connection with the magnanimity which is extolled. Happily, "the evil that men do," if not always "interred with their bones," is, in political affairs, far less permanent than any good they may have been the means of doing. They may have filled their generation with grief, or for the time have "left a realm undone;" but if they have also chanced to remove some clog on the springs of industry, or established new communications, and thereby set free the ever-strengthening forces of social life, then will future generations readily forgive the evil, which—having exhausted its effects—is well-nigh forgotten. That there is a forgiving temper amongst mankind does not, however, absolve the historian from the duty he has to perform. Lord Dalhousie's policy, according to his testamentary directions, is not to be finally judged of until the beginning of next century; but we may trust the historian of that period to discriminate between the useful administrative talents of his Lordship and the blindness of his political policy. His "Lordship's well-turned periods and persuasive arguments" will not prevent posterity from perceiving that railways might have been laid, roads planned, canals and irrigation promoted, without there being also pursued that policy of exaggerated "Englishism" which was the proximate cause of the convulsion of 1857. We do not grudge Lord Dalhousie the chance of receiving a large share of posthumous credit, which may properly be due only to that steady natural advance that is always certain to come when India is at peace; but we do contend, that there is already plenty of material before the public on which a judgment may safely be formed as to the policy of Lord Dalhousie. The Marquis had a perfect right, if he had chosen to exercise it, of sealing up his semi-public papers for a century; but the pressing business of the world can brook no delay. It was needful for the guidance of Indian rulers to-day that a lesson should be drawn from the Dalhousian policy. That lesson is generally regarded as a condemnatory one, though it appears the *Englishman* is so "sentimental" as to look for a reversal of the verdict fifty years hence. . . . . .

It might not have been worth while noticing the article of our contemporary at length were it not he therein propounds a thesis so comprehensive that it only needs applying in order to solve every Indian question. We are told that it is only possible to take either a "rational" or a "sentimental" view of Indian affairs. Moreover, we are informed that the history of British India is "the narrative of those Governors-General who have preferred reason to sentiment." It is a pity that the writer did not keep his choice theory separate from the domain of facts; but he tells us that Clive, Hastings, Cornwallis, and Wellesley

were men of "reason"—and, of course, Lord Dalhousie, as well as Sir John Lawrence. We imagine, by the way, that the friends of the present Viceroy would not prefer that he should be classed as a pupil of Lord Dalhousie's, whether he be regarded as destitute of sentiment or not. As to Clive and (Warren?) Hastings, though their "reason" was powerful in war and stratagem, we imagine that a large portion of their deeds would willingly be forgotten by Englishmen, if such things could be forgotten. The best apology that can be made for them, and a very poor one, is, that, with all their ruthlessness and duplicity, they were a shade better than the Hindu and Mussulman conquerors whom they overthrew. It may, then, be said,—do we repudiate the conquests, and do we desire to relinquish the acquisitions which the actions of these men threw as an unsought legacy upon the responsibilities of the British people? We do not. The crimes which those men committed were their own: and, notwithstanding the excess of "reason" over sentiment, for which they are preferred by some writers, many of their public acts were characterised by precisely that "regard for the peculiar state of affairs in India, and for the peculiar weaknesses of native Princes" and *people*, which the *Englishman* condemns. Clive trusted to the native soldiery when his British officers mutinied in a body; Warren Hastings assiduously cultivated the native languages, and, in conjunction with Sir W. Jones, gave the first secular impulse to the study of Oriental literature. It was very shortly before his death, and when all inducement "to stand well with the natives" had long passed away, that Hastings, in giving evidence before the House of Lords, pronounced that carefully expressed but unequivocal eulogy on the native character which Macaulay has approvingly quoted.—*April* 26, 1865.

BARODA MISRULE: DUTY AND LIMITS OF INTERFERENCE.

MORE than once during the last few months our columns have been opened to remarks on the misgovernment of the principal Native State in this Presidency. While the British Government, like a wise and liberal landlord, has been extending to its ryots ample means of comfort and self-improvement, His Highness the Gaekwar has been experimenting how far extortion may be carried without converting his territory into a desert. Avarice appears to be the ruling spirit, and *quocunque modo rem* the motto of his administration. And the uttermost farthing of the miserable ryot is not sufficient for His Highness's extravagances. *Sui profusus*, he is also, as the Latin grammar says, *alieni appetens*. Conscious that his executive officers are corrupt, he summons them, each in proportion to his conscience (!) or his evil repute, to disgorge the fruits of extortion and injustice, not in order to return them to his plundered subjects, nor to expend them on another Outram's bath, but—to pay for H.H.'s last new necklace.

Under our present policy incorrigible despots are no longer visited with dethronement. But all the more inevitable should be the will of the Imperial Government, in requiring of those who rule under its shadow that they shall rule with justice and mercy. On none may such demand be more justly imperative than on the dynasty of Baroda, whose main support has been the British Government, from the days of Governor Duncan to the troubles of 1857. . . . . .

It has been reported that the appointment of Resident is to be conferred on Colonel J. T. Barr. This officer, it will be remembered, was removed from the office of Political Agent in Kattiawar, in 1862, on account of official conduct which hardly amounted to more than want of tact. It is probable that Sir Bartle Frere, who had then very recently reached Bombay, acted in this matter with a hastiness which he afterwards regretted. He has at least been subsequently at some pains to provide Colonel Barr with an appointment. We have nothing to urge against Colonel Barr personally; but he is a representative of the conservative school of Colonel Lang in Kattiawar, the policy of which, outwardly amiable and plausible, has entailed unhappy consequences on that province. . . . . .

If Major Keatinge cannot be spared from Kattiawar, it seems worthy of inquiry whether he might not combine his present duties with the not very arduous office of Resident. The Gaekwar is the ruler of certain districts in Kattiawar, and those not the best governed or least troublesome in that peninsula. If the supervision of the Kattiawar chiefs and the direction of the policy of His Highness are placed in the same

hands, there is an end of the possibility of a difference of opinion between the Resident and the Political Agent. We do not wish to advocate the abolition of the Political Agency, but only its subordination to a dominant authority at Baroda, which may harmonize, and thereby strengthen, the operations of British diplomacy in Guzerat. One thing is, at any rate, quite certain—that, in the new policy on which we have entered, we require more knowledge, more tact, and higher purposes kept more steadily in view than at any earlier period. Our Agents, therefore, must no longer be mere good-natured mediocrities. They must unite to high moral aims, intellectual breadth of view, force of character, quickness of perception, and administrative energy. Indulgence must else sink into imbecility, our humane and beneficial influence become inoperative, and the old down-hill course of misgovernment, insurrection, interference, and absorption be pursued once more, in spite of all the warnings of experience, and of the duties imposed on us by our imperial position.—*Nov.* 27, 1865.

PROGRESS—EXOTIC OR INDIGENOUS.

II.—The management of the political relations between the Government of India and tributary or allied native States is not a subject that attracts much attention in these days. The "land has rest;" and neither our fear nor interest is seriously concerned in our relations with native sovereignties. Hence, discussions are very languid in regard to a department of statecraft that, in times past, has been a school in which our best Indian statesmen exemplified that skill and wisdom for which they are deservedly honoured. The mere reference to these men is sufficient to remind us that there are far higher considerations pertaining to the diplomacy of the Indian Government than those—important though they be—which concern our interests and fears. In this time of rest, when we had much rather not acquire any new territory, and have no fear of losing any, it would seem a suitable season in which to favour the healthy operation of that influence which naturally emanates from a strong power and civilized State towards those somewhat lower than itself with which it is brought in contact. The great characteristic of the nobler class of Indian statesmen to whom we allude has been that, while keeping through periods of intrigue and disaffection the firmest hold on British political interest, they sought to promote through the native rulers themselves that intangible national influence of which we speak. This course was prompted not only by just views of human nature, but their sagacity taught them to adhere to it as being strictly in accordance with the theory of Indian society. Here in the East all social and national improvements must be initiated from above, and it must permeate through the channels of political authority. There have often been impatient or too zealous men associated with Anglo-Indian diplomacy and administration who sometimes endeavoured to reverse this settled order of things, and sought by appealing to the people—as the Western phrase runs—to hurry them towards European civilization at a speed which their hereditary superiors could not follow. Though some energetic men of this stamp have occasionally exerted a considerable personal influence in their own immediate neighbourhood, it has been like the seed in rocky ground, springing up quickly and presently withering away, because it could have little root in the deeper soil of Indian custom and character. Especially has this been the case, both in regard to political influence and administrative reforms, wherever, as in Oude, it has been sought to promote them by summarily superseding the long-established hereditary authority. On the other hand, it is noteworthy how those Indian administrators who have been profoundly convinced of the wisdom of leaving untouched the political framework of old Indian rule, have also left behind them the most abiding influence from British rule and civilisation. Although we have referred to influence exercised by native States partially under direct English management, we speak mainly of those which are avowedly under independent native rule, and at the Courts of which, in pursuance of some treaty arrangement, a British Resident is permanently stationed—as at Hyderabad and Baroda.

The Guicowar's State we have aforetime spoken of as one that might afford an illustrative instance of the proper limitations and definition of the "non-interference" policy of the Indian Foreign Office. Of that policy, as rightly understood, we have constantly expressed the fullest approval, believing it to be both wise and safe. Unfortunately, in regard to the Guicowar's State, the special information is not forth-

coming which would render the history of its recent administration useful as some guide to the proper conduct of Indian political relations in the altered circumstances of this country. Neither the Government of Bombay nor the Supreme Government have vouchsafed any authorised report on the business of the Baroda Residency of sufficiently recent date to be of any practical value. The public, therefore, are left to make the best of conflicting statements; and, as we have already intimated, the net outcome of information so gained is not favourable to the rigid application of the non-interference policy. On one side we have statements—varying in consistency from the thinnest of rumours to definite reports—which tend to characterise the administration of the Guicowar as avaricious, and yet profligately lavish, oppressive in its revenue collection, and wantonly cruel in its penal inflictions. Many of these statements have been adopted by the only Anglo-vernacular newspaper in Guzerat; and, until they are denied on behalf of the Guicowar by some competent authority, they are entitled to a fair amount of credence. Regarding that Prince merely as a foreign ruler, there need be no anxious feeling on our part because of his misgovernment, but the newspaper in question has persisted in casting on the British Resident much of the responsibility for the Guicowar's shortcomings. Though speaking ourselves under all reserve as to the facts, it is evident we have here raised in a tangible form the abstract political question as to the limits of non-interference. . . . . .

We are inclined to think that the writer, in his anxiety to praise an honoured public servant, has claimed for the late Resident a much closer responsibility than fairly belonged to him; but, it being the only published report relative to our political influence in Guzerat, we are compelled to ask,—could no better result have been forthcoming? The most impassive rendering of the strict non-interference theory could not have produced any less result in Guzerat; and yet the most powerful legitimate influence which a Resident can possess is stated to have been exercised by Colonel Wallace. We are told that the Resident never used this influence "to coerce" the Baroda Durbar; a course which was quite needless, seeing he had all the influence that he could possibly need for useful purposes. To what purposes of general social and political usefulness that influence has been exerted has yet to be explained. As remarked when before referring to this subject, the Bombay Government at this juncture owes it alike to itself, to the late and the incoming Resident to publish some full statement as to the extent and character of British influence in Guzerat and Kattiawar. The non-interference policy in native States may on its negative side be simply defined as the abstaining, by our Residents, from coercive and imperative action; but the noblest advocates of the doctrine based it upon a wise and generous conviction that almost everything fairly to be desired could be obtained through the native Durbars themselves. In calling attention to affairs in our neighbouring province of Guzerat, and the political *inertia* that seems to have been the rule there, we are only anxious to bring into view the wide scope for usefulness which pertain to the proper exercise of our political influence. For illustration let us glance at the Central Provinces, where, after a successful usurpation, we have given full scope to the action of an energetic Commissioner.* The progress there has been considerable, and has certainly lost nothing in the manner by which it has been set forth to the public; but it is to a great extent superinduced and exotic, and it will be long before the improvements effected will take root in the habits of the people and the constitution of society. In Guzerat all the conditions of material and social progress far exceed anything there is in the Central Provinces. Throughout the greater part of the Guicowar's dominion the soil is of inexhaustible fertility; there are natural watercourses that would supply irrigation to every inch of cultivable soil; its prevailing level of surface affords every facility for internal communication, whilst the trunk railway running through its entire length connects all its districts with this (which might be), the first port in Asia. The rapidity of improvement in Guzerat, so far as it can be accelerated from above, ought by many degrees to outstrip that in the Central Provinces; and it might do so more effectually than there, for it might operate through the indigenous authority of the country. When we are told that a British Resident had obtained such influence at the Durbar of Baroda, and that his will was law, we cannot but regret that there are not greater results to be shown.—*Jan.* 22, 1866.

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* Then Mr. Richard Temple.

Elephant-Trampling.

III.—Some months ago it was stated—and the statement passed without official contradiction—that, at Baroda, a criminal had been executed by slow torture—that consisting in the poor wretch being dragged through the streets of the city, bound to the foot of an elephant. We happen to know that the Dewan of H.H. the Guicowar, in private conversation, denied that such an occurrence had taken place; but, on the other hand, by public rumour in Guzerat it was circumstantially explained that the wretch so barbarously done to death was only a robber Wagher who had had the skill and determination to break from his prison more than once. Credence in that ghastly rumour may be again revived if a story, told the other day by our contemporary the *Bombay Gazette*, cannot be denied or explained away. Persons of experience in India are habitually sceptical as to stories of torture in native States; for not only, as our contemporary remarks, is there "always a vein of exaggeration running through every native account," but there are so frequently persons at hand whose political and race prejudices prompt them to accept any story which tells against the native administration of independent Indian States. It is, however, difficult to see how the story told by the *Gazette* can be discredited, unless the whole should be proved to be a fabrication; and its appearance in the editorial column of that paper precludes any such humane hope. . . . . .

This truly Oriental story may turn out to be a pure invention, and the man may be proved to have been a criminal of the deepest dye—even a conspirator against His Highness. But this will make no difference in the feeling with which the public will regard the cruel barbarity of the mode of execution. It is true that, in a political sense, we have nothing to do with the matter. We cannot reform the Guicowar's penal code, and are not in the slightest degree responsible for the savagery of his officials. Our Government, whether Local or Supreme, has no more right or responsibility in respect of the Guicowar's treatment of criminals than has the Imperial Government in regard to the penal code of Pekin—probably not so much. It is important to bear in mind the definite lines of political demarcation between British and native States—some merely allied and independent, as Baroda, others tributary and partially subject. But, whilst these considerations are not forgotten, it is as legitimate as it is unavoidable for the public in British territory to express the strong abhorrence which all must feel against the barbarity reported to have been deliberately committed under the authority of the Guicowar. We observe our contemporary "believes" that—acting in the only way open to him—"Colonel Barr (the new English Resident) remonstrated long and earnestly with His Highness, representing that no murder had actually been committed, that the evidence was unsatisfactory, and that the mode of execution was barbarous and abominable." Nothing less than this faithful remonstrance was to be expected of Colonel Barr; but one cannot but wonder, after the long residence of Colonel Wallace at Baroda—first, that such a remonstrance should be needed; and, having been made, that it should be disregarded. The late Resident enjoyed a high reputation for his diplomatic talent and thorough knowledge of native character; but that reputation was gained long before his retirement to Baroda. Can it be that those excellent qualities had been allowed "to rust in him unused" during the later years of his incumbency in Guzerat—that his former clear views of the doctrine of non-interference had degenerated, so that indifference to, and passive observation of the glaring faults mixed up with the Guicowar's administration had become the rule of late years at Baroda? The report of this barbarous act, and the Guicowar's persistence, suggests those questions; but the records of Colonel Wallace's stewardship at Baroda being hidden away in the dusty corners of the Calcutta Foreign Office, no reply to those queries can now be given. Indian diplomacy needs to have more and earlier publicity given to its proceedings.—*May* 23, 1866.

Limits of British Responsibility.

IV.—It is evident from the letter of our Baroda correspondent, which appeared three days ago, that we have not yet got at all the facts respecting the penal tortures said to have been inflicted in that city under the direct authority of the Guicowar. It is always

needful to receive such stories with reserve; but, in this case, although it seems that the Mussulman gentleman—who was said by a contemporary to have been so barbarously done to death—is yet sound, if not at liberty, the fact is confirmed of an elephant having been employed as executioner. Whilst awaiting further information, it is due to notice that we are charged by some writer in our weekly contemporary with having propounded an opinion respecting the relative position of the Guicowar and the British Government which the reviewer, in his haste, writes down as "unfounded and dangerous." . . . It is needful for the sake of the reviewer and others who know little of "the conditions under which the native States hold their independent existence" to recapitulate the course of remark which is denounced as "unfounded and dangerous" —that is both untrue and mischievous. . . . . .

But to return to our "unfounded and dangerous" opinion respecting the limits which facts impose on us in our desire to see native States in general, and that of Baroda in particular, conform to an English standard of criminal legislation. We remarked, by way of illustration, that "our Government, whether Local or Supreme, has no more right or responsibility in respect of the Guicowar's treatment of criminals than has the Imperial Government in regard to the penal code of Pekin—probably not so much." Now, if it should turn out that such an opinion is well founded, it will, we own, remain open to discussion whether it be "dangerous" or not to take the "responsibility" of stating it. We think not; especially if the statement tended to clear the English name from the shadow of reproach that would fall on it from Baroda in case the reviewer's thesis were true—namely, "It is perfectly certain that the broad fact of our position does make us responsible for 'savagery' in native States." When told by our censor that we had put forth an "unfounded opinion," we naturally looked for some proof of our having done so, some appeal to the treaties with the Guicowar, or a reference to other authentic documents; but not a jot of such substantial material is to be found throughout the reviewer's article. Instead thereof, immediately following the summary judgment passed upon us, are two sentences of assertions each commencing with the words—"It is perfectly certain," &c.; and then the reviewer favours his readers with the following utterance of what may be styled impassioned statesmanship:—"We say most emphatically that we both can reform, and ought to reform, and must." We have already proved that the Guicowar's internal jurisdiction is independent of our "authority;" but we have never said or implied in any way that any native State is independent of, or beyond the "influence" of the Supreme Government and the English people. Had we thought so, it would have been useless to take the trouble that we did to denounce the cruelties said to be practised at Baroda. The reviewer has muddled together these two things, "influence" and "authority;" but it is of the latter that he speaks and desires to invoke. His mystification is so complete that, on our raising the question whether, of late, Colonel Wallace had efficiently used at Baroda that "diplomatic talent and knowledge of native character"—in short, that "influence"—for which he was formerly noted, the reviewer takes this supposition as a "flat contradiction" to our disavowal of "authority" over the Guicowar in his treatment of criminals. There was no excuse for this misconception on the part of our contemporary, seeing that we spoke approvingly of the present Resident having used "faithful remonstrances" in order to prevent the recent barbarous execution.

One word more with the reviewer: he says, with a certain pretentious air, "Our reason for taking notice of this article and exposing its fallaciousness, is not because our own statesmen are likely to share in such notions, but because the Guicowar is liable to be misled by such writing appearing in a responsible journal published in the Presidency capital." We have shown that "our own statesmen" not only "share such notions" as those expressed by us, but that they are as distinct as it is possible to be in defining the independent powers of native States—"the criteria of our rule." As to the danger of the Guicowar being misled, the reviewer may rest assured he can be told nothing by us respecting his political position with which he is not already acquainted. On the other hand, he is far more likely to be influenced for good by those who, like ourselves, freely acknowledge and defend the rights of native Princes, than he is to heed the denunciation of those who would dragoon the people of this country into civilisation, or would "hurl from their thrones" those native rulers who lag behind that standard of administration which we set up for them.—*June* 1, 1869.

THE BERARS—PRESSURE ON THE HYDERABAD STATE.

IN recently discussing our relations with the Nizam, we found that our alliance with this Prince had proved a source of advantage to us in several ways. So apparent was this to both the Home Government and the Government of India, that in 1860 it was deemed desirable to reward His Highness in some signal way, not only for the services that the Contingent had performed in Central India during the Mutiny, but still more for the strenuous and successful efforts made to stem the spirit of mutiny in Hyderabad itself, both by the Nizam himself and by his Minister, Salar Jung. "The Exalted Order of the Star of India had recently been instituted, and the Nizam was amongst the first recipients of the decoration." Yet it was for him a very questionable honour, though with true Asiatic politeness he arranged to receive in open durbar the Star along with the Khureeta reciting the reasons for its bestowal. As a Mohammedan prince the Nizam could not, without doing violence to his prejudices, receive actual investiture of the "Star," and the sash or collar on which it was suspended, so that final ceremony was put off from time to time. Another drawback to the value of the distinction was, that in the despatch covering the other documents respecting the gift it was spoken of by the Persian word *touk*. Unluckily, this word is familiarly used to describe a collar or necklace worn by slaves, or, at any rate, is a term indicative of servitude in the party receiving such a gift. With regard to more substantial recompense to the Nizam, there was considerable show made of our generosity. The principal debt of 50 lakhs, in respect of which the assignment of Berar, &c., was obtained from His Highness, was remitted by the Government of India. The districts of Raichore and Dharaseo were proposed to be returned to him. In this there was no great merit on our part, seeing that the districts already belonged absolutely to him. They yielded a revenue of 21 lakhs; and this transfer still left us in possession of territory yielding 24 lakhs, to which were added 8 lakhs of revenue from additional districts bordering on the Berars, to complete our demand as security for the due payment of the Contingent, and sundry other items included in the provisions of the treaty. We restored to the Nizam, therefore, only 13 lakhs' worth of territory. The guarantee for the due fulfilment of the treaty having been afforded us by our holding 32 lakhs' worth of districts in Berar, we had no pretext for retaining the southern provinces. Various advantages were gained by us in the negotiations; indeed, it is said by those best conversant with the matter that the balance of advantages under the supplementary treaty of 1860 was much in our favour. . . . . .

Little need be said by way of pointing the moral of our present relations with the Nizam. It is very evident that the subject demands the serious attention of all who desire the settlement of our internal affairs, and who wish to see our rule distinguished by a consistent regard to justice and fair-dealing. It is very certain it has not been so in the case of this Prince; but, happily, the memory of the injury that has been done may even now be completely obliterated by the British Government restoring the alienated districts to their ancient ruler, and by the manifestation of a frank and generous spirit. By this just course we should add incalculable strength to our power throughout Southern India. There are, we are well aware, those who counsel a different course, and who speak in the coolest tone of "the Nizam's concurring in the erection of Berar into one of our ordinary provinces." This obtuseness to the common political considerations of *meum* and *tuum*, and such desires to consider only our own convenience, would, if allowed full swing, keep India in a perpetual ferment. There is not one of the sovereign Princes of India with whom one could so well afford to be just as with the Nizam. Before leaving this subject we should just draw attention to the fact that Colonel Davidson in 1862 sent in his report as usual, but in that report no political section appears. This is a circumstance that demands searching investigation. It is impossible to believe that Colonel Davidson compiled his report without an elaborate political section; therefore the inference is that his report did not support the spoliation of the Nizam—hence its suppression, as we imagine, by the Calcutta Foreign Office. On a reference to all Hyderabad reports previous and subsequently to 1862, a political section invariably forms a part of the report. Why, then, an omission in 1862?

As a commentary on our treatment of the Nizam, we can quote some pertinent remarks from a high authority: In para. 17 of a despatch from the Secretary of State for

India, acknowledging receipt of the Bhootan Treaty, the following terms occur: "The existence of a strong Government in the neighbouring States, and the prosperity of their subjects, are among the best securities for the permanent peace of our frontiers. To deprive the Government of a contiguous country of the means of enforcing its authority over its chiefs and functionaries, and of compelling them to execute the engagements which it has entered into for the maintenance of the peace and security of our frontier, can *in no case* be sound policy. In this view it would not be advisable to impair the resources of the Bhootan State," &c., &c. We venture to suggest to our Indian authorities the pursuit of a policy equally liberal to "our faithful ally, the Nizam," since the retention of Berar by the British Government seriously weakens the executive power at his Court and seriously diminishes the resources of his State.

We have now clearly shown that the Nizam's difficulties commenced owing to the insatiable desire of former Governors-General of India to exercise patronage by posting their friends to the Nizam's Contingent; that had the Contingent been maintained on its present footing, the Nizam would have been richer by 5¼ crores (£5,000,000); that, instead of giving effect to Her Majesty's intention, we tricked the Nizam out of certain districts which were subsequently made over to Nagpoor; that the Contingent has been as useful to us as to the Nizam, while he has paid for it throughout; and that at a period when the troops might have been urgently required in his own country, they were co-operating with Lord Clyde, on the banks of the Jumna, having accompanied Sir Hugh Rose throughout his entire campaign. Such are a few of the indisputable facts connected with our alliance with the Nizam.—*April* 3, 1866.

MYSORE ANNEXATION.

THOSE who continuously watch the course of British imperial politics must often feel, whatever their own bias may be, that the concerns of our Empire are so vast and complicated, that they cannot receive due consideration from the public at home. This has frequently been the case with Indian questions; indeed, it may be regarded as the rule; but the irremediable mischief which might, because of this, be regarded as inevitable, is eventually averted from our internal administration by means of the tact and special knowledge of Indian administrators. It is not so with political decisions. . . . These remarks apply very directly to the secret transaction by which it is being attempted to blot out another of the indigenous sovereignties of India—the Hindoo *raj* of Mysore. The responsibility for this unscrupulous and dangerous measure cannot yet be clearly fixed. At present, Sir C. Wood and a subservient portion of the Indian Council are the ostensible offenders against public right; but a grave though undefined responsibility also rests on the Cabinet, then presided over by Lord Palmerston, whilst a still more palpable stigma, concerning this violation of the Queen's Proclamation of 1858, must attach to Sir John Lawrence and the Calcutta Foreign Office. The people of England have not sufficient time to attend to this matter in which their honour is so intimately concerned, but when it is fairly brought before Parliament there is little doubt that the decision of the Indian Council will be reversed.

These remarks we make on the supposition that all who feel any interest in the political future of India and the honour of the British name will have perused the essential portions of the "Mysore Blue Book" as given in the Overland papers. The question of the continued existence of the Mysore sovereignty came before the Indian Council in due course from the Supreme Government here, in consequence of the Mysore Rajah having formally announced to the Viceroy his intention of adopting a son and successor, in observance of all the rites and ceremonies prescribed by Hindoo usage and law. That act of adoption, as our readers will remember, was solemnly performed with all due formality; and, whatever may be the ultimate decision of the British Government, the youth now heir apparent of Mysore will by the people throughout India be regarded as the rightful sovereign immediately on the death of the present Rajah. . . . . .

Having now referred at some length to the moral and political considerations connected with the proposal to suppress the Mysore *raj*, it is not needful to do more than advert to these pleas urged by Sir John Lawrence and Sir C. Wood, which are based upon the terms and omissions of the two treaties made in behalf of the present Rajah

(who was then a boy) in 1799. The first of those agreements is a "Partition Treaty," to which our faithful ally, the Nizam, was the second party, in conjunction with whom Lord Wellesley agreed that a "separate Government shall be established in Mysore." It was agreed between the British representative and the Nizam—in conjunction with whom we had just overthrown the Mussulman usurper, Tippoo—that the present "Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahadur, a descendant of the ancient Rajahs of Mysore, shall possess the territories hereinafter described upon the conditions hereinafter mentioned." The second of the two agreements by which this representative of a long line of Hindoo rulers was restored to the sovereignty of Mysore, is known as "the Subsidiary Treaty of perpetual alliance and friendship," and it was to be "binding upon the contracting parties as long as the sun and moon shall endure." It may well be wondered how, half a century afterwards, such solemn obligations can be set aside, and the sovereignty of Mysore treated as a sort of tenancy at will which can be resumed whenever it suits ourselves to resume it. This is done by the method of making what the treaty instituted as a conditional and temporary arrangement, into an absolute and permanent one. By Art. 4 of the Subsidiary Treaty, in the case of such disorders arising in the Mysore State that the subsidy agreed upon to be paid to the Company, or the peace of our territories, became jeopardised, the Supreme Government was authorised to assume the government of Mysore. In 1831 the Rajah did neglect his duties, and oppression by his officials and consequent disorders arose. The administration of Mysore was then assumed by the Government of Madras under orders from Lord W. Bentinck, and has been retained by us ever since, although the occasion for such an assumption has long since passed away, and in spite of repeated remonstrances and petitions from the Rajah praying that he should be restored to his rightful position under the Treaty.

In 1834, only three years after our assumption of the Mysore government, Lord Bentinck found that the circumstances under which he had taken such an extreme step had been overstated and misrepresented. He wrote of this to the Directors at home, expressing doubts as to the "legality and justice" of what had been done; he pointed out that the subsidy was not in jeopardy, and affirmed that the "Treaty was in no way cancelled, but still remained in full force." He added, that notwithstanding "the past errors" of the Rajah, "I believe he will make a good ruler in future;" and there is no doubt that, had his Lordship remained a little longer in this country, he would have restored the native sovereignty of Mysore. His not being able to do so was with him one of the few shadows resting on the bright retrospect of his Indian administration. Now, after this lapse of time, when the Mysore State is far more fitted to be remitted to the care of its rightful rulers, Sir John Lawrence and Sir C. Wood attempt to pervert those provisions of the Treaty intended for a temporary purpose, into a sentence of violent extinction against the Mysore sovereignty. There is not, and has not been for many years past, the slightest excuse to withhold the Rajah's rights on the ground of misgovernment, or his failing in any way to fulfil all the duties towards us specified in the Treaties. . . . . .

It is not that the aged and loyal Rajah of Mysore is in the least degree likely to resent the decision against him; but the danger is that we thereby put weapons into the hands of the disaffected and turbulent throughout the whole extent of India. Something better than this might have been looked for from Sir John Lawrence—at least, by those who take the ordinary and popular view of his character; as to Sir Charles Wood, it is most likely he drew the supple majority of the Indian Council after him in deference to some secret but effective impulsion from within the Cabinet itself. We feel morally certain that the decision must be reversed if Sir H. Rawlinson will do his best to open the whole question in Parliament, for public opinion in England will not permit such a gross violation of the whole spirit and tendency of the Queen's Proclamation. No journalist in India, so far as we have seen, has said a word in defence of the Mysore resumption, except, of course, the Serampore apostle of annexation. . . . . —*June* 16, 1866.

THE SIRDARS OF THE DECCAN:

An Historical Tableau.

IT might afford matter for curious consideration how much the pursuit of political upholstery and the elegant art of State ceremonial might have gained had the French retained dominion over any large portion of India. Judging from the brief career of the splendid Dupleix, it might have been worth while—to the end of our better instruction in this not unimportant phase of political manners—that the advent of Clive should have been delayed for a generation. However, that would have been a heavy price to pay for such a refinement; and, although we should have gained a little by such an acquisition, we may content ourselves by thinking that, in regard to the more substantial qualities of tact, adapting our administration to the multiform political and social wants of this country, and in a wise and comprehensive sympathy with its varied races, we possess far more valuable gifts in the science of government than that skill in State ceremonials which we might have learned from the brilliant Frenchman.

There were brought together for the Durbar at Poona materials, so to speak, for a most impressive effect had they been utilised with all that intelligent and thoughtful skill of which the ceremonial was worthy. By effect we do not mean simply the scenic effect of "pomp and circumstance," but that moral and political impression which the occasion demanded. There was a good deal of that—in spite of certain deficiencies in the scenic arts of arrangement and order—and the chief actors in the Durbar on both sides would feel satisfied with what had been done; but we fear a large number of the Sirdars and their friends would depart feeling that they had acted but as lay figures in the ceremony. They would, indeed, have the satisfaction of thinking that they had performed a certain important social duty—a feeling deepened no doubt by the glitter and clang of ancient ceremonial which they had gathered round themselves—but the majority could scarcely obtain from the Durbar all that instruction and enjoyment which it was intended to yield. . . .

This Durbar might in many respects be taken as a renewed ratification of that Magna Charta to the people of India—a charter not extorted, but generously given when all constraint on the royal giver had passed away. It is probable that the swords of many of the Sirdars present were more than half way drawn from their scabbards when, nine years ago, the State of Kolapoor was seething with sedition which broke out into partial revolt. They will remember how the predecessor of the young Rajah just now installed remained faithful to his allegiance, and they cannot fail to trace in the speech of his Excellency the most complete recognition of that fidelity. In this respect the reassuring and conservative influence of the Durbar would be very considerable. Political disaffection will sometimes linger on in most hopeless circumstances, and nothing short of complete reconciliation and indemnity will extinguish its embers. The presence at the Durbar of Punt Prutinidi, who, with his two little sons, was very prominent on the occasion, carries us a step further back in the history of Western India—indeed, to one of the most distinct though not the earliest steps in that downward course from which the Queen's Proclamation signified our complete recovery. This Punt Prutinidi was himself the Dewan and chief adviser of the Rajah of Sattara, whom we despoiled. At that time he no doubt felt natural feelings of resentment because of our high-handed proceedings towards the well-governed State of which he was the mainstay; but he has long since given thorough proofs of his loyalty and attachment to the British Power. In the management of his own personal *jaghire* or patrimonial estate he has shown his appreciation of our methods, and by adopting our revenue system — which necessarily checks the more prevalent abuses under native administration—he has set an example of moral courage and practical enlightenment which should work as a strong indirect testimony in our favour in the eyes of his fellow Sirdars. In the Vinchoorkur, on whom was conferred one of the three Stars of India in the hands of his Excellency for presentation, we have a link connecting the present peaceful time with the turbulence that was closed with the surrender at Asseerghur of the Peishwa Bajee Rao. It was through the father of the Vinchoorkur that Sir John Malcolm negotiated the treaty which extinguished the Peishwa as the last active leader of the Mahrattas; and the late Vinchoorkur retired with Bajee Rao to Bithoor—that place of ominous association. The present Vinchoorkur—who retains half the *jaghire* held under the Peishwa by his father—and his two brothers are Sirdars who have both given proofs of the strongest attachment to our rule, and even of loyal enthusiasm to the British Power. To these

sentiments the Vinchoorkur gave very hearty expression in response to Sir Bartle Frere's remarks when investing him with the insignia and Star. The receipt of a *nuzzerana* from the young Rajah of Jowar, Pattan Shah, gave an incident of variety to the proceedings; and the history of this little territory forms one of those byways in Hindoo story which are fast receding from notice. Jowar is a hill State in the northern extremity of the Syadari range, lying between the Collectorate of Tanna and Surat, and inhabited by a Kolie or Bheel tribe; so that the little Chief did service as a representative of one of the few aboriginal dynasties. A predecessor of his received the title of Shah from the Moguls, in acknowledgment of permission of free transit through a pass in his territory which lies in the direct route from Delhi to the coast of Guzerat. The present youth has been adopted in lieu of another adopted son of the late chief, so that the Government of India, in accepting his *nuzzerana*, and confirming the succession, allows Sir Bartle Frere to give another illustration of the complete good faith of the royal promises. To return to the Sirdars of the Deccan present at the Durbar; we should name as another representative of an ancient line, the Naik of Phaltan, or "the Nimbalkhur" as he is styled. His ancestors were of an old family of Hindoo chiefs, who held their *jaghire* before the Mohammedan invasion; and one of them afterwards remained faithful to the cause of the Bejapoor kings even against Sivajee himself, whom the Naik of Phultan had some excuse to regard as an upstart.

To come to more recent times, and to a class of services not strictly connected with politics, we should notice, amongst other incidents of the Durbar, the investiture, with the Star of India, of Syud Hossein Ul Edroos and Mr. A. D. Sassoon. The former has in many ways acted as the representative of the Mussulman population of Guzerat, and answers, so to speak, for their loyalty to the British Crown. Mr. Sassoon receives the decoration as a public testimony to the noble character and princely liberality of David Sassoon, an Israelite of truly patriarchal type. Thus another stripe of faith and race is suitably added to the chequered and glowing tissue of history and character which the Durbar has unfolded before us. . . . . .

But whilst regretting the passive demeanour of many of the young hereditary chiefs of the Deccan, we must not forget that many excellent men would be stirred to exertion by the hopes of a continually rising career, who could be moved by no temptations of pecuniary emolument in an absolutely subordinate rank. Our rule is strong and acknowledged to be beneficent; but we want it to strike its roots into the soil, and we cannot afford to dispense altogether with the element of a worthy family and personal pride. In this respect there were, amidst the picturesque assembly addressed by Sir Bartle Frere the other day, materials which any wise statesman would seek to utilise by every fair method open to him. Then, again, to take a strictly practical view of things, and estimating the Sirdars as we find them, it cannot be doubted for a moment that their influence serves, and may yet serve still more, to attract towards our rule in Western India a respect which in the distant Mofussil it can scarcely be said yet to enjoy. Some of the motley retinues, the grotesque trappings, and faded embroideries displayed at Poona on Monday last might afford matter for a passing smile, but there could be no mistake as to the lively interest and genuine enthusiasm excited in the native populace by the sight of their grandees of olden time thus being brought into formal accord with the British *raj*. The whole population turned out to witness the processions and gathering, and the people poured into Poona from many miles round. A similar popular movement will have been evoked in every direction on the routes traversed by the various chieftains on their journeys to and from the ancient capital of the Peishwa. Therefore, allowing for all drawbacks, we think it may fairly be asserted that the Durbar at Poona has left behind it moral and political influence far more distinct and permanent than any that could have been produced by a mere pageant or ceremonial, however artistic in design. Sir Bartle Frere has a good right to cherish very pleasing reminiscences of the Poona Durbar of 1866.—*Nov.* 1, 1866.

SIR SALAR JUNG'S RESIGNATION: POSITION OF THE NIZAM.

THE state of affairs in Hyderabad (Deccan) at the present moment is far from satisfactory. For some time it has been known that a serious misunderstanding has arisen between the Nizam and his famous Minister, Salar Jung. The baneful influence

of intrigue seems to have been at work, and the result, according to our latest information, is that the Minister has resigned, and the government is virtually at a standstill. So many versions are given of the circumstances which have led to this deplorable result, that it is unsafe for us to enter into detail.* We conclude that the machinations of a party hostile to order, progress, and the true interest of their country, personally jealous of Salar Jung, and not over-friendly to British influence, has prevailed with the Nizam to the discredit of his most faithful servant, and that the latter, finding it incompatible with his own dignity and the good of the State to administer affairs when his sovereign's favour and confidence was withheld, very properly resigned his trust. . . . In the event of his finally withdrawing from the position he has so ably occupied, it is difficult to point to any other noble of Hyderabad who could adequately fill his place. The inevitable result would be a retrogression in the condition of the State, and not improbably a scene of domestic confusion which might spread beyond the limits of the city, producing disorders the effects of which might disturb our own districts. It is to be hoped that prudent counsels will in the end prevail, and that Salar Jung may be reinstated in his office, with a firmer hold upon it and the confidence of his master, than he has hitherto enjoyed. Should the affair continue much longer in an unsatisfactory state, there is a possibility—though, owing to the improved condition of the Nizamate, not a probability—of the scenes which marked the history of Hyderabad from 1846 to 1851 being acted over again. . . . . .

It must never be forgotten that the Nizam is an independent sovereign. We have no more right to insist upon his nomination of a particular Minister than we have a right to dictate to the Sultan of Turkey upon the choice of a Vizier. As allies with a Resident at his Court, we are expected, of course, to offer advice and warning. We should be ill discharging the duties of an ally if we allowed the Nizam to rush headlong into trouble without endeavouring to open his eyes to the probable consequences of his own act; but beyond this, we have no right to interfere with the direct administration of his own affairs. Should disorder follow upon indiscretion, so long as it is confined to the limits of his dominions, we have, strictly speaking, no right to step in. It might perhaps be a humane policy to do so, but by strict international law we are not justified in entering upon such a course of conduct, unless the evils of his misgovernment were of so outrageous a character as to shame humanity and cry aloud for retribution; but of this, in the case of the Nizamate, there is no likelihood whatever. Should inflammatory statements as to any danger to ourselves from disorders in the Nizam's dominions be put forth in connection with the present squabbles in Hyderabad, they will require to be strictly scrutinised. It is very likely that we shall have the restless Serampore ally of the Foreign Office rushing in to improve the occasion. It will afford him another chance of obscuring from public observation more effectually than is now the case the fatal effect which our own Foreign Office policy has had in inviting disorder in Hyderabad, and in bringing about the embarrassment of the Nizam. As to any actual danger to our districts, or even to the Mysore territory, there can be no serious cause for alarm. The Resident at Hyderabad, Sir G. Udney Yule, is an energetic and experienced Political Agent; he is also so far a true friend of the Nizam's that we feel sure he will do what can be done to protect that monarch against the intriguing and ill-disposed men who, it seems, have for the moment gained an influence over His Highness. If in these circumstances the Resident were unable to check sedition and open revolt, there is—besides the Nizam's own semi-European force—the Contingent commanded by British officers, and which, as it exists for no other ostensible purpose whatever, may surely be relied upon for such a small service as the maintenance of internal order. . . . . .

We are not at present suggesting any particular course being undertaken, but we do urge, that now, when attention is being turned to the great Mussulman kingdom of the Deccan, some sincere endeavour should be made to revise our relations therewith, in that just and honourable sense which the British public, both here and at home, are anxious should be maintained with the allied and tributary Princes of India. The first step towards this on the part of those primarily responsible for these matters would be, for the Foreign Secretary to be instructed to hand to the press—together with suitable explana-

* Full details of this episode—taken from Sir George Yule's then confidential reports—have since been published in a "Memoir of Sir Salar Jung, G.C.S.I.," by SYUD HUSSEIN BILGRAMI. (*Times of India* Press, Bombay.)

tions—the suppressed political section which *ought to have* appeared in Colonel Davidson's Administration Report from Hyderabad in 1861-2. Sir John Lawrence has just proved that his "masterly inactivity" in regard to Central Asian politics—the negative side of his foreign policy—is fully approved at home; but it remains for him to show that the positive side of his "political" policy is equally worthy of general commendation. The capacity to develop and reinvigorate the administrative abilities of native rulers, and through them to work out great results, has ever been the department of Anglo-Indian politics in which our statesmen have obtained for themselves the most durable renown. Sir John Lawrence can scarcely be said to have signalised himself in this respect—he is the model Commissioner rather than a great Political; but there is yet scope for him to win a new reputation in the noble task of thoroughly revising our relations with the great kingdom of the Deccan. We have alienated from us the affection and much of the respect with which the Nizam ought to regard us; but a little justice will go a long way with him, and the Viceroy, through Sir G. Yule, could win him back to our side, and never had we a worthier coadjutor in such an undertaking than would be Sir Salar Jung if he were fully trusted by us, and through us were reconciled to his master. To win the Nizam to our side in all freedom and sincerity were an object worthy of a statesman's ambition. Let the Viceroy, through the wise Minister, make to our faithful ally some worthy manifesto of reparation, and a new era would at once begin.—*Feb.* 26, 1867.

THE STATES OF CENTRAL INDIA.

VERY few people know anything of the working of the Indian Foreign Office; and the opportunities of knowing what is done or neglected to be done by our numerous and well-paid political officers have been so few and unsatisfactory, that it is impossible to maintain any continuous interest in the subject. . . . The publication of Colonel Meade's Report for 1865-6 is, we believe, the first approach to a definite and regular method of communication between the hitherto shrouded Foreign Office and our public. We trust this instinct of publicity may be permitted to have free course. This cannot be otherwise than beneficial to all concerned—to native prince and peasant, to our own administrators, and to the political officers themselves, who are called upon to transmit reports, knowing that all the suitable portions of them will be published. The publication of Colonel Meade's "Report on the Political Administration of the Territories comprised within the Central India Agency, for the year 1865-6," is, as we have intimated, the first step of our Foreign Office towards affording the public early and direct information on the multiform and deeply interesting subjects with which it has to deal. The book before us is sufficiently suggestive of the vast field of truly Indian life which is shrouded behind the *purdah* of the Foreign Office. Colonel Meade here reports upon seventy-one different seignorities, which comprise a territorial area of 83,600 square miles, having a population of 7,670,000 souls and a public revenue of Rs. 2,61,23,000. This region may, loosely speaking, be described as lying between the upper courses of the Nerbudda flowing westward, and the whole line of the Chumbul flowing from the northern slope of the Vindhyan range near Dhar to the Jumna below Etawah. Then, immediately adjoining the congeries of independent or tributary States watched over by Colonel Meade, stretching from the Chumbul to the great desert of India and the borders of Bawulpore, is Rajpootana, the region in many ways so famous both in the history of Hindostan and Western India. Rajpootana—which is watched over by another agent of the Governor-General, a report from whom would be very welcome—comprises some thirty territories, and exceeds in population and revenue the protected States of Central India treated of in the report before us. All these States—together with numbers more throughout India, including the great kingdom of the Deccan—with their teeming populations, their ancient dynasties, their vast capacities for material improvement, and all the tendencies for good or evil of their administration, are each placed under the superintendence and discretional control of British officers. These again are responsible to the Foreign Office alone, which in the work is unassisted by the insensible but effective co-operation that nearly all other departments receive from the reflex action of tolerably well informed public opinion. . . . .

The British territories in Ajmere and of Northern Guzerat are not much better supplied in the matter of roads than the States under native government; but in British

districts the traveller and the merchant are at least comparatively safe from robbers and dacoits. Here some measure of security is ensured by a more or less efficient police. In many native States, however, there is scarcely any establishment worthy of the name. . . . Under the influence of what may be described as a reversed system of "black-mail," the value of keeping up a police force throughout the country is more obstinately ignored than ever, and the question regarded as one connected with the lines of road alone. Thus the notion of good internal government is rendered excessively distasteful by this high-handed decree, which places the chiefs under the pressure of an invidious compulsion, as if for the sake alone of the selfish interests of the British Government. Paying for depredations that may chance to be committed is more economical than maintaining a general police; and the villagers and townspeople are considered as able to defend themselves against dacoits as their forefathers were, while high-minded Princes feel themselves insulted when regarded as cognisant of brigands and vagabonds who come from British territory as often as their own. There are other and higher matters intimately connected with the prosperity and progress of both our own territories and conterminous native States which annually published reports from political officers will force into publicity and attention, and this Report of Colonel Meade's will do good service in explaining many things that are at present hopelessly misty to the apprehension of the home public.—*May* 15, 1867.

ORGANISATION OF THE POLITICAL AGENCIES.

THERE is one invaluable habitude of home procedure in regard to public matters which the transfer of Company to Crown has not yet given us in India. In England every legislative and even administrative change is preceded not only by special or, it may be, technical preliminary investigation, but it also goes through the informal, though thorough, processes of public discussion. . . . Here a reverse process is the customary rule. Measures of the greatest importance are hatched in secret and discussed, not even in secret conclave, but by interchange of minutes, notes, and memoranda. All this may be going on for months before the fact of the question being even mooted can be known, either to those affected by the changes proposed, or to the general public, whose important counsel would always be of great service in determining the true bearings of every administrative or political change. We have the highest appreciation of the great value of the searching discussions which all important Indian questions receive at the hands of our thoughtful rulers by the system of minute writing and review; but there are special advantages inherent in the British custom of discussion in the light of day which cannot be otherwise supplied—not even could we assure ourselves that the light of original genius dawned upon every man called up into the Supreme Council, or that splendid talents were the appanage of every local councillor.

From amongst various measures now supposed to be going through that incubatory progress which we have spoken of as an heirloom handed down to us by the splendid Company, we select for notice one that specially concerns this Presidency, and which is now "under reference," possibly for final sanction, though no regular intimation concerning the proposal has been given to the public in any shape. We refer to certain measures for the reorganisation of the Political Agencies in this Presidency, which, suggested and talked of at various times, have had something of definite shape given to them, and are now understood to be under consideration by the Supreme Government. The central proposition is one for placing the Political Agents in charge of native States under the guidance and control of Commissioners, to whom the various Agents would report instead of to the Governor in Council as now; while the said Commissioner would hear appeals and memorials from the several protected and tributary States, and revise or revoke the decisions of the Political Agents. There is, undoubtedly, a good deal to be said in favour of some reform in the system through which, in our allied and protected States, the Bombay Government administers the paramount imperial power. On one hand, the Political Secretary is beset with numerous references and trivial details which, under the present rule, the Agents are in some cases not empowered and in others not competent to dispose of. On the other hand, in regard to many matters of great importance wherein the vital interests of native Chiefs and peoples are deeply concerned, they can scarcely

feel that they have a chance of fair hearing. Only very few of the Chiefs retain the ancient privilege of appearing before his Excellency in Council in person or by vakeel. In the great majority of cases claims or complaints from native States can only be heard by Government through its Political Secretary, and the course is to refer the application to be reported upon by the Political Agent of the State from which the document has been received. In most of these cases the Agent has already had a good deal to say in regard to the matter in hand, and has probably made up his mind on the subject before he receives the reference. Unless he be a decidedly superior man, his report must be biased by his foregone conclusion. The busy Government of Bombay or Poona reposes confidence in its Agent, and thus the native Chief, probably after interminable delay, finds he must rest content with an *ex parte* decision. . . . . .

What knowledge or information, we would ask, has been communicated to the various Rajahs, Thakoors, and Chiefs to the effect that it is intended to interpose another screen between them and the representative of Her Majesty—the fountain of honour and justice? . . . Native Chiefs are apt to cherish what may seem to us strange and exaggerated notions of their own dignity and consequence; they inherit an extreme jealousy for the maintenance of their own authority, and are keenly sensitive on all points of honour. These characteristics are very far from being altogether mischievous or absurd; they go to form the substratum on which a wise Government and a skilful political officer can mould a noble character and rear a permanent and beneficent policy. It might be a serious mistake to do anything which, by exciting indefinite suspicions, would mar this good work, that in many instances, from Kalapoor in the south of this Presidency to Kattywar in the north, is going steadily forward. We say, then, most earnestly, that no measure which affects the relations between independent Chiefs and the *Sircar* should be adopted without full notice and ample discussion. They are reasonable enough to accept any change that can be shown to be for their benefit, but they dislike changes that to them appear to be introduced merely for the sake of change. . . . . .

We have as yet scarcely the semblance of any political representative system in this country, for the native gentlemen who are summoned to our Councils are called to aid in legislation, and not in any political character. Hence, in regard to all changes that affect our feudatories and allies, we are almost bound to consult with them, and in some degree defer to their own views, before permanently deciding on a measure which will affect them so closely as the present proposal. . . . We cannot but feel apprehensive that opposition more or less intelligent will arise against it in every native durbar of this Presidency; and it would be wise for our honourable Councillors who still deliberate and govern from behind the *purdah* to consider very carefully whether any advantage sufficiently permanent and real can eventually be gained by persisting in a measure which is not unlikely to be very distasteful to those primarily affected by it. . . . . .

If we go northward to Kattywar, we find in Colonel Keatinge a Political Agent who has already realised all that could be done by the best devised Commissionership. He is, of course, formally subject to the Executive Government, and all that he does must be ratified by the central authority; but we imagine that were the references and political appeals from the rest of the Presidency of no greater proportionate importance than those from Kattywar, the Political Secretariat could not have required this scheme of Commissionerships for its relief. Colonel Keatinge is virtually, though not formally, the Commissioner of Kattywar, and the assistants under him—their energy and self-confidence having been evoked by contact with an earnest worker and a self-reliant man—are themselves Political Agents. It is in regard to the smaller charges of Kutch, Mhye Kanta, Pahlunpoor, Rewa Kanta, or Sawunt Waree, that the institution of a Political Commissioner might be a useful experiment, and the wide geographical distribution of those charges cannot necessarily be an objection when we remember what the Political Secretary gets through under the present system.

There are several other topics pertaining to this proposal for reform of the Political Agencies, but we cannot do more now than refer to one special suggestion in connection with the proposed Political Commissionerships which seems to us decidedly objectionable. We allude to the proposal to place the Political Agencies, or several of them, under the Revenue Commissioners, which, as it seems to us, would be a seriously retrograde step,

if not a fatal mistake. The task of revising the appeals from independent Chiefs, and settling the references from Political Agents, is one entirely incongruous with the whole course of a Revenue officer's training and duty. The two classes of public servants stand in diametrically opposite positions. Revenue officers are eminently fitted to supervise and control a body of executive subordinates; it is their *forte* to act promptly and efficiently, rather than to deliberate and weigh the claims of others. Political Agents have very few executive duties; they have to advise and prompt the native Chiefs to perform those governing tasks to which they are born; but besides all this, the Political Agent discharges grave judicial functions, and many of his decisions have force similar to the decrees of civil courts. As few of the Political Agents can boast of more than a superficial acquaintance with the principles of jurisprudence, it would be manifestly inconsistent to place them entirely under the final revision of the Revenue Commissioners, who, though generally capable men, are seldom remarkable for a judicial cast of mind, and are still less likely to appreciate many of the more delicate and critical questions which are so frequently being reviewed in the Political Department of the Local Government.—*Oct.* 31, 1867.

Political Agents and Revenue Commissioners.

II.—As the Local Government thinks it well worth while to do something towards reorganising or supplementing its Political Department, we may be pardoned for again inviting attention to the subject. The department itself, its agents, and their work are matters about which the general public troubles itself little—not necessarily from indifference, but because the native States, their relations to us, and the method in which those relations are conducted, are things removed from ordinary observation. A settled belief is generally held in the outer world that the internal administration of native States is continually going wrong, and it is supposed that only the presence of our Political Agents prevents anarchy and universal oppression. If there were but a reasonable modicum of truth in this exaggerated view of things, we should not need to say one word to enforce the very serious importance of everything connected with the constitution and working of the Political Department. Those who are tolerably acquainted with the ordinary sluggish and uneventful course of affairs in these allied and subordinate jurisdictions may, on the other hand, rather wonder that we cannot let well alone. It is sufficient to say in reply that as the Bombay Government is said to have taken into consideration a scheme for the reform of the department, it is well to take advantage of the occasion to raise a discussion on proceedings that have very great political and social influence, but which are generally beyond the congnisance of the European public.

There are under the supervision of the Bombay Government in its Political Department more than sixty officers. These include, respectively, the Resident at Baroda, the Scinde Frontier, Muscat, Bushire, Zanzibar, as well as the Agents at Kholapoor and Kattywar. But it is not of these that we now write, for the change contemplated by Government can only affect the smaller and, as the outside public would say, the insignificant Agencies. Nevertheless, there are probably a couple of millions of people whose public affairs—political, judicial, and administrative—it is proposed to take from under the immediate supervision of the Political Department of Government and place under that of the Revenue Commissioners. . . . . .

It will be demanded, What, then, do we propose instead, whereby the manifest weaknesses of the present system can be remedied? The first and essential step is to begin at the beginning by demanding different and higher qualifications in the Political Agents. Physical courage or military success, when they deserve recognition by the State, may find fitting rewards in the higher police appointments or in exceptional military promotion; but it is a grave mistake to make such qualities the pathway to the Political service, and it is still more reprehensible when that service is made a nursery ground for patronage and favouritism. The emoluments attached to these posts are generally sufficient to compensate men of training and culture specially adapted for the work, and men of this stamp should be directly encouraged to volunteer from the ranks of the Civil Service, or wherever else they can be found. In many instances none would perform the duties of a Political Agent better than would some of the more thoughtful of our (native) University *élèves*, after they had been tested for a while by the rough work of making their

own way in the world. But all applicants for Political service should pass through the strait gate of a close and appropriate departmental examination. In this, besides the indispensable linguistic attainments, some evidence of familiarity with the two Codes, and the methods of applying them, should be insisted upon. We desire Native Chiefs to imitate our systems of government and jurisprudence; and the least we can do towards this is to undertake that the men we impose on them as associates in the task of administration shall be familiar with our own systems, so that they may be likely to stimulate Native Princes into preference for the best and the highest principles of our rule. —*Nov.* 20, 1867.

EXACTIONS OF A KATTIAWAR CHIEF.

POREBUNDER stone we know a good deal about in Bombay, but few of us know or care much about the Rana of Porebunder, the ruler of the little tributary State where the quarries are situate, whence the stone is brought of which many mansions and towers of new Bombay are built. Though the said Rana is of little consequence in our eyes, his doings are very important to the subjects of his small State, amongst whom he is a veritable King Stork, who bids fair to snap up all men of any substance who dwell within reach of his beak. The Rana is of Rajpoot race; and, though something is said about a bar sinister in his 'scutcheon, the family is respectable enough, and there is no desire amongst his much enduring lieges to see the stock rooted up. There is, however, a very strong wish to have the present Rana dealt with—to have him placed on the shelf, and his power for mischief restrained; and of these wishes we believe the Bombay Government have had ample proof in the shape of memorials and petitions from the Rana's people, praying to the paramount Power for protection. Probably Colonel Keatinge has his keen eye upon the oppressive Prince; but nothing has yet been done, and we may properly draw attention to this long-standing abuse of authority on the part of our tributary. Had the Rana's whim taken the turn of annoying his neighbours, he, no doubt, would have been dealt with long ago; but as it is only his own subjects, and any luckless travellers who happen to cross his little territory that feel his exactions, he has been allowed a very considerable stretch of tether.

Did his subjects understand the important distinction that political economists draw between the results of a spendthrift's or a miser's career, they might derive consolation on behalf of the next generation; for it would seem the Rana's exactions all tend to the amassing of treasure, which, after he leaves it, may be turned to the advantage of the State some day. But the process is too painful to be endured with complacency; so the artisans and merchants are gradually deserting the little dominion, while the people who are tied to the place by property and family connections put up their complaints to the *Sircar*. . . . . .

We have given these details so that it may be seen to what extremes misgovernment may go in these small States when it has been allowed to get head-way. Though the proceedings of the Rana of Porebunder display a degree of perversity that almost indicates mental aberration, these exactions have been continued, as we are assured, during several years past. It cannot be that these things have wholly escaped the notice of the Political Agent. We are quite willing to believe that Colonel Keatinge, or the Bombay Government, may already have some plan devised for remedying the troubles of the people of Porebunder; but nothing whatever has yet been done, and, so far as we know, the paramount Power has given no sign that it is conscious of its responsibility. Our convictions in respect of the political and hereditary rights of our tributaries and allies are well known; but we disclaim with earnestness a policy which, under the term of non-interference in native States, is but an excuse for blind and stolid indifference—a policy which seems to have characterised the attitude long maintained by the Bombay Government towards the largest and most important native State in this Presidency. Letting Baroda pass for the present, Porebunder affords, if we mistake not, a striking instance in which the salutary influence of the paramount Power might be exerted with very beneficial effect. Those who are charged with these duties, and are fully informed of all the

facts, will know whether or not the Rana of Porebunder is incorrigible, and his case hopeless, and whether nothing can be done but to send him off to count his money in peace, so that he may be prevented from doing more harm. . . . . .

The practical question is, if the Bombay Government find it needful to suspend and pension off the Rana, who or what can they suitably set up in his stead? The eldest son of the Prince is said to be a confirmed opium-eater, and altogether very unpromising as a possible ruler. Perhaps, with efficient European assistance and supervision, the somewhat dissipated youth might come round to a proper sense of his duty; but there is less need to concentrate attention on the eldest son, for he has two brothers, and we understand the people of Porebunder do not strictly hold to primogeniture as an article of political faith. They do, however, hold with considerable tenacity to the family of the Rana; and though he has completely estranged himself from their respect, they would be filled with dismay were it proposed to set aside the ancient Rajpoot line. There can be no occasion for this, for either of the two younger Princes might be trained and fitted for the *gadi* (throne); but the present and most urgent question is one of administration. The Bombay Government cannot allow the misgovernment of the Porebunder State to drift on much longer, and action of some kind will have to be taken. Within a recent period a sort of vice-royalty has been set up in the Kattywar States of Rajkote and Limree, the chiefs of which are also Rajpoots, and in every way similar to the State of Porebunder. Some deputy ruler would now be eagerly welcomed in that State, and it seems to us that the latent resources of the district are such that there is an excellent opportunity for some wise and energetic man to do incalculable good, and carve for himself a name in that capacity.—*Nov.* 2, 1867.

KATTIAWAR BRIGANDS.

THE Wagheers—who, and what are they? and what is to be done with them? are questions very much more easy to ask than to answer. The discontents and the depredations of these Wagheers of Kattiawar alike demand that some practical solution should be found to those questions, for these bandits are a thorn in the side of our otherwise prosperous and contented Presidency. They have no spokesman, and we cannot here undertake to offer any adequate reply to the queries stated. In the first place, the information relating to the ethnology and history of the Wagheers is so scattered and confused, that it could not be intelligibly arranged except in a lengthy paper by one of the pundits of our Asiatic Society. As to the proper course that should be taken with them, and the most effectual methods for securing the peaceable and industrious villagers from their assaults, opinions differ with each new adviser. . . . . .

These Wagheers are not mere vermin to be hunted down. If they are an aboriginal rather than a Hindoo race, they are of a higher class than the Bheels, Pindarees, and Gonds, on whom many excellent officers have at one time or other spent the best efforts of their lives. Their rude declaration of war, quoted by our correspondent, indicates that they are not without strong sense of a sort, which men of the right stamp—like political officers of the olden time—could work upon with effect, were it possible fairly to approach these outlaws. Whether it might be an easier task to hunt them to death, and finally exterminate the whole race, or to get an adequate account of their grievance and provide some practical method of redress, we are not at present able to say. As "K." points out, no consistent plan has been followed; and though he seems rather to prefer the former of the two methods, we doubt not that he, or any one of perhaps half a dozen men thoroughly acquainted with Kattiawar, could devise some effectual method of dealing with the Wagheers as if they were rational beings. . . . Colonel Walker tried his hand on the turbulent district, and in 1809, after having taken one of their towns by assault, he went to Dwarka, where he made formal agreements with the Wadhels, Rajpoots, and Wagheers, who promised to pay certain compensation and to behave better in future. They are said to have broken through those agreements, and after various ineffectual attempts to get them to pay up the compensation, it was in 1815 resolved to deliver the district over to the Guicowar, who set great value on "it in consequence of its celebrity as a place of great sanctity amongst the Hindoos."

It is very likely this consideration had quite as much to do with the seizure of Okha as had the marauding dispositions of its people. They had a rude spirit of independence, and upset the Guicowar's forces a year or two afterwards, turning out a Mr. Hendly, who acted as his Resident or Agent. As the Guicowar had paid us the compensation ineffectually demanded from the poverty-stricken chiefs of Okhamundal, of course he must be reinstated, and in 1820 Colonel Stanhope was sent to retake the district. He had to carry Dwarka by assault, after a stiff struggle. It may be significant of the direct political connection between those events and the present brigandage that the Chief of Dwarka, who was then killed in defending his little mud-walled metropolis, bore the name of Mooloo Manik, the same as that of the principal outlawed freebooter who now harasses our feudatory State of Rajkote. This coincidence does not make the nuisance any less tolerable, but it might serve as a thread for some shrewd, strong man to trace his way out of the muddle into which this plague of Wagheerism has drifted. It seems very plain, as "K." says, that the Guicowar has kept his bargain very badly; and a just inquisition might show that the pilgrim revenues of Dwarka and Beyt would be more equitably bestowed on some industrial and agricultural scheme for reclaiming the Wagheers. There are—as in the cases of the Bheels in Khandeish, and the Boogtees in Sinde—numerous instances in which tribes, quite as unpromising as these very tough and active brigands, have ceased to be a terror to the peaceable ryot, and have themselves become useful members of the great British Indian State. A similar effectual victory over the dispossessed and despairing Wagheers is one of the many tasks which await the appointment of some wise, patient, and strong man as Commissioner of Kattiawar.—*Dec.* 19, 1867.

History of Dealing with Waghairs.

II.—Just before the recent fatal but successful fight at Machurda, in Kattywar, under Colonel W. Anderson and Major Reynolds, we had traced the political history of the Waghairs up to 1820, when Dwarka was stormed by Captain Stanhope, the Chief Mooloo Manik was killed, several noted Waghairs were captured and imprisoned, and Okhamundel was a second time made over to the Guicowar. It was in 1816 that the district was first made over to that potentate, on terms which—whilst eminently satisfactory to him and to us—did not ignore the rights of the Wagheer-Wadhel-Rajpoot chiefs of the district, for it was arranged they should receive certain periodical allowances. We have no information whether these allowances were adequate for their decent maintenance, whether they were heritable and perpetual or only pensions, or whether they were faithfully paid by the Guicowar and his *Koomavisdars*, or managers. It is manifest that the last question is all-important in any attempt to estimate such merits or traditionary reputation as the Waghair "cause" may have; and, so far as we can infer, it seems most probable that from the first the several managers of the Guicowar—who we believe were all farmers of the revenue—stinted the Okha chiefs of their stipends as closely as practicable. Undoubtedly these semi-Scythians were turbulent by nature; but as, the very next year after the bargain, Putranal Manik, of the *Bhayad* (brotherhood) of the Chief of Dwarka, "committed such excesses which were suppressed by a detachment of the Guicowar's troops with some difficulty," it is highly probable that this determined resistance was in consequence of some attempt to defraud the said Manik of what he deemed his dues. In the following year (1819) there seems to have been a general rising amongst the Okhamundel chiefs. Mr. Hendly, who represented the Guicowar, was turned out, and though troops were sent from Baroda, they had to negotiate with, instead of dragoon the Waghairs. In fact, the Guicowar was completely dispossessed; for after a conference between the chiefs of Okha with Captain Ballantyne at Joonaghur, the chiefs refused to surrender their sterile territory, or yield to the Guicowar possession of the revenue-yielding shrines of Dwarka and Beyt. These incidents are long since past, and perhaps few persons will think that they have any direct bearing on the disturbances and exigencies of to-day; but it strikes us that if history can throw any light upon this extraordinarily tenacious system of brigandage, it is at this very point. . . . . .

But again the question arises, why, before or at the time of the military advance in Okha, were not means taken to come to some terms with the Guicowar's disaffected pensioners and jaghedars, the Waghair leaders, who alone have formed the life strength

of outlawry in Kattywar? What response, for instance, was made to the pleading memorial which we quoted yesterday, in which the cheated and "harried" Waghair Chief appeals in terms of manly confidence to the representative of Her Majesty? We have found some difficulty in getting at this point, which has so intimate a connection with the political threads of this tangled web. It is satisfactory to find that the British officers personally concerned appeared to have done their duty in the matter; but it was altogether too late. There had lacked, during the weary years covered by the record of the Waghairs' wrongs, as cited in Jodha's petition, some superintending mind with foresight to perceive what must be the result of the irregularities and frauds practised by the wywutdars and agents of the Guicowar in Okhamundel. The memorial in question was forwarded to Captain Black, then First Assistant Political Agent in Kattywar, who replied at once to the Chief, and referred him to Captain Barton, the officer who had been appointed with full authority to act for the Baroda durbar. He was backed with force strong enough to reduce the province, and this, we believe, was in the very month that the memorial is dated. Whether he ever replied to Jodha Manik we cannot learn, but he issued a proclamation calling on the Waghairs to send an intelligent delegate to him. It is doubtful whether this document ever reached them; certainly it had no effect, and though Captain Barton was a British officer, he represented the Baroda durbar in which it had become impossible for the Waghair chiefs to repose any confidence whatever. It was to the representative of Her Majesty that Jodha Manik had appealed; but it was too late. No hope of amicable adjustment of grievances was then possible; he had to escape from Okha as a hunted fugitive, and, we believe, died in the jungle from exhaustion and exposure. Thus was lost an excellent opportunity of getting at the very root of Waghair disaffection, and we fear no other can ever recur.

The Bombay Government has not since that period restricted its efforts to the various plans for hunting down the Waghairs—which, as we have recently recounted, have so constantly proved abortive—but some intermittent attempts have been made to reclaim and settle the general banditti of Kattywar. Under Sir George Clerk, a plan similar to that which had proved so successful with the Bheels was arranged, by which the Guicowar entrusted the supervision of his affairs in Kattywar to two British officers under the Resident of Baroda. One of these officers, Major Johnstone, was employed to raise from amongst the Waghairs and their turbulent cousins a corps of 300 men for the defence and police of Okhamundel. This plan succeeded at once; and on occasion of the Guicowar's tour through his districts in 1862, the new defenders of order were paraded before him, when the Waghair leaders amongst them showed that they were by no means incorrigible, for with profound salaams they acknowledged His Highness as *Sircar*. We presume it is a similar organization that is now kept up under Lieut. William Scott, Commandant of the Guicowar's Corps, and who reports considerable success during the past year. Many of the aborigines of Okha, the Kheroos and Ahers, have returned to the province, and several of the Waghairs have again taken to cultivation, and have accepted patches of waste land that have been offered them. The partial success which has attended this policy affords sufficient reason for thinking that if it had been followed up more vigorously and extensively, and if more pains had been taken to offer to the Waghair chiefs a fair chance of restoration to the position guaranteed to them by us, in conjunction with the Guicowar, in 1816 and 1820, there would have been an effectual stop put to the brigandage before it could have resulted in the desperate fight at Machurda, with its deplorable results. It seems that since 1862 no sufficient pains have ever been taken by the Bombay Government to get at the political pith of the business, and therefore it is that we have to regret the virtual extermination of a race of valiant and extraordinarily energetic men. Of course the peace of Kattywar must be assured, peaceable inhabitants must be protected, and those who harbour banditti must be exposed and punished, whatever their position; but it would be mere senseless, blind fury for us to rush into a system of indiscriminate terrorism, as we observe is advocated in some quarters.—*Jan.* 22, 1868.

[Wagheers = Waghairs = Waghurs.]

COMPARATIVE MERITS—BRITISH AND NATIVE RULE.

THE years 1866-7 will be especially memorable in Anglo-Indian history as one of those periods in which there has been a large accession to the amount of exact information about India rendered available alike to the English community in India and the home public. Amidst a host of smaller publications which the activity of the new broom, Lord Cranborne, brought to light, such as the papers on the Mysore controversy, there are the voluminous reports drawn up by the (Orissa) Famine Commission, with all the minutes pertaining thereto; and now we have—also suggested by a remark of Lord Cranborne's—a volume of correspondence on "the Comparative Merits of British and Native Administration in India." These letters are contributed by members of both Services in all parts of India, all of whom have either held political appointments in native States, or high administrative posts, bringing them into contact with feudatory chiefs or recently annexed provinces. The volume contains a vast amount of information of a kind which all the Governments of India are far too chary of granting for publication. It is true that the various letters may be somewhat coloured by the leanings of the respective writers, but many of them give lists of official or historical works which will serve to confirm their own remarks, or supply that substratum of fact which so small a volume could not contain. In making selections for our columns, we have, from amongst others of perhaps equal interest, placed at the head one relating to our own Presidency, written by a gentleman of the Bombay Civil Service, who had the great advantage of being brought up at the feet, so to speak, of that excellent political Gamaliel—Sir George Clerk. We give also Sir Richard Temple's paper, which, if not the most comprehensive, is doubtless one of the most readable of the whole set; also the able contribution of Mr. R. H. Davies, Chief Commissioner of Oudh.

These papers must necessarily be read under the rubric which Mr. Wyllie, of the Foreign Office, has indited for them under the behests of his Excellency the Viceroy. It will be seen that the circular invites proofs of a foregone conclusion; and therefore, like novels "with a purpose," the compilation loses somewhat in literary and intrinsic value. The Viceroy proposes the theorem that "the masses of the people are incontestably more prosperous and far more happy in British territory than they are under native rulers."* It will please us all if this be demonstrated in the volume before us; but it would have been every way more satisfactory if the *q. e. d.* had been involuntarily evolved by the free discussion of this deeply interesting subject, which in this volume is "set in the light of many minds." Moreover, it is not quite fair to Lord Cranborne himself to make an unquoted remark of his the theme for a dissertation on a text set by another. We therefore venture to supply the omission of the Simla Foreign Office, and will here quote the passage of his Lordship's speech in last June. It will be observed that Lord Cranborne's interrogatory and suggestive propositions are at once more precise and more comprehensive than the "copy slip" set by our chief preceptor in this country. The following is the passage, and we trust that readers of the correspondence will fully bear it in mind, though the writers could not be expected to do so:—

"If Oudh could be quoted against the native Governments, he feared that in a few days hon. members, with the report on the Orissa famine in their hands, would find a more terrible example to be adduced against the English rule. The fact was that the faults of the two systems were of an entirely different kind. The British Government was never guilty of the violence and illegality practised by native rulers, but it had faults which, though far more guiltless in intention, were far more terrible in effect. A listless, heavy heedlessness, the fear of responsibility, extreme centralisation—all these causes not traceable to the moral fault of any man, yet often combining to produce a considerable amount of inefficiency, and, if reinforced by natural causes, creating a terrible amount of misery—must be taken into consideration when comparing the elaborate and artificial English system with the rough and ready methods of native government. . . . . —*Dec.* 21, 1867.

* It may be well to mention that this set of quasi-confidential reports, though now very scarce, is still accessible, and may be serviceable to the historian or political investigator. As to the rubric alluded to, in the sentence quoted, and following the word "happy," as above, there was inserted, in one version of the official instructions, the phrase *sua si bona norint*—a suggestive cue which gave rise to some bantering criticism.

MR. SETON-KARR'S APPOINTMENT.

THE office of Foreign Secretary under the Government of India is one of which the nature and scope must considerably puzzle an ordinary home politician. And yet such an observer, when he came to inquire into the functions and powers of the Indian Foreign Secretary, would speedily be convinced that the internal repose of this empire and its general political security are more dependent on the efficient discharge of the duties of that office than of any other single department of the Viceroy's Government. Hence we have watched with some interest for the appointment of Sir Richard Temple's successor, and, in common with many of our contemporaries, have been somewhat surprised by the Viceroy's selection of Mr. Seton-Karr, of the Bengal Civil Service. We would express disappointment also, were it not that such confession would imply that we had some candidate of our own in view, or that even now we could at once point to some better man for the post who would also have been likely to accept it. That is not in any way the case. It is purely on abstract and general grounds that, to a certain extent, we coincide with the objections, all but universally entertained, respecting the recent nomination to the most important of the Indian bureaux. These objections were expressed somewhat strongly in our Saturday's letter from Calcutta; and if we quote some of them, it will enable us more easily to show how far we agree with, and where we differ from, other critics of this nomination. . . . If we are not mistaken, Mr. Seton-Karr incurred some odium by sanctioning or permitting the publication of the once famous *Nil-Durpan* papers; but that we can only regard as a very venial error, and one that leaned to virtue's side; at any rate, it did not stand in the way of his elevation to the judicial bench, it being soon after those occurrences that he was nominated a Judge of the Calcutta High Court by Sir Charles Wood. And here we cannot help thinking that some of the keener and more personal criticisms that have been directed against Mr. Seton-Karr are prompted by animosities which date back from the embittered contests of that period. If we remember aright, he did, in a somewhat prominent manner, espouse the cause of the defenceless ryot, and join hands in resisting the grasping landlord and planter interest. The Calcutta press is not likely to forget the men by whom it was worsted in that great social struggle. And even were the particular facts forgotten, the instinct of the colonial party would not fail it in seizing any opportunity to denounce or disparage one who has ever successfully vindicated the rights and claims of the dumb masses against the aggressive and would-be dominant few.

But after all that may fairly be said in favour of Mr. Seton-Karr—his great personal abilities and his previous successful career—we find little to commend his being selected for the Foreign Office. We may be reminded that in Lord Dalhousie's time he was Under-Secretary in the same office, and that at that time he proved his ability in various important documents afterwards acknowledged as from his pen. The antecedent rather weighs against than in favour of Mr. Seton-Karr's appointment to the Foreign Office. We do not dispute the ability of the then Under-Secretary any more than we do the high talent of his great preceptor, but we cherish a profound distrust of the training then received. This distrust is by no means lessened by the tolerably notorious *rapprochement* —referred to by our Calcutta correspondent—between Mr. Seton-Karr and the journal of Serampore. We shall lose the Viceroy too soon, and above all other services that he could do for India before his departure would be that he should thoroughly purge the Foreign Office from the kindred vices of political covetousness within our borders, and craven distrust of the remote and much-hampered rival far beyond our North-west frontier.

We wish the recent appointment afforded more assurance on this point; but it rather indicates a danger of drifting back towards the evil traditions of the Foreign Office. Without, however, laying stress on doubtful or disputable objections, it is sufficient, and to our minds decisive, condemnation of the nomination of Mr. Seton-Karr to the Foreign Office—that he has never been employed out of Bengal. There may be an excuse that suitable men are scarce; but India is wide, so that stronger and broader men could have been found. The excuse is no justification for the appointment of a Civilian of provincial training only, who has never felt the strong pulses of native political feeling which yet lives in India, who has never been brought face to face with the Chiefs, many of whom have to feel that the destiny of their dynasty and the political future of their race lies in the hands of the Foreign Secretary.—*May* 5, 1868.

II.—It seemed to be taken for granted by the press on the other side of India that Mr. Seton-Karr, in going home on leave from the Foreign Secretaryship, is leaving India for good and all. . . . Considering the vehemence with which Mr. Seton-Karr's appointment to the Foreign Office was denounced by our eastern brethren generally, he may congratulate himself on being let down so gently by them after his two years' tenure of the post for which so few deemed him to be fitted. Though we took occasion to rebuke some of the partisan animosity which his appointment aroused—dating apparently from the time of the Indigo disturbances, when Mr. Seton-Karr withstood the violence of the planting interests—he did not seem to us as the right man for any protracted tenure of that difficult post. His early indoctrination as Under-Secretary with the maxims of the rough-shod Dalhousian school, out of date during the last ten years, and his want of acquaintance with the diplomatic Persian—so indispensable to the right understanding of our position towards all Mussulman states as well as Hindoo powers once feudatory to Delhi—are disqualifications which the Foreign Secretary must himself have keenly felt. Happily, the times have been such as to afford little chance for blundering in the conduct of our political affairs. The Secretary, under the later years of Sir John's tenure of office, could not have gone far wrong, even had he been wrong-headed himself—a characterisation we scarcely think that Mr. Seton-Karr has ever merited. The late Viceroy, who in the conduct of political relations, both within and without, was of late years "wiser than he knew," kept a firm hand on the Foreign Office, so that the Secretary could not well err in that direction to which he might have been prone under an imported Viceroy. As it is, Mr. Seton-Karr's conduct of his functions there may have been slightly ostentatious: he leans to peremptory mannerisms and a weakness for imposing on native States little cut and dry constitutions and Europeanised forms. These peculiarities might serve a little to irritate and perplex some of the Chiefs; but, under the vigilant control of the real director of affairs, and in recent times of repose, the political inaptitudes of the pure Bengal Civilian in charge of the office had not scope for much mischief. If Mr. Seton-Karr should return to the post, which, according to the new rules, he will be able to keep hold of for two years, it will be under conditions very different from those obtaining during his past administration of it.—1869.

JINJEERA.

THE little political *coup*, to the scheme of which, a fortnight ago, we referred indefinitely, has now been accomplished. Mr. Havelock, an experienced Civil officer of the Bombay Government, under its orders and in pursuance of general directions from the Foreign Office at Simla, has, without leave asked, presented himself before the Hubshee —"His Excellency Seedee Ibrahim Khan Yacoob Khan, Nawab of Jinjeera,"—demanding that he should receive and entertain, at his own cost, a resident Agent from the Bombay Government, into whose hands should be placed the whole of the criminal jurisdiction hitherto exercised by the said Hubshee in the fort and territory of Jinjeera and Rajpoori. This has been done. On Tuesday last, Mr. Havelock returned in the *May Frere*, having delivered the *khureeta* from H.E. Sir Seymour Fitzgerald—virtually a mandate of deposition—and having installed as *de facto* chief ruler of the Jinjeera principality a certain Mr. J. B. Larcom, hitherto unknown to fame, but a gentleman in whom the Bombay Government, accepting the recommendation of the Viceroy, reposes confidence as qualified for the invidious task committed to him. . . . Whilst leaving the new British Agent to feel his way in the little mediæval state thus somewhat rudely opened to the stimulating effects of a modern police system and the enlightening influences of the Penal Code, we may inquire how all this has happened to our ally, the Hubshee, with whose predecessors, 136 years ago, a former Governor of Bombay entered into "an alliance offensive and defensive," "for to establish upon a firm and lasting foundation a perpetual alliance and sincere friendship betwixt the Government of Jinjeera and Bombay." . . . . . .

We have, in effect, acknowledged the full independence of the Hubshee, which is, by strict political right, quite as complete, and, in some respects, more so than that of the Guicowar, Scindiah, or the Nizam; although, being a "petty state," we stopped the mint of Jinjeera in 1834, which we should not think of doing in any of the three larger kingdoms just named.—*Nov.* 9, 1869.

II.—On Tuesday we broke off our account of the Jinjeera State at the point where, having stoutly maintained its independence against the Mahrattas, it was left in undisturbed possession, and the Hubshee, in the spirit of the Treaty of 1733, was regarded as our ally on terms of political equality. And now, let us inquire how it is that, apparently at a single blow, the Government of India destroys the political existence of this little kingdom, and tears up the treaty of "perpetual alliance and sincere friendship betwixt the Governments of Jinjeera and Bombay." Here a little retrospect is again needed. The territory being in such close proximity with our Tanna districts, and occupying a part of the coast where shipwrecks not unfrequently take place, it was only to be expected that occasional disputes should arise between the two jurisdictions. Like many of the Kattiawar chiefs, the Hubshee held tenaciously, and his people still more so, to their ancient rights as wreckers, thinking themselves entitled to whatever property the good-will of Allah might drift to their shores. In 1843, in the case of a pattimar thrown on the coast, the late Hubshee claimed his half share as of manorial right. We do not gather how that was settled; but in 1855 the Bombay Government levied Rs. 50,000 on the Jinjeera treasury as restitution for the wreck and cargo of the *Nusseer*, a native vessel that had been plundered without stint after the old Cornish fashion. The Hubshee's people have always resented intrusion into their forts by strangers; but in 1860 they carried this jealousy too far, in beating off a boat's crew under Lieut. Williams, engaged in surveying the coast below Alibaugh. For this the Chief was sharply called to account by Sir George Clerk, and the survey was renewed, the Hubshee, we dare say, expressing proper contrition and promising not to permit again any such unneighbourly conduct. In all these incidents—though objectionable enough, like many other doings in semi-civilised States—there was nothing amounting to political ill-will on the Hubshee's part, or deliberate violation by him of the treaty of alliance between us. . . . . .

The present proceeding against the Hubshee, which has entirely superseded his criminal jurisdiction, thereby virtually deposing him, is an exercise of our paramount power pure and simple. As such, it might do to satisfy those who consider that we have scarcely sufficient to do in governing British territories, but must needs make ourselves responsible for securing to every community within the geographical limits of India the blessing of the Penal Code, and the immunities afforded by the principles of jurisprudence according to a European standard. This view of our onerous responsibility, and the obligation of the Hubshee to guide his domestic polity in accordance therewith, were duly set forth in a very high and mighty *khureeta* forwarded early in 1867 to Jinjeera by the Political Agent at Tanna, embodying or quoting a cut-and-dry lecture from the Viceroy, or, rather, the Foreign Secretary, which concluded with ominous threats as to what should befall H.E. Seedee Ibrahim Khan in case of his continuing—as his fathers had done before him, and the Koran enjoins—to dispense justice himself, according to his own lights and at the bidding of his own unaided or, as we say, arbitrary will.

There can be no satisfactory defence of the Hubshee, or of his government, in respect of the particular occurrence which has brought him the visit from Mr. Havelock, and the recent installation of a British Agent. . . . . .

Thus, as we have said, the proceedings taken against the Hubshee rest entirely upon our supposed right and duty to interfere in the affairs of his internal administration. There is no breach of alliance or neighbourly conduct by him on which so sweeping a measure could be justified. But it may for the present be granted that, though we have no treaty claims to interfere, our position as a civilised and paramount power required some adequate measures being taken to protect the Hubshee's people from arbitrary jurisdiction and possible barbaric treatment under the name of law. The practical question is, have the best means been taken to secure the good end the Viceroy professes to have in view? This cannot be answered in the affirmative. The most rough and ready and artificial method possible has been taken, and precisely that course has been adopted which is most likely to extinguish any elements of internal reformation or political life there might be in the little State. The police officer appointed to perform these curious political functions may be exceptionally intelligent; it is said he knows something of Persia, and has had some experience, possibly, amongst Mussulmans in the Punjab; but at Jinjeera he will be an alien engaged in forcing on an unwilling people a legal system which they cannot comprehend. The Mussulmans in this Presidency are not as a body distinguished for intelligence or political aptitude; but some educated Mohammedan might have been found

who . . . could gradually have led the Hubshee and his advisers into a natural and intelligent adoption of a civilised system of administration. That would have been to follow a constructive policy, and to introduce a self-acting force; what we have done is disintegrating and destructive. It is a clumsy proceeding, without any political method whatever. Nor does it derive any justification from the chance circumstance that, owing to some internal dissensions, the Hubshee himself—"being at all times willing to obey the behests of the sublime British Government"—expresses himself ready to allow Mr. Larcom to rule in his stead for a while.—*Nov.* 12, 1869.

JINJEERA AND BRITISH POWER.

III.—Our local contemporary, in the opening sentence of his Saturday's article—which sentence is characterised by gross misrepresentation, or an abuse of rhetorical license, which you please—tells his readers that we "have undertaken the championship of the Hubshee." This, as our own readers know, is quite untrue, or, let us say, incorrect, for some allowance must be made for an excited antagonist. What we have done has been to explain, with the fulness that seemed due, the curious political and historical interest of the subject of the relations of the Jinjeera State to the British Government. It seemed likely enough that, whilst informing the public what has recently been done at Jinjeera, we might interest many who care no more for politics than did the "needy knife-grinder." . . . Jinjeera is a very little dominion, which we made duly apparent in our statement; but our contemporary knows nothing of the art of tracing the great in the minute, of illustrating great principles by little incidents. This being so, we can only advise him to live and learn, although we apprehend this philosophy, so strange to him in regard to small States and insignificant Princes in India, would be familiar and rational if applied to Luxemburg or Schleswig-Holstein. But this inability to appreciate the small politics of India gives our contemporary no license to indulge in the misrepresentation that with us "the British Government must always, or nearly always, be in the wrong;" or that we have championed the Hubshee. There was, in this instance, no question raised as to the misdoing of the Jinjeera Chief, but it was the wisdom or otherwise of the course followed by the Bombay Government, acting under the third-rate Dalhousianism of Mr. Seton-Karr. . . . Our critic is quite welcome to the chaff about the "curious machine," as he terms the educated Mohammedan, who, if a suitable one could have been caught, we think should have been sent to Jinjeera; but we suppose it is generally known that the said State is a Mussulman one if it is anything, and should have been treated accordingly. As to the concluding sentence, in which there is again the hackneyed misrepresentation that we wish "to get rid of the English power in India as fast as possible," that is quite a delusion of our contemporary's. We desire to retain the British power in India to the remotest day that it can be useful to rulers and ruled. It is the "masters of India" policy, affected by the *Gazette*, which, if it had not been long since "scotched," would ere this have made India a burden and a peril to England.—*Nov.* 15, 1869.

THE SIRDARS AND THE HUBSHEE.

IV.—Notwithstanding its onerous task of defending the French Emperor's big war, our Allahabad contemporary found time the other day to dabble in the politics of Jinjeera. It was not a deep plunge, certainly; but as the diver made a great discovery immediately below the surface, why should he trouble himself to search further amongst the scanty political records of the Hubshees? In short, the *Pioneer* finds at once that our Treaty of alliance against Angria Colaba in 1733 was made with the Seedee Sirdars of Jinjerra, and not with the Nawab or Hubshee in chief. Why, then, should not the present dusky nobles of Rajpuri be regarded as having sovereign rights, and their lively doings three months back, in despite of the British flag, be not only looked upon with indulgence, but their little essay in king-making accepted as a grave act of state? We put it in this way because such a policy would be the proper sequence from the premises laid down and the conclusions jumped at by our mofussil contemporary. Moreover, contrary to his latest information as to the facts of the case, the way is still open for the installation of the seven Sirdars on seven thrones, and—if the *Pioneer* political desires such a scenic tableau—their investiture each with seven seals, "the brand-new Nawab" being set up in the centre. Due space might also be found for the British Resident, under whose mild sway the little revolution of last April was so neatly carried through in the island-fortress. The

fact seems to be that those seven Seedee Sirdars of 1733 and their seven seals (we can't help the alliteration) have carried captive the imagination of our Allahabad contemporary, or that of his *precis* provider. In his mind's eye he sees only the seven "heads of the state" still sitting—until their expulsion the other day—ruling in Jinjeera as absolute as the brave maritime chiefs of 140 years ago.

Let us assure him that all he has built on the historical fact of the Treaty of 1733 is but a myth; even the description of the situation with which he opens his paragraph is quite incorrect. How far we "have appointed officers to posts criminal and judicial" may be known, if anyone cares to inquire, perhaps during next session of Parliament—for the authorities here never divulge such grave State secrets—but our impression is, that, beyond sending over a batch of policemen from Tanna, converting a smart police-officer into a "political," and admonishing the Collector of Alibaugh to support him with such advice as may be needful, there has been no appointing of "officers to posts criminal and judicial." If it were not that the *Pioneer's* paragraph, like Mr. Charles Reade's recent story, is "written with a purpose," we should think he had thrown in this phrase by way of satirising the Foreign Office for its too facile exercise of patronage. But in writing, "We have expelled the Seedee Sirdars and their brand-new Nawab," our contemporary runs astray entirely. Here is a fatal mistake between singular and plural, induced, no doubt, by the apocalyptic refrain running in the *Pioneer's* head about the seven Sirdars and seven seals. The fact is, that a certain Sirdar was expelled, and that, too, with short shrift. . . . . .

Since we stepped into the shoes of the Peishwa, we have always dealt with the Hubshee as sole head of the State—his internal power being, no doubt, modified, as that of other Mussulman Princes, by more or less of deference to his council or Sirdars, but he remaining the sovereign representative of the State, with whom alone the British Government could deal in the way of negotiation or repression. The present Nawab, if we remember right, has been treated as such by the Bombay Government for more than fourteen years, and it would be both puerile and pedantic, at this time of day, to set about an investigation into his title or the constitution of his State. He has doubtless on several occasions acted, or allowed his officers to act, in capricious and, perhaps, barbarous fashion; but his principal excuse—a bad one at best—has been that he was beset and pestered to distraction by these very Sirdars whom our Allahabad contemporary desires should be "let alone." The Bombay Government decided that the Hubshee should be taken in hand, with a view to bring about good order in his narrow but turbulent dominion. Had this design been carried out with an ordinary common-sense adaptation of means to ends, we should have heard no more about Jinjeera or the Creek of Rajpuri, until the Hubshee, being purged of his offences, had returned to his reformed kingdom. But the policy which the *Pioneer* now advocates—that of letting those plotting Sirdars have their own way—has, in effect, already been followed, and we see what has come of it. The mistake has, we must infer, been corrected since Mr. Havelock's last investigation, and probably some little effort is being now made towards providing the Hubshee with a modern administrative organisation.—*Aug.* 10, 1870.

TRANSFERRING BERAR TO BOMBAY.

A FEW years back there might be noticed an impotent, and certainly a very mistimed, ebullition of the old—though, perhaps, yet latent—political covetousness for which a certain weekly journal on the other side of India has always been notorious. We allude to the insinuating proposal that the province of Berar "should be placed under the Government of the Bombay Presidency." . . . This ill-favoured little scheme for annexing the Berars to Bombay was put forward, too, at a moment when, if any heed could have been given to it at all, it must be pronounced as in the worst possible taste. The distinguished statesman who, whilst loyal to his own master, the late Nizam, has always been faithful to the imperial paramount power, had, at Khangaum, just met and had been received in befitting state by the Viceroy, the successor of the great Mogul from whom the "Soubadar of the Deccan" originally derived his authority. Sir Salar Jung, in his few modest and pointed remarks on that occasion, after alluding to "the alliance and long-existing friendship between the two Governments," had publicly assured Lord Mayo that the same policy would be followed, adding significantly—"with the hope that

we shall obtain the aid and support of the British Government in accordance with our rights, and in all that is reasonable, just, and fitting."

Coming on the heels of this frank and dignified declaration from the representative of the Nizam, the shameless pretence that our too tardy fulfilment of the existing treaty gives us "a right to press" for its being abrogated in our favour, and the cunning suggestion "to buy off the right of Hyderabad to the surplus," present somewhat odious comparisons to those who take note of them. A few close observers might do this; but it is a healthful sign of the times that public opinion treats with indifference or contempt any stray hints in favour of such reactionary policy. . . . . .

The desire to effect this transfer—setting aside its mercenary and politically immoral character—could only commend itself to those minds which are unable to conceive of a true Imperial policy in India. Their notions of political strength are bound up with sameness of system, mere continuity and extent of territory. They have no eyes to see that, as beauty and fitness are only found in variety, so national strength, and the free, secure movements of natural political life consist only with diversity and apposite contrasts. We want to lead the native States of India on to something better; but we shall not do this by "buying up their surpluses" or setting back their boundaries, just to suit our commercial or administrative experience. And we ourselves have yet something to learn. This is not a time to make any loud boast of our success. We are doing good work in the Berars, but let us not assume to have *created* the fertile cotton soil. It is quite possible that Sir Salar Jung, though in some respects he has been a pupil of ours, may yet have a good deal to teach us. Coming to the lowest test, that of pecuniary success, there are, in the quotation we have just given, certain points of contrast between the financial position of the Berars and that of British India at large which some of our capable and thoughtful men would do well to ponder.—*May*, 1870.

NUZZERANA—ANCIENT CUSTOMS AND MODERN EXACTIONS.

WHAT is known amongst Indian "Politicals" as the *Nuzzerana* question, has a history which is by no means easy to be traced. It is, also, a subject which, because of its cross-bearings on revenue exigencies on one hand and political principles on the other, is not one that can be very concisely treated in aid of popular apprehension. Those who have, from time to time, been able to notice the very irregular progress of these proposals for introducing a new system of feudal "reliefs" and "fines" to be levied on certain classes of Indian Princes and Chiefs, do not find any difficulty in expressing very decided opinions on the general merits of the scheme. This we have done, incidentally, at various times; but without being permitted to refer the public to definite and authenticated data, we could not expect them to take that interest in the subject that its importance demands. In the course of the year 1868, there was published in the *Gazette of India* a brief extract from the "proceedings of the Government of India," which comprised a too concise statement of what had, up to that date, been done in this matter behind the *purdah*. This paper included certain "rules" (with their exceptions) for the levy of these quasi-feudal succession duties; and the scheme was by its bureaucratic framers evidently regarded as completed. Probably, also, they considered it very symmetrical, and an admirable piece of handicraft. The resolution that accompanied this sketch directed its promulgation, and called for returns from the subordinate administrations of all the Chiefs within their paramountry whom the meshes of the new drag-net would secure, and also of those either big enough to break it, or already toned down by previous tributes so far as to allow of their escaping from the fishers of the Foreign Office. There was also an "order" in the same paper which called for further information, and referred to other papers relating to jaghires in the Bombay Presidency. The whole of this communication is comprised in about a couple of pages of the usual large official print; and we believe that paper describes all that the public have had any opportunity of definitely knowing respecting an Indian political question which, in principle, is of all but the most vital importance. It is true that a certain journal which has ever been the eager advocate of whatever might discredit or depress the native Chiefs and aristocracy of India was about the same time permitted, or took leave, to give its partisan version of the

proposals, and to array the scheme in a garb of its own making. This did nothing to inform the public mind on the subject. It only served to show that there is still a strong and unteachable party in Eastern India who, unable to comprehend the political questions of the Mutiny, are ever ready to fritter away ancient rights which Her Majesty has guaranteed, and to throw discredit on some of the most unequivocal declarations of Indian state policy. . . . . .

Having indicated the present position of this measure so far as that admits being defined, we may glance at some stages in its earlier history. So long since as 1843-4 the Lieutenant-Governor of the N.W. Provinces proposed to levy succession dues on jaghirdars inheriting in direct line. The Honourable Court would not hear of it, and directed the levy already made in one jaghir to be refunded. They added that in the Bombay Presidency, where such minor chiefs were far more numerous, they had always negatived such proposals as affecting lineal heirs, but had permitted the levy on succession by adoption. In 1860, Sir Richmond Shakespear, then Governor-General's Agent for Central India, forwarded to Government a list of jaghirdars *and Chiefs* in Bundlecund, and recommended that a system of feudal "relief" should be adopted, whereby on succession to their estates they would be made to pay from one quarter to one year's revenue. The Foreign Office was busy in those days, and it was not until March, 1862, that Sir Richmond received a final reply to his proposition. Then the Foreign Secretary took him at his word, and sent a batch of 31 "sunnuds" and directed the levy of "reliefs" on succession by adoption or by collaterals. A certain sum was to be levied also on direct successions; but this was limited to one quarter's revenue, and in the case of adoptions, the dues were not to exceed half a year's income. It is not needful to trace intermediate instances wherein the subject was discussed. In April, 1867, it was taken up by Sir Stafford Northcote in reply to an application from the Bombay Government respecting the Vinchorkur jagheers. The Secretary of State's review of the whole question in this despatch is tolerably comprehensive, but, as we gather, not particularly exact. Commencing with jaghires and jaghirdars, it glides on to speak of Chiefs—including those who received Lord Canning's adoption sunnuds—but without, apparently, taking the slightest notice of the essential political distinction between the two classes—one, consisting merely of esquires, of grantees of estates; the other, barons with independent hereditary jurisdiction. Whether this fatal oversight was favoured by any looseness of expression in certain letters from the Bombay Government on the adoption question—which went forward in 1862, and again in 1864—we are not able to say; but it is evident that the conclusions since arrived at may have been greatly vitiated for want of clear political discrimination in the very inception of the final discussion which resulted in the rules that are now found so difficult of application. . . . One of the primary exceptions laid down by the Government of India was, that "treaty States" were to be excluded from the new levy. This, and other exceptions relating to existing tributes, had the effect of clearing off many native States from the list, more especially in Eastern and Southern India. Were the first of these exceptions fairly applied in the Bombay Presidency, it is probable that the discussion would never have assumed the dimensions of a grave public question. The Bombay Government, along with most other administrations, gave in a general adhesion to the plan; but it is evident that this Government regarded the scheme as applicable mainly, if not wholly, to the non-political squires and smaller chieftains—to *estates*, and not to *States*. This distinction, which it would naturally be supposed was roughly marked off by the expression "treaty States," has not been found maintainable under the rules when issued in their final form in 1868. Those rules, as we have intimated, purport to be based on the replies received in response to the circular of June, 1867, taken in conjunction with the Secretary of State's tentative and sketchy reviews of the question. Since the 1868 rules were published and circulated, it has been sought to obtain a complete list of native States and jaghirs which fall under their operation. We are not aware what progress has been made towards this end.

It is probable, we think, that the whole scheme may have to undergo revision; though this is not the view of the Government of India, which regards the question as finally settled. It is one comprising many topics of political, historical, and juridical interest. But we regard the *fiasco* in which the Government of India's scheme is likely to result as another signal instance of the utter impossibility of governing all India from one remote centre, and under one system of uniform rigid rules.—*July* 28, 1870.

FRASER AND THE NATIVE STATES.

SO many and such great advantages might arise to England and India from the people of the former being able to "put themselves in the place" of those in this country in reference to all public measures, that efforts towards inducing such a fellow-feeling must be commended, though writers use strained analogies and extravagant metaphors. But when this fair literary device is adopted to advocate a private notion of the writer's, and when, under cover of giving our cousins at home new sensations about Indian history and politics, he seeks to suggest a sweeping scheme of spoliation and political treachery, the public should be warned against the fascination. We make these remarks in reference to the article in *Fraser* of January which is now being passed through our extract columns. It is by no means a violent supposition that to the Hindoo of the date of Job Charnock, or our President Vaux at Surat, the factors and their followers might appear as strange and lunatic as to the English would have seemed an army of immigrants from the moon, who should have abolished the High Court of Parliament, placed their leader (thereto the Man in the Moon) in Buckingham Palace, sent Viceroys to Scotland and Ireland, set up Collectors of Customs at London, Bristol, and Liverpool, and established Deputy Lieutenants in every county from which they could contrive to elbow the British squirearchy. But to make such a parable one of sustained interest, and suitable as an introduction to any useful argument on questions of policy, it should be drawn in something like parallel lines with consecutive history; and whilst fiction is on hand, the controversialist should not get the upper hand of the fabulist. All the faults of manner indicated here have been committed by the writer in *Fraser*. The career of Warren Hastings and the policy of Marquis Wellesley, the douce but vigilant and generous course of the Company, the grasping and capricious tactics of the Board of Control, seem to be pressed into service, not as a mere chequered story, but to serve the special purpose of the author. And further to mystify the home reader, the revenue and settlement controversies in the most confused period of Anglo-Indian history, or just that portion of them suited to the writer's notions, are presented in juxtaposition with the incidents of the financial panic of 1869, the "cracks" in the Public Works Department, and the now expiring Mayo-Temple levy. This slap-dash style of scene painting is not adapted without subtile design; for the story of the "Lunars and Mundanes" is a novelette with a purpose—and, as it strikes us, politically speaking, a malevolent purpose. . . . . .

We do not assume that the writer in *Fraser* and Mr. Seton-Karr are identical, but both are in the same position, and equally disqualified for dealing with Indian politics proper. In the *Fraser* article we have the hard, unsympathetic temper which can never comprehend the Oriental mind, and utterly prevents the writer from realising the nature of the relation between prince and people. In every paragraph it may be observed that the writer is wholly destitute of the political sense, as where he lets it be seen that he has scarcely a glimmering perception of the essential distinction between a revenue collector like a zemindar, and a sovereign prince or hereditary chief.

We do not at present propose to follow the *Fraser* writer in his desperate but skilful effort to reopen a controversy that was closed with the issue of the Queen's Proclamation, or rather with its ratification by the Secretary of State's righteous decision in favour of maintaining the sovereignty of Mysore. But as we are giving the clever and mischievous article in our columns, it is only fair that we should sound a note of warning. It cannot be supposed that the *Fraser* writer is to be the herald of a total revolution in Indian policy; but there is material enough in the article to spread unrest and suspicion from one end of the land to the other. The promulgation of a cold, selfish, and virulent policy, like this shadowed forth in the article before us, would on *one condition* be sufficient to fill all the remaining term of Lord Mayo's reign with wearing anxiety and thankless, fruitless effort; to swell our military expenditure to the dimensions of another deficit and income tax, with all its manifold evils; and to cast discredit on the good faith of the English Crown. But what is that condition which would make of this sophistical and exaggerated article a grave political portent? Why, that there should be some influential person or party connected with the Indian Government who would be likely to accept and coalesce with the evil counsels of the *Fraser* writer. But we do not believe there is.

What is it, in brief, that the writer proposes? He wishes to abolish the "deficit," and to establish an equilibrium for all time; and he points out that this may be done by

transforming the native Princes into idle pensioners, disbanding their troops and our native army, and sweeping all the revenues of their territories into the net of our Finance Minister. . . . . .

It is possible that the *Fraser* article has been purposely exaggerated in its scope, in order to secure a hearing for a modified scheme—namely, the levy of contributions from native States towards the present enormous military expenditure which the Horse Guards officials think it desirable that India should maintain. Some writers who look only at the money payments made by our allies and feudatories may be seduced into supporting the project which the *Fraser* writer really hopes to carry under cover of his "Lunar" threat; but those writers must remember that the tributes and payments according to treaties are only balances of huge transactions which it will be far more expedient for us to leave undisturbed.—*Feb.* 3, 1871.

TRIBUTES AND TREATIES.

UNDER the head of "Tribute from Native States" and "Military Forces in Native States" two correspondents in another column touch on a very large question, though necessarily in a partially tentative fashion. There is, indeed, no room for misapprehending the drift of their suggestions; and "Bapoo," as befits the state and condition of life to which he has been called, is very practical in the way of dealing with the subject, also, if we may add without offence, decidedly superficial. However, as his conclusions are virtually the same as those arrived at through more careful elaboration by "W. A. E. B."—whose former letter on the subject was a clear, well reasoned statement—we may treat both as in the same category. They run in the same groove as the writer of the article in *Fraser* of January; so "Bapoo," having been in such distinguished company, may pass for a big man in his *gaum;* but before he next essays to use "his mark," he must get some pundit to read a little history to him. He need not run the risk of mystifying his rustic wits by diving into the depths of Manu or the Ramayana; such plain books as some of the "Selections from Bombay Government Records," or select readings from "Treaties, Engagements, and Sunnuds," would serve his turn. But "Bapoo," though backward in "the three R's," is shrewd enough to know that this word "Treaties" is an ugly one for him. He would like to blot it out of the vocabulary. Let us suggest to him to call a "Conference;" that is the modern method of dealing with obnoxious treaties. Possibly, if "Bapoo" and his brother ryots got together half a score of Kattiawar Chiefs, with H.H. Scindia or Holkar as president, and a few Politicals as secretaries, something might be done towards that "revising" or "modifying" which is prayed for by the unsophisticated "Bapoo." Whether he would be satisfied with the result is more than doubtful, and in his own interest as a taxpayer, he might find it better to leave well alone. . . . And, still to keep to the text of the first sentence we have quoted, what is the position of this account for all India? We find that in the same year (1868), "the tribute which the Princes and Chiefs pay under engagement" amounted to £689,286, but "the cost of the political establishment maintained for their [and our] benefit" was £277,354. So much for the two not being "equivalent."

In "W. A. E. B.'s" next sentence, when he affirms that "the direct cost of the feudatory States to the Government of India is estimated at a million and half sterling," he launches into a wider field, into which we cannot at present follow him; but it may save much fruitless discussion if the distinction here indicated be borne in mind. How our correspondent estimates the "direct cost of the feudatory States" we do not gather. Perhaps it is in this way: the charge for "allowances and assignments under treaties and engagements" (quite a different account from the one already balanced) amounted to £1,892,950. If we take from this the former "equivalent" of £411,932, it brings the disbursement to considerably under the million and half. But what does that payment represent? Those who catch at the popular cry, "Make the Native States pay for their protection," are bound to search carefully for an answer to this big question before tantalising the public with the hope of a glorious "windfall" that is to settle all our financial troubles. About half a million of that sum consists of the revenues of Enamdars and Sarinjamdars of the Deccan, guaranteed to them in the British name by Mountstuart Elphinstone and his contemporaries, who scorned to make the Sirdars and Jaghirdars pay for the faults of the Peishwa. Then there is a sum of ten lakhs or so paid to Prince Azim

Jah and the Carnatic family; the now celebrated Nawab Nazim of Moorshedabad and his family draw ten or twelve lakhs; the King of Oude figures for twelve lakhs; and the denationalised and expatriated Dhuleep Sing enjoys a revenue of three or four lakhs. There are, also, scores of smaller pensioners and mediatised Princes—the whole charge for which may be compared to an infinitesimal quit-rent on the revenues and territories transferred, acquired, or conquered from their predecessors. Our financial condition will, indeed, be in a desperate case before we shall be inclined to seek safety by cutting the cable of our political honour and historical reputation. . . . Both "Bapoo" and "W. A. E. B." seem tinged with the very prevalent but unconscious hypocrisy under which it is the fashion to speak as if "our troops" and "our fleets" and "our rule" were brought here and maintained (out of Indian revenues, be it noted) mainly from a philanthropic regard for the welfare of the poor Hindoo, and for the benefit of those Native States whom we "protect." It is not difficult to imagine the curt or sarcastic remark with which Count Von Bismack or any other "intelligent foreigner" would dispose of such self-complacent notions; but until we can just a little emancipate ourselves from them, it is only waste of ingenuity to discuss the political and financial relations between British and Native States.

As to the proposal that our feudatories should disband their "useless armies," let them be induced to do so just in the degree in which the Chiefs can be persuaded that the "pomp and circumstance" of their martial array is "useless," wasteful, and antiquated: But were we somewhat more apt at the craft of empires, if we had more tact in utilising those powers and resources which, though not "ours," lie all around within reach of our public influence, we should so far control and infuse with our imperial spirit the half-million of native troops or their masters, that our own more costly forces might be largely reduced in order to effect that financial relief which our two correspondents are so anxious to obtain that they would strive for it at the expense of other exchequers than Sir Richard Temple's.—*March* 17, 1871.

KUTCH AND KATTIAWAR.

HIS Excellency Sir Seymour Fitzgerald has proceeded at such a rapid pace in his triumphal progress—from the remote peninsula of Kutch, on the far west of our Presidency proper, through the more familiar and classic ground of ancient Sourasthra to Guzerat on the mainland, which he is just now entering—that we have scarcely been able to keep up with him, or to note with due consideration the weightier matters suggested by his tour in the tracks of Malcolm and Elphinstone. . . . . .

Kutch is, to a great extent, separate and remote from the general affairs of this Presidency. The characteristics of its ruler and people, as those were brought out by the unwonted stimulation of his Excellency's visit, may have been somewhat put out of sight by the more varied and striking, though not more loyal and hearty, rejoicing and ceremonies in the sister peninsula of Kattiawar. We trust this may not be the case with all readers. Kutch, with its 15,500 square miles (including 9,000 of the useless Salt Runn) to set against the 22,000 of Kattiawar, is not only further out of the way of commerce, but its soil is poorer, its climate arid, and its productions less valuable than those of Sourasthra; nor can it boast that the allegiance of its population is divided, as in Kattiawar, between 188 Chiefs and Princes—a number which, as one of our correspondents avers, equals that of "Amalek's ungracious progeny," Amorites, Hivites, and Jebusites included, slain under divine command by Joshua and other valiant Hebrews of old time. Notwithstanding these deficiencies, as compared with its wealthier neighbour of more diversified population and political system, there is very much both in the past and present that will repay those who may take occasion from his Excellency's visit to Mandvee and Bhooj to look below the surface of affairs in that province. Those who lack time or inclination for studying "practical illustrations of the manners and customs prevalent in the ancient world 2,000 years ago," which, we are assured, may be scanned every day in Kattiawar, or who confess themselves hopelessly puzzled by the tangle of subordinate, graduated, and conflicting rights and jurisdictions that have struggled through inextricable confusion in Kattiawar, may find an easier though scarcely less picturesque field of inquiry in Kutch. . . . .

So much has recently appeared in our columns in relation to Kattiawar, that we

might well be exonerated from saying anything further in reference to his Excellency's tour through that province, unless there were some call to criticise the proceedings or the various speeches delivered. In the letter of "our Kattiawar Correspondent," which appeared on the 12th, together with his notice of the "Social and Religious Customs" of the province in the paper of the 24th, nearly everything is stated that can be needful as a basis of facts and information to enable the general reader to grasp the significance that attaches to the official tour of Sir Seymour Fitzgerald. The entire population of the province is about two and a quarter million souls. These are under 188 Chiefs, great and small, of whom 96 are tributaries of the British Government, 20 of the Guicowar, 9 of them paying something to both, while 132 also pay *zortulbee* (formerly "black mail") to Joonaghur, the most important State in the province, and 13 are lucky enough not to pay any at all. Amidst this medley of States, some of them as proud as poor, and amongst the wealthy ones some inclined to be oppressive and grasping, it is invaluable as a security for something like constitutional order, that they should have one common centre, some power, just as well as strong, to which they can all look with equal confidence. They have this in the British Government, which is represented to them by the Political Agents stationed in the province; but while the Agency suffices for the transaction of business and the maintenance of order, the Chiefs crave now and again for some special and personal manifestation of Her Majesty's imperial sway. From that motive, a few of the more important Princes of Kattiawar came down to Bombay to meet H.R.H. the Duke of Edinburgh in February of this year; but it was none the less desirable that the whole province should have its natural craving gratified by witnessing the formal progress through it of Her Majesty's direct representative. . . . There is some reason to hope that the good seed sown broadcast by Sir Seymour Fitzgerald at the Rajkote Durbar may spring up at a future day in the minds of the youths who in years to come will occupy the class-rooms of the Rajkoomar.

The establishment and successful opening of this institution is an event of which this Presidency and those specially concerned in it may well be proud, and not least so the Chiefs who for this purpose have contributed so generously of their wealth. We cherish the hope that the College may, in time, produce such invaluable effects as those described with so much force and discrimination by the Director of Public Instruction. But we could wish there had been a little less appearance of an artificial forcing process in connection with the speeches wherewith this hall of learning was "inaugurated." It is a bold experiment, and perhaps it was good policy to put a bold face on the proposal that the Chiefdom apparent of Kattiawar should be transferred *en masse* from the *zenana* to an English public school, itself an exotic on Indian soil. We appreciate, as fully as any of the speakers, the end in view, and the inexpressible value to Kattiawar, if such were possible, of "disciplining the character as well as the head" of the whole rising generations of Chiefs. But such a social and intellectual "wrench" as is prefigured in Colonel Anderson's address—somewhat too fluently responded to by Sir Seymour Fitzgerald and Mr. Peile—is, in the nature of things, *not* possible. Whilst there is abundant occasion for hopeful congratulation, it might have been well somewhat to tone down the flourish and avoid running the "public school" hobby quite so hard. . . . . .

One cannot easily praise too highly the short address delivered by Mr. Peile, when, in his capacity as Director of Public Instruction, he formally took over charge of the Rajkoomar; but when in glancing towards the distant fortune of Kattiawar and its Chiefs, he said, "Whether they will elect (as I think the nobler choice) by a voluntary surrender of their isolated sovereignty to enter the Councils of India as nobles of the Empire, time will decide," he seems to us to be deviating from the firm and self-reliant tone which characterised the rest of his address. It would betoken a more successful tutelage on our part, and tend to far more permanent imperial gain, if we could lead the future Chiefs of Kattiawar to carry out in their own way, and in accordance with the idiosyncrasies of their race and country, that "honourable" and self-dependent "rivalry" which is in accord with the highest conception of an imperial position. He is the greatest sovereign, the truest king of men, under the shadow of whose power other Princes voluntarily range themselves. If we ask Mr. Peile which is the nobler type—that represented by the emasculate pensioned Maharajah of the Punjab and the Nawab of Moorshedabad; or that of which the Maharajah of Jeypore, Sir Salar Jung, or even H.H. Scindiah, with all his faults, are examples,—the Director of Public Instruction could not hesitate in

choosing the latter as the "nobler" type of Indian Princes and statesmen, who, whilst self-reliant in their own "hereditary right," form really the strongest bands of our imperial power.—*Dec.* 24, 1870.

THE RIGHT WAY WITH AND FOR BARODA.

THE noted Mahratta statesman, Sir Dinkur Rao, is, it appears, on a visit to Poona, and other places in the Deccan: and the *Indu Prakash* suggests, here is the man to fill the much contested appointment of Baroda Dewan. After all the discussion there has been towards convincing H.H. Mulhar Rao of what would be for his good in this matter—much of which we were unable to follow—it is, we suppose, too late to start another candidate. But why did not our contemporary look up its man before? Had there been any hope of obtaining him for the Baroda State, such a chance would, it may be presumed, have been at once seized upon alike by the new Guicowar and the Bombay Government. But it is no disparagement to the former Dewan of Gwalior when we say that there are probably half-a-dozen men whose local knowledge of Western India would make them as serviceable for the Baroda State as Sir Dinkur himself could be. Besides, as we have said, the choice is understood to have been made, though—probably because of the unobtrusive disposition of the man selected—little is known about this new Dewan.*

If Sir Dinkur Rao is still in working order and of willing mind, there are numerous high and confidential employments in which the Government of India might utilise for imperial purposes his special abilities and ripe experience. Might he not in various ways strengthen the Political Agency in Rajpootana, thereby effecting more in a year or two than can be gained by ten durbars? In connection with native States which are somewhat more civilised than Marwar, would not Sir Dinkur Rao be the man to lead them, to hasten slowly, but surely, in applying so much as is practicable of such sage counsel as that embodied in the "New Year Letter" of the Maharajah Satyapriya, which appeared in our columns of Wednesday last? . . . . . .

Lord Mayo scarcely belongs to the rank of statesmen strong enough to defy the great majority of the administrators on whose zealous aid he is necessarily dependent; so that we need scarcely expect to see any result follow the rumour to which we have referred. But if there were an actively sincere desire to utilise the best and most practical Indian wisdom for the imperial service, then Sir Dinkur Rao may be taken as a fair type of certain invaluable resources as yet almost undrawn upon. The appointment of Sirdars and Princes to seats in our talking (*i.e.*, Legislative) Councils is not without its use; but there is more of garnish than work in this expedient. And, as very properly pointed out in the Calcutta petition, the presence in our "parliaments" of chiefs from "foreign" territories serves as excuse or occasion for the continued exclusion of more competent and suitable native representatives who *are* British subjects. But the question before us is that of utilising superior native talent in executive work; and we are glad that the casual visit of Sir Dinkur Rao to the Deccan has given us fair opportunity to refer to a neglected topic, one of vital significance to our imperial rule.—*Feb.* 10, 1871.

II.—Under the *régime* of profound silence maintained by the Political Department of the Bombay Government, it is not easy to speak with certainty as to the position of affairs in the Baroda State. Rumours and surmises are rife enough, and it would be well if some duly authenticated statement of "the situation" in the Gaekwaree Court and dominions could be placed before the public. It is not easy to conceive of any harm that could come of such an exposition, and it is highly probable that good would result from it. Honest, well-meaning men might be encouraged; and schemers might be somewhat restrained by a public reminder that, as Sir Seymour Fitzgerald once said in durbar, "the eye of the British Government is everywhere." In the absence of any such authorised current report on Baroda affairs, we may as well make a few notes on passing events there, so far as any grains of wheat can be gleaned from the "piles o' caff" with which the public is supplied from Baroda by various means. The one thing certain above all appears to be, that H.H. Mulhar Rao is to take to himself a wife this very day. . . . Amongst the two hundred suing damsels, is said to be one who holds a writing

* This was Mr. Dadabhai Naorojee, at present (1886) on a visit to England.

from the once disconsolate prisoner of Pardee, to the effect that he "would be to her a true and faithful lover, and if ever he came into his kingdom—ah, then !" It is very likely this Marathi *billet doux* was far from being explicit enough to found a breach of promise case upon. And such a suit would, moreover, be weak in one important particular. Not only was "a ring given and taken in token and pledge"—said still to be worn in the necklace of the Gaekwar presumptive—but, on the other side, Mulhar Rao is said to have sent the maiden a handkerchief, which she was to keep as his *gage d'amour* and fealty. And now the precious "piece of conviction" is missing; so this Marathi beauty may now murmur in the words of "the gentle lady married to the Moor":—

"Sure, there's some wonder in this handkerchief;
I am most unhappy in the loss of it."

Passing by this as one amongst several other quaint Baroda stories in circulation—many much less harmless and amusing—it might be worth while for the Bombay Government to know how this marriage brokerage has been transacted. . . . Amongst the men who would be likely to do the Baroda people good, if granted sufficient assistance by the Regent, is a person who was trained in one of the best educational institutions of Bombay. This man would speedily set up schools in every zillah, if the durbar would permit such a revolutionary policy; but without support from outside, it does not appear that Mulhar Rao will have the firmness to introduce the pedagogues. Measures of this kind—to say nothing of the weightier matters of revenue and judicial reform—can only be rooted and grounded in the Baroda State by a Dewan properly appointed and thoroughly assured of the co-operation of the Regent and the support of the British Resident. The best man for such an onerous post would probably be one quite unconnected with Baroda, though it would be essential for him to know Western India, to be familiar with the vernacular Gujerati, and acquainted with the durbar Marathi; so that he might be able to circumvent the scheming *karbarrees* wedded to the old system. In these last-named matters of detail we fear the British Resident at Baroda is not sufficently well furnished. He is, we believe, anxious to do the utmost to promote the welfare of the Gaekwar's people; but it cannot be too often repeated that Politicals appointed to any important State should be thoroughly well acquainted both with the written and colloquial language spoken therein.

Whether the productive and populous territories of Baroda are to be raised to a far higher level than they have hitherto reached, is a question very much in the hands of the Bombay Government. By judiciously stimulating Mulhar Rao to use aright the great responsibilities of his position, and by supporting him in the choice of a Dewan strong enough to defy all intrigue, a way might readily be opened at Baroda to carry out that safely progressive policy which is indicated, rather than sketched, in that admirable manifesto of plain good sense in administration comprised in Sir Salar Jung's speech at Beder, report of which appears in another column.—*March* 16, 1871.

YOUNG CIVILIANS AND ANCIENT STATES.

THE Joudhpore and Oodeypore Durbar tiff is not a topic to which we would willingly recur, but our Calcutta contemporary, the *Daily Examiner*, has just delivered itself in such an exceedingly diplomatic fashion on the matter, that it may be well to clear up its mistiness. The *Examiner*, as if zealous for the Foreign Office, assures its readers that "there is no foundation for the statement put forward by a contemporary, that advices have been received from the Secretary of State by the Government of India expressive of his dissatisfaction with the proceedings taken by the Viceroy to visit his displeasure upon the Maharajah of Joudhpore for failing to attend the Ajmere Durbar." We do not remember what contemporary ventured to make such an incautious statement as that comprised in the quotation just given, which, as it stands, is characterised neither by point nor probability. If his Grace had taken the Viceroy to task for the course followed by him in a signal exercise of his Excellency's highest public functions, it is not likely that such "advices" would have become known to the outside public on this side of 1880. . . . The writer pointed out the impolicy, and, from an historical point of view, the grave impropriety of the Viceroy being made to refer in a disparaging sense to the sixteenth century marriage alliances between the Rajpoot Princes and the house of Akbar.

The correspondent of the *Friend* remarked on the peculiar invidiousness of those references, seeing that Earl Mayo, at the time of the Durbar, was, in a certain sense, the guest of Jeypore, whose ancestors had, perhaps more frequently than any other Rajpoot house, made matrimonial alliances with Delhi. The critic also commented on the blunder, as reminding him that the younger Civilians who have entered the service by competition are imperfectly acquainted with the position of the princely houses of India, and fail to comprehend what is due to those Chiefs who, besides being our feudatories, are our allies and coadjutors in the difficult task of ruling this great and diversified empire.

There may be some little ground for this doubt regarding some competition-wallahs; but if so, it must be mainly the fault of the Civil Service Commissioners or the Examiners. In addition to the "standard" histories that the competitioners have to "get up"—and which, being somewhat starchy pabulum, are apt to be retained only in the memory without nourishing the reasoning faculties—it would be well for the insight said to be prevalent amongst junior Civilians if they could be put through a course of "Aitchison's Treaties." The present Foreign Secretary, though one of the new order, is in the first rank both of date and attainments. The editor of six volumes of Treaties with Indian Chiefs and Princes, which documents form such an essential portion of Her Majesty's title-deeds, was not likely to misconstrue the policy of the Rajpoot Princes who formed family alliances with Delhi when the Mogul dynasty had fairly made its home in India.

Yet by some mischance the invidious and misleading comparison *was* imported into the Viceroy's letter; and we have testimony of our own to show that this circumstance did excite considerable dissatisfaction at home amongst men by whom the whole circumstances were best understood. . . . It will now drop out of the public mind; but the references that have been made to it will be useful if they serve to induce some younger officials of the present generation to look more closely and thoughtfully into the strange and instructive stories called up by the pageantry of modern Durbars, and to study more carefully the continuous narrative of Indian history, of which British rule is only the latest chapter.—*Feb.* 16, 1871.

EMPLOYMENT OF EUROPEANS BY NATIVE STATES:

An Antiquated and Invidious Regulation.

VERY often, in the dealings of our Supreme rulers with native States, scant measure of justice and consideration is meted out to them, and thereby our true imperial prestige is lowered. One illustration of this disposition we have cited was the apparently one-sided arrangement come to with H.H. the Nizam regarding the railway now under construction in his dominions by the British Public Works Department, for which he has been made not only to give up all the required land to British jurisdiction in perpetuity, but also to provide all the capital, and guarantee all the interest. . . . . .

Suffice it to say, that the Calcutta authorities, not content with getting the capital of the railway provided ready to hand by the Nizam's Government, issued, as we are credibly informed, an order to that Prince, before Lord Northbrook's arrival in India, calling on him to cancel the appointment of a European gentleman of experience who has been employed by Sir Salar Jung to organize the affairs of the railway company on a European model, and in such a manner as to protect the interests of the shareholders by arranging a regular system of share certificates and accounts, and promptly paying to them their dues in the shape of guaranteed interest and other matters which the ordinary constitution of a native Government treasury renders it unable to cope with. Moreover, we learn that the appointment had been originally made under the full approval of the Resident, Mr. Saunders, whose ready sanction in such a case was surely only natural, looking to all the circumstances. There is, however, it appears, a treaty of last century which makes the consent of the "Company's Government" necessary in order to Europeans being employed by the Nizam's Government. We are assured that this treaty, though sought to be disinterred on the present occasion for the purpose of stopping Sir Salar Jung's career of progress, bears clearly on the face of it that its sole end and aim was the wholly different and temporary purpose of compassing the discharge and preventing the re-engagement of French military officers then in the Nizam's army. Even putting out of account how times have changed since the days of the brilliant Raymond and the

making of that treaty, we cannot but hold that the sanction of the British representative at Hyderabad—which, it appears, was duly obtained—was sufficient; even if not, that the exercise of the obsolete right of dissent by the Calcutta authorities—if such right of dissent to the act of their own officer exists—could, in the present instance, be justified by no argument. . . . . .

The Government of India must surely feel that the regulation of the complex affairs of a joint-stock company, to the formation of which they have committed the Nizam's Government, cannot be efficiently carried out without the aid of some European officer; and it is surely not too much to say that the good faith and honour of the Supreme Government should be considered pledged to the support of the Nizam's Minister in all his arrangements necessary for furnishing this railway capital, for which he consented to become responsible only on the urgent representations of the British Government. It may safely be assumed that his Excellency would never have so become responsible had he dreamed that the British Government would be on the watch to thwart the railway company whenever formed, and to discredit the undertaking with the shareholders, by prohibiting his employing "any European" (for we believe the threatened veto extends to all Europeans) for its management; nay, further, by requesting him to befool himself before his own subjects by dismissing from his service the confidential officer whom he had just employed under the sanction of the British Resident at his Court. It can well be imagined what must be the feelings with which a high-minded and generous native administrator like Sir Salar Jung must view such a requital of his strenuous efforts at seconding the British Government in its objects and policy. Unless all apprehension of similar checkmating action in the future be promptly removed, which we trust Lord Northbrook will effect, can the consequence be otherwise than altogether to deter native States from co-operating with us in schemes of advancement and progress?

The present consequence of the rumoured adverse action of Government regarding this appointment is, that the railway shares are just now selling at 20 per cent. discount, representing a most unjustifiable loss inflicted on the trusting shareholders. Further, as calls under such circumstances cannot be realized, Sir Salar Jung is, we hear, actually reduced to pay the British Government the amounts of its monthly indents for expenditure on the line now in progress from his own treasury. . . . . .

In a time of profound peace, and in dealing with an ally of unswerving loyalty like the Nizam, what can be alleged as a reason for forbidding him the services of our countrymen? We would repel the idea that the Foreign Office can stoop to the meanness of being jealous lest complete success should attend the Minister in the carrying out of the very scheme which he generously undertook at their own urgent instance. We absolutely refuse to entertain the notion that any British administrators would be better pleased if he should fail in producing the required capital, if this railway which they have urged on him were to become the cause of financial embarrassment to our ally. If Mephistopheles had a seat in the Supreme Executive, that accomplished politician might suggest such a course with the malevolent object of making the Nizam once more the debtor of the Government of India, so that, his creditor perhaps proving remorseless as on a former memorable occasion, another assignment of territory might be finally extorted from him. Verily, some will be driven to imagine all these possibilities passing in review before the mind of "our faithful ally," whose past experience of the Government of India is that of a relentless creditor, who mercilessly piled up against him charges for the Hyderabad Contingent of 40 lakhs per annum—charges which its own subsequent reduction of its cost to 26 lakhs proved to have been quite unjustifiable, and regarding whose pecuniary dealings with our ally, Colonel Davidson, the Resident, has put on record the following statement: "The wonder clearly is that instead of owing only 43 lakhs of Company's rupees at the end of 50 years of such a system, our claim did not render the Nizam hopelessly insolvent."

Thus far we have noticed this question of our Government's refusal to allow the appointment of a European account officer at Hyderabad, not from any desire to deal out censure to any one at this stage. . . . If Lord Northbrook's attention is once fairly drawn to the matter, it cannot slip past him comparatively unnoticed. It is an opportunity which gives him a special opening to prove, at the outset of his career, his regard for the just interests of native States, to evince his desire that, according to the spirit of the Royal promise which he quoted with so much loyal spirit, they be strong

and prosperous, and to give them the much needed assurance that jealousy of their strength and prosperity is *not* a part of the policy which he will allow to emanate from his Foreign Office. This invaluable service, not so much to the native Princes of India as to the British Empire itself, we look confidently to Lord Northbrook to perform.—*June* 10, 1872.

COLONEL LUMSDEN AND THE NIZAM'S RAILWAY.

THE appointment of Colonel P. S. Lumsden, Quartermaster-General of the Indian Forces, as Acting Political Resident at Hyderabad, is one so unusual that it challenges remark. . . . Our attention is drawn to it more especially by a sinister remark, apparently demi-official, going the round of the press to the effect that certain important (strategic) questions concerning Hyderabad may have to be discussed which, as it was scarcely needful to assure us, Colonel Lumsden is well qualified to deal with from a military and professional point of view. Of course the public are left to surmise as to what all this may mean. And it will all remain as great a mystery as the correspondence about, and observations on the Shum Plain, unless some capable and resolute member of Parliament compels the Secretary of State to wring from the Government of India a full explanation of what is meant by this perpetual worrying of, interference and tampering with H.H. the Nizam's Government. Only the other day we had to expose the extraordinary stretch of Imperial authority by which, falling back on terms of an obsolete treaty, it is sought to deprive the Nizam's administration of the services of a competent European financier whom Sir Salar Jung had engaged to organise the interest and capital accounts of his new State railway. There is some reason to think that this stupid proceeding has been forced on the Foreign Office by another department, the heads of which have a certain personal bias in the matter. . . . . .

As to the railway, it is well known that this great and valuable work was made an affliction to H.E. Sir Salar Jung in every possible way; and in connection with its planning and organisation, our Supreme writers seem to have exhausted every means in their power to show their distrust of the Nizam's Government, and to hamper and embarrass the Minister. Months were consumed in insisting that the line should take a long circuit, so as to go round by our cantonments, instead of direct to Hyderabad; and though we believe that exaction has at length been waived, H.H. the Nizam is expected to make branch lines to our barracks and camp, in order that he and his people may always feel that they are under the British mailed foot. Moreover, we have forced on him our lumbering broad-gauge, thereby entailing on the Hyderabad State a continuous and unnecessary waste of resources in working expenses. This also was due to the Simla superstitions about strategic necessities, and partly to the shabby and sordid motive of getting rid of some of our surplus railway stock. These being some of the antecedents in our policy towards the Hyderabad State, the appointment of Colonel P. S. Lumsden appears to be indicative of the continued attitude of grudging, distrust, and grasping which is as unjust towards the Nizam as it is opposed to Her Majesty's royal promises, and unworthy of the British name.—*June* 24, 1872.

HER HIGHNESS THE BEGUM OF BHOPAL.

IN referring, the other day, to the Grand Cross of the Star of India just conferred on Her Highness the present Begum of Bhopal, we opined that this high decoration must be regarded more as an hereditary honour than as a mark of personal distinction. Touching this, a private correspondent, who is thoroughly well acquainted with the *régime* both of mother and daughter, assures us that our casual comparison between the two does not do justice to the latter.

Our correspondent himself begins by eulogising the late ruler of Bhopal, and though the history of her reign is well known, it may be as well to reproduce his summary of her good deeds and policy. She was faithful to the British Power to the utmost extent we could expect. . . . It was seen that she was a just ruler, and that her administration was admirably adapted to the circumstances of her people. She established a land

revenue system under which the ryots manage their own lands, and are secured in a beneficiary occupation. Adopting only so much of our administrative system as was practicable in her province, she yet made political loyalty to the British Government the hereditary pride of the family. In this strain our correspondent writes of the late Begum, and we entirely accept the eulogy.

Turning to the present recipient of the coveted decoration, he assures us that the daughter has striven, and with considerable success, to follow in her mother's footsteps. Her people are contented; they are subjected to no capricious squeezings, as in the Baroda and, possibly, in the Indore territories. The advent of an unusually good season is not the signal in Bhopal for revenue locusts to come down upon the crops, but the cultivator reaps his bountiful harvest in security. In some other Central India territories and native States elsewhere, when the yield promises to show above an average return, a special and often a retrospective assessment is levied. We need not go into detail to show that a land policy like that established in Bhopal goes far to secure the material welfare of an Indian State against any but the most sweeping calamity. If it be good to have such a beneficial policy in operation anywhere, it must be of very special imperial advantage to have it conspicuously and faithfully worked out in the midst of a congeries of native States, the rulers of which may thereby be induced to see how great is the virtue of fiscal moderation and regular ordinances. For it is not only in her land revenue system that H.H. the Begum is carrying out the wise policy of her mother: we are assured that in her general management she follows the same course, and that the condition of her people affords visible proof that they are prosperous and contented.

Altogether, then, it must be admitted that the Grand Cross has been fittingly bestowed as a mark of personal favour on the present ruler of Bhopal, and therefore we say, long may she reign to wear it, whilst her heir is being carefully trained to walk in the footsteps of the Sekundra Begum, and taught to enlarge that course of wise and liberal administration on which the State has now been entered for a generation. We should, indeed, like to hear that a little more was being done in the way of primary education in Bhopal; but that, like water works and gas lights, must come in time.—*June* 13, 1872.

THE MAYO-RAJPOOTANA COLLEGE.

ONE or two letters appeared in our paper, about a month since, containing a suggestion regarding one form of the Lord Mayo memorial, to which suggestion we ought to have given more heed at the time. The writers proposed that the subscriptions collected in Central India and Rajpootana should be devoted to the founding and endowment of a Rajkoomar—the establishment of a College for the young Chiefs and Princes of those territories. This seemed to us an eminently appropriate proposal. Nothing could be more suitable to Lord Mayo's character, or more likely to carry out his earnest desire to strengthen and raise our feudatories and allies—almost, if need be, in spite of themselves. The proposal to establish some such Indian Eton has often been made, though in no very tangible shape, and the deeply interesting occasion of commemorating Lord Mayo's untimely end affords a fair opportunity for a special effort to be entered on. . . . Whilst, however, we should rejoice to see such a design go forward—and it is high time some province took the lead in really doing something to signify the people's affection for the late Viceroy—we doubt whether a College and professors are not, as yet, beyond the desires and wants of the Rajpoot, Mahratta, and Pathan Chiefs of those remote and secluded States. Not but that several of them can appreciate the claims of higher education, for Sir William Muir received from them nearly Rs. 12,000 towards founding the Allahabad University. At the same time, some of them remarked that a High School in Bundlekund would be more to their purpose, and the Political Agent confirms that practical view of the matter. Well, then, why should not Lord Mayo's memory be kept green and his name ever fresh in Central India and Rajpootana by the establishment of Central High Schools for the sons of Chiefs—one at Ajmere or Jeypoor, and others in Malwa, Gwalior, or Bundlekund?

An institution very suitable as a model for such academies already exists at Indore, in what is known as the Residency School. We are not aware of what is the financial basis on which this institution rests, but if we may hazard a guess on the subject, it is

probable that the charges incurred in founding it were borne by the Resident, General Daly, their Highnesses Holkar, Scindia, and a few other Chiefs, and that now the institution is in good working order, the fees paid by or on behalf of the students go far towards meeting all current expenses. But whatever be the financial position of the Indore Residency School, it appears to be doing its work in a very practical and successful fashion. It contains over one hundred pupils, some of whom must come from considerable distances. Amongst them is a fine intelligent youth, in whom H.H. Scindia has a strong personal interest. There are sons of once wild Bheel Chiefs, and young Thakoors from all the scattered principalities around; again, there are Rajpoot scions of purest blue blood, while hereditary intellectual supremacy is represented by sons of Cashmere pundits. The quality of the teaching is said to be good, being conducted by well trained masters from the Calcutta and Benares Colleges.

Now it strikes us that this Indore School and its natural unostentatious success is one of the most gratifying signs of the times. If the sons of the Chiefs can be weaned from the enervating customs which have hitherto beset their youth, there may be some hope that the pages of our Political officers' reports will present a brighter and more encouraging prospect than is often the case at present. As already intimated, we know nothing of the financial position of the Indore School; but if it only needs funds in order to enlarge its operations and influence, we should vote strongly in favour of its receiving some of the Mayo memorial funds. Meantime we are inclined to ask, what is doing about the Ajmere Mayo College, an institution projected in the fit of enthusiasm evoked by Lord Mayo's visit there two years since?*—*June* 18, 1872.

CENTRAL INDIA—SCINDIA AND HOLKAR.

THE Government of India having now for four or five years permitted the free dissemination of the reports from its Political officers—we refer more particularly to those of the Governor-General's Agents in Central India and Rajpootana—it might be apprehended that by this time all novelty would be worn off from these annual reviews. The annals of these territories have, during the period referred to, been uneventful in the ordinary sense of that term. Only the severe scarcity of 1868-9 has broken the otherwise monotonous record—monotonous to us who look on from the outside, and who see that Colonel Keatinge's "inevitable conflict," threatened seven years ago, is still indefinitely postponed, and that though in Rajpootana and Bundlekund "the old order changeth, giving place to new," it changeth very slowly in those land-locked, slumberous regions. . . . Colonel Daly's report for 1870-1 in Central India brings out in a broad historical retrospect the position of affairs at the end of "the thousand years of war," when by our overthrow of the Peishwa at Kirkee, and Holkar's rout at Mehidpore, the British power introduced firm order in Central India, which—notwithstanding the Maharani Scindia's audacious and disastrous fight at Maharajpur in 1843, and the waves of the Mutiny storm which ran high at Jhansi and on the Betwa—has subsisted until now, bringing rest and assurance to the people, with wealth and security to the Princes.

Whilst this exemption from the curse of wasted harvests and plundered towns has been equally enjoyed by all these States, it is one of the most valuable services the Governor-General's Agent can perform when he carefully traces out the striking differences in the condition of the various principalities according as their rulers have utilised wisely, or perversely neglected these blessings of peace which, thanks to our firm rule, are common to them all. Though these are reports to the Viceroy, they are in many respects well adapted for dissemination throughout India, while the more practical and pointed passages describing the successes and failures in native administration ought to be translated into all the Court languages in India. Of course we should not say this if there were either in Col. Brooke's or General Daly's published reports any approach to the grave mistake made in the heedless publication of the correspondence on Native States elicited by the famous Lawrence-Wyilie *sua si bona norint* circular. As General Daly very justly remarks—

* It may be well, though scarcely necessary, to mention that the Mayo-Ajmere College has since been built, established, and handsomely endowed by the Princes and Chiefs of Rajpootana. In November, 1885, its splendid buildings were formally opened by the Earl of Dufferin, who on that occasion delivered one of his fine speeches.

"The unreserved publication of all that a Political Agent to a native Court may write of a despotic rule, alien in principle and practice to our own theories, would be as unwarranted and injurious to society as the publication of private correspondence by the Post Office." Having made this distinct and proper reservation, the Agent pleads for "frank discussion"; and it cannot be denied that H.H. Holkar comes in for the full benefit of this wholesome regimen. General Daly, after referring this, the second great Prince of Central India, to the Treaty of Mundisoor, which made the Holkar of that day one of "the dependent allies" of the British Government, and after describing the happy results of the confidence and contentment caused by Malcolm's comprehensive settlement, proceeds to refer to the Indore Prince of the present day as having persistently endeavoured to depart from engagements then entered into, and to "ignore the principles by which peace was settled." This is not the first time that H.H. Holkar's errors have been faithfully set in order before him—and, what he must relish still worse, before the world. . . . The Agent is almost inclined to think that nothing short of an authoritative declaration from the Supreme Government will induce the stern ruler of Indore to loosen his grip on these Rajpoot landholders, who, if subjected to similar treatment in former times, would long ere this have made common cause and marched on Indore. We think, however, that his Highness is too shrewd to allow matters to go such a length as to bring down on him the direct censure of the Viceroy; and we observe that even at the date of this report he had already "stayed the work of confiscation" as against the Rampoora Thakoors, and he appeared to have seen that disquietude had gone far enough. . . . . .

But we are spending undue attention on one of the Princes of Central India. As reminded in the report, the native States under the Central India Agency "cover an area of 84,000 square miles, equal to that of England, Scotland, and Wales united, with a population of nearly eight millions, yielding a revenue to Chiefs and Thakoors probably not short of four millions sterling." Chiefest of these is H.H. the Maharaja Scindia, lord of Gwalior, his territories, much of it scattered, being equal in area to Ireland, with a population somewhat under three millions, and the revenue about one million. . . . Speaking of a tour which at the close of 1870 the Agent had taken through the north-eastern States under his charge, passing through Bundlekund into Rewah, he says: "I returned to Indore by Bhilsa (Scindia's), which for miles in succession was a sheet of wheat and grain, and thence through Bhopal, which presented a similar scene." The Holkar's line to Indore will not go near enough to tap the grain-producing districts here referred to; and this is to be regretted, for in Malwa there is often a scarcity of grain, due in great measure to the circumstance that "900,000 begahs of the best land are devoted to the poppy, to the almost utter displacement of wheat and jowaree, the food supplies of the people." Possibly when the Indore line shall be finished, if our railway engineers can really bend their minds to make economical lines, it may be found feasible to send a branch into Bhopal, by which the opium growers of Malwa may be fed. General Daly does not think it needful to express any opinion on the expediency or morality of the opium production, but he makes the following suggestive remark: "So long as the Government of India maintains the present system of prohibiting the free cultivation of the poppy within its own territory, and by so doing makes an opium garden of these native States, the culture of it will go on increasing there, for no produce is so remunerative to chief or cultivator."

But we are forgetting Scindia, about whom and whose administration there is much that is interesting in this report. The Agent appears almost inclined to eulogise him to an extent that would indicate partiality, as in the following sentence: "Scindia's ability is undoubted, and he is earnest in what he says; his word to an Englishman is an engagement; this feeling renders intercourse with his Highness pleasant, and frees duty from anxiety." Scindia's bearing during the famine years of 1868-9, and much that has appeared in former reports with which our readers are familiar, go far to bear out this favourable estimate of that Chief. . . . He also, as well as Holkar, has Rajpoot feudatories in Malwa; but Scindia has wisely refrained from demanding sunnuds (title-deeds) of men whose ancestors held the land long before the Mahratta invasion. It is highly probable that this wise moderation will redound to the future gain of the Gwalior State; for Scindia's possessions in Malwa form the most fertile portion of the province, and afford ample scope for large growth of population. Thanks to the sagacity of Sir Dinkur Rao,

the settlement established in this district is a graduated one, favourable to the ryots, and one which must attract cultivators. And we observe that Scindia sees the advantage of a liberal ryotwaree settlement, as in his northern districts of Gwalior he is about introducing it, where also are large tracts of waste fertile land, which a secure tenure and liberal terms must soon people with a thriving peasantry.

Perhaps the next most important or interesting of the Central India States is that of Bhopal. . . . By its liberal and well-ordered land system, Bhopal contributes to the stability of affairs in Central India. But it is in the little State of Rutlam, under the prudent guardianship of Meer Shahamut Ali, C.S.I., where the ryot's claims are most carefully guarded, and where he reaps *all* the fruit of his labour. It is impossible to overrate the importance of this principle in the social and political economy of India. In these outlying native States, which include such striking varieties within the imperial unity imposed on them from without by the paramount Power, it will be seen that those of them are precisely the most prosperous and bid most fairly to grow in permanent strength wherein the ancient claim of the peasant is most distinctly acknowledged, where the cultivator is secured in a beneficiary interest in the soil, and where he has assured to him, by express regulation, something more than the mere wages of his labour or the profits on his slender stock.—*June* 20, 1872.

KUTCH,—ITS BANYANS AND BORAHS.

CERTAIN statements which our new weekly contemporary, the *Argus*, supplies us from time to time respecting the state of affairs in the small kingdom of Kutch, would be deserving of more public attention were matters quite as bad as represented in its columns. Of course we must always be prepared to believe in any evil—corruption, oppression, and wrong—when reported of those publicans and sinners, the administrators of native States, whose ways are not as our ways. But are we really to believe that H.H. the Rao Pragmuljee, whose visit to Bombay on the occasion of the arrival of His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh two years ago was marked by enthusiastic public demonstrations on the part of the Kutchees of Bombay in recognition of the Rao's beneficent rule over their countrymen in Kutch,—are we, we say, to believe that this Prince has so far neglected his duties, or become so careless of the affairs of his State, as to allow the reins of his government to pass entirely into the hands of his Kharbarees? Such a supposition belies the reports of our Political officers who have been or are accredited at the Court of His Highness. How, then, does it happen that all at once we hear so much about the maladministration of Kutch, and find so many writers zealous to reform all the abuses of the State? It has often happened in the politics of the old world that formidable agitations,—nay, internecine conflicts—have arisen from causes apparently trivial and on pleas transparently absurd. Was not some ecclesiastical bucket the ostensible occasion of that remorseless conflict between the Guelphs and Ghibelines which raged in Italy for generations about the twelfth or thirteenth century? Students and competitioners, please look up the reference.

This may be but a bucket quarrel in Kutch; and though not ecclesiastical, if it is one arising out of rivalries of caste and race, and the displacement of privileged classes, we can well understand why there may be a huge volume of smoke and but a very small core of fire. It appears that much of the alleged discontent in Kutch is traceable to the order, promulgated a few months since by His Highness, granting liberty to the Borahs (certain humble Mussulman sectaries) of Kutch to ride on horseback—the liberty of every man of them to bestride his own tattoo, a right withheld from the sect or caste for more than 200 years. Now the Banyan-Mahajuns look upon this common-sense order as an insult to their position as a caste, and inimical to them as a community. . . . The British Government has long desired to see this antiquated restriction removed. The Rao therefore expected that the Banyan-Mahajuns would co-operate in peacefully carrying out the object of the proclamation; but His Highness had not fully gauged the strength of caste and class privilege. The day for its promulgation was the signal for Banyan disaffection. The Borahs, these poor pedestrians of two centuries, indulged in the very natural and harmless demonstration of an equestrian procession; but when this came off, the Banyans shut up their shops and refused to do any business, and otherwise

menaced the peace of Bhooj and Mandvie. . . . A few of the ringleaders were imprisoned, and quiet was for the time speedily restored.

Though serenity has ever since outwardly reigned in the streets of Bhooj and the bazaars of Mandvie, the Banyans have taken the matter deeply to heart. No stronger proof could they give of this than that for months they have ceased to do export and import business between Kutch and Bombay. Trading and exchange business is something like a passion with them; but during this period no Banyan would openly buy or sell the bills of another Banyan on Bombay. They thought, by thus conspiring to cause a stagnation of trade, they would diminish the revenue returns of His Highness. But, unlucky men, they forget that the clock of time has not been standing still during these two centuries of Borahs' disabilities and Banyans' supremacy. Their ill-advised course in this abstention from trade became a source of profit to Khojas and others of the Rao's subjects, who thus supplanted the malcontent Banyans in business. The Banyans, therefore, found to their sorrow that they might as well try to stem the ocean's tide as to impede commerce and thus diminish the revenues of His Highness. Baffled in this attempt, they have taken to political and social agitation, and have instructed or requested their friends in Bombay to keep the game afoot in this island; so that it is not difficult to trace their influence in the prominence which has of late been given to abuses in Kutch by the vernacular press in Bombay. . . . . .

This question is quite distinct from the question of the character of the present administration in Kutch. Much has been said about the mischievous influence of the present Kharbarees, their corruption, and acts of oppression towards the subjects of His Highness. We are not in a position to dispute these statements. If, as is alleged, corruption *does* prevail to the extent reported, we think His Highness is quite competent to deal with it, and to root it out; and we should be glad to assist even malcontent Banyans in strengthening his hands for such a good work. The very general extent of such complaint no doubt shows the necessity of a thorough authoritative investigation by the Rao and his Durbar into the subject; and we trust that for the good government of the province, as well as for his own reputation, His Highness is taking steps to disabuse the public mind of the unfavourable impressions which recent agitation has a tendency to create.—*July* 16, 1872.

INDIAN PRIVY COUNCILLORS.

JUST at this moment we forget with whom it was that the conception originated which afterwards took full effect and imposing form in the customs, ceremonies, and distinctions of the "Most Exalted Order of the Star of India." The suggestion occurs, we believe, in some letter or essay by one of the large-hearted, far-seeing men who, in the eleventh hour of the Honourable Company's day of grace, strove in sadness of soul to avert the impending catastrophe, and many of whose aims and principles were recognised and adopted—after the deluge had passed. Even after the absorption of Mandvie and Angria-Colaba on John Pollard Willoughby's fatal doctrine of lapse, the seizure of Kerowlee on a similar plea, and the more shameless acquisitions of Nagpore and Sattara, we still went on "cutting down the tall poppies" on every side all over India. This had been done on the hypocritical pretence of saving the feeble from their oppressors, but really from financial greed and in furtherance of the iniquitous Whig compact supposed to be made at Bowood. The fierce conflicts of 1857 disposed of a good many more jewelled turbans by the more honourable, if more merciless wager of battle and internecine strife. Amidst the restoration of social order and the reinstitution of political power on a new basis, it began to be seen that—in some way not readily appreciable to Western minds, but real nevertheless—those tall poppies had served certain valuable public purposes.

Thus political exigency came in time to ripen the chance but pregnant suggestion, that it would be an excellent and highly useful device to institute an order of moral chivalry or merit, and a special distinction for public services, which should serve to recognise efforts for the common good, and lead Her Majesty's British India subjects of all races and creeds to look up to her as the fountain of power and the dispenser of royal favour, quite apart from the ordinary exercise of patronage in the different ranks of her own servants. . . . . .

And now the salutes have been fired, the marches played, the flags are furled, the knightly procession has passed by; what more remains to be said? It seems to us that the present is a suitable time to revive the suggestion, that, while this order of knightly pomp and circumstance continues to serve the purpose for which it was intended, there might be another institution established which should relate more nearly to the higher life of the Indian commonwealth. We refer to the proposal to institute both the rank and the office of Indian Privy Councillors. No doubt our Viceroys and Governors are now quite free to consult with and take advice from every man in the community who may be "in sage counsel old," and whose position, experience, and influence render them valuable advisers; but why should not the probability of being thus called temporarily into Cabinet be acknowledged in some formal public way? . . . This Order—which might be regarded as our political and administrative reserve—need in nowise interfere with that of the Star of India, any more than it would trench on the functions of the existing official hierarchy. For the present we are content to throw out the suggestion and there leave it.—*Nov.* 18, 1872.

KATTIAWAR TROUBLES:

MISRULE IN NOWANUGGUR.

THAT "strange affair" in Kattiawar, in which, as alleged, five men were killed and several wounded, in an affray between the *Seebundi* of the Nowanuggur Chief and certain inferior feudatories of the Jam, has not yet been satisfactorily cleared up. It is to be feared there is no mistake as to five cultivators being killed. If that number of corpses had not been taken to the Residency—as alleged in the translated extract given in our paper of the 7th—some distinct denial would have been forthcoming. Beyond that leading circumstance being accepted, we must wait for confirmation of the narrative as given by the vernacular paper, and the more so because it avowedly rested on the evidence of the *grassias* and cultivators who were fired upon by the Mekranee sepoys said to be under the orders of the Kandorna fouzdar. The statement that the Political Agent at once empannelled a jury to identify the corpses, and ascertain by what means the men came by their death, seems quite a probable one; but the further item of news, namely, that the "District Officer"—who, it seems, was Captain H. L. Nutt, one of the Assistant Politicals—was appointed by Colonel Anderson to investigate the affair, is highly improbable. We venture to assert that this course would not be taken. The preliminary inquiry held over the bodies would be sufficient to establish the fact that the parties to the affray were subjects of the Nowanuggur Chief, and therefore the investigation into the circumstances would be conducted entirely by the Jam and his Durbar. And, in accordance with the proper order of the jurisdiction, it is now stated that H.H. the Jam has deputed an officer of his own to make the investigation. Doubtless the Political Agent, as representing the paramount Power, will watch the proceedings and take note of the final result, to see whether substantial justice has been done.

So far as appears, we are inclined to regard the incidents as an exceptional one, startling and grievous though it be. . . . The Bombay Government can stretch forth its hand to control the Chiefs, can send them severe private rebukes, or in extreme cases, like that of the Rana of Porebunder, can disrate them in the political hierarchy of the province. But the Dewan, Kharbarees, or other Durbar officials, whose unauthorised exactions or tacit connivance at the Chief's vagaries and mistakes may have caused the cry of the grassias, traders, or cultivators to ascend to the slow ears of the British Government, cannot be got at except through the Chief himself. He is responsible for them, but they are not responsible for his misgovernment.

Those who regard Kattiawar affairs from the opposite point of view would level up the grassias or smaller feudatories, and would press their claims through our Political officers to such an extent as would tend to deprive the Chiefs of independent action over their feudatories, and curtail their sovereign rights as Princes. These two different schools of Kattiawar politics have often been reviewed in our columns, and it is not likely that anything we could say now would do much to harmonise the opposing views just sketched. The phrase "golden mean" as applied to policy is a bad one, and generally suggests some subterfuge or excuse for shirking firm adherence to principle; but it is

possible that the undue exaltation of princely power under Colonel Keatinge and his men may have been followed in Kattiawar States by an undue leaning to the side of the feudatories. We do not necessarily identify the present Political Agent with the *byhad* policy; because he has, we believe, leaned first to suzerain and then to feudatories, as to him has appeared expedient according to circumstances and his own considerable knowledge of the province. The direct observation and personal knowledge gained by Sir Seymour Fitzgerald during his last cold weather tour afford a guarantee that no serious mistake can now be made in Kattiawar policy so far as that can be directed from Bombay. . . . . .

Colonel Anderson has just come down to Poona on some public business or other, and, of course, the First Assistant must be the acting Agent. Owing to the remarkable arrangement made a few months ago by the Bombay Government, this province of Kattiawar, with its two or three hundred chieftains and jurisdictions innumerable, is now presided over by a young man of barely seven years' service, and that solely in office work. Granted, that this young Under-Secretary is industrious and clever, as we believe he is; that is nothing to the point. Not the possession of genius itself could enable him to vindicate the false position in which some strange freak of the Bombay Government has placed him. He has to revise the work and modify the policy of men, some of whom have been in the public service as many years as he counts at his last birthday. We have always urged that the officer placed at the head of the Kattiawar Agency should be one possessed of considerable culture in civil and judicial matters; but the present appointment might have been devised in derision of Civilian claims. There are military Politicals in this Presidency who know more of the civil work that comes under the Kattiawar Agency than can be known by any but the more experienced and specially able Civilians. Not only have all these been directly superseded by the Bombay Government's preposterous appointment of the present acting Political Agent of Kattiawar, but at least a dozen of well qualified Civilians have been passed over. And yet surprise is expressed because the wheels of State go heavily!—*Sept.* 16, 1871.

Brigands and Police.

II.—Though nothing has been heard during the last few weeks from Kattiawar of dacoity and village plundering, it can scarcely be hoped that this hitherto chronic evil of that province is dying out. On glancing over the last Report by the Political Agent, Colonel Anderson, presented so late as July last, we observe that in his notice of the condition of the States nearly all have the black mark against them—villages plundered, police inefficient. . . . This brigandage appears to have been distributed with tolerable impartiality through the principal States, Joonaghur and Nowanuggur being the worst, while Bhownuggur, Wudwan, and Palitana are conspicuous by their absence from this disreputable list. We use this term, though well aware that the robbers more frequently loot villages in States other than those where their haunts are situate; but it is plain that if the police of the State invaded were up to the mark, and if the brigands could not count upon any allies in the vicinity of their depredations, these outrages would soon cease in such a State. It must be owned that the Political Agent shows great earnestness in his desire to put down this evil, and if inveighing against it and denouncing the Chiefs for not uniting in one common effort to "polish off" these daring disturbers of the peace, would give repose to the province, then Colonel Anderson should have pacified Kattiawar long since. But the difficulty is really a complicated one; and we are not surprised that the gallant Colonel has failed in his efforts to persuade the Chiefs to establish an extra police force common to all the States. . . . Let us just make a note of two negative methods which might, if judiciously combined, bring about a gradual renovation as regards the internal peace of the province.

One of these is to lessen the amount of purely military force now stationed in Kattiawar; the other to gradually disarm the village population, beginning with the more turbulent. The suitability of the latter remedy will be obvious to every one; the only question is—how far and when will it be practicable? Mindful of the inveterate Rajpoot habit of the constant wearing of arms, and the very plausible excuse for that practice in the present state of the province, many persons will at once affirm that disarmament of the Kattiawar population is impracticable. We are not so sure of this; and there have

been some recent instances to show that such a course is willingly adopted by Chiefs when they are taken in hand the right way and have its advantages plainly shown. In Colonel Anderson's Report the demoralised condition of the Meya populations dwelling near the wilds of the Geer, and under the jurisdiction of the Joonaghur Nawab, is spoken of in strong terms. He was compelled early last year to move out with a military force to check "the tide of wholesale plunder and rapine going on," and against which the Joonaghur officials professed themselves powerless. Of course, Colonel Anderson, with his Agency sowars, and Captain Humfrey with his Federal Sebundy, soon cleared off the ragamuffins with their matchlocks and tulwars; but that was only for awhile, and they were soon at their game again. . . . We believe the fact to be that the Chiefs whose territories are infested with these banditti, if fairly taken in hand, would willingly co-operate with our officers in removing weapons of war from their villages, or establishing a licence and registration of *Shikaris* and other avowedly armed men. We say fairly taken in hand—that is, if pains were properly taken to convince them and their advisers of the feasibility of this stretch of executive authority, instead of their being merely lectured, not to say bullied about their bad police, and overawed by a display of military force wherever brigandage assumes organised action. If this drastic measure of disarmament could be once carried out and maintained for six months, as the voluntary and avowed act of the Kattiawar Princes themselves, the whole province would take a stride in social prosperity, from which we trust it would never backslide.

We have alluded to the demonstrations of military force that are made now and again; but these are far better calculated to humble or irritate the Chiefs than to catch or chastise the brigands. The maintenance of regular forces in Kattiawar so unnecessarily large for any military needs, has, we believe, a considerable indirect effect in enervating the several police forces of the province. . . . . .—*Jan.* 24, 1873.

THE KHARBAREES OF NOWANUGGUR.

III.—Severe strictures have lately been passed regarding the maladministration of the Nowanuggur State. It is stated that its Courts are but mock tribunals, and are notoriously used as instruments for corruptly exacting money from litigants and culprits. It is also alleged that members of the Durbar levy black mail on their own personal account from the several operations of trade, great and small; and it is even said that plunder is the steady purpose of men who fill the principal posts in the administration. If the British Power is unable to check such a serious and manifest misgovernment in a native State, the sooner the fact is openly avowed the better. The notion is certainly abroad, and is firmly believed, that the paramount Power exercises a beneficent influence, through its Political officers, upon the several native Durbars; and that there is an ultimate power or paramount right in reserve, in the exercise of which such States may be relieved of corrupt and incorrigible officials, and by means of which power-scourged and oppressed principalities may be rescued from impending ruin.

The Kharbarees (higher officials) in the Nowanuggur State have been able to consolidate their misused power, and to make their name a terror in every family and over every inch of the State, because H.H. the Jam has for some years past practically ceased to exercise his functions as ruler. . . . . .

That H.H. the Jam is not yet hopeless material to work upon, may be inferred from the circumstance that a short time since he readily acceded to the request made by his son, and now heir-apparent, Kuluba, that he should be introduced to official work, and be instructed in State business. This was agreed to in Durbar, the Kharbarees consenting, and the young Prince commenced his noviciate in the Judicial department. The officer presiding over this branch of public business, Mr. Narrayenrao Wassoodew, is an honest man, and one not belonging to the same set as the group of greedy caterpillars who feed on the resources of the Nowanuggur State. The youth took to his new pursuits perhaps more eagerly than had been anticipated by these politic gentlemen who had with so much suavity assented to H.H. the Jam's wishes. What was to be done? If Kuluba should become able to manage business himself, the illicit occupation of these would be gone! That danger must be averted at all costs; so plans were laid by which H.H. the Jam was persuaded that his son would become estranged by thus meddling with public business too soon, and the Judicial officer who had taken him in hand was denounced as

one who troubled the State. Under some slanderous statement to that effect, the officer in question was pounced upon and ejected from Nowanuggur, and under circumstances of very severe hardship to his family. . . . . .

An inquiry might be conducted in such a manner as would attract to it the close personal attention both of the Jam and his heir, and in this way the birds of prey that infest the neighbourhood might be driven off into the obscurity that befits them. And it must be remembered that it is with the Chiefs and Princes, not with Kharbarees and Dewans, that our Government has todo.—*May* 20, 1873.

GONDUL AND ITS SPECIAL ASSISTANT.

IV.—Since the new Political Agent went to Kattiawar he has had his hands and mind filled with the cares involved in fetching up arrears of work, and must for some time to come be much occupied with the several new organisations that are now initiated. And let him be as energetic and as well aided as possible, there are still many tangles and difficult personal problems to be settled that can only be dealt with effectually by a strong, impartial, and clear-sighted executive ruler at the centre of affairs. Whether the Bombay Government is strong enough in its Political Secretariat to be either impartial or clear-sighted is at least doubtful. One of these difficulties—which was, indeed, self-imposed under the late administration—is that of the unsatisfactory relations of the Special Assistant in charge of the Gondul State, not only to the Rani and her advisers, but to most independent persons in the town and territory. There is one instance of the Special Assistant's high-handedness, and the subserviency which that quality induces in subordinate officials, to which we will here allude. We have some satisfaction in doing this, seeing that, thanks to the judicial forms which maintain a precarious vitality in Kattiawar, a slight check has been given to the headstrong autocracy which has held sway in Gondul for a year or more. It will be remembered that some months ago the Special Assistant not only ostentatiously gave permission for the slaughtering of bovine animals—a proper thing to be done in a proper time and way—but at the same time contrived to trample on the rights of the Hindoo community by giving over to the Mussulman butchers a portion of land at Dhorajee belonging, we believe, to the Mahajun caste, and thus in various ways stirred up the Hindoos of the whole neighbourhood to great terror and agitation. In the midst of this excitement certain Hindoos sought to prevent the land in question from being trespassed upon. They were arrested and proceeded against in the local magisterial courts at the instance of this model Political.

The consequence was that one respectable resident of Dhorajee, believed and alleged by the townspeople to be perfectly innocent of any breach of the peace or good order, was sentenced to the cruel hardship of fifteen months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500, and another inoffensive person to rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 100. These sentences, which have shocked the whole community in those parts, were carried into effect at once; and while the Special Assistant was enjoying the cool breezes of Balacherry, these unfortunate but respected townsmen of Dhorajee were cooped up in Gondul gaol, fettered and clothed in felons' garb. . . . . .

The incident will be cited in native States as a curious method of educating them in our better methods of administration. But the Political department must explain how such an utterly ill-advised selection could have been made for the guardianship of this thriving little State. Mr. Jardine's independent and upright judgment will do something to allay the feeling of insecurity and discontent that prevails in the Gondul State under its present master. Something has been hinted as to the probability of Mr. Aston being sent there as Judicial Assistant, and such an expedient would be of service; but had a suitable and even-tempered, duly experienced Political officer been appointed at first—and such men were to be found last year—no extra assistance would have been required, and the Bombay Government would have stood a notch or two higher in the estimation of all whose observation has been directed towards central Kattiawar. Unfortunately, Sir Philip Wodehouse and his colleagues, being by habit and system shut up to the very imperfect and one-sided knowledge that is obtained from the secret and untested reports of officers whose first concern is to excuse or vindicate their own administration, cannot become aware of the gravity of the mistakes that have been made in this, as in many other walks of Kattiawar administration. . . . . .—*June* 25, 1873.

THE CHUMBA STATE:

A Small Instance and Large Lesson.

SOME of our contemporaries in Northern and Eastern India—who know not the name of his Excellency Nawab Seedee, Chief of Jinjeera, who are unable to distinguish the Jam of Nowanuggur from the Jam of Lus Beyla, and who may have but very hazy notions of that regal Chief, H.H. the Rao of Kutch, who reigns at Bhooj—have occasionally been inclined to twit us, in somewhat patronising terms, when we have found it necessary to enter rather earnestly into the political concerns of the principalities and chiefdoms of Western India. If it were worth while to use a little mild retaliation, might we not ask, why all this pother, weeks and weeks of it, about that very *chota raj*, the inter-Himalayan State of Chumba? The Chief and his revenues are not worth more, if so much as many a fourth-class thakoor of Kattiawar; yet the two claimants, Gopal and Suchet Sing, have received as much attention, and elicited as much good political writing, as if the affairs of one of the leading Princes in Rajpootana and Central India had been at stake. We are making no objection to this. Indeed, the energy and earnestness that have been thrown into this *cause célèbre* of the Chumba succession are none the less admirable because of the smallness of the stake. The demonstration is indicative of a healthy tone in the Indian press. If any excuse were needed for our own silence and apparent indifference to the cares of these small kings in Gurhwal, it would be found in the zeal and fulness of knowledge with which our contemporaries of Lahore and elsewhere have attended to the cause, and pushed the argument through all its stages—short of success. Nothing has been more remarkable than the unanimity with which the decision of the Secretary of State and the Supreme Government has been condemned. Even our Allahabad contemporary, finding it in this instance difficult to maintain its favourite part of judicious bottle-holder, or, to adopt a more pleasant comparison, that of the Sir Roger de Coverley of modern Indian politics, has "gone in" for the injured Suchet Sing, and condemned the erring powers both of Westminster and Simla. . . . . .

Now, as we have said, the financial value and political importance of this little mountain State are very small; but if, even with modification, the view taken by our Calcutta contemporary is a correct one, does it not open up some very grave considerations? For our part, we will avow that our attention has been drawn to this Chumba case as affording a striking instance of the ominous political effect of that persistent crave for salaries, places, and patronage which dims the purest intentions of statesmen, Parliament, and Crown. It is no personal disgrace to active and capable men that they apply for "anything that is going," and insist on their demand to have something to do. Nor is it any personal reproach to the dispensers of patronage that they look out for, and are almost ready to create—by the superintendency of one State, the management of another, or the tutelage of some well-dowered native Prince—opportunities for the exercise of capacities which are waiting all round, craving for hard work and appropriate liberal reward. But there is too much of this. The country cannot bear it; and our statesmen must look well ahead to mitigate this growing pressure on feudal India, this encroachment on indigenous talent for administration. The remedy is plain, but one that is more and more difficult to be enforced. Fewer Europeans must be brought out to India, unless some yet undeveloped sphere can be found for them in hill cultivation, mining, engineering, or commerce. As to the two principal streams that augment the great army of claimants for highly-paid appointments—the Staff Corps and Covenanted Service—the limits of these are entirely in the hands of the higher authorities, whose urgent duty it is to check and restrict the supply of *omedwars* most rigorously.—*July* 3, 1873.

BARODA IN COLONEL BARR'S TIME.

THE wholesome practice of freely publishing the Baroda Resident's annual reports, which has been adopted by the Bombay Government within the last two or three years, is seen by every one to be very suitable under present circumstances. Perhaps we should except the Resident himself. The opening paragraphs of Colonel Barr's report might be read as a protest intended to show that such documents are mere vanity, and to the writers thereof vexation of spirit. Apparently defying any one who may be disposed

to take an opposite view, he starts with the proposition that "these annual reports are *necessarily* of a very general character," and the gallant Political proceeds to generalise accordingly. Now we really cannot see that this proposition is a self-evident one. On glancing over the reports of General Daly for Central India, Colonels Keatinge and Brooke for Rajpootana, and on reading the reports furnished to them by their Assistants, we do not find anything to support the opinion that "these annual reports are necessarily of a very general character." Those Political reporters frequently express their regret that they cannot obtain full and exact information as to the condition and resources of the semi-barbaric kingdoms around them; but they carefully make the most of what particulars they are able to ascertain, and contrive in some way to present a tolerably tangible and precise account of each State under their supervision. And when we consider how remote and secluded many of those States are; that no European element is mingled in their population; that in many of them no British officer is stationed, it is not unreasonable to expect that the Baroda Administration Reports should offer a striking contrast to those of Central India and Rajpootana in the fulness of the information contained in them, and the completeness of the statistics collected. . . . . .

But we must do justice to Colonel Barr's Report, though he does what he can to depreciate it himself. It conveys a good deal of information. By paragraph 11 is reached, we learn what is the total revenue of the Baroda State—Rs.1,42,00,000 (£1,420,000), a small proportion of which is collected in kind; and it is mentioned that the rule followed in those cases is that the Guicowar takes from one-third to one-half of the gross produce. Next we are told that the total expenditure of the State on military and other charges for the public service is Rs.1,15,00,000. If this were all, there would be shown a handsome surplus of £270,000; but the balance is swallowed by the unknown quantity called *Khangee khurruch.* That uncouth term can be readily transliterated by our familiar phrase, the "Civil List." It refers to the private and personal expenditure of the Guicowar, including, of course, what under any system would be required for the maintenance of the regal or chief ruling dignity. Colonel Barr very properly reprobates the large outlay from that fund on courtiers, and on costly buildings for pageantry; but he does not allude to the wrestlers, the menagerie, the Darwinian experiments in the dovecote, or the famous "Chudder," all which open extravagances mainly contributed to make the late Guicowar's administration "almost the best abused one" in India. The neglect to carry out "works of real and lasting utility" is the great blot in Baroda administration which the Resident can never be wrong in aiming at, and under this head it is gratifying to notice that there is a chance of the Guicowar's experimental tramway being restored. We trust it will be fairly worked, so as to afford an instructive example to our cumbrous State railway department. . . . . .

It is only after disposing of the routine and statistical portion of his report that Colonel Barr comes to the great topic which adds special interest to this year's review of Baroda affairs—the sudden death of Khunderao Guicowar, after a reign of fourteen years. So much has appeared in our own columns and elsewhere relating to the circumstances arising out of that event, that there is little new to be gleaned from those passages which will give an historical interest to Colonel Barr's Report and tenure of office. For the sake of the outside public, it is well he has given a few genealogical particulars by which it may be known who the late and present Guicowar are. The Resident points out that, supposing a son is born to the late Guicowar, there will be no dispute whatever as to the succession, as even H.H. Mulhar Rao will be content to give way to the heir; therefore we do not quite see why that prospect should add to the difficulties of controlling Baroda affairs. . . . The future of the Baroda State presents an interesting problem to the politician and economist. Whether H.H. Mulhar Rao is continued as Regent during the minority of an heir, or succeeds as Guicowar in case of a daughter being born to his late brother,* it is every way to be desired that the Bombay Government may wisely fulfil the highest duty of the paramount Power, and faithfully perform the imperial function of stimulating and aiding the subordinate State to the exercise of its own natural political life.—*June* 9, 1871.

* This surmise was fulfilled: after Mulhar Rao was removed from the scene, his brother's widow, Jumna Bai, was restored as Regent, and, with the little daughter Tara Bai, became very picturesque personages during the administration of Sir T. Mahadeva Rao. Tara Bai was, in due time, married to the Chief of Sawunt Wari, the Mahratta State in the Southern Konkan.

THE SORT OF NEW RESIDENT REQUIRED.

II.—There is no longer any doubt that Colonel J. T. Barr has decided to vacate the post of British Resident which he has so long and so comfortably filled at Baroda. Though conjecture as to who will succeed him has almost exhausted itself, we may expect it to revive again as the time approaches for the change; and we trust that as soon as the authorities concerned may have settled the matter, they will let it be known, so as to set speculation at rest. Latterly, the betting has been in favour of the assumption that the post would be offered to and accepted by a Civilian. There is much to be said for such a selection. . . . But we do not see why the Political service itself should not supply a good man who, without too sudden a break, could bring about a state of affairs vastly superior to the Wallace-Barr *régime*, which has endured far too long. There are political officers of whom the public seldom hear from year to year, mainly because of the success with which they conciliate troublesome Chiefs, and quietly grapple with difficulties of which their own annual reports give but very imperfect indication. There must be some men of this stamp, who, during the last ten years, have filled the Guzerat political posts, and those connected with Guicowari affairs in Kattiawar. . . . Probably there are also some of our political officers out of sight, and out of mind, who would make eligible candidates for Baroda if appearance could be put in on their behalf; while a substantial, persevering man like Colonel F. Schneider has claims of another kind, though trained in a different province. There is Captain Goodfellow, who has been promoted away to Rewah; Colonel Sir Henry Green, an experienced and highly capable man; and Colonel A. Y. Shortt, who might not be anxious to return to Kutch, since it is understood that the policy he favoured has been in some sort superseded, and progress made in his absence of which he may not altogether approve. It is plain enough that the Bombay political service is well able to furnish a man for Baroda. We have not, by any means, covered the whole list of Bombay Politicals even by implication, and it just occurs to us that two or three weeks back it was indiscreetly remarked in one of our news-letters that the man for Baroda would be the present Political Agent in Kattiawar. But it is very plain that officer has his task set to clear up affairs in the peninsula before the time comes for him to retire. . . . . .—*Feb.* 9, 1872.

BARODA VULTURES.

III.—In reference to the recent somewhat striking cases of prison mortality reported from Baroda, we should be very sorry to accept as evidence the surmises of the native papers regarding those events. Both Bhow Scindia and the Moonshi Abi Boola were men well advanced in years, and they have not died more suddenly than did Khunderao Guicowar himself. It would be rash, and might be very unjust, to fall in with the popular clamour which attributes the death of these state prisoners to the agency of the Baroda Durbar, direct or roundabout. But the popular excitement which is said to prevail at that city in connection with these occurrences is a circumstance to which neither the new Resident nor the Bombay Government can be quite indifferent, though it must be almost impossible to see in what way action can be taken. . . . . .

Neither the present Guicowar, nor the illiterate, low-lifed fellow who is said to have full power over Mulhar Rao, can fall back upon the treaty rights of the Baroda State and fight the political game half so well as, on occasion, could be done by Khunderao and Bhow Scindia. Possibly, seized by compunction for the culpable neglect in the past to which we have often referred, the Bombay Government, catching a tinge of the popular indignation now said to be rising at Baroda, may resolve to hastily inaugurate a reign of law and morality in that State. And as materials for good administration are not ready to hand, a hierarchy of officials might have to be improvised or imported. In either case this would lead to unprofitable complications. But the Resident in the Political Department may say, "Are we, then, to allow things to drift again, and foul conspiracies to be hatched like these now gossiped about?"

Certainly not: though it is late to begin to fulfil our political duties towards Baroda, the task is not an impossible one. The new Guicowar is not yet entirely ruined by the scoundrels around him. The first step should be to make use of the unbounded respect and esteem which the masses of the people in Baroda cherish for the old Dewan Gopal

Rao Myral. He is, indeed, past work, and only the other day was rescued just in time from a perilous illness by a skilful physician; but he has life enough in him to afford a *point d'appui* from which a skilful Political might wage successful war against the corruption and demoralisation that now surround the Guicowar. Colonel Shortt has not had very intimate experience in dealing with depraved Mahratta officials and adventurers, but his case against Raoolkar and his confederate is clear enough, and with the public moral support of the aged Dewan, the Resident may speedily overcome the rabble rout. —*May* 10, 1872.

NATIVE BURMAH IN 1871.

UNTIL quite recently, the statement held good that his Excellency Lord Mayo was likely this cold weather to proceed to Ava on a state visit.* The design appears to have been laid aside, but this could not have been without serious consideration, as it is quite certain there was, and probably still is, much occasion for the visit of some high officer of state to confer with our wealthy neighbour and hitherto honourable ally, His Majesty of the Golden Foot. Apart from much of the gossip that has found its way into the papers on this subject, there is no doubt that the King of Burmah has had come upon him that mania for armaments and warlike pomp which, under other forms, has been the bane of States and the ruin of many monarchs in the Western as well as in the Eastern world. This lord of Mandalay, as he is lord not only of land, but of mines and of produce, which are practically without limit, has much treasure to spend—or would have if he could by any chance acquire the statesman's art of wise husbandry, in which is included that of productive outlay. The recent costly offering of the *Htee* need not be taken notice of, as being altogether exceptional, and, from the strange Burmese point of view, altogether necessary. . . . His command of information as to what is going on in the world is said to be very remarkable in some particular respects, and not to be easily explained. He has made himself acquainted with the latest inventions in arms of precision, rifled cannon as well as Sniders and Martini-Henrys. It is probable that in reference to these articles some cunning and designing adventurers may have been playing on His Majesty's vanity; but, however the crave arose, it had, some little time back, grown to such an uncomfortable proportion as to cause the Government of India some uneasiness.

Doubtless, the monarch of Mandalay has a right to do what he will with his own. We have possession of his seaboard, and hold the great Irrawady highway to his capital; but our treaties do not place any restriction upon his importations. If we are glad for him and his subjects to import railway materials, machinery, and piece-goods, he does not see why there should be any demur to his indenting on European firms for war steamers, rifles, Armstrong guns, and projectiles. But it is not to be wondered at that the Government of India regard this trade in "contraband of war" with a very different feeling. . . . . .

Mr. Ashley Eden is making a good administrator in British Burmah, but he is scarcely the man to be sent on a special political mission to Mandalay. His only exploit as an Envoy had the uncomfortable result of saddling us with the little war amongst the Jungpens of Bhutan. As it had been settled that his Excellency Lord Mayo could not go, the India Office naturally turned to the man last away from Burmah—General Fytch; but the late Commissioner having taken very formal leave of the Irrawady, did not incline to return. He said, "Ask Phayre," and we believe Sir Arthur Phayre was asked. We have not heard the result, but it is most likely our Foreign Office will have to select an Envoy from amongst our Politicals still in harness. Mr. Ashley Eden's just reported visit to Calcutta may have something to do with this rather perplexing business, but the new Commissioner is not "the man for Galway," however well he may suit for the latitude of Rangoon.—*Dec.* 19, 1871.

* This mention of Lord Mayo may (now in 1886) permit of our raising two questions: (1.) Had that sagacious Viceroy's career not been cut short by cruel and untimely fate, is it likely that he would have allowed affairs at Mandalay to drift from bad to worse, as did his successors? (2.) Seeing that he had acquired much of the true imperial art of Indian politics, is it likely that he could have committed, or, in his retirement, have approved the deplorable mistake of Lord Dufferin in sweeping away the native dynasty, whereby the whole country has been thrown into anarchy, with which we shall have to struggle for years to come?

MARWAR AND BELUCHISTAN.

EVER since Colonel Keatinge gave up H.H. Maharajah of Jodhpore in despair, it has been almost as difficult to understand the chief causes of the chronic disorders in Marwar, as to suggest how the Durbar and its warring Thakoors could be reconciled or induced to keep the peace. On topics of this nature the political reports are very reticent. The writers seem to take a pride in withholding the special information required until either it is too late to be of use, or the difficulties are cleared up and become matter of history. We are not able to state that this last is now the happy case of Marwar; but it is satisfactory to hear, as we do, that His Highness begins to see that it would redound to his credit to rule over a peaceful State, and also, that the turbulent Thakoors are willing to describe their alleged grievances in some tangible shape, and hang up spear and *tulwar* for at least a month or two whilst matters are being talked over. . . . In brief, the disorders in Marwar have in great measure arisen from resumptions of jagheers by the Maharajah or his durbar officials, and encroachments on the lands of his feudatories generally. . . . . .

It strikes us that this very sensible method adopted to bring about reconciliation between the Maharajah and his fierce Rajpoot Thakoors might be imitated with advantage on the Scinde frontier. We go a step further, and say that if the four authorities concerned—the Political Agent at Khelat, the Frontier Superintendent, the Commissioner of Scinde, and the Bombay Government—had been at all equal to their position, some step of this kind would have been taken long since. . . . . .

As to one result of the disorder, the extradition and captivity of the Jam of Lus Beyla, now a prisoner at Ahmednuggur, it is impossible to speak with any certainty; but it is very plain that the incident is one that shows some failure on the part of Scinde authorities or an essential defect in our system of political management. It is understood that the Jam at first came voluntarily to Kurrachee to appeal to the Commissioner or the Bombay Government, we are not sure which; but he presently found himself placed under surveillance, and gradually the bonds have been drawn tighter and tighter, until this luckless Belooch Chief finds himself a close prisoner, in what is to him the far foreign country of the Deccan, and his movable property confiscated. All this, so far as the public is aware, has been visited upon him without the semblance of a trial. In regard to this last incident, the auction sale of his horses, we proceed upon what was said by one of our Scinde correspondents in last Friday's paper. Whatever the Jam's offences may be against his relative, the Khan, he has done nothing against us to justify the harsh and bailiff-like act of selling off his stud, which happened to be within our territory only, we suppose, because the steeds had been brought into Scinde after their master, when he came across the border confiding in British justice. We trust, if the Bombay Government is not strong enough to look into this shabby business for itself, that the Viceroy will order an independent investigation into the lesser matter of the horse sale, if not also into the larger one of the border anarchy. The statement, made by one or two papers, that the Khan of Khelat is to be provided with money and ordnance, so that he may mow down his Sirdars, is too senseless a story to be believed.—*Feb.* 7, 1872.

THE TONK CASE AND TRIBUNALS FOR NATIVE STATES.

WE may all be tired of hearing so much about the Nawab of Tonk, upon whom none of us ever bestowed a thought until towards the close of 1867; but the importunate cry, "Give me a fair trial," cannot remain void for ever, and it seems likely that, quite irrespective of the issue of the Nawab's case, the uncouth designation of his little State may come to be associated with the establishment of that new court or tribunal for which the times are ripe. We take little account of the voting on the division now reported, but there is much of importance in some of the speeches on that occasion. . . . The only part of Mr. Grant Duff's speech that is not beneath notice is where he also—though with divers irrelevant remarks—shows that the Privy Council is not the tribunal where the Nawab or any other sovereign chief could be heard in his own defence. Mr. Montagu Chambers, as a lawyer, was of a different opinion, and emphatically affirmed that the Act constituting the Privy Council and its Judicial Committee gave to Her Majesty power to refer to that body semi-judicial appeals from decisions by the Executive

Government of India. And Mr. Watkin Williams, though entertaining the worst possible opinion of the Nawab's conduct, also dissented from the dictum of the Solicitor-General, and expressed his opinion that the Judicial Committee can deal with criminal appeals. Apparently, disregarding the ill-defined term "political case," he thought that the circumstances of a sovereign chief being defendant and the Viceroy prosecutor, made no difference. But amidst the conflict of opinion as to whether this case could and should be referred to the Judicial Committee as proposed by the member for Oude, it is very clear that the Nawab has nowhere else to appeal. . . . . .

As to the question of fact whether the Nawab was cognisant or ought to have been cognisant of the scheme to entrap the Thakoor of Lawa, it was scarcely likely that the debate could add much to the little tangible evidence already adduced. But several of the speakers threw such light on the nature of the evidence which could not but produce an impression on public opinion at home. When the matter was first taken up by Sir John Lawrence, and disposed of almost off-hand—subject, as it now turns out, to the deliberate sanction of the Secretary of State—we were inclined to think that substantial, though somewhat rough, justice had been done. It seems that we overrated the capacity of Sir John for looking into things for himself; and it is a little startling to find that the Government of India laid so much stress on the views of Colonel Eden, when it is tolerably notorious that the said officer was incapacitated for any continuous attention to business for long before his decease. We see that Mr. Eastwick justified his criticisms on the ground that the case was *not* investigated by Lord Lawrence himself, and he denounced the course taken by Colonel Eden and Captain Bruce as extremely improper. Sir Charles Wingfield went into the matter more fully. He showed that the first rules of judicial procedure were not observed, that the Nawab had been denied copies of the evidence against him, and thus, as Sir Charles said, there arose the monstrous result that "this native Prince was placed in a worse position than the humblest British subject." The convictions of these two competent Indian representatives are more than sufficient to set against the flippancies and special pleadings of Mr. Grant Duff. And it is very notable that notwithstanding the Under-Secretary's vigorous attempt to scold the motion down, and Sir Stafford Northcote's bland persuasives towards getting it withdrawn, half a dozen members on the Ministerial side of the House spoke out with that feeling of honest indignation which generally moves Englishmen when they hear of any persons being condemned without fair trial, be they prince or peasant. We happen to know that the report of the debate fails to show the strength of the feeling evoked by the autocratic and scornful bearing of the Under-Secretary and Mr. Lowe. . . . . .

As to Mr. Grant Duff, the cup of his cynicism and scorn must be well-nigh full; but he must answer to the Ethnographical Society for his brilliant suggestion that the grandson of a Pindaree dacoit might be of the same tribe as Shere Ali, of the Khyber.

What is left after Sir Wingfield's motion is disposed of is the previous question—whether there should not be some Court or Commission—more of a political nature than the High Courts, and having more of a judicial character than the Political Departments and Foreign Office of the Viceroy—before which should be taken all serious contentions between independent Princes, or between our allies or feudatories and the British Government itself. Then there is the further question—Should there be two branches of this tribunal, one in India and one at home, associated with the Privy Council, or only the latter? That some institution of the kind is required has been long since demonstrated by Colonel Sykes as a director of the old Company, by Mr. Prichard, and others, before the East India Association. In the Journal of the Association, bearing date March, 1870, the whole proposal is fully discussed so far as principles are concerned. . . . . .

It was characteristic of Lord Napier of Magdala that in his brief speech, the other day, at the meeting in Calcutta in honour of the late Viceroy, he concentrated attention on the way in which Lord Mayo had borne himself as the imperial and personal representative of our Most Gracious Sovereign the Queen. After alluding to the substantial good our rule has conferred on India in bringing to an end the "thousand years of war," his Lordship went on: "But deep in the heart of the people there lingered a vacancy, a memory of the old empire of India which it was desirable should be felt, and none of the great statesmen who have governed India have more [than Lord Mayo] fully and completely endeavoured to fill that vacancy by making the people, Princes, and Chiefs of India feel that he was the representative of a great Sovereign of a great monarchy, which desired to embrace and

combine them all with the British people in one great nation, in holding out the cordial hand of friendship to the Princes and Chiefs in India, advising them, assisting them to take their places and their share in the government of this great country."

Could this spirit be consistently maintained in our Foreign Office and Political Department, the Tonk cases would be few and far between; but human nature, even that of Viceroys, Governors, and Secretaries, is not equable and consistent, and misunderstandings will arise. Therefore it is that we must resort once more to the expedient of embodying principles in institutions which endure whilst men pass away.—*March* 23, 1872.

HYDERABAD AND OTHER NATIVE STATES:
Their Critics and their Masters.

OUR contemporary, the *Madras Times*, in a leading article in his issue of the 14th instant, under the head of "Affairs at Hyderabad," endeavours to draw an alarming picture of the state of that country in general, and of its high roads in particular, as if to show that the State is fast relapsing into the lawless state in which it was previous to the time—according to the *Madras Times*—"dating from the era of the Mutiny," when "a traveller, a Christian and an Englishman, was exposed to constant insult and outrage." And further; our contemporary, alluding to the waning influence of that "miraculous Minister, Sir Salar Jung, over a people he has so long governed with singular energy and ability," builds an argument against military reductions by the Government of India. To unbiassed minds, acquainted with Hyderabad and its Government, the alleged facts brought in array against the Nizam's Government do not prove the decadence of its authority, or that the reins are slipping out of the hands of the able and energetic Minister. . . . Lawless acts and robberies, our contemporary must know, will sometimes occur under the best system of government in India. Not to refer to other instances, let us take the case of the robbery of our Sattara mail and the murder of its driver, the other day, near Poona. If this had occurred in Hyderabad, there would have been no end to the diatribes of the *Madras Times* on the want of order and the dangerous state of Hyderabad. The Government would have been condemned in no measured terms, and the people denounced as comprising a large percentage of robbers and cut-throats. It would neither be just nor reasonable to say that the British Government at home and abroad lacked energy and solidity, because H.M.'s life was threatened within the precincts of her own Palace, the Duke of Edinburgh was shot—happily with no fatal result—in Australia, and Lord Mayo stabbed in a penal settlement. Do these events indicate a lawless state of the population of the British Empire?

Our contemporary deems it questionable whether Sir Salar Jung can continue any longer to keep the turbulent and troublesome people he governs in fair order and discipline. "Perhaps," says our contemporary; "the prejudices of the people are excited by the introduction of many startling novelties"—"perhaps Wahabeeism is gaining a footing in the Nizam's country"—"perhaps a Jehad is being secretly fostered and nourished there," and—"perhaps" anything and everything that the lively imagination of our contemporary can conjure up is tending to bring about the "crisis" which his fancy depicts, "when we (that is, the British Power) shall have none to fight the battle we provoke through our economy." Thus the artifices adapted by writers of sensational fiction are imported into the arena of politics. This would only be ludicrous, were it not that in thus weakly giving rein to the imagination much mischief may be done. Even were the "crisis" in Southern India as real as it is chimerical, there would be nothing to fear, if we only remember the battles fought and won in bygone years with a tithe of the European troops now in India. With the vastly superior arms now in use, and the greatly improved means of communication, a still smaller number would suffice to crush twice over any foe that could arise in India. Let any who may doubt this take some pains to refute the arguments in Colonel Meadows Taylor's letter to the *Spectator*, which was transferred to our columns a few weeks since. . . . . .

The Madras journal does not seem to understand the constitution of the Nizam's Government. He does not know that there is an *imperium in imperio*, an authority to a considerable extent independent of the Nizam's Government, within the Nizam's country, and which renders the duty of the ruler a hundredfold more difficult than under the

compact system of British India. Our Madras contemporary ought to know, but must, for the time, have quite forgotten, that there are many nobles and chiefs in the great Deccan kingdom, independent jageerdars, made independent of the authority of the Chief Minister of the State, within whose jurisdiction it generally happens that acts of violence, such as the Madras paper alludes to, do sometimes occur. That there are difficulties in the removal of this anomaly in the State we need not take the trouble to show. . . . Within the British dominions in India there exist similarly independent chiefs, whose *laches* in administration might be laid at the door of the British Government if the Nizam's Government are bound to answer the shortcomings of all their jageerdars; but the latter Government has not been in the habit of annexing principalities. It strives patiently by persuasion and example to introduce order and regularity in them.

Before concluding, we might ask whether the maltreatment which some travellers in the Nizamate may experience is not brought on by their own conduct? Accustomed as they are in British territory—especially those from Southern and Eastern India—to the abject subserviency of the people, they expect the same servility from the natives of Hyderabad, and even from the Government officials. Some wayfarers are too apt to forget that civility will beget civility, and that a haughty bearing and insolent and contemptuous language must only provoke corresponding resentment.—*March* 28, 1872.

One-sided Treaties and Grudging Policy.

II.—The short-sighted folly satirised in the homely apologue about killing the goose that lay the golden eggs, has often been exemplified in the history of nations. One conspicuous instance is that of Spain, which has not yet expiated the ruthless greed which prompted the unworthy "companions of Columbus" and the despicable, avaricious officials at home to despoil the new world of its surface wealth within less than a single generation. . . . It did not require the Member for Finsbury to remind us that there was a time also in British India when our predecessors seemed bent on killing the goose that lay the golden eggs of large dividends, heavy mercantile profits, and fortunes snatched by a few unscrupulous adventurers. That period, with its short-sighted policy—though revived for a time under the grasping Dalhousie—really passed away with the gradual extension of law and regulation, and yielded to the far-seeing and truly imperial temper of the better men of the Honourable Company, like Shore, Tucker, Grant, Munro, Elphinstone, Metcalfe, and Malcolm. But are we acting up to the spirit of these great men? Are we, in our political policy and dealings with our allies and feudatories, willing to forego immediate financial advantage, and content to wait for a larger and more continuous future profit which shall not be our own alone?

Surely with four-sevenths of the area and three-fourths of the population of this peninsula directly subject to the British Crown, England can afford to treat those native States which yet retain their independence, or are under British protection, with political justice and enlightened generosity. The policy pursued by our Government in 1853-56 towards the States of Hyderabad, Mysore, Kattiawar, Rajpootana, Central India, and Oude, would infallibly have drawn the two former kingdoms into the vortex of British annexation, as it did the latter. Even now it may be said that, unable to comprehend the wise and far-seeing policy of the British Crown towards the independent States, some of the Residents accredited to the different Courts are apt to use such a "moral pressure" as virtually renders nugatory the fair promises held out by Her Majesty. Take one instance. The enlightened Minister of Hyderabad, Sir Salar Jung, was desirous of having a railway to connect his land-locked kingdom with the outside world. The Resident was but too anxious to see one also. What was the result? A "State Railway" was decided upon, the amount for its construction—one crore and eighteen lakhs—sanctioned, the interest guaranteed, and the land all given by the Nizam's Government. All this sounds very satisfactory; but then came the step taken by the Resident and Government of India, which may render this splendid undertaking a very thankless, not to say humiliating, one for the Nizam's Government. The Resident takes the whole management and patronage of this undertaking on himself. This means not only that the Nizam's Government must supply the capital, guarantee the interest, and give the land for the line and buildings, but it means that his Minister and officers must have nothing to do with management of the railway either during construction or after completion. . . . It means that a strip of

about 120 square miles of the Nizam's territory has been virtually handed over to the British Government. . . . . .

If this peculiar manifestation of the non-interference doctrine, this very one-sided assistance towards developing the internal resources of native States, is freely applied by other Political Agents, then we need not wonder if some Chiefs find cause to be discontented, and view with mistrust the advice of the paramount Power. It cannot be supposed that a man of Sir Salar Jung's penetration does not perceive and feel keenly the injustice of these railway transactions. It cannot be supposed that, with the Minister's high tone of honour and long-tried feelings of loyalty towards the Crown, he does not feel the mistrust implied by this hard bargaining and these jealous provisions. Negotiations like those connected with the Hyderabad State Railway are likely to sow mistrust where confidence reigned, and destroy the mutual good understanding that existed. It is just the sort of experiment which, if persisted in, may cut short the natural life of the productive fowl.

III.—On turning from Hyderabad to other independent States, there is much in our management that savours of grudging and mistrust. On the plea of security the British Government forbids Holkar making percussion caps and casting rifled cannon; its officers treat the Nepaulese with distrust, and eye Scindia with apprehension; while the extortionate Nuzerana scheme has been held over the heads of all for years past. What, we ask, does it matter if Scindia delights in fine troops, and Holkar spends his money in buying steam machinery to manufacture powder as well as spin cotton? What if the Nizam would prefer narrow-gauge railways located according to his own convenience, and if Nepaul manufactures rifles and percussion caps? Instead of thwarting, let Government help these Princes with their whims, and treat them with consideration and respect. When the time of trial arrives, if it ever come again, they will find that those dreadful guns, and still more "parlous" percussion caps, and all other bugbears of mistrust, so far from being used against the British Power, will be its best defence. But this presupposes the faithful maintenance of a generous Imperial policy. The age is past when the Princes of India, being ignorant of their rights, will allow changes or encroachments to proceed without challenge. The proud Mohammedan, the haughty Mahratta, the bold mountaineer of Nepaul, are rulers and enlightened men, and quite understand that they owe allegiance to the Crown of England. . . . Lord Canning, Lord Mayo, and the best English statesmen have all assured them that their sovereign and treaty rights are firmly established. Education has sharpened their reasoning faculties, modern civilization has enlightened their minds, and they are naturally desirous of carrying out what they have learned. This may not be always done wisely, but why thwart them in their unaggressive designs?

Liberal Revisions Required—The Berars.

IV.—Another requirement connected with the duty of our Government towards the Princes of India deserves serious notice. It is the patient hearing of their complaints, and the strict observance of justice in adjudging them. At certain junctures in former years steps have been taken by Government for security's sake which nothing but the then existing exigency warranted. Some of these arrangements, in the shape of permanent treaties, confiscations, or establishment of Contingent and Subsidiary Forces, ought, if brought now before the notice of Government, to meet with due and impartial review. We will mention one instance in which the liberal revision of a treaty leading, it might be, to the restoration of a considerable territory, would not only be a graceful act, but would tend to the perpetuation of British power in India. It is well known that about the year 1813 H.H. the Nizam had a corps of 6,500 men thrust on him. This corps, called the Contingent, had to be maintained at a yearly expenditure of 32 lakhs of rupees—an expenditure which was one of the immediate causes of the Nizam entangling himself in crushing debt. To retrieve himself and meet the pressure put on him for the recovery of the debt due by him to our Government, the Nizam, by his final treaty of 1861, with bitter repugnance at having to part with territory, though temporarily, "placed the Berars in the hands of the Resident, in order that he might administer them on our own system, devote what was requisite of the revenue so realized to the payment of the Force in question, and hand over the surplus to him." The Nizam, however, carefully reserved

to himself his sovereign rights over those fertile provinces. By this transaction the British Government, or rather Bengal Civilianism, became master of an area of 18,000 square miles and a population of 3,000,000. The gross revenue at the time of assignation was 42,09,000 rupees, and has since risen—the cotton windfall having intervened—to 70,45,000 in 1869 to 1870. In 1870 the surplus, accruing out of nine years, amounting to the handsome sum of 25 lakhs of rupees, was, after a good deal of delay and demur, finally paid by us into the Nizam's treasury. However satisfactory in this respect our administration may appear, yet it has a stepmother-like look about it which might easily, and without danger, be transformed into one of paternal, disinterested care. Neither sovereign nor people can like to see a fourth of their territories taken away and administered by another Power. Even on the avowedly temporary bases of the arrangement, it cost H.H. the Nizam great agony of mind to part with what may fairly be called the Goshen of his dominions. It had at that time become absolutely necessary that some such security should be given, as the Government were the creditors, and the Nizam's affairs, especially his treasury, were in a very confused state.* But under the rule of Sir Salar Jung, all that has changed for the better, and the tone of the Nizam's administration is, as Mr. Saunders testifies, healthy and progressive. The Hyderabad revenue shows a sum of two crores and 58 lahks (£2,580,000) in 1869-70 against two crores and 26 lakhs (£2,260,000) in 1865-66. In noting this increase of 32 lakhs, it must be borne in mind that the Hyderabad kingdom was then, as it still is, curtailed of its most fertile provinces. . . . . .

Taking all these matters into consideration, and also that the successive Nizams always have been staunch friends of the British Government, we cannot but think that a revision of the Treaty of 1861 would be a step in the right direction. It would prove that, so far from our policy being dominated by interested motives, Her Majesty's representative in India has at heart the weal of the several nations under her rule, and that he desires to march hand in hand with their own natural leaders. This step would show the Princes of India that if England knows how and when to strike, she also knows how to be trustful, disinterested, and just.—*May 22, 1872.*

BARODA ABUSES—NATIVE GREED AND BRITISH NEGLECT.

IN mentioning, the other day, as an item of news the dismissal of the Head Clerk of the Baroda Residency—who, by mention of his name, we then for the first time learned is a Parsee—we are not aware of having shown any feeling in the matter one way or other. The Bombay Government, so far as Baroda affairs are concerned, has during the last few months gradually waked up from its political slumber, which extends over the last decade. It has begun to learn, what has long been well known to those of the public who take interest in these matters, that the Guicowar's Durbar has ever been more than a match for the Residency. Generally, when any disputed point of historical claims or modern pretensions has arisen, our Political Department must confess that the Durbar could boast of superior information—none the less superior because the references and hints where it could be found have been obtained from the Residency archives themselves. Colonel Phayre, who—though untrained in political service and barren of political ideas—is a man of character, firmness, and skilled as a detective, has had a fine field for his talents in tracing what has been going on in the *duftars* (records) of the Residency. As might be expected, the more special and confidential records or correspondence have been the particular attraction of the ingenious emissaries of the Durbar, whither their contents, or the substance thereof, have doubtless been transmitted much more promptly and regularly than to the Bombay Government. . . . We are told that a score or more of villages have been deserted, the people having been reduced to despair by the systematic plunder which the useless and illiterate Dewans appointed from time to time either connive at, or

* The above sentence should only be read (as is implied in the preceding context) as expressing the official assertions and superficial view at the time. The true history of the transactions referred to is duly described in other articles in this book, notably pp. 247-8, and p. 276. The "necessity" was caused by the Government of India itself, and the then confused state of the Nizam's affairs was the result thereof.

are powerless to prevent, themselves being the puppets or nominees of the cormorants who are gorging themselves on the unfortunate ryots and traders of the districts. The remedy for all this is plain, and of easy application—on two conditions—first: that H.H. Mulhar Rao should really know what his people have to endure, and that he should see the peril to which he is exposing himself; second, that he should be encouraged and supported to do the right thing—that is, clear out the cage of unclean birds who hold possession of his Durbar, and select a well-educated, English-trained Hindu Dewan, who would command the confidence at once of his own thakoors and ryots and that of the Bombay Government.

But the Residents and our Political Department have so long foregone the responsibility of giving disinterested counsel and practical instruction, that they scarcely know how to perform towards Baroda these essential functions of the paramount Power. Having gone on so long without doing anything, they will be likely to swing to the opposite extreme, that of superseding or shelving the Guicowar himself, and pressing on the State some British officer, thereby sacrificing the fine field offered for a fair and honest trial of native administration under proper conditions—that is, the sincere and co-operative support of an experienced and liberal-minded Resident. The extreme and clumsy process we have hinted at might secure the approbation of the *un*political Foreign Office at Simla, but it would not command the approbation of the Secretary of State and Parliament.—*July* 11, 1873.

PAST AND PRESENT.

II.—With regard to Baroda affairs, there is, amongst others, one baffling anomaly which, now and heretofore, renders it difficult and all but impossible for a Bombay journalist to render much service towards Guicowari reform. During the Wallace-Barr era, nothing that one could say on behalf of turning our political influence over the Guicowar for good made any impression either on the Resident or the Bombay Government. They had stolidly accepted what was very ill-described as the non-interference policy, and this was a sufficient reply to all persuasives from outsiders. When in 1865, at the command of H.H. Khunderao, a poor wretch was dragged or trampled to death by an elephant, Sir Bartle Frere read the Guicowar a severe lecture on his barbarous criminal code; but that incident passed over; all minor, though many of them very evil, practices were ignored; and, so long as His Highness was not going headlong to ruin, the Residency slumbered on. But, as we remarked, Khunderao liked to know what was going on, and had his duly appointed "reader of news." Now, when the Guicowar is rushing violently down a steep place, at the foot of which is destruction, and the Residency is fairly awake, His Highness of the present day cares little more for the murmurs of the outer world than for the groans of his much suffering subjects. He listens to his Hurris and Bapoos, who fill his weak but somewhat cunning brain with rubbish about his supposed treaty rights, and can cleverly preach unto him those dogmas of non-interference which they will have duly treasured up since the reign of somnolence to which we have alluded. In these days the "reader of news" must have a sinecure; and, as we remarked last week, anything we could indite, either by way of reminding the Guicowar of his responsibilities, or warning him of the pit he is digging for himself, would be useless. This is discouraging; for though we understand His Highness listens with respectful outward attention to remonstrances and warnings, all these are obliterated immediately afterwards by the obscure but potent evil counsellors in the Durbar. Whereas, if this infatuated ruler could be apprised that he is condemned by independent public opinion in Bombay, such knowledge might arrest his attention, and tend to break the spell which his crafty advisers have wound around him.

At present nothing we can say would startle either him or them. We might even go so far as to say that Baroda misgovernment has attracted the personal attention of His Excellency Lord Northbrook; that the Supreme Government is determined there shall, at last, be a thorough reform; and that not only shall the plundering parasites be cleared out, but that H.H. Mulhar Rao himself shall be shelved to make way for a better man. We say, if even we were in a position to make any such portentous announcement, there is no certainty, indeed little probability, that it could reach the ears of the Guicowar himself. . . . . .

The British Government, during its prolonged intermittent struggle with the Peishwa, and sometimes at later dates, derived much political and military advantage from its alliance with the Guicowars Anund Rao and Syajee Rao. In the several arrangements as to providing troops on one side, and transfer of territory on the other, the balance of financial gain may, on the whole, rest with the British Government. This does not much, if at all, affect the question of imperial responsibility that rests with the paramount Power, and the obligation of due and regulated dependence which remains with the Guicowar. The validity of these mutual relations may be inferred from almost every page of Baroda political history. Let us take one of the first of these pages on which we open: on it we find inscribed the words of a statesman whose comprehensive views can never become obsolete, and whose conclusions, now more than half a century recorded, are sound as ever for the purpose in hand. We allude to Mountstuart Elphinstone, who, in the early part of 1820, had been deputed to Baroda to confer with the then recently succeeded H.H. Syajee Rao Guicowar on the affairs of his State, and the relations between it and the British Government. After several conferences with the Prince, of which Elphinstone speaks, with his kindly courtesy, as "increasing their former friendship by personal intercourse," the experienced Political sends a brief memorandum. . . . . .

Would that there were any reasonable prospect of the present Resident ever being able to address the present Guicowar in some such words as these, with which Sir J. R. Carnac takes leave of the repentant Prince of that day:—"It will ever be to me a source of gratification to hear of your Highness's welfare, and to be informed that, by a strict adherence to existing engagements, your Highness has merited the oblivion of the past, and is pursuing a steady and honest course for the future."

Possibly such a way of repentance may yet be open to the obstinate Prince now at Baroda; but, from what we hear, there seems little likelihood of his availing himself of the chance open to him of a return to favour. As to the measures to be taken in the event of his being proved incorrigible, we have already expressed our opinion. The remedy is one that ought to have been applied, and that with a strong hand, during the interregnum; but it is not too late now. We are reminded, however, that if a first class Hindu or Mussulman Dewan were appointed, a clean sweep being made of all the present Durbar officials and their dependents, much practical difficulty might arise in the carrying on of affairs. We think little of this assumed difficulty—always supposing that only a strong, relf-reliant man shall be appointed to the onerous task of cleansing the Guzerat Augean stable. For instance, there must be at least one or two former officials of the Durbar discharged, perhaps, because they were not quite so unscrupulous as the rest, or retained a trifle of self-respect. Very little clerkly aid from one or two men of this kind would enable a new and British trained Dewan to take up the broken threads of ordinary business and restore continuity. The great desideratum at present is for H.H. Mulhar Rao to be convinced, by some means or other, that there is no help for him but in turning over a new leaf altogether.—*Aug.* 6, 1873.

Plundering Parasites.

III.—Frequently, in referring to Baroda affairs, we have had to remark—indeed, to complain—that from amidst all the denunciations of the misrule and oppressions undoubtedly practised under and by His Highness Mulhar Rao and his myrmidons, it is exceedingly difficult to collate established facts or distinctly defined transactions, such as would warrant us in demanding the deposition of the present dissolute and well-nigh demented Prince, or any other revolutionary but possibly salutary measure to be put into execution by the paramount Power. We do not now avow that the record before us of exactions and base tyrannies is sufficiently particular and circumstantial to enable us to draw up a *procès verbal*, or bill of attainder, against the Baroda Guicowar and Durbar; but from evidence which is abundant for our own conviction, we feel quite clear that the cup of Baroda iniquity is well-nigh full. Yet unless our words can penetrate the narrow mind and now depraved faculties of the guilty Prince himself, we write but as those who beat the air. If we could reach the ears of his sycophants and pandars, something might be done to arrest the rabble rout in their headlong course; but to attract their attention and make any abiding impression on their guilty souls, we ought to be in a position to point them to the high probability of their being stripped of all their ill-gotten wealth, branded with the

mark of Cain, and sent across the *kala pani*. According to most accounts, there are half-a-dozen, perhaps half-a-score, who deserve that sentence far more than all but the most hardened convicts at the Andamans. However Justice may linger, the stern goddess halts not—her sword is raised to strike. Cannot this be translated into Mahratti for the benefit of the bestial and plundering crew?

Meantime we can explain the most facile and usual manner in which Avarice pursues his ends—the chief method by which these Baroda exactions are carried out. True to the use of euphonious terms and plausible forms, the pecuniary oppressions under which, in many districts, the last rupee is being wrung from the wretched peasantry, are carried out under the system of *nuzzerana*—presents made on accepting any office or being admitted to audience. One account of this monstrous abuse runs somewhat thus: everywhere throughout the Guicowar's territories (and it must be remembered these extend, through feudal tenure, far into Northern Guzerat and Western Kattiawar) offices of all grades are conferred solely on the principle of competition in offering the largest *nuzzur*, and all the chief revenue posts are farmed. Thus, all executive posts, from the chewkeydar to the Revenue Commissioner, are in the hands of the most greedy, corrupt, and relentless rascals that can be found in the territory, or have been attracted to it, from the offscouring of British districts, as the eagles discover the carcass from afar. . . . .

But why continue to trace the circle of villainy? Let us consider its results. There are unmistakable signs that the whole State is undergoing rapid depletion. Apart from the obvious recent decline in sources of land revenue—which Baroda and other native States may feel more than our own territories—the sudden decline in the total of the Guicowari income during the last year or two, that is, nearly forty per cent., proclaims very plainly that there have been heavy leakages somewhere. To this cause is directly due the troops' arrears, the stoppage of Sirdars' allowances, and—what we have not yet before mentioned—the tendency to repudiation and other unprincipled financial measures to which His Highness Mulhar Rao has, during the last few months, shown a too ready inclination. It is very possible, if any scribe can be found sufficiently hardened to draw up some apology for recent Baroda administration, we shall be told that the State debt has been largely reduced, some say, by one and a half crores. But then the question arises—how? *Nuzzerana* again! Here is a new way to pay old debts: the amount is handed over, a receipt taken, then a thumping *nuzzur* is demanded equal to a large proportion of the liquidated debt; all demur and objections are overruled by significant hints that the Sheriff can settle the matter instead—by summary confiscation. This is one of the statements which require confirmation, but we believe that would not be far to seek. Amongst other bankers who have suffered severely under this liquidating policy, are said to be the successors to the amiable and respected Gopal Myral. If these transactions can be traced home to His Highness Mulhar Rao, they will serve to display him in the character of a breaker of engagements, and a betrayer of trusts; for it will be asked, where would either the present Prince or the Guicowar Khunderao have been without the aid of Gopal Myral? . . . . . .

The paramount Power cannot atone for its neglect of the imperial duties of political instructions and frank counsel in years that are past; but it can do its duty now. In doing this—if doing it without *arrière pensée* or sinister aim—it may count upon as full support from native as from European opinion, from our allies and feudatories as from its own officials. Much must depend upon the manner in which drastic measures towards the present Guicowar and Durbar are carried out, and also on the instruments to be made use of in restoring order and prosperity to the harassed people and impoverished State. About this there should be no difficulty, if loyalty to the political principles of the new Empire is sincerely cherished, and the crave for patronage is kept under. The Government of India in its Foreign Department has of late given proof of its determination to carry out honestly and straightforwardly the sentiments of political good faith enunciated by His Excellency Lord Northbrook at Bombay and Indore in November last. Sir Dinkur Rao was recently appointed to the charge of the Dholepore State—a very much smaller principality than Baroda; and several other instances of utilizing the invaluable indigenous material which is abundantly at disposal could be named. Sir Philip Wodehouse's Government can have no serious difficulty in carrying through the impending revolution at Baroda, though they are somewhat hampered by the grave mistakes of their predecessors in the Wallace-Barr era.—*Aug.* 11, 1873.

H.H. MAHARAJAH HOLKAR ACCEPTS MODERN METHODS.

NOTICES of the various changes effected in the administration of His Highness the Maharajah Holkar's State of Indore have, for some time past, appeared intermittently in our columns, and in those of our contemporaries. In most of the references to these reforms praise has predominated, though there have not been wanting occasional indications of dissent, other than those mutterings of discontent which may be expected to arise when customs peculiarly comforting to a few are disturbed, and when the venerable rule of thumb in matters of public business is superseded by the regularity and method of trained men. We must confess also to some misgivings on our own part lest the new order was being introduced too rapidly. It was not that we thought Sir Mahadeva Rao would push forward any change not really needed, but we have had some misgivings as to the Maharajah himself, lest, after having for so many years always held the reins himself, he should begin to be uneasy about the driving of another, and thus be induced, some month or other, to interrupt the great and good work to which Sir Mahadeva has put his hand. So far there has been no sign of His Highness's drawing back; and from information which recently came in our way, we are gratified in finding there is as yet no likelihood of any such backsliding on the Maharajah's part. It must be irksome to an active-minded Prince, accustomed all his life to govern as well as reign, to find that he has entered on a course in which he must defer and yield, as well as order and command; but His Highness Holkar is a tolerably well-read man, who has in many ways turned his own comparatively narrow experience to very good account. Having counted the cost and personal sacrifice involved in accepting something like constitutional rule, he bids fair to persevere to the end; and we doubt not he does already appreciate the fair prospect that opens out. . . . . .

Much has been said in news-letters about the impulse given to education in His Highness the Maharajah's territories, but we wish there were more certain evidence than is yet available to show that the movement has extended much beyond Indore and into the rural districts. There can be no doubt that both the Prince and the Minister are anxious to spread the blessing of good plain instruction throughout the population; but this is not a matter to be hurried. At the other extremity of the social scale, the claims and advantages of mental culture are not likely to be overlooked. The Minister, understanding these advantages so well, is as anxious as the Maharajah himself that the Princes should receive as much of mental plenishing as possible, and certain arrangements for carrying on their education have recently been matured.

In public works it might be supposed that, whilst His Highness is advancing at the rate of several lakhs a-year for the Indore State Railway, he would be slack in spending on other permanent works. But this is not the case, and in that direction also a fruitful and well-directed activity is manifest. Two lakhs have been granted during the year for ordinary works, mainly for improvement of the roads in and about Indore itself, and in repairing the chief district highways converging on the city; public offices and new gaol buildings; these last, long required, are already being built from separate funds. As a proof that public works will now receive a fair share of the annual grants, and that roads, bridges, and reservoirs will claim steady attention from His Highness, we may remind our readers of the appointment (already mentioned) of Mr. J. Carey, an engineer of good standing, well known amongst Bombay men. Though manufacturing enterprises do not properly come within the scope of State action, we may mention here that the Indore cotton factory, which, in the earlier stages of its history, was beset with mischance and difficulties, which no one but a Prince, and a very determined one, could have overcome, has lately made great progress under its manager, Mr. Broome; and the enterprise seems likely to pay a profit at last. It will be remembered that, two or three months ago, an advertisement appeared in our columns, offering His Highness's Burwai Iron Works on lease. Knowing the formidable nature of the enterprise which any lessee would have to face in undertaking to work this huge forge, we had doubts whether any response would be elicited. Now we are agreeably surprised to learn that the Burwai works on the Nerbudda have been leased, and thus another impulse may be given to the industrial activity of Central India. . . . . .

In many respects, the intelligent designs and fair success of Mahratta Prince and Dewan under the new motto of "Arts, not Arms," are full of political and historical interest.

It betokens in the Mahratta character a capacity for sound policy and honest administration which, truth to tell, is still required to be tested and confirmed by experience. It is also a pleasing testimony to the high comparative success of our system of public instruction to see a Mahratta of the far south, after doing much to elevate and strengthen remote Travancore, adjusting himself to the very marked idiosyncrasy of His Highness Holkar, proving himself capable of entering into and grappling with the, to him, totally new circumstances and system of Central India. But the chief practical lesson we wish to draw from the promising prospects of affairs in the Indore State is, to ask—what might not such a *régime* do for Baroda? If His Highness Mulhar Rao could but see that he is rapidly sliding towards the brink of a precipice, he might also see that the efforts now being made by Sir T. Mahadeva Rao and his colleagues show plainly the way by which the Baroda State may yet be rescued from ruin. But we fear that the Guicowar is deaf.—*Aug. 19, 1873.*

Sir T. Mahadeva Rao and his Indore Coadjutors.

II.—Besides that cheap defence of nations, the respect and loyal regard of the masses of the people, which the rulers of British India can always count upon when they are large-hearted and wise enough to act up to their better lights, there is, or might be, another constructive and conservative force in our imperial Indian system which is almost unique in modern history. We refer to the aid which may be, and in many instances is, rendered by the Princes and administrators of native States in ruling the diverse population of this vast Peninsula, and in binding together those portions of the incohesive mass which lie beyond our red boundary lines. Within these we have quite enough to tax all our ingenuity and energies. No doubt there are some instances in which native States constitute a disintegrating force and seem to give more trouble than they are worth. This is the case with Baroda just now; but then, as we have constantly pointed out, this is because of exceptionally bad administration. The relative value of such buttresses of British power as native States might be made, is not so much to be perceived on merely taking note of the numerical proportions in which the British stands to the native population and territory. According to our latest estimates, there are about 185,000,000 of souls and 911 square miles under the British flag, to 50,000,000 and 644 square miles under native rule. Beyond this arithmetical comparison, there are such considerations to be taken into account as that variety of administration is itself an advantage, while we must remember that the assured maintenance of indigenous States affords a sense of security to men of social consequence within our own borders, and, in turn, well administered native States afford that invaluable balance wheel in our imperial machinery—a career for native talent and active spirits for whom there may not happen to be scope within our own borders.

This latter advantage is, we think, being exemplified under the new *régime* in the Indore State. The capacity and character of a native Prince are often forcibly illustrated by the class of public servants he employs to conduct his administration. And it seems to us that the Maharajah Holkar deserves no inconsiderable credit for selecting well-informed, experienced, and upright counsellors. Some notice of the more prominent of these may not be quite uninteresting to the public. Sir T. Mahadeva Rao, who holds as Dewan the highest office in Holkar's Durbar, is one whom it would be impertinent to praise, and whose career it would be needless to describe, as it forms part of the Indian history of our day. It required unusual moral courage on the part of His Highness Holkar to engage the services of this Tanjore-Maratha administrator, whom we believe that Prince had not so much as seen. The selection was spontaneous, and is in itself an indication of the clear perceptions and political sagacity of the Indore Prince. . . . . .

This short notice of the leading men now in Holkar's service will suffice to show that His Highness has been fortunate in the choice of his agency. With such men in his post made personally responsible for good administration, it cannot be long before the best results are attained. One highly satisfactory feature in the character of these Indore officials is that, so far, we are assured they are sensible enough to work in perfect unison. No petty jealousy or foolish pride mars their usefulness to the State.

This may to some seem a state of affairs too good to last, but we trust it will be endured long enough to quietly and smoothly transform the whole system of Indore

administration. Under a Prince so shrewd and a Minister so suave and enlightened, there is little danger of personal rivalries ever making head. At any rate, we can only speak as we find; and we fully believe that the new but already settled Indore administration will afford an example which some other native States will be glad to follow. Peradventure it is not yet too late for unhappy Baroda, but His Highness Mulhar Rao is fast losing his chance to amend.—*Oct.* 18, 1873.

KATTIAWAR—A NOTABLE STEP TOWARDS THE REIGN OF LAW.

EVERY one on this side of India knows in a general way something of the vast amount of pains taken by various Political officers from Colonel Keatinge's time onward—aided, too, by much thought bestowed on the subject by the Bombay Government—towards establishing a sort of Political Court of Arbitration in Kattiawar. Such an institution has been established under the title of the Purdhan Court, and has now been open for a few weeks—not long enough to test its working, but a sufficient time to afford some estimate as to the probability of the present arrangements serving the purposes for which they were intended. The objects and constitution of this Court are concisely described in the Bombay Administration Report for 1871-2, and they are so well known that we need only here use general terms in speaking of the Court, its members and suitors, or appellants. Besides the score or so of Princes and Chiefs in Kattiawar who have distinct and historical political status, there are scores of other Chiefs with more or less of local importance and jurisdiction; and again, hundreds of feudatories known as Bhyad and Mul Grassias, many of whom own considerable estates, and possess various territorial rights. As may readily be supposed in a province like Kattiawar, where rights are often unrecorded and boundaries unsettled, and where the progress of partial civilisation has necessarily thrown disproportionate power into the hands of those who hold a position assured by quasi-legal sanction, there have been numberless encroachments—the greater part of which have tended to the aggrandisement of the larger, more active, or more powerful States. It was mainly to check this tendency, which the right of appeal to the Political Agent was insufficient to restrain, that this Court was devised and established. . . . . .

It is demi-officially admitted that "the success of the entire measure must depend upon the capacity and tact of the officer appointed to preside over the Sabha" or Court. . . . But notwithstanding all these favourable circumstances, there are doubts and misgivings to which we feel bound to draw the attention of the Bombay Government in time. It would be much easier to modify the Court's constitution now than after its proceedings shall have become intertwined with the curious and intricate politics of the province. Or, if the nature of its defects are now clearly perceived and acknowledged, it will be more easy to introduce a different element into the *personnel* of the Sabha as the members, now just appointed, move off by resignations or deaths. When the Survey staff of the Sabha gets to work, something may be done to remove the feeling of coldness and shyness with which its opening has been received; but it is now tolerably plain why that feeling exists. The Bhyad and Grassias at present regard the institution as one which is better adapted to support and confirm the encroachments of their powerful rivals than to afford relief and protection to themselves. Of course, this view of the Purdhan Court is entirely opposed to its theory and object; therefore, we trust that means will yet be found to give it the just and impartial character originally intended.—*Aug.* 27, 1873.

Powers above the Law.

II.—We trust that the brief description we gave, the other day, of the different hierarchies in Kattiawar would serve to make the affairs of that province more easy to be understood. A good deal of light is thrown upon the otherwise tangled questions that beset the inquirer into Kattiawar politics when he sees that the inevitable preponderance of the three or four larger durbars is a force which requires all the firmness and sagacity of the Political Agent to withstand. If this be not done, that force tends to pulverise not only the Bhyad or subordinate landlords under those durbars, but also the smaller States, whose political status and prescriptive rights are, in many instances, as sound and ancient as that of the four or five leading princedoms. The test of the

Kattiawar Political may be said to lie in this—how far does he direct that force wisely ; or how far is he borne along by it, or beguiled by the insidious influences of the skilful Kharbarees* who, more or less for their personal ends, manipulate and hold that force? Here we must remind the inquirer that, while the smaller and larger States are by the circumstances of their position often thrown into antagonism and rivalry, this attitude is not necessarily that of the Kharbarees. Amongst this remarkable class there is a steady *solidarité* maintained, though the exigencies of durbar disputes may sometimes throw them into apparently angry contention. The Kharbarees of the smaller States know full well where power lies, and in what direction profits are to be made. It may not be their destiny to remain for life in the State where they first learn the official craft, and it may be worth while their striving for years to conciliate the larger durbars in order to obtain a foothold therein.

Thus all local influences make in favour of the larger States; and if it should be seen that the Political Agent and his more prominent assistants lean that way also, then "ill fares the province to hastening ills a prey." Then all the astute agencies of chicanery and mischief are let loose, while oppressions on one side and desperation on the other abound. This state of affairs should, of course, be impossible with a British officer at the head of the province; but the forces of evil, of selfishness, jealousy, and greed are at once subtile and strong, and the Political Agent of Kattiawar needs all the support he can have from an enlightened Government at head-quarters. Yet that support must be intelligent and discriminating; and there is no evidence to show that, as yet, Sir Philip Wodehouse has been able to read the open secret of Kattiawar politics. . . . . .

New Wine in Old Bottles.

III.—There has been so much talk about the Rajasthanik Sabha, or the Purdhan Court, that this new institution might be supposed to have overshadowed or absorbed almost every other quasi-judicial function formerly exercised by the Political Agency. There has been mention made, more or less loosely, in news-letters of a large number of appeals having been recently disposed of; and the easy-going reader could scarcely be blamed if he had put these cases to the credit of the Purdhan Court. But that Court, as we stated the other day, is an utter failure, and so far as we are at present advised, not half-a-dozen cases have been brought before it. These appeals said to have been disposed of are regular Agency appeals, relating mainly to boundary questions. Colonel Anderson left about 150 of them on the files ; and as the new Purdhan Court was scarcely ready, and its President, Colonel Law, was rusting for want of work, the Acting Political Agent very properly gave him these arrears to go over. Somehow the process was to be by "arbitration." About 90 of them have been gone through and "disposed of"—after a fashion. It is one thing to decide appeals, but it may be a very different matter to satisfy appellants. We have alluded to the urgent need there is, in regard to Kattiawar affairs, of the Executive Government itself being in possession of full information impartially reported. Under the ordinary routine of the Political Department this is not always certain to be at hand when wanted. Political officers are often closely engaged in office duties, and at other times, as now in Kattiawar, they are condemned to change the pen for the sword, the correspondence file for the revolver. But as the maxim of the Political department is *festina lente*, there will be time for it to return to the subject.

We would, therefore, urgently recommend that due inquiry should be made into the procedure followed both in hearing and deciding these appeals. Is it possible that pressure was used—not, of course, by the authority of the Political Agency—to induce weaker suitors to enter a submission to the arbitrator's decision beforehand? Amongst the durbars of Kattiawar the "imposition of Mohsuls"—billeting a cavalry soldier or two on recusants—is a familiar method of persuasion. The clever Kharbarees know very well indeed how to apply this gentle pressure, and they have a way of doing it so that the ostensible plea put in may have nothing to do with the object sought. Ask any of them interested on behalf of their durbars in the settling of these appeals, if they had "moshulled" the other side by way of securing submission to the "arbitration" and consent to its decision, and these eminent politicians would affect an astonishment which

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* Mahratta designation of the higher class of native officials or their deputies.

would *appear* as great as that which the Political Agent would *really* feel could the prevalence of such antiquated civil procedure be proved before him. Nevertheless, before the wholesale disposal of appeals be again tried in Kattiawar, we should advise some vigilant attention being given to the course of procedure followed towards the weaker parties out of court. . . . Whether the brand-new Statute-book will work now that it is drawn up remains to be seen; but as it will have to be resolved upon by Government, we may suggest that before final sanction is given rather close inquiry should be made as to the *modus operandi* under which this code has been knocked together. And it would be particularly desirable to know if the Chiefs and Kharbarees, who will have to administer it, have given an intelligent consent to its provisions and introduction. We do not libel the latter class when we remark that, whatever their personal partialities may be, they are not likely to be enamoured of the reign of law.—*Oct.* 15, 1873.

THE GUICOWAR'S IMPENDING DOOM.

BARODA affairs have at length attracted such attention as must insure a reform in that unhappy and much squeezed State. How the required changes will be brought about is not yet certain, but that an improved administration of affairs will arise either under this Guicowar or *another*, we feel quite confident. One of the gratifying signs that, notwithstanding their English garb, our recent strictures have taken some effect, may be traced in a curious and peculiarly suggestive letter which appears in another column. We have reason to believe the original was written in Marathi, and that it was translated by the "neutral" gentleman who has been asked to send it to us. The genuineness of the epistle is proved by abundant internal evidence. Here we have an apologist—nay, an advocate—for the Guicowar's rule, who writes as if he sincerely believes what he says, who considers that we and our correspondents have traduced that Prince and his remarkable administration, and who would have us believe that the cry of oppression and wrong that comes from one Guicowari district or another every week is merely the result of designing and disappointed factions. How are we to deal with a man of this kind?

We have our answer ready for him; but, meantime, let us look at his friendly letter, and glance at his would-be skilful way of putting things. We have divided the letter into paragraphs, in order to render its beauties more apparent. Our great modesty would have forbidden us to print his flattering opening paragraphs, only we also publish, "after compliments," the bitter admonitions and the rasping sarcasms under which our editorial judgment is covered with confusion. Of what avails us to be told in one paragraph that our paper "suits the tastes, and its articles carry the assent and sympathy of almost all its readers," if in the next we are rebuked for having "made such statements regarding H.H. Mulhar Rao's administration as to strike the minds of all well-informed and impartial persons, as well as disinterested thinkers [think of that!], with amazement, inasmuch as they [the statements] want authenticity." And if we "take hold of silly and flying rumours for the truth," how very certain it is that our "interesting and creditable (!) paper will be despoiled of its beauties, its standard be lowered, and the reputation in which it had hitherto been held would be diminished." It is unfortunate for the interests of truth that the writer has not specified the silly and flying rumours to which he so strongly objects, when in our columns they wear the aspect of grim fact and stern admonition. He does, indeed, pay us the left-handed compliment of suggesting that our guileless and unsuspecting nature has been imposed upon by some designing *umedwars* who (wicked men!) have "thrown dust in our eyes with the view of accomplishing their own vile, selfish, and vindictive purposes." All this is, of course, inexpressibly sad; and it is a great reproach to journalism that we should be so ignominiously taken in and done for by some scamps or other, name and profession unknown, who only want to turn some other scamps out of the Baroda Durbar. But why does not our candid friend descend to particulars? . . . . . .

We have spoken of the letter of the 16th, but it is a short note in our paper of the 20th (not of the 19th), signed "Denzil," which has shot alarm through the heart of our patronising but reproachful correspondent. But why should he be so grieved about that? It is only a very little one. The reply is plain, as we thought at the time, and is now involuntarily avowed, "Denzil" hit the right nail on the head. He suggested the

appointment of a Commission, composed of experienced Political and Judicial officers, who should hear what the Resident has to allege as to the prevalence of abuses under H.H. Mulhar Rao's rule, and also what the Guicowar and his officials may have to plead in denial or extenuation of the evils testified to in evidence. Then let justice be done; which, as "Denzil" suggested, would—supposing the Commission's verdict confirm the popular one—result in the deposition of the present ruler, and the installation of the nearest and most suitable heir of the Guicowar family, provided with a trained responsible Minister. No wonder the programme shadowed forth by "Denzil" seemed a dreadful portent to our correspondent of to-day; but we are glad that he and his friends have sense enough to perceive the peril into which the vultures of the Durbar have dragged H.H. Mulhar Rao. It is satisfactory to see that this *advocatus diaboli* has the candour to avow that our remarks addressed to H.H. the present occupant of the Baroda *gadi* "bespeak our friendly intention and aim at the well-being of His Highness and his State." He must know that on broad political grounds we should resist any movement towards annexing the State and destroying the *raj;* but we do wish to see a root-and-branch reform effected, and should not much grieve if H.H. Mulhar Rao's deposition were found to be the price required in order to obtain such an estimable boon for the unfortunate people of the Baroda State. . . . There are at least half-a-dozen other birds of prey, less well known by name, but equally eligible for perpetual exile from Baroda. Is His Highness prepared to pass sentence on these? If not, let himself ask for a Commission, and abide by the result. Such an inquiry might open the eyes of His Highness Mulhar Rao to a story of oppression and systematic peculation that would convince him his only salvation can be found in the entertainment of a British trained administrator as Dewan, and in the institution of responsible, open-handed administration. "Denzil" suggested that a Dinkur Rao or Mahadeo Rao would be required; but there are several men in the Bombay Presidency less known to fame who, if a fair chance were given them, would do as much good at Baroda as could be done by either of these eminent administrators.—*Sept.* 2, 1873.

THE EDITOR AND A CANDID FRIEND.

II.—Our readers will appreciate the following reference by the Bombay correspondent of the *Pioneer* to the remarkable Baroda letter in our paper of last Tuesday:—"A correspondent of the *Times of India* gravely takes that journal to task for its utterances concerning the Guicowar, and in the most solemn and virtuous way in the world protests that there is no room for complaint against the Guicowar's conduct, or against his officials. The severe simplicity of this letter and an injured air of conscious virtue combine to make it one of the most amusing documents ever seen." After quoting some of the *naïve* testimony of the Guicowaree writer, which purports to proceed on "personal knowledge," the *Pioneer's* correspondent thus remarks:—"The superb vagueness and broad generalisation of this person's letter renders it one of the most grotesque things that the Hindoo mind, fertile in falsehood and supreme in cool contempt of truth and reason, has ever produced; and the sleek, Tartuffe-like tone adopted throughout is as exquisite fooling as anything ever attempted by any hypocrite on any stage." Our contemporary, the *Argus*, has, by the way, an ingenious apology, or plea in demurrer, on behalf of Baroda as it is. The following is the concluding portion:—"The position occupied by the Resident is a very difficult one, but though he represents the paramount Power, he cannot make that Power responsible for all he may do. As matters now stand, more reliable evidence is required than is now available before the condemnation of H.H. Mulhar Rao is pronounced. If the British Government intends to step over the treaty with the Guicowar, and interfere in the internal administration of that State, there ought to be very unmistakable proof forthcoming that the act is fully justified; otherwise the triumph will be due to superior power, not to the exercise of an undoubted right."

We do not much object to these propositions, except as to the assumption that there is any question of the British Government stepping over its treaties with Baroda. . . . Let, then, a good impartial Commission be appointed. Let such ingenious men like the one who wrote to us last week, and certain others of like plausibility or callousness, be fully heard. Then let justice be done on evil rulers and perverters of Princes. Thus the birds of prey will be chased away to the Deccan, whither the lamented Bhow Scindia despatched,

but where he lost most of his spoil. By this means the hand of justice will strike miscreants; but the Baroda State will be preserved, we trust, for generations to come, under a system of honest and thrifty indigenous administration, furnishing a corrective, a contrast, and comparison with our own well-governed but much-taxed Gujerat.—*Sept.* 8, 1873.

A Final Warning.

III.—The occurrence of some street disturbance at Baroda, caused by some freak of licentiousness permitted, if not connived at, as alleged, by the Prince or his Durbar, again forces the affairs of that State on the attention of the public. Certain vague talk of amendment, and loose promises about appointing better men, have had due commentary, not only in this unpleasant incident, but in the readmission to Durbar confidence of an official recently dismissed, who, it is currently believed, had already taken away several lakhs of spoil. We have nothing to add to what we have said on former occasions regarding the deplorable condition of this State; but while we desire, above all, to rescue its inhabitants from their miseries, we would, if it be possible, make another effort to save the unhappy Mulhar Rao from the fate which he is assiduously preparing for himself. Perhaps it may best serve to emphasise and make plain our position in this Baroda Durbar question if we quote portions or the substance of a letter addressed to us by an experienced and thoughtful politician, who somewhat objects to the course taken by ourselves or some of our correspondents in this manner. He says—"I am sorry to see the Guicowar is run down so mercilessly. I know he has his faults, and that there are 'cormorants' there; but I doubt if on the whole the Baroda Durbar will be found much worse than any other native State. The course adopted at present to raise a cry against him and then to bring him down, is not the right one to bring him round. Of course the paramount Power in its strength can do what it likes; but deposing him will not be the right course. . . . It was his misfortune that as soon as he came to the *gadee* his evil genius K——— first, and others after him, acquired influence over him, and led him astray. To bring him round again will now require some effort, but this crying him down without mercy is, I am afraid, not the wisest. The misdeeds of the 'cormorants' and bad advisers might have been exposed without such a dead set being made against himself. He needs more advice, support, and encouragement, instead of abuse, to lead him to reform a state of affairs holding its ground from past times. A revolution in a native State is no easy thing for the Prince himself to carry out."

We should premise that the writer of the above is now at a considerable distance, and has scarcely had opportunity to hear or realise the aggravations of misrule, extortion, and wicked waste which have been reported from Baroda during the last few months. . . . We have not proposed the Guicowar's deposition, though we have warned him that he was making haste towards that goal. Nor have we wished to see the administration superseded by the action of the Resident or the fiat of the Bombay Government. It has been pointed out in these columns—the merit of making the suggestion is not ours, but that of an experienced correspondent—that the course most suitable and free from any objection would be the appointment of a High Commission, consisting, say, of three members, one nominated by the Bombay Government, one by the Government of India, and one by H.H. Mulhar Rao himself. Before this open committee of inquiry the Resident would only appear as a witness, and the Guicowar might send to it as many of the peculiarly ingenious men at his command as he likes. Then, when the facts and the truth were incontestably established by this impartial court of political appeal, and its recommendations approved by highest authority, H.H. Mulhar Rao should himself have the carrying out of those decisions, he being assisted to that end if needful. Thus, it is not we who wish "to run the Guicowar down mercilessly;" rather is it our aim to set him on his legs again, if he has any moral and political backbone left. . . . . —*Oct.* 24, 1873.

THE RIGHT MAN FOR BARODA AT LAST.

THE Baroda Commission has virtually completed its labours; but under the system of obscurantism to which it is subject, we are not likely to have any authorised report of its proceedings or statement of its conclusions until this time in 1874, when it will be too late for its deliverance to be of any practical service. This waste of their pains and

talents is certainly not the fault of the Commissioners; and, from what little we can hear, they seem to have discharged their difficult and perplexing duties with judgment and impartiality. . . . . .

Whilst, however, the Commission and all that it has done must remain for many months amongst the things of the under-world, there is one practical matter affecting the present interests of the Baroda State and people which presses for speedy solution. We refer to the appointment of Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji as Dewan, already made by H.H. Mulhar Rao, by whom the nomination has been duly submitted to the Government of Bombay, and, we presume, that of India also. Whatever the decision of the Commission may be as to the past, it is well known that in accepting a man of integrity and high political principle like this well-known Bombay citizen, the Guicowar has fairly broken with that evil past. And seeing that his desire to have this educated and Britishised politician as Minister was manifested long before the verdict of the Commission could be anticipated, it may fairly be supposed that His Highness is sincere and settled in his wish for thorough reformation. Yet, just at this juncture, when the Baroda Prince has voluntarily turned over a new leaf, and has given the best pledge in his power to enter on a more excellent way, there are those who understand Indian politics so badly that they are moving above and below to prevent the consummation of this natural and hopeful movement towards thorough reformation of the largest native State on this side of India. On the one hand, impossible advice is given as to seeking for Baroda certain unattainable native administrators; on the other, the irrepressible crave for patronage and promotion breaks out in the urgent demand that the Guicowar, who is already watched by a morbidly vigilant Resident, shall be saddled for an indefinite period with some British officer and establishment who shall supersede the whole framework of native administration. . . . . .

Now that the Commission has sat and deliberated, Colonel Phayre will surely be "visitation" enough for the Baroda State; and as an exceptionally favourable opportunity has arisen in Baroda for "extending and intensifying the moral authority of our Government," without attempting in that State "to be ubiquitously executive," we trust the Bombay Government will not foreclose that opportunity. It is certain the Government of India will not take the responsibility of superseding the Guicowar in his internal administration just at the time when, of his own free choice, he has selected as Minister a British subject whom the Viceroy himself might be glad to trust.—*Dec.*, 1873.

FACTIONS, OBJECTIONS, AND SINISTER COUNSELS.

II.—It was to be expected that a portion of the world of officialism, also the army of placemen and waiters on the providence of our Local Government, would be sorely disquieted at the prospect of the Guicowar of Baroda having the good sense to choose and stand by an independent native politician as his Dewan. But it is matter of surprise to observe what may be described as the mere commonplace second class official view of Baroda State reorganisation accepted by our elder daily contemporary. However, as all sides must be heard, it is well that the most plausible statement possible shall be made out for the right divine of British officials to manage native States and be quartered on their revenues at every favourable opportunity. The article to which we are alluding opens with the following sweeping assumption and impotent conclusion: "The objections to the choice of Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji as Minister to the Guicowar of Baroda are so serious that we are glad to believe the Bombay Government is likely to withhold its sanction to the appointment." The said "objections" can only affect and weigh with those who do not know the capacity and skill of the Bombay citizen thus condemned offhand; therefore, those objections cannot be held "serious" in the open court of public opinion. We can quite believe that the Bombay Government—if it follow the narrow, parochial, and mere "service" view of its political obligations, manifested too frequently during the last three or four years—may withhold its sanction to the unexpectedly wise choice H.H. Mulhar Rao has made; but we think it is very likely that Lord Northbrook's Government, to say nothing of the Secretary of State, may take a broader and more far-seeing view of this incident, which may be said to form a part of the test question in Anglo-Indian politics of the day. . . . . .

Now when it appears that its inquiries have been kept within manageable compass,

the remainder of zeal is to find scope in the demand that a Revenue Survey Commissioner and his establishment shall be sent to browse on the fat pastures of Baroda; while the unfortunate Prince, just when he has come to his senses, and seems likely to do well according to his lights, is to be pensioned off and kept in stock on show as a puppet king.

This is in, brief, what is meant by the apparently organised opposition to the Guicowar's free choice of a Minister; for it would have been just as easy to find fault with any other independent native politician who might have been selected by H.H. Mulhar Rao. Still we rely upon the Supreme Government to see the true bearings of the case from a higher standpoint than that of the Baroda Residency or Bombay officialism. The most obvious of those bearings is, that as the Guicowar has made his own free choice, it can do no harm and may do a world of good to allow a fair trial to his own arrangement. This view will, we venture to think, be taken at Westminster, if not at Calcutta.—*Dec.* 31, 1873.

BHOWNUGGUR—EXPERIMENT OF JOINT ADMINISTRATION.

IN taking up his post in the joint administration of the Bhownuggur State two years ago, Mr. E. H. Percival was placed at disadvantage by certain circumstances, the misleading influence of which was enhanced by reason of his own too confiding disposition, and by that extraordinary glamour which certain leading officials of that State have, for the last eight or ten years, contrived to throw over the Bombay Government and some of its influential servants. In the first place, Mr. Percival entered on the scene too late for any effectual retrospective investigation. An official accountant sent before him had been effectually baffled. The timely conflagration of "useless records" rendered the Civilian administrator powerless to trace back peculation to its sources even had his suspicions been aroused—which they ought to have been, but were not—by the beggarly amount of only 25 lakhs left in the Treasury at the late Thakore's death. Still, the wholesale depletion of the State which had been going on for years was notorious enough—within the charmed circle of Frereian officials always excepted. To what an extent the plunder had gone on will now never be known, though the minimum estimate is astounding.

Of course, the appointment of a Civilian as joint administrator with full powers was sufficient to stop all the grosser forms of Kharbari looting; and we are glad to find that Mr. Percival, with the British officer's proper hatred of such plundering of Prince and people, has not hesitated to visit with exemplary punishment one instance of that offence, evidence of which recently came before the joint administrators. It appears that a certain Durbar officer, a Nagur Brahmin by caste—in some such position as we should describe by the name equerry or stud-master—whose name we would give at once, except for the risk of misspelling, had not contrived to get all his accounts thrust into that lucky conflagration of 1870, so that some old records have witnessed against him and insured his conviction, carrying with it expulsion from office. It is much to be regretted that we do not hear of his being compelled to disgorge. But it is very significant that this caterpillar of the State is said to have felt most keenly and complained most bitterly of the addendum which Mr. Percival very properly insisted on affixing to the sentence of expulsion—namely, that So-and-so should be "proclaimed" as one ineligible ever to hold office again under the Bhownuggur State. . . . When the Bombay or any Indian Government undertakes the temporary management of a native State, no reasonable pains should be spared to make known to the people at large the special advantages of our incorrupt and equable administration. This need not be done ostentatiously; but there is no occasion whatever to hide our political light under a bushel. Yet this is done by making all correspondence on these subjects secret, and by huddling away the reports on such management until the whole story has become stale, and the good influence has evaporated which might result from the sharp contrast between impartial supervision and the happy family system of administration by caste and kin. It is true that this practice of faithful open reporting might occasionally be inconvenient. For instance, Mr. Percival is by this time, perhaps, in a position to draw up a report on the revenue and expenditure of the State under his charge which, by inference, would reveal some extraordinary hiatus in the financial history of the State during the eight or nine years preceding the late

Thakore's decease. But if, as we have intimated, it might be shown that during the period in question a sum almost sufficient to pay off our Port Trust debt had been diverted from the Bhownuggur Treasury, what will be said as to the supineness or ignorance of the Bombay Government in its Political Department whilst this systematic looting was going forward? . . . . . .

It was rumoured the other day that the Treasury was in such a plethoric condition that it had been proposed to redeem the annual tribute to the British Government by paying into our Treasury the full capital amount which that contribution represents. It is scarcely likely that such an offer would be accepted if made, but we mention it as a hint to future Financial Ministers who may stand in need of "windfalls." Public works have been one of the elements that went to the making up of the Bhownuggur "eyewash" which has worked such wonders with the Bombay Government in past years. . . . No doubt this expenditure of Bhownuggur spare funds on communications and public buildings is all very proper; but when the far superior maritime facilities of the contiguous British port of Gogo are considered, one cannot but wish that Gogo might be put under "joint administration," if that would enable it to get piers and a light railway into the interior.—*Oct.* 21, 1873.*

H.H. SCINDIA'S KONKANI BRIDE.

SUNDRY references have been made to a certain matrimonial alliance into which H.H. the Maharajah Scindia is about to enter. As most native Princes have quite a habit of marrying, this incident might be disposed of with mere passing mention; but there are two or three circumstances connected with this marriage of the Gwalior ruler which give to it some little political interest. The proud Mahratta Prince from remote Central India—the successor of the conquerors from the Deccan—seeks a bride from the extreme south of the Konkan and in one of the smallest native States in the Bombay Presidency. The young lady thus chosen to high estate in Gwalior is a daughter of the Sur Desai of Sawunt Waree, which territory borders on that of Goa. But this small dominion, though it has passed through trying vicissitudes, has a history which entitles it to some special political consideration. With that true imperial instinct so often manifested by the Kings of Delhi in maintaining friendly alliances with remote, and, more especially, with seaboard States, Sawunt Waree and its Chiefs were cherished by the Great Mogul. As a peculiar proof and emblem of imperial favour, the Sur Desai was permitted to use as part of his regalia the *Morchal*, or fan of peacock's feathers. Republicans might stigmatise this regal insignia as a "bauble"—albeit this natural trophy is more beautiful than any mace ever designed—but neither the Indian people nor their rulers know anything of political Puritanism, and with them the *Morchal* was, and is still, esteemed a great prize. We believe the Guicowar of Baroda possesses that mark of royal favour, it being one of the most coveted amongst the several gifts and concessions sued for and obtained by H.H. Khunderao Guicowar from Lord Canning, the first British representative of the Great Mogul. . . . . .

Perhaps some impatient politicians will say that this small history is like a paragraph about the Pumpernickels, or Petit-Strelitzes from an "Almanac de Gotha" of the last generation. But we are in Asia. Here the pomps and vanities of principalities and graduated sovereignty have still a name to live and retain a vital hold on the imagination and political affections of the people. Sawunt Waree would have made but a small Collectorate, and we might not have been any more proud of it than—if we are honest with ourselves—we dare be of Rutnagherry. This little State by the sea which thus gives a bride to the still powerful Prince who holds, as it were, the outposts and northern landmark of Mahratta influence and tradition, serves to keep alive the self-respect of that race, and helps to preserve, in harmonious alliance with British power, the political pride of that capable and serviceable people. Let us then be rather more than merely satisfied that Lord Elphinstone and the Viceroy of 1858 had the good sense and prescience to restore little Sawunt Waree. The lesson is still worthy of being pondered over. Indian politics are not quite so plain and easy as the multiplication table.—*Nov.* 6, 1873.

* It may be well to mention that the reform begun, as above described, in this important Kattiawar State was fairly maintained; so that, under the present Chief and his advisers, Bhownuggur has become known to the British public mainly by Mr. Edwin Arnold's recent glowing description, and the fine show it made in the Colonial and Indian Exhibition—as one of the most thriving of the native States of India.

MISRULE IN KATTIAWAR:

A Demi-Official Apology.

THE political authorities in Kattiawar, or some very indiscreet agents of theirs, have taken the unusual course of obtaining the insertion in the columns of a contemporary of a demi-official reply *en bloc* to various of our news-letters and other communications, in which several local chroniclers, all well informed and more or less impartial, have described the overt course of outlawry in Kattiawar, and the methods taken for its suppression—as yet with but partial success. This communication has for rubric the following: "We have been *requested* to publish the following true statement of facts as to the recent affairs with outlaws in Kattiawar." The words, from "publish" to "Kattiawar," are evidently a quotation, so that our contemporary can have no responsibility for issuing this extraordinary document, though a long passage in one of its own news-letters—consisting of a puerile apology for the failure of the Rajasthanik Court—bears a clumsy impression from the same mint as the more finished communicated *piece justicatif*. This document we would reproduce in its entirety but for the pressure of "Europe news," and for the consideration that the paper containing it can be obtained in Medows Street at the small price of four annas. Then, too, as the Bombay Government is so chary of giving out authorised versions of political affairs—never yet, for instance, having allowed the last Kattiawar Administration Report to see the light—it would be ungracious on our part to discourage the purchase and sale of volunteered demi-official manifestoes like the one now in evidence in the columns of our contemporary. Besides, no one can grudge "a powla" for a compilation so exceedingly artistic, seeing that in these days manner is considered of incomparably more consequence than matter.

But we have something to say to the matter of this document; and we may as well remark at first, as at last, that more desperate special pleading and more audaciously partial yet withal ingenious travesty of current history we have not met with for many a month. . . . Such facts, as are stated in this cunningly devised and peculiarly one-sided extra-political report, present very striking confirmation of the general correctness and manifest good faith of our correspondents, one and all. In truth, the ludicrous failure of the demi-official writer to impugn the statements on *bharwuttism* (outlawry) which have appeared in our columns will create much amusement in Kattiawar, and everywhere else where the ground is known and the subject is understood. The attempt made to show that it was "all those Wagheers," and that the outlawry and brigandage was confined to a very narrow district, have signally failed. We sincerely regret to receive collateral evidence from such an unlooked-for quarter as to the very serious prevalence of insecurity in Kattiawar during the past season; but it is some satisfaction to find that our correspondents have been, on the whole, so well informed, and that, by due circumspection, we have been enabled to prevent the public from being served with sensational or exaggerated stories—such as several of these incidents in Kattiawar might have furnished for the pen of a ready writer. . . . . .

As to the general question of the conduct of Kattiawar affairs, we can have only one desire in the matter—namely, to see discontent allayed and ruffianism replaced by rural peace and ordered freedom. It can be no pleasure to us, as faithful chroniclers of our times, to have to show how far that happy state is from being attained. Having for years urged the appointment of some Civilian as Agent in that province, we held out as long as we could against the evidence, which latterly has become overwhelming, of the utter failure of that experiment. Still the grounds on which we urged a selection being made from that class are still sound, and we would have it tried again. Meantime, we claim to report upon and review affairs in Kattiawar, as elsewhere, with motives as disinterested, and with a mind as impartial, as that which any Agent, Civilian or military Political, can bring to bear on the subject.—*Nov.* 26, 1873.

IMPERIAL SWAY:

Its Living Title Deeds.

IN dealing with Indian politics proper we necessarily address only a limited audience. In the old countries of Europe, though nearly every citizen is more or less of a partisan, and does on occasion mingle with eagerness in political strife, politicians are

scarcely more numerous than scientific men. In India, most European residents have something else to do than study politics; and, if they be officials, it comes quite natural to rest or work in the easy belief that the party always in power—that is, the British *raj*, the Lord paramount—is always in the right. It saves a world of trouble to forget the history of how our empire here was built up. It accords with all our national and personal predilections to assume that things as they stand are for the best, except in so far as it may be possible to rub down, curtail, or finally absorb any of the princedoms, dominations, or "hereditary jurisdictions" which may be supposed to stand in the way of consolidating or strengthening our beneficent British rule of this great peninsula. There may be an uneasy consciousness that this is not quite an exhaustive political philosophy, even for India; and there are few, if any, members of the Services who would avow this creed. But there can be no doubt that it is one held by some who occupy prominent official positions. It would be vain to enter into argument in the hope of refuting opinions which are so manifestly due to our race idiosyncrasy, or the result of uninquiring prejudice. It is sufficient to observe that though these opinions count for something in the way of obstruction and latent irritation in the Anglo-Indian body politic, those who hold them cannot be regarded as politicians, and their views can be of no help towards the solution of political questions. As, however, it is not disquisitions and theses, despatches or minutes, that are needed for the conduct of national affairs, but the proper thing to be done at the right time, the question becomes a practical one—whether the political principles on which the Government of India professes to be carried on are intelligibly applied and faithfully maintained.

Whatever may be our wish or inclination, it must be remembered that the British *raj* is not alone in this peninsula, nor is it ever likely to become the sole ruling power; and the country will never be parcelled out like a chess board on one pattern of administration. Of the 1,400,000 square miles of total Indian territory only 868,000—that is, little more than half—are coloured red; and of the 254,000,000 of total population 55,000,000 are under native rule in hundreds of States and Chieftainships. Waiving for the time all retrospective inquiry as to how this relative position came about, and leaving as a forgotten story the time when the preponderance was the other way, we may ask, how are we getting on with our neighbours? . . . . . .

Our Calcutta contemporary is evidently not quite sure as to his Excellency's political pulse; and with regard to the course that may be taken by the Supreme Government, he concludes his article with the significant remark—"We trust that it will so act that there can be no question as to the purity of its own motives." If some of the sinister and grasping proposals regarding Baroda that have been so freely made in our neighbourhood were carried out, there would be something more than "question" as to the administrative purity of our political authorities on this side of India. But why should the Calcutta writer seem to hint at the possibility of any similar weakness on Lord Northbrook's part? On his Excellency's arrival here he gave forth no uncertain sound as to the political disinterestedness of the British Government. At the Byculla Club, at the Victoria banquet, and again at Burwai, his Lordship was so distinct, nay, so emphatic in his expressions of resolve to maintain the rights and foster the autonomy of native States, that it seemed as if he might have come to India almost on purpose to endorse and renew Her Gracious Majesty's Proclamation of 1858—that "Golden Bull" which pacified an empire while seething with revolt and bitter disaffection. If they were not so well remembered, we would quote some of Lord Northbrook's words on those occasions; but instead of these, it will be more to the purpose if we quote from a recent writer who is combating the blind and reactionary school of Indian politicians to whom we have alluded: the reply, in this instance, is directed against some special pleading speech of Mr. Grant Duff's, who, for the purposes thereof, had divided Indian Princes and Chiefs into three classes. . . . . .

Let the Baroda Commission do its duty, and let judgment on the past be pronounced by all means; but if, now that a total change of policy has taken place, the Guicowar's administration should be ignored and the autonomy of the State be overborne, either by Resident or Special Commissioner, then the word will pass round amongst our allies, feudatories, and stipendiaries, who are our "living title deeds," that the Red Spectre has been "allowed to recommence operations." Lord Northbrook is not the man we take him to be if he will risk the raising of such a ghost as that.—*Jan.* 29, 1874.

KISHENGHUR AND FUTTEHGHUR:

SUZERAIN AND VASSAL.

AS we anticipated, the State of Kishenghur is not the offender which has caused the despatch of a force from Agra. On the contrary, it appears to be on behalf of the State in question that British interference has been exercised. It seems that ever since 1845 there have been differences between the Maharajah of Kishenghur and the Thakoor of Futtehghur, and that by 1872 they assumed such a form as to demand a settlement. The chief grounds of dispute are (1) the tenure on which the Futtehghur estate is held, and (2) the relative status of the two parties. The Maharajah, on the one hand, contends that the estate is not held other than as an ordinary jaghire; that the Thakoor is in every respect a dependant of his Durbar; and that as such he has a right to receive from him due performance of the duties of allegiance. The Thakoor, on the other hand, maintains his independence of the Maharajah and his Durbar; that his estate was not conferred in jaghire, but was bestowed on his ancestors as a *share* of the *raj*, conferring on them perfect equality with the Maharajah, the same sovereign powers, and the right to sit with him on the same cushion in Durbar.

The conflicting claims were investigated by Colonel Beynon, the Political Agent at Jeypore, when, we are told, a considerable amount of contradictory evidence was forthcoming on either side; while, strangely enough, the *sunnud* (deed) by which the estate was, in the first instance, granted, and the very document of all others that might have thrown light on the subject, was not produced, and is said to be lost. Neither the original nor a copy can be found, and the reasons assigned for such an extraordinary circumstance are declared to be far from satisfactory on either side. Although the Thakoor's proofs of independence fall far short of the preponderance of evidence in favour of his Suzerain, it is Colonel Beynon's opinion that the distinctive rights and privileges which have been enjoyed by the Chiefship from the time that this branch of the Kishenghur family have been in possession, denote a dependency of the higher order, and much above that of a jaghire in the more ordinary acceptation of the term. Nevertheless the Political Agent has given it as his opinion that, considering the whole of the circumstances, the Maharajah has acted with extreme moderation towards his vassal. Some time since His Highness expressed to Colonel Beynon his willingness to take the most lenient view of the past misconduct and contumacy of the Thakoor, and to treat him in every respect upon the same footing as younger branches of Rajpoot Chiefs similarly circumstanced in other parts of Rajpootana; in short, to accord him every possible privilege and indulgence consistent with the dignity and honour of his own position as Suzerain, excluding, we believe, the claim put forth by the Thakoor to sit on the same *Gadi* with the Maharajah.—*Feb.* 6, 1874.

THE VINCHUR CHIEF.

A LIVING LINK WITH THE DEAD PAST.

WE observe it mentioned in the local papers that the appeal recently preferred by the Chief of Vinchur to the Secretary of State has been disallowed. The case of this respected Deccan Sirdar may be briefly stated. His father, the Chief of Vinchur, was the standard-bearer of the Peishwa, who, after the battle of Kirkee, had a large part in the negotiations between the Peishwa and Sir John Malcolm. According to the testimony of that high authority, the Vinchurkar had a great share in inducing the Peishwa to yield to the terms offered by the British Government. He was at this time in the enjoyment and incumbency of a military *saranjam* worth some twelve lakhs of rupees per annum; but on the dissolution of the Peishwa authority, a larger part of this lapsed to the British Government. But he possessed also a personal jaghire, then valued at Rs. 58,000; and this was ordered to be hereditarily continued by the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone when he settled Deccan affairs. But some doubt or dispute afterwards arose as to this personal *saranjam*, and the Court of Directors, under imperfect information, ruled to divide the jaghire into two portions at the present Chief's death—one to be absorbed in the British revenues, and the remainder to be split up amongst his brothers and their descendants. The Chief has subsequently been enabled to show abundant testimony to the value of the

services rendered by his father, and also as to the more ancient origin of his personal *tynat* or jaghire; and it is on these grounds that he has besought the Secretary of State to reverse the old decision and allow the *saranjam* to be continued as a whole to the heir he desires to adopt. It is this prayer which the Secretary of State has just refused to grant. The case is one that naturally excites much interest, particularly amongst the older families of Deccan Sirdars. Whether there may still be some way open to the Chief to obtain the privilege which he considers his just right, we do not know; that remains to be seen. —*Aug.* 23, 1879.*

II.—Here is a loyal offer from one of our Deccan Chiefs, which was recently forwarded in due form to the Agent for Sirdars:—

I heard with deep regret of the horrible slaughter of the new British Resident at the Court of the Ameer of Kabul, with his escort, consisting of about seventy-five men; and now I hear nothing but bustle throughout India of mighty preparation that is being made to inflict condign punishment upon the actual murderers of the said officer, &c., and to exact a memorable retribution from those who have hitherto acted so perfidiously against the British Power.

Thinking that, as the chief representative of a military Chieftain, and a loyal and faithful subject of Her Majesty the most Glorious Empress of India, it becomes me, nay, it is my bounden duty on this emergency to wear away my person in their cause, I beg to volunteer my service to Government in the great expedition which is to be soon made against Afghanistan.

I trust you will be pleased to bring this, my profter, to the kind notice of Government, and inform me of their orders on it.—I have, &c.,

Vinchur, 29th Sept., 1879. R. V. VINCHURKAR.

We believe that this worthy Chief has not had so much as a troop of sowars left to him. Nevertheless it is an incident of political interest to see the descendant of the Peishwa's standard-bearer and son of the last Chief who adhered to that infatuated Prince but who also did invaluable service in carrying through the negotiations with Sir John Malcolm, thus come forward. Should Colonel John Watson, who has just returned, be called upon to marshal another Contingent from the native States, he might do well to have the Vinchur Chief on his staff.—*Oct.* 25, 1879.

A POLITICO-FISCAL DIFFICULTY.

FORCING BRITISH TAXATION ON NATIVE STATES.

IN our No. 47 (Oct. 25th) we described the "Politico-Fiscal Difficulty" which has been created in Kattiawar in the attempt to force on the native States of that province the "imperial" policy by which the Government of India is striving to extend its fiscal operations into foreign territory. . . . The paramount Power demands that the condiment essential to life shall be made as dear to the people of native, as of British India, and that its fiscal authority shall prevail within native States where salt is produced. Sufficient has been said to show the hardship and unreasonableness of this oppressive policy. Its political impropriety was also touched upon, and the high-handedness shown by the Political officers who have charge of the negotiations was exposed.

It is now desirable to go somewhat further into the political aspect proper of this episode; for we seem to be travelling so fast down the declivity of "imperialism," that many of our administrators, even some in high position, seem to be rapidly forgetting the modern history of India. . . . It would be a sorry state of affairs if the British Government of these days were now to carry out an oppressive and overreaching policy which, when it was truly imperial, though under humble guise, it forbade one of its strongest allies to attempt. Again in 1834, after the treaties and engagements for the suppression of infanticide in the province had been agreed to and were proclaimed, the Bombay Government, in re-guaranteeing the Chiefs their internal sovereignties and possessions, recorded—"It is the sincere wish of Government that they should continue to enjoy them and all their privileges and immunities free from molestation."

Coming to more recent times, there was a notable instance of authoritative declaration of the independence of the Kattiawar Chiefs and the autonomy of their States. This was in 1864, by the Secretary of State (then Sir Charles Wood), and it was

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* This and the remaining extracts of the present Section are from the *Bombay Review*.

made, if we mistake not, in deprecation of some insinuating scheme of our local Government, the immediate object of which we forget. There is no mistake as to the force and scope of the Secretary of State's avowals on that occasion. He reminded Sir Bartle Frere and his colleagues that the Chiefs of Kattiawar had received formal assurance that their rights should be respected, and that, in 1858, the Home Government "had repudiated the opinion that the province of Kattiawar was British territory and its inhabitants British subjects." He added: "It has been our aim not to undermine their (the Chiefs') authority and independence, nor to undertake the internal administration of the province." Then follows a deliberate and comprehensive declaration which ought, one would think, to have precluded any such coarse encroachment as that now attempted: "Her Majesty's Government have no desire to claim any more direct and formal sovereignty than has thus [by the co-operation and concurrence of the Chiefs] been exercised since our first connection with Kattiawar, nor to impose British laws and regulations on the Chiefs of the province." Again, so recently as within the period of the present Viceroyalty, similar propositions have been laid down by the Legal Member of the Supreme Executive. . . . The Hon. Mr. Hobhouse repudiated the vague notion that "Kattiawar had become part and parcel of British India." He said this was not the case. "All that has been done [by British officers] has been done by and in combination with the Chieftains; laws made for British India have never operated in Kattiawar." He added that—as we have already stated—"the Secretary of State in Council had formally decided that Kattiawar was not part of British India." This political fact is, indeed, plain enough. Yet, in defiance of it, the Revenue officers concerned in pushing through their fiscal scheme seem as if they would, by sub-legal and furtive means, treat Kattiawar as "part of British India," and its Chiefs as so many small zemindars, subject to the *jo hukum* of much mofussilised Collectors. It is scarcely needful to adduce further authorities on this subject; but we would refer those who desire to pursue it further to the report of observations by the Hon. T. C. Hope, in the Supreme Legislative Council, on the same occasion as that just mentioned. Speaking partly on the bases of local knowledge, he went into the subject more thoroughly than the Law Member had done. Through documentary history and an array of facts well known, he traced the political evolution of the Kattiawar princedoms, clearly establishing their autonomous quality and local sovereignty. One form of this deduction Mr. Hope thus expressed: "He thought that, in point of fact, a careful scrutiny of the leading documents of those days (17th and 18th centuries) could not lead to any conclusion other than that the whole of the territory was as completely foreign territory as that of the Nizam or the Gaekwar of Baroda." He proceeded to point out in effect that although, as paramount Power, the British Government had power of extraneous control, and the prerogative to intervene to preserve internal order, it could not therefrom claim any right to meddle with the jurisdiction of the Chiefs, or interfere with their fiscal policy. He characterised it as "a fundamental error to suppose" the contrary of this.

Now the question is, will the Government of India dare to persist in this "fundamental error," or uphold the irresponsible Revenue officers of the Bombay Government in such persistence? The maintenance and extension of the salt revenue may be a sacred object in the eyes of Sir John Strachey and his emissaries, or *protégés*, our too zealous Revenue officers; but that object is, at best, a mere money question and a departmental detail. It is not, surely, for a shortsighted policy or sordid end like this that we are to indulge in "unwarrantable usurpation," or permit subordinate Revenue officers—though supported by Political Agents who forget their proper and impartial functions—to encroach on political rights that are older than our own, and thus discredit treaties which are as needful to our legitimate title of paramountry as they are to the States of which they are the imperial charters. We have not heard what has been done during these last few weeks in the matter of these Kattiawar Chiefs' salt revenues, but it is clear to us that, however quietly or determinedly these encroachments may be pushed on, they will not bear daylight discussion—still less will the method in which they have been promoted (as explained by us in our former article) be approved by the higher authorities. We are not aware how far the local Government is committed to the support of this political raid; but not even the great prestige of Sir Richard Temple would avail to avert Parliamentary censure when these furtively conducted but high-handed proceedings come to be exposed in that arena.—*Nov.* 29, 1879.

INDIAN POLITICAL CAUSES AND APPEALS.

WE are glad to observe that Lord Stanley of Alderley is to bring the subject of "Indian Appeals" before an early meeting of the East India Association. The system of Judicial Appeals to the Privy Council appears to have gone on with tolerable smoothness in recent years. This may be partly attributed to the more harmonious working of the District and High Courts in India; also to the more scientific character which, since the time of Sir Henry Maine, has been acquired by the "law in India." . . .

But we opine that Lord Stanley's concern is more with regard to Indian Political appeals—a subject which is very imperfectly understood amongst politicians and journalists at home. His lordship, thanks to his public spirit and praiseworthy exertions on behalf of political appellants who have found themselves treated with contumely by the India Office, must be fully informed on this somewhat occult branch of Anglo-Indian administration as viewed from the home side. . . . The real and grave difficulty is with regard to appeals and memorials in this country—the India of the Rajahs, of which the Anglo-Indian press still knows comparatively little. We wish some one would write the natural history of the system under which appeals in and from native States have to struggle. There the Political Agent is judge, jury, and paramount power rolled into one. In some instances experience does give these all-powerful officers some tinge of the judicial faculty, when they have it not by nature and training; but, at the best, their anomalous jurisdiction, free from the salutary restraints of judicial forms, is often little better than a scrambling arena where the strongest, loudest, or wealthiest claimants have by far the best chance. Then, when the baffled suitor essays to appeal to the local Government, he is environed with obstacles at every step. . . . Then the suitor's prayers and evidence have to pass through that complicated mill called "the Governor in Council"—the driving wheel of which for this purpose is the Political Secretary or Under Secretary for the time. When these officers happen to be at once conscientious and capable of getting through lots of work, then the weaker appellants from native States have hope of justice being done to them under his Excellency's order. Even then, if the order should be contrary to the wish or preconceived opinion of the Political Agent, the chances are against its being carried out. We speak here of the suitors who happen to be weaker in personal influence or political status. The strong, prosperous, and favoured can generally get their appeal. In cases when the appellant fails to get satisfaction either from the Political Agent or Governor in Council, and resolves to represent his case to the Secretary of State or Governor-General, he again finds his way further hedged up. He may be able to show a case which would at once carry conviction before an impartial judge or in open court; but these are not the conditions under which he can approach either of the two principal representatives of Her Majesty. His memorial will, indeed, be forwarded—though not without delay and under certain rigid restrictions as to date of the case arising—but the suitor's case will go to Westminster or Simla heavily weighted with all the Political Agent, the Governor in Council, or any of his colleagues may desire to record against it; this, too, in addition to what the stronger or more influential suitor may have piled up against it to hide the true issue in question.

That under these circumstances justice is occasionally done by the Secretary of State or Governor-General on behalf of weak appellants who have right on their side, speaks very highly for the strength of the sentiment of British justice and fair dealing which cannot always be stifled under the cumbrous procedure and secret processes that are devised to discourage political appellants. We have gone more into detail than we intended—though only touching the outline of this curious recondite branch of British Indian administration—but have done so in order that the good Lord of Alderley may be forewarned his task is only beginning. There is also in this Presidency one partial exception to this purely bureaucratic and secretive procedure in political or quasi-political cases to which we should draw attention. We refer to the institution known as the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in Kattiawar, of which (at present) Mr. Edward Candy is the able and impartial Judge or President. In that arena there is the inestimable safeguard of open proceedings and publicity. Lord Stanley, or others who seek to promote the urgently needed reform of our secret political procedure, would do well to call for and study the history of that special Judicial Court in Kattiawar, which, notwithstanding the impediments that often thwart its free operation, has afforded invaluable relief in that province.—*April* 10, 1880.

A Special Tribunal Required.

II.—The subject and proposal now revived by Lord Stanley's paper really cover some of the most specially test questions of Indian political administration. Perhaps it may here be as well to repeat—what seems difficult to get understood even in the Indian Press itself—that this proposal has nothing whatever to do with our judicial procedure, or the "grievances" of which our Courts now take cognisance. It refers to wrongs and rights which are expressly excluded from open judicial procedure, and so excluded—under the phrase only too familiar to Indian politicians—of the "political plea." This plea is the potent legend under which the Indian bureaucracy, alike under Company and Crown, have refused, and still determinedly refuse, to allow their executive *en camera* decisions regarding "political cases," big or little, to be treated by open judicial methods and by "deputies that implead one another." In our remarks on this subject on April 10th (only very partially referred to by Lord Stanley in opening his paper*), we described carefully, but only too concisely, how the "Star Chamber" system, which it is proposed to supersede, works in this country up to the time when the despairing Chief or tribulated jaghirdar resolves on further appeal—under similar adverse conditions and one-sided investigation—to that secret and autocratic tribunal known as the Secretary of State in Council. . . . . .

To revert to the essay before us. We observe that the *Englishman* of the 13th—after noticing, as we did, the rather imperfect form in which the scope of the argument was defined—gives the following lucid statement of the object aimed at:—

> These Indian grievances refer solely to the grievances of native Princes and Chiefs, who are of more or less independent standing, against the Government of India. In the case of such Princes and Chiefs feeling themselves aggrieved by the Government, according to the present procedure, the Government decides the matter itself. Lord Stanley declares that it is unseemly and unjust that the interested party should also be the Judge. He therefore proposes that a permanent Court should be appointed with the exclusive duty of dealing with disputes between the Government of India and the many semi-independent States in this country. Questions of disputed succession, questions of boundary, and all matters in which a native State on the one side and the Government of India on the other were concerned, could be decided impartially by this independent and high tribunal.

The remainder of the *Englishman's* short article is well worthy of perusal, being clear in statement and liberal in tone. But the question is a very large one indeed, and we desire to take this opportunity of giving two or three references that may be serviceable to those who desire to follow it up. The project of instituting a Political Court, with open procedure, for and in India, has been advocated by many writers on Indian politics, and was, we believe, once formally brought before the Court of Directors. So far as we remember, the best thought out proposal of the kind was one by the late Iltudus Prichard. It was placed by him before the East India Association in January, 1870, when it gave rise to very instructive discussion, which was renewed, on somewhat more specific bases, in May of the same year. The former passages will be found in Part 1, Vol. iv., of the Association's *Journal;* and the renewed debate in Part 3 of the same volume. Several persons of great Indian experience, some of them eminent men, took part in those discussions, the record of which thus form a valuable contribution to British-Indian political science. On the latter occasion General Le Grand Jacob sent a characteristic letter in which, to some extent, he criticised Mr. Prichard's proposals, and mentioned certain circumstances that sometimes modify the usual rigid and autocratic nature of the present secret executive procedure. Major Evans Bell, than whom no writer on this subject is better qualified to discuss it, interpolated certain specific points relating to its juridical aspects, and quoted a telling passage from one of Sir Bartle Frere's Minutes in his better days. Thus ample materials are available for examination of this project of a Court of Political Causes for India; and it is to be hoped, now the question is re-opened, that means will be taken to push it forward to some practical result.—*July* 17, 1880.

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* The paper by Lord Stanley of Alderley, referred to above, together with report of the discussion thereon, is published in Part 2, Vol. xiii., of the *East India Association Journal.* The following papers also throw much light on this subject—one that still awaits the hand of some masterly Anglo-Indian reformer: "The Silent Chamber at Whitehall," by William Tayler, Part 1, Vol. vii.; "A Privy Council for India," by Major Evans Bell, Part 5, Vol. ix.

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